Teachers frequently find that their teaching is unsuccessful with a particular group of students. This paper describes how Heidegger’s ontology was useful to teachers as they developed a distance education platform to teach astronomy to culturally diverse Aotearoa New Zealand secondary school students. Māori students do not perform well within their State’s model of normalising education, and academic authors ascribe this “failure” to the effects of cultural difference and imperialism. This paper conjectures that Māori are not merely “culturally different” but (...) that they represent a metaphysical heritage that is akin to that described as Greek metaphysics by Heidegger. There are cultural artefacts and practices that serve for modern Māori in a way that parallels Heidegger’s account of the ancient Greeks. Māori may represent an ontological tradition that stands completely outside of Western metaphysics. If the conjecture is correct, normalising education is unlikely to ever to be satisfactory for Māori. (shrink)

Empirical evidence indicates that bereaved spouses are surprisingly muted in their responses to their loss, and that after a few months many of the bereaved return to their emotional baseline. Psychologists think this is good news: resilience is adaptive, and we should welcome evidence that there is less suffering in the world. I explore various reasons we might have for regretting our resilience, both because of what resilience tells us about our own significance vis-à-vis loved ones, and because resilience may (...) render us incapable of comprehending how things really stand, valuewise. I also compare our actual dispositions to extreme alternatives (“sub-resilience” and “super-resilience”), and consider whether we might endorse (plain) resilience as a kind of mean. (shrink)

Experience machines, popularized in print by Robert Nozick and on the screen by the Wachowskis’ film The Matrix, provide highly or perfectly realistic experiences that are more pleasant and less painful than those generated in real life.1 The recent surge in virtual reality and neuro-prosthetic technologies is making the creation of real-world experience machines seem inevitable and perhaps imminent.2 Given the likelihood of the near-future availability of such machines, it behooves ethicists to consider the moral status of their potential uses. (...) In this chapter, we investigate the use of experience machines in palliative and end-of-life care situations. We pair up various kinds of experience machines with patients in a range of conditions, to illuminate the moral problems and benefits of using experience machines in this way. We argue that the use of Nozickian experience machines to treat patients in most conditions would be morally problematic, most notably for the negative effects on patients’ characters and real-world relationships. Informed by this initial moral analysis, we describe an experience machine that is more closely related to a virtual reality game, and argue that it can avoid the moral problems encountered by Nozickian experience machines. In fact, we argue that this new kind of experience machine could improve some patients’ characters and relationships with real-world people. We conclude that some kinds of experience machines could benefit many patients, especially those in extreme pain and those not in the position to meaningfully interact with their loved ones in reality. We also note that certain kinds of experience machines could be useful for religious people, for whom the range of palliative and end-of-life care options is often thought to be relatively narrow. (shrink)

La planète est exténuée. L'humanité dans son ensemble traverse une mauvaise passe. A tel point que certains chercheurs professent l'effondrement, voire la fin de notre civilisation. Ces lanceurs d'alerte cosmique ne sont pas de simples illuminés. Ils comptent parmi eux des intellectuels de renom et des savants influents. Dans le même état d'esprit, des ingénieurs futuristes, anticipant une évolution qu'ils jugent inéluctable, programment le remplacement de notre espèce par des créatures hybrides d'un nouveau genre, humains augmentés ou améliorés. Demain, assurent-ils, (...) la "Singularité" assurera la relève du genre humain. L'ère du posthumanisme serait déjà entamée. Faut-il s'en féliciter? Laurence Hansen-Love expose ici les tenants et les aboutissants d'un débat qui nous concerne tous et dont les enjeux sont vertigineux. (shrink)

As the Mohist doctrine of inclusive care (jian ai 兼愛) is usually understood, it is an affront to both human nature and commonsense morality.1 We are told that the Mohists rejected all particularist ties, especially to family, in the interests of a radically universalist ethic.2 But love for those close to us is deeply rooted in our natures, and few would deny that this love has moral significance. If the Mohists did deny this, it would be easy to (...) dismiss them, regardless of the abstract weight of their arguments. But the Mohists did not deny this. They consistently took it for granted that we have special attitudes and obligations toward those close to us. Filial piety was one of their core values, and .. (shrink)

Caring for the competent, fragile, elderly patient at the end of life is becoming increasingly challenging. This case explores several ethical areas of concern that arise when caring for patients who have written durable powers of attorney for health care decisions and face life or death choices. Areas covered are informed consent with the elderly patient, the family's right to be involved in decision-making, futility of treatment, and the nurse's role as patient advocate during times of difficult decision-making. Recommendations for (...) increased nursing intervention during these times are incorporated. Les soins des personnes âgés, fragiles mais toujours compétentes et dont la vie touche à sa fin, posent des problèmes de plus en plus urgents. Cet article discute de plusieurs aspets qui se manifestent dans les soins des malades ayant écrit des mandats concernants leurs soins et qui doivent maintenant prendre des décisions graves concernant la vie ou la mort. Les aspets dont il s'agit dans cet article sont: le consentement informé des personnes âgés: le droit de la famille de participer à la décision; les traitements inutiles; et le rôle des infirmiers/ères pour plaider leur cause pendant des moments difficles de prises de décisions. Des recommendations pour de plus importantes interventions infirmières sont comprises. Die Pflege der geistig kompetenten aber hinfälligen Personen im hohen Alter stellt immer grössere Anforderungen. Dieser Artikel untersucht verschiedene ethische Aspekte, die bei der Pflege von Patienten, die eine schriftliche Vollmacht über medizinische Behandlung ausgestellt haben für ihre Pflege und jetzt Entscheidungen über Leben oder Tod treffen müssen. Der Artikel umfasst folgende Bereiche: informierten Zustimmung des Patienten, das Mitbestimmungsrecht der Familie, Zwecklosigkeit der Behandlung, und die Rolle des Pflegepersonals als Fürsprecher der Patienten bei schwierigen Entscheidungen. Empfehlungen für eine grössere Beteiligung oder Mitbestimmung des Pflegepersonals in diesen Fällen sind eingeschlossen. (shrink)

There is an obvious, perhaps even trite, argument against getting married which deserves our attention. Reduced to a crude sketch, the argument is simply that, most of us view the prospect of being married in the absence of mutual love with something like horror or at least great antipathy; the mutual love between us and our spouse existing at the inception of our marriage may very well fail to persist; and hence when we marry we are putting ourselves (...) in the position of quite possibly ending up in a loveless marriage of the sort we acknowledge to be undesirable, and this is a mistake. (shrink)

Every thinking person wants to lead a life of meaning and purpose. For thousands of years, holy books have told us that such a life is available only through obedience and submission to some higher power. Today, the faithful keep popular devotionals and tracts within easy reach on bedside tables and mobile devices, all communicating this common message: "Life is meaningless without God." In this volume, former pastor Dan Barker eloquently, powerfully, and rationally upends this long-held belief. Offering words of (...) enrichment, emancipation, and inspiration, he reminds us how millions of atheists lead happy, loving, moral, and purpose-filled lives. Practicing what he preaches, he also demonstrates through his own personal journey that life is valuable for its own sake--that meaning and purpose come not from above, but from within. (shrink)

The Bachelor's Argument against marriage, as I described it in this journal,1 says that marriage involves taking an imprudent risk of finding oneself committed to a relationship with someone one does not love. The evidence indicates that many people who marry eventually find themselves without the feelings for the other person which made a marital relationship seem worthwhile in the first place; and were that to happen to us, it would seem highly undesirable nonetheless to be locked into a (...) relationship with our spouse as a result of the commitment we made when we married. I went on to argue that several obvious responses to this argument fail. In particular, if we enter into marriage without genuinely intending to keep our promise of maintaining a relationship with our spouse, we will be making an insincere promise. Alternatively, if our promise is sincere, but the morality of promise-keeping is such that when our feelings for the other person fade away the moral force of our commitment is canceled, then the commitment itself seems otiose. However, I did not consider all of the possible responses to the argument, and Iddo Landau has recently made an interesting suggestion about how to interpret the marriage commitment in a way that does not render it immoral or pointless.2 His proposal is that what we are committing ourselves to when we marry is ‘to invest work in performing certain acts that are likely to sustain the. (shrink)

In The Christian Idea of Man Josef Pieper brings off an extraordinary feat. He acknowledges that whoever introduces the theme of "virtue" and "the virtues" can expect to be met with a smile - of various shades of condescension. He then proceeds to single out "prudence" as the fundamental virtue on which the other cardinal virtues are based. In defining it, he does away with the shallow connotations which have debased it in modern times. Similarly, he manages to divest it (...) of all traces of "moralism," which, to a large extent has become identified with the Christian idea of virtue and has made it fall into general disrepute. For Pieper, prudence is fundamentally based on a clear perception of reality - of things as they are - and the prudent person is the one who acts in accordance with this perception. It has nothing to do with knowing how to avoid decisions which might be to one's disadvantage. Similarly, justice, which is based on prudence, involves acting toward other persons according to one's perception of the truth of the circumstances - again, a perception of things "as they are." This is not a reference to any "status quo," but to the reality as constituted by the Creator. In referring to courage [fortitude], Pieper discusses the overcoming of fear. This does not imply having no fear but, precisely, overcoming it. With regard to the fundamental fear of death, Pieper rejects the approaches which contend that there is nothing to fear in death. On the contrary, there is everything to fear in death: it concerns the question of possible absolute annihilation! Here Pieper introduces the consideration of the "theological" virtues of faith, hope, and love [charity]. When confronted with the question of possible annihilation, the Christian's faith is paramount. Belief in God lets him confront danger and overcome even the most radical fear - through hope in God. His love of God does not wipe out fear but gives him courage. Moderation is seen as the last in the hierarchy of the cardinal virtues. Through its manifestation, in recent Christian thinking, with chastity and abstinence, it became in the Christian mind the most prominent characteristic of the Christian idea of man and one that dominated everything else. It has been reduced to the status of the most private of the virtues and is combined with a moralistic conception of the good. Pieper's analysis of moderation shows how this virtue needs to be rethought, although, even then, it will remain the last in the hierarchy of virtues. (shrink)

In Solo: A Star Wars Story, the debonair Lando Calrissian is clearly in love with the artificially intelligent droid L3‐37. There are lots of friendships between droids and humans in Star Wars. This chapter looks at the relationship between Lando and L3‐37 in Solo and argues that they exhibit all the hallmarks not just of friendship, but of love. A friendship between people who both seek to gain from the relationship is one of utility, while a friendship between (...) people who simply enjoy each other's company is one of pleasure. Droids are the kinds of beings that can be good friends, as is clearly supported throughout the Star Wars canon. One potential concern is that droids smarter than humans might take advantage of an inferior organic life form by having a sexual relationship with them. (shrink)

Augustine tells us in the Confessions that his reading of Cicero's Hortensius at the age of nineteen aroused in him a burning ‘passion for the wisdom of eternal truth’. He was inspired ‘to love wisdom itself, whatever it might be, and to search for it, pursue it, hold it, and embrace it firmly’. And thus he embarked on his arduous journey to the truth, which was at the same time a conversion to Catholic Christianity, and which culminated twelve years (...) later in his experience in the garden in Milan. (shrink)

This is a forthcoming section for the book "Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in Philosophy", edited by Graham Oppy, Gregory Dawes, Evan Fales, Joseph Koterski, Mashhad Al-Allaf, Robert Fastiggi, and David Shatz. I was asked to write a brief essay on divine hiddenness and divine inscrutability. I argue that theism is trapped between two opposite poles. On one end, we encounter an argument developed by John Schellenberg. God is understood as a being who, in virtue of God's perfect love, (...) would have relationship with any of Her creatures who are open to loving relationship with God. If so, we would not expect there to exist non-resistant non-believers. Yet there are non-resistant non-believers. So, this sort of God does not exist. On the other pole, God is completely incomprehensible. But if God is incomprehensible, then this leads to a series of theological problems. For example, if God is incomprehensible, then it is difficult to understand how any human could rationally endorse God's existence. I argue that both poles are problematic for the theist and that it is difficult to see how to construct a road through the middle that would not inherit the problems of either pole. (shrink)

?Achievement is doing what well?? A competitive democracy tends to repress this question as inegalitarian; it uses the slogan ?Whatever you do, do well?. But this slogan could not be taken seriously, nor is it really egalitarian. Our actual hierarchy of activities is based on an unargued and arbitrary consensus; it is an example of the way audiences control performers. Doubts about ?true achievement? are not merely ?philosophical?. Noting repressed concern about this issue suggests hypotheses to help explain some social (...) tensions, e.g., over women's liberation. The love of competition might or might not make achievement more likely. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes”Dan Lloyd (bio)To think about grief is to think about many things. My one-year-old daughter was practicing opening and closing a cabinet door as I puzzled over a response to Wright, Sloman, and Beaudoin’s “Toward a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes.” She was completely absorbed in her project, and as I watched my elf at her task, I thought about the (...) voices of loss that speak briefly in section 3.1. How terrible it would be to lose a loved one. With that, I was overcome with a pang of love for my daughter, and further thought about the paper ceased.In the authors’ terms, my feelings about my daughter were “perturbances,” states that interfered with the internal management of my thought process, derailing it from the deliberate project of responding to the paper. Reading and thinking about loss activated the attachment structures involving those whose loss would be most devastating to me. The activation of the attachment structure was my episode of intense feeling, arising in me with an insistence level that temporarily exceeded my academic pursuits. The whole sequence of mental events arose through the interaction of major processes of perception, beliefs, “motivators,” plans, self-monitoring, and global control. The mind, according to the authors, is a collection of such processes.Is that all there is? The familiar objection to this brand of functionalist analysis is that it leaves out the most important part of mind, namely, conscious experience. Such an “architecture” for an “intelligent agent” is at best a simulation of some aspects of cognition, but the feelings, the moods, the subjective what-it-is-like of experience are missing. And without them, say the familiar critics, the mind is missing. The authors are naturally aware of this objection, and are careful to hedge their project: “In our discussion the ‘phenomenological problem’ is factored out and placed to one side.”I wonder, however, whether the authors are too quick to concede that their model omits the phenomenal. The symptoms of grief expressed by its sufferers would all be considered reports of the experience of grief, aspects of its phenomenology. The authors use these reports to guide their analysis of the functional processes of grief, and their analysis in turn explains why the grievers experience their losses as they do. Functionalist psychologists usually base their analyses on strictly observable responses obtained in cognitive psychology experiments. In using first-person reports as their guide, the authors inaugurate a promising union of phenomenology and functionalism. After their treatment of grief, the left over and left out phenomenology is noticeably slimmer.What remains of grief is its pain. In the spirit [End Page 127] of the paper, I will close with a brief speculative extension of the authors’ approach, using it to examine the core of the experience of grief. Like physical pain, emotional pain is curiously resistant to description, and not even easy to remember. (One remembers that one was in pain, and that it was hateful, but such reminiscences are faint shadows of the experience itself.) Though its phenomenology is elusive, pain has a clear function. It is aversive. As the authors note, pain involves “dispositions to terminate or reduce some state or process.” In their terms, pain is a motivator with a very high insistence level. Motivators motivate plans, and an aversive motivator would principally motivate a plan to remove the cause of the pain. However, grief and other chronic emotional pains are marked by irremediability. There can be no plan that replaces the loss, only fantasy plans or reversions to infant strategies of last resort (like crying). Within the cognitive architecture proposed by this paper, emotional pain is thus characterized by a collision of two processes, a highly insistent motive meeting a vacuum where a plan should be. The unanswered insistence would make the collision hateful, while the absent plan would leave a state partly without intentional content, and thus hard to describe or remember. This breakdown, arguably, is the pain—an emergent state or states arising in just this sort of wrenching bind.The traditional critic will insist that the painfulness... (shrink)

On the basis of a definition of God as “love”, human philanthropy is derived from Divine philanthropy, and therefore extends to all human beings. Because Divine philanthropy is most centrally expressed in Christ's incarnation and resurrection, Christ's identification with all who suffer presents the strongest motivation for human philanthropy. After a short review of the Romanian Orthodox Church's development after 1989, the author turns to his special case study, the Social-Medical Day-Care Christian Centre for older citizens. He describes the (...) wan in which Church-based philanthropy can integrate social-medical with Christian pastoral care, and how this work draws the local communities into assuming a shared responsibility. (shrink)

The notion of uncommandability has been central to how we perceive our emotional lives, and particularly romantic love. According to this notion: while we can control how we treat people, we have little control over how we feel about them. The argument from uncommandability is often evoked as a way of sidestepping moral obligations regarding our romantic emotions. One challenge to uncommandability is the potential to manipulate our emotions through psychopharmaceuticals. Much of the debate on so-called “love drugs” (...) has concerned the permissibility and worth of these interventions. By comparison, less has been explored about their implications for moral obligation and responsibility. How might the emergence of these interventions change what can be emotionally demanded of us? We ultimately suggest that it is necessary to view the complex morality of our emotional lives through different evaluative paradigms: one concerning moral duty and obligation, where we have no claim to each other’s romantic love irrespective of its commandability, and the other concerning the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes, where we are at times justified in feeling morally injured by another person on account of their failure to love us, regardless of whether they had control in the matter. (shrink)

Religious art can reconfigure our conception of God’s omniscience. This should be seen in terms of divine understanding, with empathy and love required for God’s understanding of human beings. §I surveys reasons to think that God can empathize with us. §II and §III consider different ways that religious art has attempted to represent such empathetic relations. There are images of Christ’s suffering that elicit empathy in the viewer, and there are depictions of God’s empathetic understanding of humanity. §IV and (...) §V consider the epistemic roles of art and how religious art can reconfigure how we think of God’s omniscience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:134 When the woman saw that the fruit of the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining wisdom, she took some and ate it —­Genesis 3:6 Abstract Aesthetics has emerged as an important battleground in the moral quest for a lower carbon society. Especially in the case of proposed wind farms (an environmentally benign technology in terms of low carbon emissions), (...) opponents frequently refer to the unsightly machines creating negative landscape impacts and ruining the view. This essay seeks to reflect on the particular ways in which visual aesthetics are framed and mobilized in this moral debate. Exploring the dividing lines between pictoral and more-­ than-­ representational approaches I ask if the moral dilemmas in our landscape decisions (e.g. individual rights to beauty or collective duties toward future generations) are obscured by physical or visual realms. The largely invisible nature of wind, electricity and climate change, set within the physical and tangible nature of landscapes and turbines, challenges us to experience the aesthetics of landscapes-­ with-­ machines through more creative and engaging means that are not limited to visibility, nor deaf to morality. SIN, DUTY, AND THE AESTHETICS OF NATURE As the first act of sin in the bible, Eve’s consumption of a visually aesthetic fruit led to humans being banned from the Garden of Eden. Looking at the above sentence more closely, we could even argue that “good for food” is not a positive condition (e.g. tasty, nourishing), but Justice in the Eye of the Beholder? ‘Looking’ Beyond the Visual Aesthetics of Wind Machines in a Post-­Productivist Landscape DAN VAN DER HORST Dan van der Horst / Justice in the Eye of the Beholder? 135 rather the absence of a negative (e.g. inedible), whilst “also desirable” may sound like the hunger for wisdom was only a secondary, additional attraction. The sentence thus draws attention to the key role of aesthetics in the making of a moral decision; would Eve have eaten the forbidden fruit if it was not “pleasing for the eye”? Aesthetic judgments may be informed by a range of factors, but as this bible quote illustrates, morality is key among them. Associations between right and wrong on the one side and beauty or ugliness on the other, are not exactly rare in written history, be they religious, literary or scholastic works. As a marked contribution to the latter, Immanuel Kant has paid particularly close attention to the links between aesthetics and morality, arguing amongst others that any universal agreement in judgments of the sublime must rest on an appeal to moral feelings.1 But universality is not the only logical link between aesthetic judgementandmorality.Peoplecanfeelasenseof‘duty’tofindcertainthings beautiful e.g. because that is the aesthetic judgment of the group they aspire to belong to.2 Whilst this sense of duty can refer to social conditioning and group belonging, it also has resonance for landscape aesthetics at a time of anthropogenic climate change (a universal threat) when we must “learn to love the low carbon landscape.”3 This presents a point of departure from the debate on the moral obligation of preserving aesthetically pleasing landscapes (as we tend to do through legal designations, e.g. national parks), an ethical logic which leads, to use the words of Holmes Rolston, “from beauty to duty.”4 Moreover a posi­ tive aesthetical appreciation of a landscape because it accommodates low carbon technologies, would potentially require an inverse ethical logic, i.e. from duty to beauty.5 Notwithstanding the clear conceptual links between moral and aesthetic judgment, in everyday life it may be far less clear what kind of moral issues may underpin particular expressions of aesthetic sensibility. This can be particularly problematic for the deployment of environmental technologies (i.e. technologies pursued to reduce pollution ) that have significant landscape footprints. That is where we can find universal moral claims demanding environmental action for the common good rubbing up against aesthetic landscape judgments in places where such developments are proposed. This produces an unsatisfactory situation in which the deployment of clean technologies ENVIRONMENT, SPACE, PLACE / VOLUME 10 / ISSUE 1 / 2018 136 is delayed, tensions within local communities may increase... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Witness Against the Beast, William Blake and the Moral LawDan LatimerWitness Against the Beast, William Blake and the Moral Law, by E. P. Thompson; xxi & 324 pp. New York: The New Press, 1993, $30.00.The social context from which William Blake arose was fundamentally hostile to the grandiose projects of Court and official Church. So modest were the ambitions of Blake’s working-class forebears that their historical oblivion would (...) be assured, had they not professed theological views irksome to those whose job it was to enforce uniformity. The eccentric theology of this nonconformist class earned them the name antinomian, from “anti-nomos,” “against the law,” a term which carried the sense of both “heretic” and “terrorist.”Antinomians emerged from the Puritan Interregnum of the 1650s. They went quiet during the Restoration of Charles II, then were given a second life in the 1790s when the energies of Jacobinism refocused working-class frustrations on the hegemonic alliance of Court and Church. Eventually, sedition laws drove the antinomians underground to stay. Abhorring all official places of worship, they met over pints of beer in public houses, singing songs composed by themselves out of their home-made hymnals set to such unthreatening melodies as “God Save the King” to delude the casual passer-by.One such sect was the Muggletonians, whose very name ensured groans of genteel ridicule from the educated and powerful. They never numbered more than two hundred members in all of England. Taking their name from a seventeenth-century sectary, Ludowick Muggleton, they kept largely to themselves, did not evangelize, and did not pray, since they considered prayer servile. They met for fellowship, song, and hours of intricate theological discussion. For three hundred years, the faithful preserved the manuscripts of their prophets, records of discussion and debate, song books and membership lists, until Thompson tracked it all down in 1975 to a furniture depository in Tunbridge Wells. What Thompson wanted to show was some empirical connection between Muggletonian theology and the eccentric mythos of William Blake, since the two systems had so many already obvious antinomian similarities. It must have been discouraging for him to get no closer than “Hermitage,” the name of Blake’s mother’s first husband, a hosier named Thomas. In the Muggletonian song books are compositions from the 1750s by a George Hermitage, who in Thompson’s working hypothesis is a possible uncle of Blake. Thompson admits, however, that the image of Blake’s mother singing nonconformist family songs over the cradle of her infant son will have to remain a pretty fiction.Why does Thompson specifically want the Muggletonians in the Blakean picture? There are four pertinent articles of Muggletonian belief. The first is that they repudiate moral law, that is, the notion of religion as a system of discipline and punishment for sin. They substitute love and generosity as [End Page 412] characteristic of the divine principle. The second is that Reason is explicitly identified as a Satanic item, binding, constraining, and inhibiting the imaginative vision of God. The third article is the doctrine of the Two Seeds, according to which Satan, in the form of the serpent, had carnal relations with Eve, who subsequently gave birth to Cain, the serpent’s child and half-brother to Abel and Seth, the legitimate offspring of Adam. Henceforth, though, the Satanic and divine seeds are mixed in all human beings. The persistent Satanic element, the humanum maternum, gives our worshippers occasion, not only for an indictment of the rich and powerful, serpent-spawn all, but for a gnostic hostility for all material creation, including the body, implying, one need hardly say, a robust sense of woman’s addiction to the secret and forbidden, the worm that flies in the night.The fourth article deals with the divine influx of God into man on the occasion of Christ’s birth. For the Muggletonians, this incarnation (and eventual extinction) was entire. There weren’t any other parts of God left over somewhere else. Thompson sees here elements of a radical humanism which may have motivated such notions as “the human form divine” in Blake. On the other hand, the doctrine of the... (shrink)

Hastings reads the novel Comme dans un film des frères Coen by Bertrand Gervais as addressing both the midlife and the blank page crisis. Indeed, the main character of this novel is a writer in his fifties who still suffers from the failure of his last novel ignored by the critics. Disenchanted, he slowly enters a world of fantasy, and falls in love with the voice of his GPS he called Gwyneth “parle trop” therefore recalling the name of the (...) actress with the same name. He gradually loses contact with his wife and his son, a successful painter, and is transformed into “the man who was not there” another character from a movie by the Coen brothers entitled The Barber: the man who was not there. Hastings asks: How could one get lost with a GPS? After the main character had initially bought his GPS for a trip in Australia in order to find his way, it started to go beyond its role as a road guide and questioned where he was in his relationship with his wife, in his career as a writer, and in his skin as a mature man. Not only was the GPS not fulfilling its purpose but also it started to ruin a fragile relationship hoping to find its way back to love during a last minute trip in Australia. Even after destroying the annoying talkative GPS, it continued to disrupt the couple in the plane on the way back to Canada. As much as Gwyneth the GPS is synonymous with escape and freedom, it is also showing the main character the wrong way, the way out of his reality, out of his family and out of his life. His attempts to free himself from Gwyneth are worthless, her image is still there, haunting his thoughts like images from a movie. But the displacement happens at another level than just the diegetic one. The confrontation of the text with moving images has consequences on the shape of the text itself. The mapping of the text on the page is influenced by this amalgam. The white page becomes a space where words are rearranged in different ways, some of which suggest poetry, other cartoons or cinematic images. The displacement of literature in areas that were previously foreign to it is at the heart of creative activity, and determines its renewal. Hastings presents the consequences resulting from the confrontation with the GPS, both on the mapping of one’s identity as well as the mapping and the shaping of the text itself. (shrink)

The strongly resilient are able to quickly get over the loss of their beloved. This is not an entirely attractive capacity. In this paper, I argue that it is appropriate to be distressed about the fact that we might, quickly or slowly, get over the death of our loved ones. Moller argues that the principal problem with resilience is that it puts us in a defective epistemological position, one where we are no longer able to appreciate the significance of what (...) we have lost. Although I think this is a genuine concern, it does little to capture the source of our dismay at the prospect. The problem is not that not caring will make us blind to our beloved's past importance, but that we simply will no longer care for our beloved. The source of our dismay is captured nicely in a passage from Proust that Moller cites but quickly dismisses in two separate papers. My goal here is to defend something akin to the Proustian view that resilience amounts to a death of self. (shrink)

My dissertation, “Love, Self-Constitution, and Practical Necessity,” offers an interpretation of love between people. Love is puzzling because it appears to involve essentially both rational and non-rational phenomena. We are accountable to those we love, so love seems to participate in forms of necessity, commitment, and expectation, which are associated with morality. But non-rational attitudes—forms of desire, attraction, and feeling—are also central to love. Consequently, love is not obviously based in rationality or inclination. (...) In contrast to views that attempt to fit love into existing models of practical reasoning, I argue that love participates in a unique form of practical necessity, different from both moral and psychological necessity, yet bearing resemblances to each. Distinctive to this type of practical necessity is a direct appeal to another particular person that cannot be delivered in third-personal terms—that is, a non-moral yet normative type of expectation on another person. This type of expectation is predominant in loving relationships, but can also make better sense of the experiences of humor and beauty, as well as attitudes like forgiveness, gratitude, and agent-regret. I treat Immanuel Kant’s discussion of the experience of beauty in the Critique of Judgment and Christine Korsgaard’s work on self-constitution as fruitful starting points for this account of love. I conclude that our loving relationships enable us to have distinctive personal selves, and provide support for this account of love by offering a complementary theory of grief. In Part One of the dissertation, I focus on two prominent approaches to love characteristic of the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions. I begin with the work of David Hume, which treats desire (understood as something like a simple impulse or craving) as the paradigmatic mental state, and emphasizes our personal and affective dimensions. Hume has the valuable insight that loving someone affects our sense of ourselves. But Hume’s view becomes unsatisfying when he claims that love is essentially enfeebling, implying that to love is to be passive toward and readily overcome by another person. While this indicates Hume’s awareness that love involves being open and receptive to another person, the problem is that love is also a demanding attitude. Hume lacks the conceptual resources to offer a nuanced view of the self, in which we can—with one attitude—be both demanding of and vulnerable to another person. Hume’s model of a desire-based deliberative process has recently been revived in Harry Frankfurt’s discussions on love and rationality. Frankfurt, however, goes beyond Hume’s picture of the self by introducing a notion of “identification,” which he offers to make sense of our apparent ability to commit ourselves decisively to certain projects or people. I argue that active powers like identification and commitment cannot be accommodated within any basically Humean moral psychology. Such abilities, and with them the possibility of love, depend on something closer to a Kantian conception of rational agency. I next focus on the work of Kant, who provides the substantial counterpart to Humean-inspired moral theories, but is not known for his insight into our emotional lives. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides love into “practical love”—what we experience when we are morally motivated to help someone—and “pathological love”—what we experience when we feel fond of something. But in reality, we experience love neither as a mere preference for another person, nor as something that generates the kind of demands that would be binding on any rational creature. David Velleman attempts to remedy the deficiency of Kant’s dichotomy. Velleman offers a Kantian theory in which he describes love and respect as two ends of a continuum of attitudes that it is morally appropriate to have toward people. Velleman’s view has the peculiar implication that everyone deserves the love of everyone else, and I argue that this is a fatal flaw. Like Kant and Velleman, Korsgaard characterizes personal love as involving the treatment of other people as Kantian ends-in-themselves to a heightened degree. Korsgaard, though, also contends that our individual identities depend upon our personal relationships, and I take this position seriously for the remainder of the dissertation. Ultimately, however, characterizations of loving relations as subsets of moral relations can account for the authority of the demands of love, but not its particularity. The major conclusion of Part One is that any attempt to understand love primarily on a model of practical reasoning with which we are already familiar is doomed to fail. Our experience of love calls for a theory of a unique type of practical necessity. In Part Two I take seriously the possibility that love is simultaneously inescapable (in something like the way morality is supposed to be), and yet ineluctably personal. In love, we experience an engagement with a person as essentially particular, rather than as an instance of a rational agent in general. To make sense of this direct attachment to an individual, I argue that love involves distinctive forms of expectation and disappointment. When those we love let us down, they hurt our feelings, which is not a response to a failed prediction, but nor is it a reaction to a moral insult or offense. According to Peter Strawson and Stephen Darwall, second-personal moral reactive attitudes (such as resentment) always have third-personal analogues (such as indignation). In contrast, I argue that the type of hurt feelings associated with love is a second-personal reactive attitude that does not have a third-personal corollary. I take this as evidence that the expectations involved in love are not objective in the way that the moral is objective. Nor, however, is love a matter of mere preference. On my interpretation, Kant introduces this different type of expectation in the Critique of Judgment. Whereas he characterizes moral judgments as universally communicable, judgments of beauty implicitly involve only second-personal address: I appeal to your direct experience with a particular object. This provides the conceptual space for an account of love according to which it involves a uniquely second-personal form of practical necessity. I contend that the second-personal addresses we make in love are appeals to strengthen the intimacy implicit in the loving relationship, and I identify three interrelated dimensions of that intimacy. First, those we love have the standing to interpret us in a constitutive manner. We fine-tune and make determinate the character of our concerns and interests in part by accepting the interpretations provided by those we love. In that way, the people we love have the normative power to constitute who we are. Second, we share a perspective with those we love in a way that is not reducible to or derivative of our independent perspectives. Loving someone centrally involves the activity of forming concerns together, and we do this in a mode best understood on the model of playing a spontaneous game or improvising music. Finally, being loved enables us to see ourselves as distinctive and special, because the concern those who love us have for us does not track the objective merit of our characteristics. These dimensions of the intimacy that characterizes a loving relationship reveal what it is that we appeal for in love, and how we are hurt when our appeals are rebuffed. In broad terms, this dissertation advocates the recognition of a non-moral yet normative type of expectation, which is predominant in loving relationships. Humor and beauty, too, make more sense when understood in terms of this non-moral yet normative type of expectation, as they involve appeals to others that are more than mere predictions of, but less than rational demands for, a certain kind of response. Introducing this alternative notion of expectation into the discourse of moral philosophy can shed light on other common attitudes that are clearly normative, but defy translation into objective, third-personal terms. Such attitudes include certain experiences of pride and shame, apology and forgiveness, the bestowing of mercy, gratitude, agent-regret, and perhaps a basic sense of trust we have in others. Ultimately, I situate love in respect to grief, which demonstrates my theory’s ability to make sense of related dimensions of our emotional lives. The people we love and grieve over give us a sense of who we are as distinctive, particular individuals, as the three interrelated dimensions of intimacy in loving relationships reveal. Consequently, grief is best understood as a type of practical disorientation—namely, a disorientation that involves the loss of the personal self. I present my account of grief against the type of account that would draw philosophical conclusions about the nature of love and grief from empirical psychological data alone. In particular, these data indicate that we recover quickly from the deaths of loved ones, and Dan Moller draws the philosophical conclusion that those we love fulfill certain roles in our lives and are replaceable. In contrast, I contend that while we should acknowledge the truth of the objective judgment, made in the third-person, that we will likely recover after the deaths of those we love, it does not follow that we must affirm such a claim from the internal perspective of one person who loves another. As a result, the case of love and grief supports a general claim concerning the proper work of moral philosophy, which is that the understanding of ourselves gained through empirical data is not a substitute for the normative conclusions that are revealed through first-personal reflections on our relationships. (shrink)

Dans l’essai qu’elle consacre au roman de Dickens David Copperfield (« Le bras de Steerforth : l’amour et le point de vue moral »), Martha Nussbaum affirme que si ce roman montre qu’une union de l’amour et de la moralité est possible, le narrateur y parvient à travers l’écriture du roman et grâce à l’amour « romantique et érotique » qu’il éprouve pour le personage de Steerforth. Je montre au contraire que la forme de moralité que l’amour permet d’atteindre caractérise (...) aussi, dans ce roman, d’autres types d’amour, non-érotiques, notamment l’amour parental, l’amour filial et l’amour chrétien. Je montre également qu’Agnès Wickfield n’est pas dans ce roman le personnage kantien ou le spectateur impartial qu’y voit Nussbaum, de sorte qu’Agnès exprimerait « une position éthique qui diffère de celle qui anime la narration dans son ensemble ». Je montre au contraire qu’à travers l’amour sans jugement qu’elle porte à son père, Agnès illustre précisément, tout comme d’autres personnages qui s’y trouvent, la position éthique générale de ce roman. (shrink)

The Decalogue is the ten commandments which are a covenant between God and His people. Written on two tablets of stone, this Decalogue is apodictive (unconditional command and prohibition). It expresses the love between God and His people and between members of the people. This article shows that in the Pentateuch there are two versions of the Decalogue (Ex. 20:1-17 and Deut. 5:6-21) with some differences between them. Deuteronomy 5:6-21 contains additions to Exodus 20:1-17. Ex. 20:1-17 was spoken by (...) God himself to the Israelites at Mount Sinai; Deut. 5:6-21 by Moses in the plains of Moab when quoting Ex. 20:1-17. The commandment to keep the Sabbath day holy in Ex. 20:8-11 is motivated by God’s rest on the seventh day of creation; in Deut. 5:12-15 it is motivated by Israel’s liberation from slavery in the land of Egypt. Ex. 20:13-17 contains fi ve social commandments in no apparent order; Deut. 5:17-21 contains six social commandments inparallel arrangement. The Decalogue, as a law does not guarantee its implementation. And the Israelites repeatedly violated or disobeyed the law. Therefore, God Himself takes the initiative and intervenes toensure its implementation. After the destruction of the city of Jerusalem as an outward sign of the end of the Old Covenant, the prophet Jeremiah prophesied the New Covenant at the initiative of God to bewritten in the hearts, so that previously impossible loyalty would now become a reality (Jer. 31:31-34). Thus, the New Covenant is not different from the Sinai Covenant, but rather a renewal of YHWH’s faithfulnesswhich is rebuilt and deepened continuously so that it becomes a “covenant without end” (Lam. 3:22-23). Abstrak Dekalog adalah sepuluh fi rman yang merupakan pernjanjian antara Allah dengan umat-Nya, tertulis dalam dua loh batu. Dekalog yang bersifat apodiktif (perintah dan larangan tanpa syarat) mengungkapkankasih antara Allah dengan umat-Nya dan antarumat Allah. Artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa dalam Pentateukh terdapat dua versi Dekalog (Kel. 20:1-17 dan Ul. 5:6-21) dengan beberapa perbedaan. Ul. 5:6-21 memuat beberapa tambahan yang tidak terdapat dalam Kel. 20:1-17. Kel. 20:1-17 diucapkan sendiri oleh YHWH kepada bangsa Israel di gunung Sinai; Ul. 5:6-21 diucapkan oleh Musa di dataran Moab dengan mengutip isi Kel. 20:1-17. Perintah kuduskanlah hari Sabat dalam Kel. 20:8-11 bermotifkan istirahat Allah pada hari ketujuh saat penciptaan; dalam Ul. 5:12-15 bermotifkan pembebasan bangsa Israel dari perbudakan di tanah Mesir. Kel. 20:13-17 memuat lima perintah sosial tanpa urutan yang jelas; Ul. 5:17-21 memuat enam perintah sosial yang disusun paralel. Dekalog sebagai undang-undang tidak menjamin pelaksanaannya. Berulangkali bangsa Israel telah melanggar atau tidak setia pada penjanjian tersebut. Maka, Allah sendiri yang berinisiatif dan campur tangan demi terjaminnya pelaksanaan perjanjian-Nya. Sesudah penghancuran kota Yerusalem sebagai tanda lahiriah berakhirnya Perjanjian Lama, Nabi Yeremia menubuatkan Perjanjian Yang Baru atas prakarsa Allah yang akan ditulis dalam hati manusia, sehingga kesetiaan yang tadinya mustahil akan menjadi kenyataan (Yer. 31:31-34). Dengan demikian Perjanjian Yang Baru itu tidak berbeda dengan Perjanjian Sinai, tetapi lebih berupa pembaruan kesetiaan YHWH yang dibangun kembali dan diperdalam terus-menerus sehingga menjadi “perjanjian yang tak berkesudahan” (Rat. 3:22-23). (shrink)

L’article se propose d’explorer ce qui est dit du mariage et de l’amour dans la correspondance d’une famille bourgeoise qui couvre plusieurs générations sur un large xixe siècle. Trois épisodes ont été retenus qui permettent d’observer bien des tensions entre mariage arrangé et mariage d’inclination. D’abord, au début du siècle, la correspondance d’un jeune homme à l’aube d’une brillante carrière scientifique explicite les « raisons » sociales et économiques qui déterminent son choix matrimonial. Puis, dans les années 1840-1843, l’échange entre (...) fiancés montre comment se construit le sentiment amoureux dans le respect de l’autorité parentale et des conventions en vigueur. Enfin, en 1858, autre moment stratégique dans le processus d’ascension sociale, la correspondance résonne des tractations menées par la famille pour conclure une union d’intérêt. À toutes ces étapes, il apparaît que les femmes assument leur destin social, qui est vécu et écrit comme une responsabilité face au cheminement des hommes de la famille. (shrink)

... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...

Le modèle évaluatif de l’amour est centré sur l’objet et basé sur les raisons : l’amour se fonde sur des raisons dérivées des propriétés appréciables de l’aimé. Le modèle attributif de l’amour est axé sur le sujet et non fondé sur les raisons : l’amour n’est pas basé sur des raisons dérivées des propriétés appréciables de l’aimé, mais provient plutôt de l’amant. Dans cet article, je mélange ces modèles opposés dans le but de préserver leurs vertus et de surmonter leurs (...) difficultés. Je propose un compte rendu de l’amour basé sur des motifs et axé sur le sujet : l’amour éclot chez l’amant mais, en lui, il repose sur les raisons qui motivent l’amant. (shrink)

Abstrak: Pemisahan antara ruang privat dan publik merupakan solusi liberalisme atas tantangan pluralitas masyarakat modern. Dalam kaca mata politik pengakuan, solusi liberalisme tidak mencukupi. Liberalisme dianggap mengenal individu hanya sebagai subjek hukum dan karena itu hanya dapat memperhatikan tuntutan validitas hukum. Dalam kaca mata liberalisme, kesetaraan subjek-subjek hukum hanya dapat dijamin jika aspek-aspek tradisi, kultural dan konsep hidup baik dijauhkan dari politik. Namun apa yang menjadi objek pengakuan justru aspek-aspek ini. Tulisan ini memperkenalkan konsep konsep pengakuan intersubjektif Axel Honneth. Konsep (...) pengakuan intersubjektif melampaui paham pengakuan interkultural seperti diperkenalkan oleh tokoh seperti Charles Taylor. Dalam paradigma intersubjektif, pengakuan tidak hanya dilihat pada tataran relasi interkultural, tapi dipahami sebagai sebuah antropologi. Pengakuan mengkonstruksi manusia sebagai subjek. Hal ini ditunjukkan Honneth dalam uraiannya tentang pelbagai tingkatan interaksi antarmanusia yakni tataran cinta, hukum dan solidaritas. Pada bagian akhir tulisan diajukan beberapa pertimbangan kritis atas konsep pengakuan Honneth ini. Kata-kata Kunci: Pengakuan, multikulturalisme, intersubjektivitas, teleologi, autentisitas. Abstract: The separation between private and public spheres is the solution of liberalism to the challenges of plurality in modern societies. In the perspective of politics of recognition this solution of liberalism is insufficient. Liberalism is considered to recognize the individual only as a subject of law and therefore can only attend to the demands of legal validity. In the perspective of liberalism, equality of legal subjects can only be guaranteed if the aspects of tradition, culture and the concept of a good life are seperated from politics. But precisely these aspects are the object of recognition. This paper introduces the concept of intersubjective recognition of Axel Honneth. The concept of intersubjective recognition goes beyond intercultural recognition as introduced by Charles Taylor, for example. In the intersubjective paradigm, recognition is not only seen at the level of intercultural relations, but understood as an anthropology. Recognition constructs the human being as subject. This is shown by Honneth in his account of the various levels of human interaction, that is the level of love, law and solidarity. At the end of the article the author will give some critical considerations on Honneth's concept of recognition. Keywords: Recognition, multiculturalism, intersubjectivity, teleology, authenticity. (shrink)

Dans la littérature arabe médiévale, il existe une façon spécifique de mourir à cause d’une passion amoureuse, liée à la conception d’un amour chaste qui possède ses propres valeurs et qui ne peut s’exprimer que dans les limites de ses propres règles. Le présent article étudie les vers récités par les amants avant d’exhaler leur dernier souffle contenus dans une vingtaine de notices d’al-Wāḍiḥ al-mubīn fī ḏikr man ustušhida min al-muḥibbīn (ou Précis des martyrs de l’amour) de Mughulṭāy (m. 1361). (...) En analysant les situations dans lesquelles ces vers sont prononcés, nous avons essayé de comprendre s’il existe (ou non) une manière spécifique, déclinée au féminin, d’exprimer son émotion avant de mourir. (shrink)

On déplore le manque d'éducation du cœur. Qu'attend-on pour en préciser la logique et la rhétorique? Notre éducation est trop informative, pas assez transformative. Trop centrée sur l'acquisition et l'échange des informations, pas assez sur les valeurs de tendresse et de fraternité. On n'admire les marques de la présence du Christ que par les yeux du cœur. Mais faut-il vraiment en appeler au tiers d'un véritable Ordre du cœur, comme ordre de vérité? Pourquoi un ordre de vérité? Il y a (...) trois ordres de choses : la chair, l'esprit, la volonté ; et trois ordres de discours : philosophique (qui s'adresse à l'intelligence), théologique (à l'intelligence éclairée par la foi), mystique (adressé au cœur).0Le réalisme biblique veut qu'il existe dans le réel une autre dimension entée sur les questions qui engagent l'homme dans l'existence et peuvent la transformer. Au lieu de s'installer sur le terrain métaphysique de l?Être, adoptons une théorie du being dont les éléments ne s'écarteront pas de leur mode d'interroger et de catégoriser. Une philosophie néo-critique de l'interrogation en prend acte. (shrink)

Aphrodite, tout en présidant à la sexualité et à l’éros, est une puissance divine aux multiples facettes exerçant aussi son action dans d’autres domaines. Depuis l’époque archaïque, Aphrodite et Arès constituent un couple bien établi au sein du panthéon de la Grèce ancienne. Cette association avec le dieu guerrier, attestée à la fois dans les récits mythiques et dans les cultes, se révèle solidaire d’autres données concernant les prérogatives politiques et militaires d’Aphrodite. L’examen de ce dossier nous invite à remettre (...) en question le portrait canonique d’Aphrodite en tant que « déesse de l’amour » et à repenser son rapport avec le dieu de la guerre autrement qu’en termes d’opposition complémentaire. Aphrodite, loin d’être exclue de l’univers de la guerre, y contribue efficacement et peut susciter elle-même « le désir de la bataille ». Aussi, à l’intersection du domaine d’Aphrodite avec celui d’Arès, des liens se nouent entre l’éros et la fureur guerrière.Aphrodite in the world of Ares. Elements for a dialogue between myth and cult. Aphrodite, the goddess governing sexuality and eros, is a deity with a large and multi-facetted sphere of action. Since archaic times, Aphrodite and Ares have constituted a well-established couple within the pantheon of ancient Greece. The association with the warrior god, attested both in myth and cult, is consistent with other evidence regarding Aphrodite’s political and military prerogatives. All of this prompts us to question Aphrodite’s canonical portrait as the “goddess of love” and to rethink her relationship with the “god of war” in terms other than those of complementary opposition. Aphrodite, far from being excluded from the world of war, contributes to it effectively in many different ways and is able to arouse “the desire for battle”. At the intersection of Aphrodite’s realm with that of Ares, links are woven between eros and fighting fervour. (shrink)

If one comes to Phénoménologie de la perception after having read Sein und Zeit (or Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs) one will be in for a surprise. Both works contain a number of both implicit and explicit references to Husserl, but the presentation they give is so utterly different, that one might occasionally wonder whether they are referring to the same author. Thus nobody can overlook that Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl differs significantly from Heidegger’s. It is far more charitable. In (...) fact, when evaluating the merits of respectively Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty often goes very much against the standard view. This is not only the case in his notorious remark on the very first page of Phénoménologie de la Perception where he declares that the whole of Sein und Zeit is nothing but an explication of Husserl’s notion of Lifeworld, but also - to give just one further example - in one of his Sorbonne-lectures, where Merleau-Ponty writes that Husserl took the issue of historicity far more seriously than Heidegger. (shrink)

In this entry, I tackle the phenomenon known as "faultless disagreement", considered by many authors to pose a challenge to the main views on the semantics of subjective expressions. I first present the phenomenon and the challenge, then review the main answers given by contextualist, absolutist and relativist approaches to the expressions in question. I end with signaling two issues that might shape future discussions about the role played by faultless disagreement in semantics.

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight essays by some of the leading figures in the field, and gives an authoritative overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. It is the definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology, and offers a rich source of insight and stimulation for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are (...) interested in the state of phenomenology today. The essays explore a diverse range of topics, including intentionality, embodiment, perception, naturalism, temporality, self-consciousness, language, knowledge, ethics, politics, art and religion, and will make it clear that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought. (shrink)

Pourquoi, alors qu'abondent sites de rencontre.

Many times, what we say proves to be wrong. It might turn out that what we took to be a comforting remark was, in fact, making things worse. Or that a joke was inappropriate. Or that yelling out loud was rude. More importantly for this paper, there are plenty of cases in which what we said turns out to be false: we spoke without paying attention, we were misinformed or tricked, or we made a reasoning mistake. -/- A particular instance (...) of this latter phenomenon is when someone changes their perspective and doesn't find their previous assertions true anymore. For example, imagine that you used to like licorice as a child, and that you went around saying things like "Licorice is tasty." But, growing up, you find licorice too strong and quite boring; your tastes have changed. While the taste of licorice itself has not changed, you are not going around anymore uttering "Licorice is tasty." In fact, in certain cases, you might even think that what you said in your childhood was wrong - at least in light of your present preferences. -/- Sometimes we "take back" the assertions we made when we realize they are no longer true. Such speech acts of taking back can be performed in various ways: more formally, as effected in a court of law or when an official speaks to the press, or more informally in our day-by-day interactions. These acts of taking back are known as retraction. Retraction is usually achieved by employing certain linguistic markers ('I was wrong', 'I was mistaken', 'I retract', "Scratch that' etc.) that signal that the retractor takes their previous speech act to be faulty in a certain way. -/- This phenomenon has formed the basis for a popular argument used by relativists about a variety of natural language expressions (predicates of taste, epistemic modals, moral and aesthetic claims etc.) in support of their view. Recently, several considerations (mostly from contextualists about the same expressions), both from the armchair and based on empirical studies, have been offered to undercut the support retraction was thought to provide for relativism. In this paper, I consider and re-evaluate that support in light of both types of considerations, showing that neither of them decisively undermines it. However, to survive the contextualist counterattack, the relativist needs to pay a price: that is, she will be forced to make some concessions or rethink certain claims. I show what I think those concessions should be and what needs to be rethought (and how). The upshot is that, while the support retraction offers relativism is not as strong as initially believed, appeal to retraction remains a legitimate move in the debate. In section 1, I introduce the views in the debate and clarify the phenomenon of retraction and its dialectical role. Armchair data are investigated in section 2, proper experimental studies in section 3, while section 4 summarizes and concludes. (shrink)

This communication wants to deal with the relations between the Philosophy of Plato and the cult of Dionysus in Ancient Greece. This makes necessary to distinguish the cult of Dionysus with its feasts and secret rituals, especially the maenadic rites of women, from orphism. The Maenads practiced rites closely associated with mania and those rites included bloody sacrifice (sparagmos) and the consommation of raw flesh (omophagy). As we assumed in our book“Dionysos em transe: la voix des femmes”, this cult was (...) an iniciatic feminine rite, connected to biological transformations particular to women, as pregnance and birth. At the other side, orphism is an asceptic and vegetarian sect, which clearly influenced some platonic theories, as exposed in Cratyle or Gorgias, concerning “the body as the tomb of the soul”. What we want to show here is the dionysiac character of some other theories, as those about the mania in Phaedrus or even the so called “platonic theory of Love” in the Symposium. We are dealing than with the definition of Philosophy itself in platonic dialogs: is Philosophy a study about death as orphic influence demands or is it a work of birth, as dionysiac influence suggests? (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology contains thirty-seven new essays by leading scholars in the field. The essays all highlight historical influences, connections, and developments and provide an in-depth coverage of the development of phenomenology; one that allows for a better comprehension and assessment of the continuity as well as diversity of the phenomenological tradition. The handbook is divided into three distinct parts. The first part contains chapters that address the way phenomenology has been influenced by earlier periods (...) or figures in the history of philosophy. The second part contains chapters targeting prominent phenomenologists: How was their work affected by earlier figures, how did their own views change over time, and what kind of influence did they exert on subsequent thinkers? The contributions in the third part trace various core topics such as subjectivity, intersubjectivity, embodiment, spatiality, and imagination in the work of different phenomenologists, in order to explore how the notions were transformed, enriched, and expanded up through the century. The handbook will be a source of insight for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the phenomenological tradition. It is an authoritative guide to how phenomenology started, how it developed, and where it is heading. (shrink)

Evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-devo) is a loose conglomeration of research programs in the life sciences with two main axes: (a) the evolution of development, or inquiry into the pattern and processes of how ontogeny varies and changes over time; and, (b) the developmental basis of evolution, or inquiry into the causal impact of ontogenetic processes on evolutionary trajectories—both in terms of constraint and facilitation. Philosophical issues are found along both axes surrounding concepts such as evolvability, novelty, and modularity. The developmental (...) basis of evolution has garnered much attention because it speaks to the possibility of revising a standard construal of evolutionary theory, but the evolution of development harbors its own conceptual questions. This article addresses the heterogeneity of Evo-devo’s conglomerate structure (including disagreements over its individuation), as well as the concepts and controversies of philosophical interest pertaining to the evolution of development and the developmental basis of evolution. Future research will benefit from a shift away from global theorizing toward the scientific practices of Evo-devo. (shrink)

Lauréat en 2011 du Prix Frankel d’histoire contemporaine de la Bibliothèque de Vienne, Love in the Time of Communism de Josie McLellan constitue l’un des travaux les plus innovateurs de l’historiographie actuelle sur l’Allemagne post-1945 comme sur la révolution sexuelle. En étudiant la transformation et les limites des mœurs sexuelles de l’Allemagne de l’Est dans les années 1970 et 1980, Josie McLellan traduit les problématiques actuelles des liens entre la famille, la sphère privée et la co...

L’amour conjugal existe au Moyen Âge, la littérature en est un lieu d’expression privilégié. Visible également dans les sources épistolaires ou notariales, il est cependant plus difficile à aborder à travers les archives judiciaires, notamment les procès matrimoniaux ecclésiastiques. L’officialité de Saragosse au xve siècle est par excellence la cour où sont jugés les litiges conjugaux. Les procès consultés offrent un récit récurrent de la relation conflictuelle entre époux et laissent à penser que l’amour n’y a guère sa place. Ce (...) n’est pas totalement vrai. Les affaires d’adultère, les unions clandestines, les demandes de solennisation de mariage ne sont pas toutes déposées ou dénoncées au seul motif de haine et de discorde. Les sentiments sont parfois bien présents, sous-jacents, et attendent seulement d’être lus à travers des actes, des mots précis (amor, affectio, cavalgar, enamorar) ou même des silences. (shrink)

Vuillemin a écrit un article concis sur la Théorie de la justice de Rawls où son propos se concentre uniquement sur la justice comme convention, c’est-à-dire sur le contrat qui définit une société juste selon Rawls. Après avoir analysé la nature du « contrat explicite » puis celle du « contrat implicite » dans cette théorie, Vuillemin critique la définition de la justice que donne Rawls et soutient que celui-ci«s’est trompé d’ancêtres » en considérant que sa philosophie politique est dans (...) la filiation de la morale kantienne alors qu’elle est, selon Vuillemin, l’expression d’un scepticisme comparable à celui de Carnéade. On réfute dans cet article l’interprétation que Vuillemin donne de la théorie de Rawls en montrant que celle-ci est fondée sur une lecture à la fois partielle et partiale de la Théorie de la Justice. (shrink)

Dans Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit conteste le point de vue de Bernard Williams quant à la relation entre l’amour et l’identité. Williams pensait que dans un monde où plusieurs répliques de son bien-aimé existeraient, notre conception actuelle de l’amour s’avèrerait caduque. Parfit partage l’avis de Williams sur les ramifications de la réplication, mais croit que lorsque la réplication adopte une forme non ramifiée notre vision courante de l’amour demeure intacte. Je pense que Parfit arrive à cette conclusion parce qu’il (...) a mésestimé combien l’affirmation de Williams se rapportait davantage à une vision de l’amour que de l’identité. (shrink)

Axée autour de la différence d’âge entre partenaires masculins, contrevenant tant, en matière érotique, aux conventions d’âge qu’aux prescriptions sexuées, la configuration de l’« amour vieux-jeune » (laoshaolian) homosexuel diffère singulièrement des formes de culture gay qui se déploient dans les espaces urbains centraux fréquentés par les nouvelles classes moyennes et supérieures chinoises. Constituée des liens sexuels et affectifs qui s’établissent dans la métropole entre vieux « locaux » et jeunes travailleurs migrants, imbriquée dans les formes et les lieux ordinaires (...) d’une sociabilité principalement masculine, populaire et intergénérationnelle, elle apparaît avant tout ancrée dans le contexte de la Chine des réformes et de l’ouverture post-maoïstes, au sein duquel les reconfigurations de l’espace discursif, de l’organisation économique et de la structure sociale jouent un rôle central. (shrink)

Face aux nouveaux désirs des femmes, le rappel à l’ordre par les hommes au pouvoir a été constant. Les femmes sont vite sommées de rester à leur place d’épouses, de mères de famille et de maintenir leur supposé penchant de douceur pour qu’il agisse au foyer. Au mieux, elles doivent transmettre l’amour de la patrie à leurs enfants, le goût de l’héroïsme à leurs fils. La pensée, puis l’expérience d’un brouillage des affects et des places produisent l’affolement des hommes. Pour (...) que les guerrières et les furies ne surgissent plus il est attendu des hommes qu’ils soient capables de retenir les pulsions féminines, de les lier entre elles afin de maintenir ladite douceur. C’est pourquoi les émotions ont un genre ou peuvent faire mauvais genre, symptômes de l’attente politique différenciée à l’égard des hommes et des femmes, des riches et des pauvres, des lettré.e.s et des peu lettré.e.s, symptômes également de la dissonance entre la prescription, la revendication et le vécu émotionnel pour chacun et chacune dans un contexte où tous les possible se sont ouverts. (shrink)