Downsizing is a process whereby human relations management emerges as a critical skill in its effective management. This paperis about perceptions of employees of a small-sized Turkish firm who survived successive downsizing decisions. It was found that downsizing affected the organizational justice-related perceptions of survivors. The questionnaire used to explore organizational justice-related perceptions involved three dimensions and was developed by Saunders and Thornhill (1999). Procedural, interactional and distributive justice-related perceptions of survivors were influenced by the way management handled the process. (...) Management credibility, communication and commitment were other variables studied. The findings supported the view that downsizing not only affects the victims but also the survivors. (shrink)

This book explores the central questions and themes lying at the heart of a vibrant area of philosophical inquiry. Aligning core issues in psychiatry with traditional philosophical areas, it presents a focused overview of the historical and contemporary problems dominating the philosophy of psychiatry. -/- Beginning with an introduction to research issues, it addresses what psychiatry is and distinguishes it from other areas of medical practice, other health care professions and psychology. With each section of the companion corresponding to a (...) philosophical subject, contributors systematically relate themes in philosophy of psychiatry to topics in philosophy of mind, phenomenology, philosophy of science, ethics, social and political philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of medicine. Looking ahead to new research directions, chapters address recent issues including the metaphysics of mental disorders, gender and race in psychiatry and psychiatric ethics. -/- Featuring discussion questions, suggestions for further reading and an annotated bibliography, The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry is an accessible survey of the debates and developments in the field suitable for undergraduates in philosophy and professional philosophers new to philosophy of psychiatry. (shrink)

Recent advances in brain imaging methods as well as increased sophistication in neuroscientific modeling of the brain’s reward systems have facilitated the study of neural mechanisms associated with addiction such as processes associated with motivation, decision-making, pleasure seeking, and inhibitory control. These scientific activities have increased optimism that the neurological underpinnings of addiction will be delineated, and that pharmaceuticals that target and change these mechanisms will by themselves facilitate early intervention and even full recovery. In this paper, we argue that (...) it is misguided to construe addiction as just or primarily a brain chemistry problem, which can be adequately treated by pharmaceutical interventions alone. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article discusses the Celtic myths, figures, and central themes of Tomm Moore’s animated movie Song of the Sea, from a transmodern feminist perspective. While the movie offers a vivid portrayal of the dichotomy between the tranquil Irish countryside and the turbulent city of Dublin, its main theme revolves around a rural family’s lament for the loss of the mother who is a modern-day personification of the Celtic selkie. This curious female figure embodies contradictory characteristics: she is semi-human and (...) at the same time a mother and a wife who, in struggling with her in-between state, leaves her family and returns to her mythical roots. By focusing on several of the Celtic mythical figures and central themes of maternal loss, motherhood, gender relations, and family reconciliation, I attempt to show that the movie’s transmodern echoes and concerns suggest that alternative family formations and changed gender roles are possible in Irish society and in the world more generally. (shrink)

Aristotle (b. 322 BC) was the first philosopher in the history of thought to examine all modes and types of belief acquisition such as knowledge, supposition, error and indirectly imagination. In his _Prior Analytics_, which he wrote primarily to clarify his theory of demonstration, Aristotle examined in detail the syllogism, which he saw as the most important form of reasoning, and his analysis was subject to interpretation by different traditions of thought for centuries. Aristotle’s _Prior Analytics_ was translated into Arabic (...) in the classical period and later interpreted by many Islamic logicians. This article aims to show how Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism in the _Prior Analytics_ was taken up and interpreted in the Peripatetic Islamic logical tradition. These interpretations of the definition of the syllogism will provide us with an idea about the unique features of the commentaries on the _Prior Analytics_ in the Islamic world. Here, introductory information about the translation of the _Prior Analytics_ into Arabic and its commentators in Arabic will be given, Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism and its versions in Peripatetic Islamic logicians will be indicated, and the interpretation of the basic terms in the definition by Peripatetic Islamic logicians will be revealed. (shrink)

J.C. Nyíri’s work is well-known for his interpretation of Wittgenstein as a conservative thinker. Nevertheless, his reading of Wittgenstein is only one strand, even if presumably the most influential one, in his general interpretation of Austro-Hungarian philosophy. Therefore his reading of Wittgenstein is best understood if viewed as part of a complex, sociologically inspired picture of Austrian philosophy. In this introductory essay I present Nyíri’s work as an exercise in the sociology of philosophical knowledge, broadly understood, and provide a unified (...) view on his attempt by exploring its various strands. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein repeatedly called religion and faith "madness", "folly", etc. However, this does not mean that he considered it irrational or meaningless. Rather, he saw in it a way of thinking and speaking, a “language-game”, that was not explicitly rational, but nevertheless meaningful, and in which there were “entirely different connections” than normal between individual statements. Nor can the language of faith be regarded as conventional, according to Wittgenstein, even if approached from the point of view of the nature of (...) the statements it contains. If, for example, we think that theological statements are factual statements (as if they refer only to existing things or objects), then this language immediately becomes meaningless. The aim of my study is to analyze the “grammar” of this language (the language of faith or religion), using Wittgenstein’s notes from different times, paragraphs of his published works, comments made during university lectures, etc., and to describe the correct use of words in it. Keywords: Wittgenstein, madness, religious faith, language-game. (shrink)

The paper attempts to reconstruct the intellectual frame- work of British liberal tradition focusing on two major problems of it, namely the problem of justice and that of political liberty. The liberal interpretation of justice is meant to tolerate all possible individual views of good life, consequently it cannot be established on one of them. This means that the interpretation of justice shouldn’t be derived from some philosophy, as any interpretation has its basis in the political tradition of modernity. Conse- (...) quently democracy always must have priority to philoso- phy (R. Rorty). On the matter of political liberty, Isaiah Berlin defends a “negative” concept of freedom, the freedom of choice without any pressure, while Ch. Taylor sustains the Positive one. The debate between defenders of negative and positive freedom seeks the answer for a question formulated for the first time by John Stuart Mill: why individuals - even if they are free - act usually rational? (shrink)

This study explored the unique effect of fathers’ parenting behaviors and the quality of co-parenting described as the degree of consistency between paternal and maternal parenting behaviors on children’s academic self-efficacy. The power of both pancultural parenting behaviors and specific parenting controlling behaviors that are relatively common in Turkish culture in predicting academic self-efficacy was tested. A total of 1,931 children completed measures of parenting behaviors and academic self-efficacy in math and literature courses in their school. Overall, girls reported higher (...) levels of literature self-efficacy, whereas boys reported higher levels of math self-efficacy. Compared to boys, girls perceived higher levels of positive parenting behaviors from both their fathers and mothers. The results of the regression analyses showed that, whereas father warmth had stronger effects on boys’ math self-efficacy, mother warmth had stronger effects on girls’ literature self-efficacy. Examination of the effects of co-parenting quality demonstrated that children with positively consistent parents reported the highest level of academic self-efficacy, whereas those having negatively consistent parents had the lowest level of academic self-efficacy. Analyses on inconsistent co-parenting, however, yielded compensatory effects, which were similar to positively consistent parents, and deterioration effects, which were similar to negatively consistent parents depending on the gender of parent and child, domain of parenting behavior, and academic efficacy. This study contributed to the current literature by showing the unique role of fathers over and beyond mothers, and confirmed the importance of positive parenting and parenting consistency in promoting children’s academic efficacy. Cultural and practical implications of the findings were discussed. (shrink)

The paper contrasts Robert Brandom’s account of rationality with that of Daniel Dennett. It argues that neither of them is tenable, and sketches an alternative outlook that avoids the problems. In spite of their fundamental differences, both Brandom and Dennett employ a robust, i.e. explanatory and predictive notion of rationality, and for different reasons they both fail to offer a plausible theory supporting it. The lesson offered here is that rationality should not be treated alongside other norms prescribing behaviour, as (...) it cannot be accounted for in the same terms. Instead of ascribing rationality a robust role in a philosophical understanding of behaviour, it should be assigned a more modest one: its function should be located not in the context of explaining and predicting behaviour, but in the context of narratives folk psychological interpretation offers. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to describe what we see as several important new directions for philosophy of medicine. This recent work (i) takes existing discussions in important and promising new directions, (ii) identifies areas that have not received sufficient and deserved attention to date, and/or (iii) brings together philosophy of medicine with other areas of philosophy (including bioethics, philosophy of psychiatry, and social epistemology). To this end, the next part focuses on what we call the “epistemological turn” in (...) recent work in the philosophy of medicine; the third part addresses new developments in medical research that raise interesting questions for philosophy of medicine; the fourth part is a discussion of philosophical issues within the practice of diagnosis; the fifth part focuses on the recent developments in psychiatric classification and scientific and ethical issues therein, and the final part focuses on the objectivity of medical research. (shrink)

In this paper, the scientific realism/anti-realism debate, which is one of the most popular topics in the metaphysics of science, will be examined in supporting the realistic wing. In this respect, the discussion will be conducted by keeping the subjects of ‘existence of an external mind-independent world’ and ‘unobservable entities’ at the center of this paper. In the context of understanding the world, ‘Science’ activity is not the sum of the research carried out only by considering empirical data; on the (...) contrary, it will be claimed that it is an endeavor that pursues unknown but interesting things (such as protons, photons, or viruses) and tries to give meaning to the world. Thus, against the empirical rigid attitude of anti-realism –bearing in mind the views of logical positivists; it will be illustrated that scientific realism is an understanding based on metaphysics and has a philosophical basis. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to explore Lewis’s best system analysis and how it can accommodate laws with exceptions. The Best System Account has been introduced to provide an alternative view for both minimalist and counterfactual theories of regularities. Simple regularity theory faces problems in which there is some generalization that seems to be a law or some regularities that are established accidentally. It tries to exclude the accidental generalization from the account. However, the best system analysis can solve the (...) problem of how to distinguish between laws and accidents. (shrink)

Mehmet Kaplan ve Nihad Sâmi Banarlı’nın kültürel kimlikle ilgili görüşlerini inceleyen bu çalışma yakın dönem Türk tarihinde kültürel kimlik düşüncesinin değişim sürecinin anlaşılmasına katkı sunmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçla 1940’lardan 1980’lere uzanan ve birer seçki niteliği taşıyan, Mehmet Kaplan’ın Kültür ve Dil, Nihad Sâmi Banarlı’nın ise Türkçenin Sırları adlı eserlerine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışmada Türkiye’de kimlik ve kültürle ilgili tartışmalar üzerinde kısaca durulmakta; Kaplan ve Banarlı’nın çalışmalarında kültürün konumundan söz edilmektedir. Ardından literatürden hareketle kültür ve kimlik kavramları ele alınmakta; Kaplan ve Banarlı’nın Türkiye’nin (...) kültürel kimliği algısı tartışılmaktadır. Kaplan ve Banarlı’nın kültürel kimlikte dil ve edebiyata nasıl yer verdikleri dil, edebiyat ve kültür birlikteliği; Türkçe ve diğer diller; dilde tasfiyecilik ile edebî simalar ve Yahya Kemâl başlıkları altında incelenmektedir. Her iki yazarın da dil ve edebiyatı kültüre eşdeğer gördüğü, Türkçenin geleceği için geçmişinin iyi bilinmesi gereğine dikkat çektiği ifade edilmektedir. Kaplan ve Banarlı’nın dilde tasfiyecilikle ilgili görüşleri ise Atatürk’ün dile yaklaşımının süregelen etkileri, dile yönelik yanlış tutumların eleştirisi ve dile yaklaşımda sağlıklı olan yöntemin tespiti bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. Mehmet Kaplan ve Nihad Sâmi Banarlı’nın Türk diline ve Türk edebiyatına sahip çıkarak Türk kültürel kimliğini korumanın mümkün olduğunu düşündükleri gösterilmekte; incelenen eserlerin devlet kurumları, siyasetçiler, toplumun geneli ve özelde gençleri muhatap alarak harekete geçirmeyi hedeflediği iddia edilmektedir. (shrink)

Muammar b. Abbād al-Sulamī (d.215/830) was one of the most influential figures of his time in terms of recognizing things and making sense of the changes in the universe, which occupies an important place in Islamic thought. Muammar, who was a Basra Mu'tazilite, appears especially with his naturalistic ideas. What makes him stand out is that he also embraced atomism. Although the atomist conception was of foreign origin, the theologians revised it according to their theological views. This view was also (...) presented as a proof of God’s constant activity in the universe. Muammar, who also defined substance, body and accident, which are the basic concepts of kalam cosmology, influenced other theologians, especially with his definition of body. For Muammar, things have a nature. The body creates its accidents as a result of its own nature. Ultimately, in his thought, it is God who gives this nature to the body. Therefore, he accepts that the functioning of the universe takes place within the framework of the laws that God has set in the universe. This idea of Muammar’s about the nature of bodies is actually to demonstrate that the universe functions in a tremendous way in this way. The concept of māna, which is based on Muammar’s thought, occupies an important place at this point. With this concept, which is identified with the understanding of nature, he aimed to exclude the essence of God from the beings. In his view, this concept is also active when it comes to God’s attributes. For him, that’s why God is the wise and the powerful by means of the knowledge and the power that He possesses through the māna. According to Muammar, māna means cause. He argues that the separation of a moving object from an immobile object is the result of a māna. Therefore, objects are also differentiated from each other through a māna. A māna can exist with a māna, which brings forth the idea of the infinity of māna. However, the infinity of māna does not mean the infinity of things. Muammar’s most criticized point is the nature of objects and the fact that they undergo change as a result of this nature, that is, they create their accidents. In this case, the concept of continuous re-creation, which is generally accepted in theology, does not fit Muammar’s system. For Muammar, there is a system based on cause and effect. Although there are criticisms that this relationship he defended belongs to a strict determinist approach, in fact, it can be said that he was concerned with excluding God from situations that take place on the plane of time and space, such as movement and change. Compared to other contemporary theologians who held naturalistic views like him, Muammar’s justification of nature on the basis of māna sets him apart from the others. (shrink)

Özet Kuzey Kıbrıs emek piyasası üzerine yapılan çalışmalar, toplumsal cinsiyet temelli mesleki ayrışmayı kadının işgücüne düşük katılımını etkileyen en önemli sebeplerden biri olarak tespit etmiştir. Bu çalışma 11 yıl içerisinde bu tespitten yola çıkarak Kuzey Kıbrıs emek piyasasındaki mesleki ayrışmanın büyüklüğünü, zaman içerisindeki değişimini ve bu değişimin kaynaklarını araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.Ayrışma, Hanehalkı İşgücü Anketi verileri kullanılarak 9 ana mesleki grup için genel, kırsal ve kensel bölgelerde ölçülmüştür. Çalışma bulguları, tüm bölgelerde toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı mesleki ayrışmanın yüksek ve yaygın olduğunu göstermiştir. İndeksin (...) ayrıştırılması artan ayrışmanın temel sebebinin net ayrışmadan, yani bireysel meslekler içindeki kadın erkek oranında meydana gelen değişmeden, kaynaklandığını göstermiştir. Yüksek ve yaygın olan mesleki toplumsal cinsiyet ayrışmasının, emek piyasasının kadın ve erkek meslekleri olarak katmanlaşmasına sebep olduğu, bunun da kadının meslek grupları arasında hareketinin kısıtlanmasına yol açarak işgücüne katılımını olumsuz etkilediği sonucuna varılmıştır. (shrink)

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant invokes the moral law as an underived fact of reason. The aim of this article is to explore the highly debated role of the fact of reason and the nature of this fact, which apparently defies the senses of actuality commonly associated with empirical facts and objective entities. Following David Sussman's interpretation, I argue that the fact of reason not only marks the abandonment of deduction of the moral law but illustrates that the (...) failure to ground the moral law does not undermine its unconditional authority. Therefore, I claim that rather than signifying a methodological maneuver to get out of the circle that Kant admits to be entrapped, it operates as immanent, dynamic and an aporetic facticity. This perspective allows seeing its heuristic function for keeping intact the aporia that structures morality and offers away of coming into the circle of morality. (shrink)

What are mental states? When we talk about people’s beliefs or desires, are we talking about what is happening inside their heads? If so, might cognitive science show that we are wrong? Might it turn out that mental states do not exist? Mental fictionalism offers a new approach to these longstanding questions about the mind. Its core idea is that mental states are useful fictions. When we talk about mental states, we are not formulating hypotheses about people’s inner machinery. Instead, (...) we simply talk "as if" people had certain inner states, such as beliefs or desires, in order to make sense of their behaviour. This is the first book dedicated to exploring mental fictionalism. Featuring contributions from established authors as well as up-and-coming scholars in this burgeoning field, the book reveals the exciting potential of a fictionalist approach to the mind, as well as the challenges it faces. In doing so, it offers a fresh perspective on foundational debates in the philosophy of mind, such as the nature of mental states and folk psychology, as well as hot topics in the field, such as embodied cognition and mental representation. Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations essential reading for advanced undergraduates, postgraduates and professionals alike. (shrink)

his article develops a set of recommendations for the psychiatric and medical community in the treatment of mental disorders in response to the recently published fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, that is, DSM-5. We focus primarily on the limitations of the DSM-5 in its individuation of Complicated Grief, which can be diagnosed as Major Depression under its new criteria, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). We argue that the hyponarrativity of the descriptions of these disorders (...) in the DSM-5, defined as the abstraction of the illness categories from the particular life contingencies and personal identity of the patient (e.g., age, race, gender, socio-economic status), constrains the DSM-5's usefulness in the development of psychotherapeutic approaches in the treatment of mental disorders. While the DSM-5 is useful in some scientific and administrative contexts, the DSM's hyponarrativity is problematic, we argue, given that the DSMs are designed to be useful guides for not only scientific research, but also for the education of medical practitioners and for treatment development. our goal therefore is to offer suggestions for mental health practitioners in using the DSM-5, so that they can avoid or eliminate the problems that may stem from the limitations of hyponarrativity. When such problems are eliminated, we believe that effective psychotherapeutic strategies can be developed, which would be successful in repairing the very relationships that are strained in mental disorder: the patient's relationship to herself, her physical environment, and her social environment. (shrink)

Advances in applications of artificial intelligence and the use of data analytics technology in biomedicine are creating optimism, as many believe these technologies will fill the need-availability gap by increasing resources for mental health care. One resource considered especially promising is smartphone psychotherapy chatbots, i.e., artificially intelligent bots that offer cognitive behavior therapy to their users with the aim of helping them improve their mental health. While a number of studies have highlighted the positive outcomes of using smartphone psychotherapy chatbots (...) to handle various anxiety related problems no conclusive data illustrate their effectiveness or warrant their use in mental illness diagnosis and treatment settings. Yet smartphone psychotherapy is highly endorsed by experts in the field of mental health research. In this paper, I focus on the specific features of smartphone psychotherapy chatbots intended for the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness and criticize three popular promises; i.e., they enable early diagnosis and intervention through digital phenotyping; they defy the stigma of mental illness diagnosis and treatment; they offer increased access to mental health treatment globally. Going against the popular enthusiasm, I argue smartphone psychotherapy chatbots have epistemic and ethical limitations in the diagnosis and treatment of illnesses. In light of these, I encourage researchers, clinicians, policy makers, patients, and caregivers to pause before jumping on the artificial intelligence bandwagon to seek solutions for mental illness on the grounds of these three promises. (shrink)

For Jerry Fodor, Hume’sTreatise of Human Natureis “the foundational document of cognitive science” whose significance transcends mere historical interest: it is a source of theoretical inspiration in cognitive psychology. Here I am going to argue that those reading Hume along Fodor’s lines rely on a problematic, albeit inspiring, construction of Hume’s science of mind. My strategy in this paper is to contrast Fodor’s understanding of the Humean mind (consonant with the widely received view of Hume in both cognitive science and (...) much of Hume scholarship) with an alternative understanding that I propose. I thereby intend to show that the received view of Hume’s science of mind can be fruitfully revised while critically engaging with Fodor’s contemporary appropriation. Consequently, I use this occasion to put forward a rather unorthodox interpretation of Hume’s theory in dialogue with Fodor as my guide. (shrink)

This paper challenges the exclusion of patients from epistemic practices in psychiatry by examining the creation and revision processes of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), a document produced by the American Psychiatric Association that identifies the properties of mental disorders and thereby guides research, diagnosis, treatment, and various administrative tasks. It argues there are epistemic—rather than exclusively social/political—reasons for including patients in the DSM revision process. Individuals with mental disorders are indispensable resources to enhance psychiatric epistemology, (...) especially in the context of the crisis, controversy, and uncertainty surrounding mental health research and treatment. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists have advanced a plethora of explanations of the self in relation to narratives, positing varying degrees of connection between them. For some, narratives created by a subject about herself shape her self-constitution (Flanagan 1991; Fivush 1994). For others, they help the subject to participate in social cognition (Hutto 2008). Some represent narratives as merely one basis of personal identity and consider them cognitive tools used by the subject to construct self-concepts (Neisser 1997; Tekin 2011); others render (...) narratives the basis for self-constitution (Dennett 1992; MacIntyre 1981; Schechtman 1996). Some require that the subject create her ‘whole life narrative’ unifying her .. (shrink)

Mental disorder is an urgent and growing public health problem.1 Scientific investigation of this problem has the pragmatic goals of identifying the causes of mental disorders and developing strategies to effectively treat them. Philosophers of psychiatry have participated in the inquiry into the empirical examination of mental disorders, predominantly by debating whether psychopathology is a legitimate target of scientific inquiry and, if so, how mental disorders should be explained, predicted, and intervened on. However, as I show in this paper, these (...) philosophical discussions have mostly neglected the actual state of inquiry in psychiatry and relevant disciplines, as well as the first-person experiences... (shrink)

In this article I attempt to reconstruct David Hume's use of the label ?experimental? to characterise his method in the Treatise. Although its meaning may strike the present-day reader as unusual, such a reconstruction is possible from the background of eighteenth-century practices and concepts of natural inquiry. As I argue, Hume's inquiries into human nature are experimental not primarily because of the way the empirical data he uses are produced, but because of the way those data are theoretically processed. He (...) seems to follow a method of analysis and synthesis quite similar to the one advertised in Newton's Opticks, which profoundly influenced eighteenth-century natural and moral philosophy. This method brings him much closer to the methods of qualitative, chemical investigations than to mechanical approaches to both nature and human nature. (shrink)

Various traditions in mental health care, such as phenomenological, and existential and cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy, implicitly or explicitly acknowledge that a disruption of the self, or the person, or the agent is among the common denominators of different mental disorders. They often emphasize the importance of understanding patients as reasonsresponsive, in their full mental health relevant complexity, if their mental disorder is to be treated successfully. The centrality of the concept of the self is not mirrored in the mainstream scientific approaches (...) in psychiatry however; the self has rarely been considered as the object of scientific research, the empirical investigation of which might yield successful explanations of and interventions in mental disorders. Thus, even though self-related phenomena are clinically relevant in so far as they give important information about a mental disorder to the clinician and help the development of effective interventions, they are not considered among the scientifically relevant properties of mental disorders. Leaving the self-related phenomena out of the scientific research on mental disorders can be attributed to the presupposition that the self is not empirically tractable and its use will hinder psychiatry’s goal to be scientific. In this paper, taking issue with this, I argue the self is empirically tractable, and its use as a target of research will not hinder psychiatry’s scientific commitments. (shrink)

This paper explores the factors that contribute to the degree of a mood disorder patient’s self- insight, defined here as her understanding of the particular contingencies of her life that are responsive to her personal identity, interpersonal relationships, illness symptoms, and the relationship between these three necessary components of her lived experience. I consider three factors: (i) the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), (ii) the DSM culture, and (iii) the cognitive architecture of the self. I argue that the (...) symptom-based descriptions of mood disorders which eliminate the subjective features of the patient’s illness experience, in conjunction with the features of the DSM-culture and the cognitive biases that guide the patient, contribute to the impoverishment of her self-insight. The resulting impoverished self-insight would prevent her from developing resourceful responses to her interpersonal problems. In analyzing how these factors combine to influence the patient’s self-insight, I distinguish the therapeutic impact of receiving a psychiatric diagnosis, which facilitates patient’s clinical treatment, from its reflective impact, how the diagnosis informs the patient’s reflection on who she is, how her mental disorder is expressed, and how her interpersonal relationships proceed. I substantiate my argument by considering a patient’s memoir of psychopathology. (shrink)

, Looping Effects, the Self, Psychopathology.

This paper sketches a recently emerging divide between two interpretations of Hume's methodology and philosophy of science. On the first interpretation Hume relies on an inductive methodology and provides a dynamic theory of the mind, and his philosophy of science reflects this methodology. On the second, Hume relies on inferences to the best explanation via comparative analysis of instances, and offers an anatomy of the mind relying on a chemical and organic imagery. The paper also aspires to lean the reader's (...) sympathies toward the latter interpretation while outlining some of its potential consequences for the character of Hume's psychology, the limits of associationism, and his empiricism. (shrink)

Current philosophical reflections on science have departed from mainstream history of science with respect to both methodology and conclusions. The article investigates how different approaches to reconstructing commitments can explain these differences and facilitate a mutual understanding and communication of these two perspectives on science. Translating the differences into problems pertaining to principles of charity, the paper offers a platform for clarification and resolution of the differences between the two perspectives. The outlined contextual approach occupies a middle ground between mainstream (...) history and sociology of science, bracketing questions of rationality, and individual coherence-maximizing, rationality-centered approaches. It can satisfy those, who believe that science is an epistemically privileged endeavor, and its epistemic content should not be neglected when reconstructing the scientists’ positions. It can also satisfy those who hold that it is naive to believe that the immediate context, e.g. the challenges to a theory, the expectations of the author about his audience, etc., does not affect the position a scientist takes. Its theoretical considerations are exemplified with a close study of the debate following the 1672 publication of Newton's theory of light and colours, also offering a novel reading of the development of his methodological views concerning the demonstrativity of the famous crucial experiment. Although we only show the capacity of the framework to analyze a direct controversy, given that it is hard to think about any scientific text as detached from an argumentative context, this approach has the potential to be a general guide for interpretation. (shrink)

When there have been substantial failures by institutional leadership in their oversight responsibility to protect research integrity, the public should demand that these be recognized and addressed by the institution itself, or the funding bodies. This commentary discusses a case of research failures in developing genomic predictors for cancer risk assessment and treatment at a leading university. In its review of this case, the Office of Research Integrity, an agency within the US Department of Health and Human Services, focused their (...) report entirely on one individual faculty member and made no comment on the institution’s responsibility and its failure to provide adequate oversight and investigation. These actions missed an important opportunity to emphasize the institution’s critical responsibilities in oversight of research integrity and the importance of institutional transparency and accountability. (shrink)

Mathematics for Hume is the exemplary field of demonstrative knowledge. Ideally, this knowledge is a priori as it arises only from the comparison of ideas without any further empirical input; it is certain because demonstration consist of steps that are intuitively evident and infallible; and it is also necessary because the possibility of its falsity is inconceivable as it would imply a contradiction. But this is only the ideal, because demonstrative sciences are human enterprises and as such they are just (...) as fallible as their human practitioners. According to the reading suggested here, Hume develops a radical sceptical challenge for mathematics, and thereby he undermines the knowledge claims associated with demonstrative reasoning. But Hume does not stop there: he also offers resources for a sceptical solution to this challenge, one that appeals crucially to social practices, and sketches the social genealogy of a community-wide mathematical certainty. While explaining this process, he relies on the conceptual resources of his faculty psychology that helps him to distinguish between the metaphysics and practices of mathematical knowledge. His account explains why we have reasons to be dubious about our reasoning capacities, and also how human nature and sociability offers some remedy from these epistemic adversities. (shrink)

In “Mad Narratives: Self-Constitutions Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass,” by using narrative approaches to the self, I explore how the diagnosis of mental disorder shapes personal identities and influences flourishing. My particular focus is the diagnosis grounded on the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). I develop two connected accounts pertaining to the self and mental disorder. I use the memoirs and personal stories written by the subjects with a DSM diagnosis as illustrations to bolster (...) my claims. First, expanding on the narrative approaches to the self, I explain how narratives about a subject shape her self-constitution. I elucidate how this process is generated by drawing on research in developmental psychology, cognitive science, and social psychology. Next, using this account as a springboard, I argue that the DSM diagnosis of mental disorder serves as a source of narrative, entering into the patients’ autobiographical and social narratives. This plays an important role in the diagnosed subjects’ self-understanding, self-constitution and flourishing. In this vein, how mental disorders are classified is not only a theoretical question about accurately taxonomizing the various experiences related to mental distress but also an ethical question about which ways of talking about mental disorders will allow subjects to respond effectively to their psychological distress, to flourish and to live autonomous and fulfilling lives. Finally, I suggest that the DSM-based narratives wield a double-edged sword when it comes to the subject’s flourishing: On the one hand, there are problems with some DSM-based narratives that stem from the DSM diagnostic schema and the culture of DSM diagnoses. These problems render these DSM-based narratives unbeneficial for flourishing as they constrain the range of adoptive social, cognitive and emotional responses the subjects can give to their mental disorders. On the other hand, there are grounds to believe that some DSM-based narratives help subjects to flourish. For instance, they provide certainty to subjects' otherwise puzzling symptoms and help them reach out to others with similar experiences. Understanding how the DSM-based narratives can both benefit and harm will help us address problems with psychiatric diagnoses and the dissemination of knowledge about mental disorders in popular culture. The project aims to convince both philosophers and psychiatrists that no plausible theory of the self can be developed without attending to the topic of mental disorder and that no theory of mental disorder can be complete without devising the tools provided by the philosophical approaches to the self as well as developmental and social psychology. It also calls for methodological alterations in mental health ethics research, arguing that a careful scrutiny of mental disorder memoirs can advance the ethical underpinnings to the practice of psychiatry. (shrink)

I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component (...) of realism about folk psychology, and from this I separate realism about mental entities as an ontological commitment towards them. I point out that the two views are mutually independent, which provides the possibility of considering folk psychology as not being in cognitive competition with scientific psychology. At the end I make a tentative suggestion as to how to interpret the former in order to avoid this conflict. (shrink)