During the last thirty years different methods have been proposed in order to manage and resolve ethical quandaries, specially in the clinical setting. Some of these methodologies are based on the principles of Decision-making theory. Others looked to other philosophical traditions, like Principlism, Hermeneutics, Narrativism, Casuistry, Pragmatism, etc. This paper defends the view that deliberation is the cornerstone of any adequate methodology. This is due to the fact that moral decisions must take into account not only principles and ideas, but (...) also emotions, values and beliefs. Deliberation is the process in which everyone concerned by the decision is considered a valid moral agent, obliged to give reasons for their own points of view, and to listen to the reasons of others. The goal of this process is not the reaching of a consensus but the enrichment of one's own point of view with that of the others, increasing in this way the maturity of one's own decision, in order to make it more wise or prudent. In many cases the members of a group of deliberation will differ in the final solution of the case, but the confrontation of their reasons will modify the perception of the problem of everyone. This is the profit of the process. Our moral decisions cannot be completely rational, due to the fact that they are influenced by feelings, values, beliefs, etc., but they must be reasonable, that is, wise and prudent. Deliberation is the main procedure to reach this goal. It obliges us to take others into account, respecting their different beliefs and values and prompting them to give reasons for their own points of view. This method has been traditional in Western clinical medicine all over its history, and it should be also the main procedure for clinical ethics. (shrink)

The goal of education is the promotion of the intellectual, moral and human skills as well as the character of human beings. In Kantian terms, it is to foster their autonomy. This is a quite strange activity, given most of the influences the environment exerts on human beings are pursuing the exact opposite: compel us to do what they want us to, that is, to act heteronomously. Ethics is quite the only academic discipline whose direct aim is to empower people (...) to do what they should; hence its enormous importance, comparable to its complexity. But all throughout Western history, ethics has also fallen into the habit of promoting heteronomy over autonomy. Such practice claims for immediate correction in such a troubled moment as the initial steps of the 21st century. (shrink)

What does autonomy mean from a moral point of view? Throughout Western history, autonomy has had no less than four different meanings. The first is political: the capacity of old cities and modern states to give themselves their own laws. The second is metaphysical, and was introduced by Kant in the second half of the 18th century. In this meaning, autonomy is understood as an intrinsic characteristic of all rational beings. Opposed to this is the legal meaning, in which actions (...) are called autonomous when performed with due information and competency and without coercion. This last meaning, the most frequently used in bioethics, is primarily legal instead of moral. Is there a proper moral meaning of the word autonomy? If so, this would be a fourth meaning. Acts can only be called moral when they are postconventional (using the terminology coined by Lawrence Kohlberg), inner-directed (as expressed by David Riesman), and responsible (according to Hannah Arendt). Such acts are autonomous in this new, fourth, and to my mind, the only one proper, moral meaning. The goal of ethics cannot be other than forming human beings capable of making autonomous and responsible decisions, and doing so because they think this is their duty and not because of any other nonmoral motivation, like comfort, convenience, or satisfaction. The goal of ethics is to promote postconventional and mature human beings. This was what Socrates tried to do with the young people of Athens. And it is also the objective of every course of ethics and of any process of training. (shrink)

The discussions of these past twenty years have significantly improved our knowledge about the foundation of bioethics and the meaning of the four bioethical principles with concern to at least three different points: that they are organised hierarchically, and therefore not “prima facie” of the same level; that they have exceptions, and consequently lack of absolute character; and that they are neither strictly deontological nor purely teleological. The only absolute principle of moral life can be the abstract and unconcrete respect (...) of human beings. But when determining the material content of this respect, principles become contingent and relative. Therefore, moral reasoning must have necessarily no less than three moments, one absolute but merely formal, namely respect for all human beings, and the other two relative and material. The first material moment is comprised of the four bioethical principles, divided into two levels, one private, including the principles of autonomy and beneficence, and the other one public, including those of nonmaleficence and justice. The second material moment deals with specific cases, and requires analysis of their context, including their circumstances and consequences. Only when following these steps, and therefore balancing principlism and contextualism, can moral reasoning be correct and complete. (shrink)

The discussions of these past twenty years have significantly improved our knowledge about the foundation of bioethics and the meaning of the four bioethical principles with concern to at least three different points: that they are organised hierarchically, and therefore not “prima facie” of the same level; that they have exceptions, and consequently lack of absolute character; and that they are neither strictly deontological nor purely teleological. The only absolute principle of moral life can be the abstract and unconcrete respect (...) of human beings. But when determining the material content of this respect, principles become contingent and relative. Therefore, moral reasoning must have necessarily no less than three moments, one absolute but merely formal, namely respect for all human beings, and the other two relative and material. The first material moment is comprised of the four bioethical principles, divided into two levels, one private, including the principles of autonomy and beneficence, and the other one public, including those of nonmaleficence and justice. The second material moment deals with specific cases, and requires analysis of their context, including their circumstances and consequences. Only when following these steps, and therefore balancing principlism and contextualism, can moral reasoning be correct and complete. (shrink)

The historical stages through which Latin American society has passed are at least four: the first, dominated by a particular sort of ethic I have termed the “ethic of the gift;” then the period of conquest, in which the prevalent ethic was one of war and subjection by force, which I call the “ethic of despotism;” followed by the colonial age, in which a new ethical model of “paternalism” emerged; and finally the stage of the “ethic of autonomy,” which began (...) with the independence movements of the 18th and 19th centuries and is far from ended. Independence was won by the criollos from European domination with very little participation by the Indian population. The latter was left out of the democratic process and saw itself relegated to a worse situation than in the centuries of colonial rule, for it was no longer protected by the paternalism of the Laws of the Indies of 1542. This is the reason for the division of the Latin American society of the last century into two quite different social strata: one bourgeois, which has assimilated the liberal revolution, and enjoys a health care quite similar to that available in any other Western country and hence faces the same bioethical problems as any developed Western society; the other a very poor stratum, without any economic or social power and hence unable to exercise its civil rights, such as the rights to life and to humane treatment. In this population sector, which is numerically the larger, the major bioethical problems are those of justice and the distribution of scarce resources. The study of Latin American medical ethics can earn for these subjects, whose deplorable condition has been essentially ignored in the bioethics of the first-world countries, the importance they merit. (shrink)

La investigación clínica, entendida como la búsqueda de soluciones para los problemas que acechan a la salud es, por su objetivo, una de las actividades de mayor trascendencia para el ser humano. Esta obra colectiva, como su propio título indica, explora no solo lo mucho que de positivo (las luces) tiene la investigación clínica, cómo se realiza, qué problemas encuentra y qué soluciones se plantean, sino también algunos aspectos negativos (las sombras) que la comunidad científica ha sido, hasta la fecha, (...) incapaz de impedir que se produzcan. (shrink)

Philosophy is the search of truth. This means that philosophers are those which are looking for the truth, no matter where it could be. As a consequence, the study of previous philosophers can only have the role of an aid in order to reach this task. They are only means, not ends in themselves. The rest is ‘scholasticism’. As a true philosopher, Zubiri was changing all his life his mind and progressing in the analysis of reality. In this paper some (...) important differences between their two major works, On essence (1962) and Sentient intelligence (1980-1982) are analyzed. At the first glance it seems that both are talking about the same, ‘reality’, but the first is the analysis of what Zubiri calls ‘real-thing’ (cosa-realidad), while the goal of the second is the description of ‘reality’ as such, understood as the formality of the intellectual human approach to things. This difference, which seems minimal at the beginning, is at the end plenty of consequences, not only in the field of Metaphysics, but also in Anthropology and Theology. (shrink)

The relationship between science and philosophy has always been difficult. During thewhole classical and medieval periods, philosophy denied that science was an autonomousactivity, by defining it as epistéme or apodictic and deductive knowledge. Science thus cameto be confused with philosophy. This impeded the development of experimental scienceuntil well into the modern world. When, at the beginning of the 17thcentury, it breaks ontothe stage, a new process begins that will culminate in the 19th century, with philosophyturning into a theory of science. (...) Now it is science that denies a role to the philosophy.Such it was the work of the positivism. Zubiri considers that both science and philosophythey have their own specificity, but that they converge in a fundamental point, viz. beingknowledge about ousía or reality. There are three periods: between 1942 and 1960 he defines reality as “there are”; from 1960 to 1972 it is the “reality thing” as opposed to the“meaning thing”; and between 1973 and 1983 the character of “actuality” stands out. It ismainly in this last stage when Zubiri distinguishes three intellectual modes of actualizingreality: the most basic and immediate, common to science and philosophy, or “primordialapprehension of reality”, that proper to “logos”, merely descriptive, and that specificic to“reason” or what is formally explanatory. It is at this last level where both scientific andmetaphysical investigation unfold. Reason never exhausts reality, and for that reason itsknowledge is always penultimate. Whence the necessity to make explicit its ultimategrounds, which are those characteristic of the two previous strata.Las relaciones entre ciencia y filosofía han sido siempre difíciles. Durante toda la épocaclásica y medieval, la filosofía anuló a la ciencia como actividad autónoma, al definirla comoepistéme o saber apodíctico y deductivo. Ciencia venía a confundirse, de ese modo, confilosofía. Ello impidió el desarrollo de la ciencia experimental hasta bien entrado el mundomoderno. Cuando, a partir del siglo XVII, irrumpe con fuerza la ciencia moderna, se iniciaun nuevo proceso que culminaría en el siglo XIX, al convertirse la filosofía en teoría de laciencia. Ahora es la ciencia la que anula a la filosofía. Tal fue la obra del positivismo. Zubiri considera que ambas, ciencia y filosofía, tienen su propia especificidad, pero que convergen en un punto fundamental, el ser saberes sobre la ousía o realidad. Se diferencian tresperiodos: entre 1942 y 1960 define la realidad como “haber”, de 1960 a 1972 caracteriza la“cosa-realidad” por oposición a la “cosa-sentido”, y entre 1973 y 1983 resalta su carácter de“actualidad”. Es sobre todo en esta última etapa cuando Zubiri distingue tres modos intelectuales de actualización de la realidad, el más básico e inmediato, común a ciencia y filosofía, o “aprehensión primordial de realidad”, el propio del “lógos” o meramente descriptivo,y el específico de la “razón” o formalmente explicativo. Es en este último nivel en el que sedesarrollan tanto la investigación científica como la metafísica. La razón nunca agota larealidad, y por eso su conocimiento es siempre penúltimo. De ahí la necesidad de hacerexplícitos sus fundamentos últimos, que son los propios de los dos estratos previos. (shrink)

Los autores resultan tanto más difíciles de entender cuanto más originales son sus planteamientos. El contexto de lectura de las obras de un innovador no puede ser otro que el previo a la innovación, aquel en que se acuñaron los términos que por necesidad él tendrá que utilizar, bien que dotándoles de nuevo sentido. Lo normal es que este nuevo sentido pase inadvertido para el lector, que tenderá a interpretar esos términos en su sentido tradicional. Esto es por demás evidente (...) en el caso de la filosofía de Zubiri, al que con frecuencia se le ha interpretado con categorías racionalistas completamente extrañas a su pensamiento. En este artículo se intenta aclarar ese punto, confrontando la razón pura leibniziana con la inteligencia impura o sentiente de Zubiri. Son dos modos distintos de entender el pensamiento y la realidad, que generan a su vez dos teorías filosóficas divergentes. (shrink)

En el año 1986 Diego Gracia publicó el libro `Voluntad de verdad: Para leer a Zubiri`, que pronto se consagró como la obra de referencia para una primera introducción al pensamiento del filósofo español. Pero han pasado desde entonces treinta años, las obras publicadas de Zubiri y sobre Zubiri se han multiplicado, su interpretación ha ido evolucionando y el conocimiento sobre él es cada vez más amplio y profundo. Ya no es hora de hacer introducciones a su filosofía sino análisis (...) detallados y críticos de la misma. Eso es lo que Gracia ha intentado en múltiples trabajos sobre el tema publicados en diferentes lugares a lo largo de estas tres décadas (y en algunos que se publican por primera vez aquí). Antonio Pintor-Ramos se ha encargado de revisar todos esos trabajos, seleccionarlos, ordenarlos y formar con ellos el presente volumen, que ha resultado no ser una simple recopilación de textos sino un libro perfectamente organizado y sistemático. Esta obra ofrece, por tanto, una revisión actual del pensamiento de Zubiri, profunda y detallada, que sintetiza las diversas interpretaciones realizadas sobre él a la vez que expone con argumentos la que el propio Gracia asume como suya. (Fuente: Triacastela). (shrink)

Born in 1898, Zubiri’s life unfolds at the same time as the XX century. Though alreadyfully formed intellectually, during the decade of the twenties Zubiri is influenced by thephilosophies of life then in vogue in Europe and, especially is influenced by his teacher inMadrid, José Ortega and Gasset. This leads him to focus on the subject of God based onthe category of life. Religion is not a danger for the fullness of life, as Nietzsche argued, butjust the opposite: it is (...) the aspiration of the human being to a full and endless life. The contrast between this and the historical expression of religions, especially Catholicism, provoked a deep interior crisis for Zubiri. This crisis disappears toward the mid-thirties, afterhis sojourn in Germany and the influence of several authors, especially Heidegger. At thispoint he begins to focus on the topic of the religion in a new way that will no longer varysubstantially throughout the rest of his life. The formula of this change he expounded inhis university course university “Hellenism and Christianity” , opposing the“religion of life” to the “religation of life”. Life is not the original category. Life is religated.To what? To something that is difficult to define based on philosophy, but which Christiantheology expressed, through St. Paul, in the category of mysterion.Nacido el año 1898, la vida de Zubiri transcurre a la par que la del siglo XX. En plenaformación intelectual, durante la década de los años veinte, Zubiri recibe el influjo de lasfilosofías de la vida entonces en boga en Europa y, sobre todo, sufre la influencia de sumaestro más directo en Madrid, José Ortega y Gasset. Esto le lleva a enfocar el tema deDios desde la categoría de vida. La religión no es un peligro para la vitalidad, como defendióNietzsche sino todo lo contrario, la aspiración del ser humano a la vida plena e inacabable.El contraste entre esto y la expresión histórica de las religiones, en especial de la católica,le produjo una profunda crisis interior. Esta crisis desaparece hacia la mitad de los añostreinta, tras su permanencia en Alemania y el influjo de varios autores, en especial de Heidegger. A partir de aquí comienza a enfocar el tema de la religión de un nuevo modo, que yano variará sustancialmente a lo largo de su vida. La fórmula de este cambio la expresó en elcurso universitario “Helenismo y Cristianismo” , contraponiendo la “religión dela vida” a la “religación de la vida”. La vida no es la categoría originaria. La vida está religada. ¿A qué? A algo que desde la filosofía es difícil de definir, pero que la teología cristianaexpresó, a través de Pablo de Tarso, en la categoría de mysterion. (shrink)