Science is a form of distributed analysis involving both individual work that produces new knowledge and collaborative work to exchange information with the larger community. There are many particular ways in which individual and community can interact in science, and it is difficult to assess how efficient these are, and what the best way might be to support them. This paper reports on a series of experiments in this area and a prototype implementation using a research platform called CACHE. CACHE (...) both supports experimentation with different structures of interaction between individual and community cognition and serves as a prototype for computational support for those structures. We particularly focus on CACHE‐BC, the Bayes community version of CACHE, within which the community can break up analytical tasks into “mind‐sized” units and use provenance tracking to keep track of the relationship between these units. (shrink)

Modeling cognition by structural analysis of representation leads to systematic difficulties which are not resolvable. We analyse the merits and limits of a representation-based methodology to modeling cognition by treating Jackendoff's Consciousness and the Computational Mind as a good case study. We note the effects this choice of methodology has on the view of consciousness he proposes, as well as a more detailed consideration of the computational mind. The fundamental difficulty we identify is the conflict between the desire for modular (...) processors which map directly onto representations and the need for dynamically interacting control. Our analysis of this approach to modeling cognition is primarily directed at separating merits from problems and inconsistencies by a critique internal to this approach; we also step outside the framework to note the issues it ignores. (shrink)

Cognition is the flexible coupling of perception and action. Whether direct or complex, this coupling depends on representing information and operating upon it. Thus, representation and its partner, processing, are the most fundamental of ideas in cognitive science. Representations are the bundles of information on which processes operate. Cognitive processes such as perception and attention encode information from the world, thus creating or changing our representations. Processes of reasoning and decision making operate on representations to form new beliefs and to (...) specify particular actions. Process refers to the dynamic use of information. Representation refers to the information available for use. Loosely speaking, representations include the ideas, sights, images, and beliefs that fill our thoughts and also the sensations and dispositions which may fall outside our awareness. Because representation is such a central concept in cognitive science, the term is used in a number of related senses, and I will note a couple of these more specialized uses as the need arises. (shrink)