Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a (...) robust form of naive realism which is unfazed by the blurriness of some of our experiences, even when that blurriness is understood as a subjective modification of consciousness. (shrink)

This introductory textbook presents Christian philosophical and theological approaches to ethics. Combining their expertise in philosophy and theology, the authors explain the beliefs, values, and practices of various Christian ethical viewpoints, addressing biblical teachings as well as traditional ethical theories that contribute to informed moral decision-making. Each chapter begins with Words to Watch and includes a relevant case study on a vexing ethical issue, such as caring for the environment, human sexuality, abortion, capital punishment, war, and euthanasia. End-of-chapter reflection questions, (...) illustrations, and additional information tables are also included. (shrink)

I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—the basis problem. And second, it is less committed (...) than standard formulations are in the metaphysics of perception. (shrink)

Naïve Realists think that the ordinary mind-independent objects that we perceive are constitutive of the character of experience. Some understand this in terms of the idea that experience is diaphanous: that the conscious character of a perceptual experience is entirely constituted by its objects. My main goal here is to argue that Naïve Realists should reject this, but I’ll also highlight some suggestions as to how Naïve Realism might be developed in a non-diaphanous direction.

In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...) “see” does not have the sort of meaning (a purely perceptual meaning) which would sustain Turri's claims about the cases he offers (specifically, the (A) verdicts). (shrink)

I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . And thus we can’t sustain (...) fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that $p$ , a non-propositional view of seeing that $p$ is, I argue, perfectly intelligible. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory, as a method of management based on morals and behavior, must be grounded by a theory of ethics. However, traditional ethics of justice and rights cannot completely ground the theory. Following and expanding on the work of Wicks, Gilbert, and Freeman (1994), we believe that feminist ethics, invoking principles of caring, provides the missing element that allows moral theory to ground the stakeholder approach to management. Examples are given to support the suggested general principle for making business decisions (...) under feminist moral theory. (shrink)

Ordinary cases of object seeing involve the visual perception of space and spatial location. But does seeing an object require such spatial perception? An empirical challenge to the idea that it does comes from reflection upon Bálint's syndrome, for some suppose that in Bálint's syndrome subjects can see objects without seeing space or spatial location. In this article, I question whether the empirical evidence available to us adequately supports this understanding of Bálint's syndrome, and explain how the aforementioned empirical challenge (...) can be resisted. (shrink)

Table of Contents: Politics, morality, and pluralism -- Liberal morality and political legitimacy -- Political legitimacy and social justice -- Williams's concept of the political -- Legitimacy, stability, and morality -- The politics of morality -- A moral point of view -- Manners and morality -- Morality and conflict -- Moral conflict and political theory -- The morality of politics -- Feminism and multiculturalism -- A defense of culture -- Politics and normative conflict -- The political as moral viewpoint -- (...) Morality and politics: a review -- Political unity and pluralism -- The liberal archipelago -- Loose linkage and political legitimacy -- Political unity and the body politic -- Social justice and political unity -- The bonds of civility -- Nationhood and the liberal polity -- The nature of nationhood -- Pluralism and nationalism -- Nationalism and social justice -- Deliberative democracy and the liberal polity -- Liberalism and democracy -- Democracy and deliberative discourse -- The terms of deliberative discourse -- Normative discourse and political legitimacy -- Deliberative democracy and intragroup politics -- Group autonomy and intergroup discourse -- Politics, history, and reason -- Principle and justice in the liberal polity -- Liberal institutions and liberal ideals -- Stopping history -- Rationalism and politics. (shrink)

"Cover"--"Dedication"--"Title" -- "Copyright" -- "Contents" -- "Acknowledgements" -- "1 Introduction: Dimensions of Fairness" -- "The Material and Formal Dimension of Concepts" -- "Two Concepts of Fairness" -- "Fairness and Respect for Persons" -- "2 Objectivity, Impartiality, and Fairness" -- "Taking Advantage and Disadvantaging" -- "Impartiality and Bias" -- "Disadvantaging and Personal Interests" -- "3. Fair Shares" -- "The Principle of Fairness" -- "Fairness and Equality" -- "Presumptive Equality" -- "Fairness and Associative Attachments" -- "4 Fairness and Following Rules" -- "Fairness (...) and Formal Justice" -- "Procedural and Background Fairness" -- "Following Rules and Acting Unfairly" -- "Fair Bargains and Bargaining Fairly" -- "5. Fidelity to Social Practice" -- "Social Practices" -- "The Fundamentals of Fairness" -- "Fairness and Distribution" -- "The Limits of Fairness" -- "6 Toward a Moral Theory of Fairness" -- "Traditions of Moral Discourse" -- "The Morality of Happiness" -- "Fairness and Interactive Morality" -- "Fairness and Associative Morality" -- "Fairness and Consent" -- "7. Simple Fairness" -- ""Being Fair To... "" -- "Facilitative Fairness: Simple Accommodation" -- "Facilitative Fairness: Lotteries" -- "Taking Turns and Respect For Others" -- "8 Fair Procedures" -- "Hard Bargains" -- "Fairness and Rational Choice" -- "Perfect and Imperfect Procedural Justice" -- "9 Fairness and Virtue" -- "The Fairness of Social Practices" -- "Fairmindedness" -- "Fairness as an End" -- "Bibliography. (shrink)

This work introduces and defends a radically different type of liberal political theory by severing liberal thought from all underlying moral foundations. Its aim is to present a type of liberalism capable of accommodating the richly diverse differences of worldview and moral theory of the good present in today's pluralist societies. By constructing liberalism as a purely political doctrine, the author develops a theory of toleration, and civil association more generally, capable of meeting liberalism's historic commitment to diversity. While the (...) justification for such a liberalism must be made in prudential terms, rather than the more familiar moral terms used to support competing liberal theories, the liberalism developed here remains faithful to the liberal tradition by defending a theory of equal liberty as the primary political virtue of a just society. (shrink)

In his landmark monograph, "The Politics of Jesus", John Howard Yoder challenged mainstream Christian social ethics by arguing that the New Testament account of Jesus's founding of a messianic community entails a normative politics, not only for early Christianity but for the contemporary church. This challenge is further elaborated in several important posthumous publications, especially "Preface to Theology", in which Yoder examines the development of early Christology with attention to its political and ethical implications, and "The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited", Yoder's (...) proposal for a renewed Jewish-Christian dialogue around the moral meaning of messianism. This article interprets these writings with reference to a range of critical scholarship on and about Yoder, Yoder and Augustine, and Jewish and Christian messianism, paying particular attention to questions of political ethics. (shrink)

This work contains newly translated excerpts from Samuel Pufendor's two major works in political and moral thought, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence and The Law of Nature and Nations. The editor and translator have worked to present a readable and comprehensive introduction to Pufendorf's political philosophy. The new English translation far exceeds what is currently available in terms of sophistication and clarity. A substantive introduction is included to acquaint readers with Pufendorf's ideas.

Some have argued that we can put pressure on a relational view of experience with reference to the fact that the idiosyncrasies of perceivers can affect the qualitative characters of their experiences. Quassim Cassam calls this the problem of idiosyncratic perception. I defend the relational view in response to this problem.

Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 102-119, October 2020.

The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that (...) can be used to make the argument valid. But we argue that the obvious fixes are problematic. If our arguments are successful, we show that the argument from illusion is even more difficult to defend than is commonly acknowledged. (shrink)

Quassim Cassam offers a conception of ways of knowing which he argues is preferable to rival accounts such as the account we find in Williamson. The correct way to think about ways of knowing matters for philosophers, such as Cassam and Williamson, who want to understand knowledge itself in terms of ways of knowing. So is Cassam right that his conception of ways of knowing is preferable to Williamson's? The discussion to follow is irenic in spirit: I will argue that (...) in fact Cassam and Williamson don't offer competing accounts of the same phenomenon, but consistent accounts of subtly different phenomena. It is then open that ways of knowing in both senses are relevant to elucidating knowledge itself. (shrink)

We explore the better known paradoxes of Zeno including modern variants based on infinite processes, from the point of view of standard, classical analysis, from which there is still much to learn (especially concerning the paradox of division), and then from the viewpoints of non-standard and non-classical analysis (the logic of the latter being intuitionist).The standard, classical or Cantorian notion of the continuum, modeled on the real number line, is well known, as is the definition of motion as the time (...) derivative of distance (we are not concerned with position and motion in more than one dimension, since Zeno wasn't). The real number line consists of its points, the distance between distinct points being positive and finite. The standard, classical derivative relies on the classical notion of limit, which does not use infinitesimals. (shrink)

Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a (...) robust form of naive realism which is unfazed by the blurriness of some of our experiences, even when that blurriness is understood as a subjective modification of consciousness. (shrink)

In an influential series of papers, Cleland (2001, 2002, 2011) argued that historical natural scientists employ a distinctive methodology—which exploits Lewis (1979)s asymmetry of over determination—that is capable of putting knowledge of the deep past on an epistemic par with experimental knowledge. Currie (2018) clarified the nature of the asymmetry claim and used it to argue for a more restricted form of optimism toward the historical sciences. This optimism is licensed by the evidential redundancy that the asymmetry of over determination (...) guarantees.In this chapter I show that the argument for the asymmetry of over determination is circular and the thesis is false. Over determination toward the past is smuggled in from the start by ruling out of consideration so-called backtracking counterfactuals. By banning backtracking counterfactuals, consideration is restricted to possible worlds in which the over determination thesis holds. But in the actual world, the present is compatible with many different histories. (shrink)

The practice of psychology in rural areas offers unique challenges for psychologists as they try to provide optimal care, often with a minimum of resources. Psychologists are frequently required to be creative and flexible in order to provide effective services to a wide range of clients. However, these unique challenges often confront psychologists with ethical dilemmas and problems for which their urban-based training has not prepared them. The author examines how certain characteristics of rural communities may lead to specific ethical (...) dilemmas. By being a part of a small community, psychologists will inevitably face multiple relationship dilemmas. Confidentiality is harder to maintain in a small town, particularly with its informal information-sharing network. To provide services to meet community needs, with a limited number of referral options, psychologists typically need to be generalists. This may lead to concerns about scope of practice, training, and experience with diverse populations. Psychologists also face other competency issues, such as a lack of supervision and consultation resources. Other concerns addressed include the psychologist's visibility in the community, having clients know about the psychologist's personal life, and the blurring of professional and personal roles. Suggestions are made for coping with each of these ethical issues, although more quantitative research and discussion are needed on the practice of psychology in rural areas. (shrink)

In this paper I describe the context and goals of Francisco Vallés' In IV librum Meteorologicorum commentaria. Vallés' work stands as a landmark because it interprets a work of Aristotle's natural philosophy specifically for medical doctors and medical theory. Vallés' commentary is representative of new understandings of Galenic-Hippocratic medi-cine that emerged as a result of expanding textual knowledge. These approaches are evident in a number of sixteenth-century commentaries on Meteorologica IV; in particular the works of Pietro Pomponazzi, Lodovico Boccadiferro, Jacob (...) Schegk, and Francesco Vimercati. Vallés' conviction that Meteorologica IV is relevant to medical knowledge depends on his understanding of Aristotle's theory of homeomerous substances and their relation to composite substances. The application of Meteorologica IV to medical topics became commonplace in the following years, and this Aristotelian book became widely known as a bridge between natural philosophy and medicine. (shrink)

The subject of meteorology was central to Girolamo Cardano’s thought. It held together his encyclopedism by tying the celestial realm to the sublunary world and human action. Meteorology, for Cardano, links abstract knowledge to the practical and operative. While many of his Aristotelian predecessors understood weather prediction as distinct from meteorology as a natural philosophical field, Cardano’s profound interest in conjectural arts and probabilistic reasoning led him to tie causal explanations to methods of forecasting future conditions of the air and (...) their effects on humans, especially regarding health and disease. While it might be expected that Cardano would have emphasized astrological tools for weather forecasting, instead he went in a different direction, namely, embracing the ancient tradition of weather signs and revising Aristotelian theories of winds. At the end of his career, which he mostly spent writing commentaries on Hippocratic writings, he integrated his understanding of weather signs with Hippocratic rules of prognosis, revising traditional understandings of the causes of winds. (shrink)

How ought we respond to advance directives that appear to fly in the face of a severely mentally impaired patient's quality of life? An advance directive is a legal instrument wherein a person records instructions regarding the medical treatment that she is to receive in the event that she becomes persistently incapable of refusing or giving informed consent to treatment. Where these instructions are legally binding, they enable a person to exercise control over her future medical treatment. This has been (...) welcomed by some on the grounds that it increases patient autonomy, but there has also been concern that in cases in which a patient is left conscious but severely mentally impaired, the person's advance .. (shrink)

I argue that George Ainslie’s model of Hyperbolic Discounting fails to yield strict akratic action. But it does yield a deflated view. Furthermore, by understanding the nature of a hyperbolically discounting self, we can also offer a deflated view of self-deception, according to which self-deception is motivated error by hyperbolic discounters who desire to view themselves as rational.

Cowan, Ruth Schwartz (1983) More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave. New York: Basic. ...