In this paper, we argue for the value of two complementary pedagogical tools for teaching moral emotions: (1) taxonomies and (2) normative case studies. The paper proceeds in four parts. Section One discusses our motivations for teaching moral emotions. Section Two introduces envy as the central example we use to demonstrate the value of developing a scaffolded approach to teaching moral emotions that moves from taxonomy to normative case studies. Specifically, we engage with Sara Protasi’s The Philosophy of Envy (2021). (...) We start by focusing on how an instructor could use Protasi’s taxonomy of envy effectively in the classroom. Then, Section Three engages with Rebecca M. Taylor’s recent work on normative case studies. We build on one of Protasi’s cases to demonstrate how instructors can design normative case studies to speak directly to the experiences of their students and we suggest a sample assignment. Finally, Section Four concludes by reinforcing the complementary relationship between taxonomies and normative case studies for teaching moral emotions. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore risks and responsibilities associated with speaking for others. I argue that, contrary to the recent philosophical literature on the subject, speaking for others is not always epistemically or politically illegitimate. Moreover, epistemological justification is not the only important consideration when trying to determine if we should speak for others. Ethical justification also matters and can override epistemological worries. Indeed, sometimes we should speak for others though we cannot know their experience. I identify and evaluate five (...) kinds of speaking for others. I end by exploring some of the implications of my analysisfor social justice for women and girls internationally. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore risks and responsibilities associated with speaking for others. I argue that, contrary to the recent philosophical literature on the subject, speaking for others is not always epistemically or politically illegitimate. Moreover, epistemological justification is not the only important consideration when trying to determine if we should speak for others. Ethical justification also matters and can override epistemological worries. Indeed, sometimes we should speak for others though we cannot know their experience. I identify and evaluate five (...) kinds of speaking for others. I end by exploring some of the implications of my analysisfor social justice for women and girls internationally. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore risks and responsibilities associated with speaking for others. I argue that, contrary to the recent philosophical literature on the subject, speaking for others is not always epistemically or politically illegitimate. Moreover, epistemological justification is not the only important consideration when trying to determine if we should speak for others. Ethical justification also matters and can override epistemological worries. Indeed, sometimes we should speak for others though we cannot know their experience. I identify and evaluate five (...) kinds of speaking for others. I end by exploring some of the implications of my analysisfor social justice for women and girls internationally. (shrink)

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge. Contemporary epistemology is a theory of knowledge in terms of reasons, evidence, justification and explanation. This book shows how Anglo-American philosophers captivated by the power of modern science and concomitant advances in logic and mathematics mistook knowledge itself to be reducible to the propositions of science and logic. Ethics, along with metaphysics and religion, were cast off as mere expressions of sentiment at best, or (...) as utter nonsense at worst. Is science the only source of knowledge? Can ethics count as knowledge? Are there kinds of knowledge beyond epistemology? This book develops innovative answers to these and other related questions. (shrink)