: In the context of nineteenth-century philosophical reflection, Francesco Bonatelli set himself the following goal: to defend the pillars of Spiritualism and ontology through an careful examination of psychic contents and consciousness, while closely contesting both the psychology and the psychophysiology of Positivism and Spiritualism itself, La coscienza e il meccanesimo interiore and Percezione e pensiero Bonatelli puts forward his “critical experience-grounded philosophy” and proposes an original solution to the problem of the nature of the subject, consciousness and its unity, (...) using an analysis of “sentiments” to reveal the inseparable tangle of the cognitive and ontological dimensions of the self. Keywords : Positivism; Consciousness; Self-consciousness; Actus essendi ; Substance; Gnoseology Francesco Bonatelli: un approccio critico alla coscienza e al soggetto umano tra spiritualismo e positivismo Riassunto : Nel contesto della riflessione filosofica dell’Ottocento, Francesco Bonatelli scelse come proprio ufficio la difesa dei capisaldi dello spiritualismo e dell’ontologia, mediante un attento esame dei contenuti psichici e della coscienza stessa, in un serrato confronto con la psicologia e psicofisiologia del positivismo e con lo spiritualismo stesso. In opere come Pensiero e conoscenza, La coscienza e il meccanesimo interiore e Percezione e pensiero, Bonatelli espose la propria “filosofia critica a base sperimentale” e propose una soluzione originale al problema della natura del soggetto, della coscienza e della sua unità, mostrando come nell’analisi dei sentimenti si riveli l’inscindibile intreccio delle due dimensioni, cognitiva e ontologica, dell’io. Parole chiave : Positivismo; Coscienza; Autocoscienza; Actus essendi ; Sostanza; Gnoseologia. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the presence, in the section of the Dialektikdedicated to the issue of the Seele and the psychological paralogisms, of an "antinomic" approach regarding, in particular, the debate on the simplicity of the soul. In the examination of Mendelssohn's thesis concerning the soul's incorruptibility, Kant shows that it is possible to assume, together with the "extensive" criterion, an "intensive" criterion which leads to admitting the "decomposability" of the soul and the possibility of its annihilatio per remissionem. Thus, (...) as happens in the antinomies, we are faced with two theses on the "simplicity" of the soul which are both non-contradictory, but, at the same time, opposed to each other. These reflections, proposed in the 1787 edition of the Kritik (and which seem to refer back to and refine the considerations in the 1781 edition on the simplicity of the "thinking subject" and Ich denke), play an important role and show their full value in the context of the second mathematical antinomy. (shrink)