This book examines slavery and gender through a feminist reading of narratives including female slaves in the Gospel of Luke, the Acts of the Apostles, and early Christian texts. Through the literary theory of Mikhail Bakhtin, the voices of three enslaved female characters—the female slave who questions Peter in Luke 22, Rhoda in Acts 12, and the prophesying slave of Acts 16—are placed into dialogue with female slaves found in the Apocryphal Acts, ancient novels, classical texts, and images of enslaved (...) women on funerary monuments. Although ancients typically distrusted the words of slaves, Christy Cobb argues that female slaves in Luke-Acts speak truth to power, even though their gender and status suggest that they cannot. In this Bakhtinian reading, female slaves become truth-tellers and their words confirm aspects of Lukan theology. This exegetical, theoretical, and interdisciplinary book is a substantial contribution to conversations about women and slaves in Luke-Acts and early Christian literature. (shrink)

Usama ibn Munqidh. The Book of Contemplation: Islam and the Crusades. Translated, with introduction and notes, by Paul M. Cobb. Penguin Classics. London: Penguin, 2008. Pp. xlviii + 339, map, family tree. $16.

The idea that our economic institutions should be designed meritocratically is back as a hot topic in western academic circles. At the same time political meritocracy is once again a subject of philosophical discussion, with some Western philosophers embracing epistocracy and Confucianism being revived among Eastern philosophers. This survey has the ambition, first, of putting differing strands of this literature into dialogue with each other: the economic with the political, and the Western with the Eastern. Second, we seek here to (...) impose order on the debates over meritocracy by carefully separating out the four steps that must be traversed on the journey to a meritocratic conclusion. Third we want to promote a more productive debate moving forward by cleanly pulling apart three kinds of purported merit base. (shrink)

In the paper, titled ‘Choosing death in unjust conditions: hope, autonomy and harm reduction,’ Wiebe and Mullin argue that people living in unjust social conditions are sufficiently autonomous to request medical assistance in dying (MAiD). The ethical issue is that some people may request MAiD primarily because of unjust social conditions, not their illness, disease, disability or decline in capability. It is easily agreed that people living in unjust social conditions can be autonomous. Nevertheless, Wiebe and Mullin fail to appreciate (...) that autonomy is only a necessary condition for MAiD. In addition to autonomy, one must decide that providing assisted dying to a patient because they are living in unjust social conditions is ethical. Central to making this ethical decision is the principle of non-maleficence, famously articulated as ‘do no harm.’ The authors admit that performing MAiD in response to unjust social circumstances is harmful, but they justify this harmful action by appealing to the principle of harm reduction. A fundamental flaw of their approach is that it relies on the legislative definition of intolerable suffering, which is based on circular reasoning and given that 99.2% of patients that have applied for MAiD satisfied this criterion, it is essentially equivalent to no standard/criterion. Canadian society is struggling with the ethical implications of its permissive MAiD programme, and, fundamental to this debate, will be determining the proper balance between autonomy and non-maleficence for people living in unjust social conditions. (shrink)

The recent desperation to clone human embryos may be seriously undermining accepted ethical principles of medical research, with potentially profound wider consequencesIn her editorial in the February 2005 issue of this journal, Nikola Biller-Andorno questioned whether the effort and resources that have been invested in debates about cloning at the United Nations might have been somewhat disproportionate, if a binding universal agreement on reproductive cloning cannot be reached.1 Although most of the overt disagreement has centred around “therapeutic” cloning, rather than (...) the potential use of nuclear transfer for reproduction, it is none the less clear that the delay and ultimate failure to date in achieving consensus on the former has also increased the likelihood of the latter becoming a foreseeable reality in the absence of a legally binding global convention. Whilst the much heralded promise of therapies has now been severely undermined by scandals of fraud,2 the available evidence from various primate studies3–5 and the history of similar work with other mammalian species6,7 have provided little reason to doubt that human reproductive cloning might be possible in principle . I completely agree with Dr Biller-Andorno’s appeal that we need to “foster a genuine, worldwide discourse on bioethical issues” and not let our debate get completely derailed by vested interests, whether politically or economically motivated. If we don’t, we can probably expect dire consequences for the future of biomedical research and its impact on society at large.Prior to the United Nations’ discussions regarding a ban on human cloning in October 2004, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority in Great Britain announced that they had granted their first licence to clone human embryos by nuclear transfer,8 though no other applications had apparently been made following the legalisation …. (shrink)

The word ‘meritocracy’ was coined by Michael Young in 1958 in his book The Rise of the Meritocracy (Young [1958] 2017]), and philosophical discussions under tha.

ABSTRACT When hope is discussed in bioethics’ literature, it is most often in the context of ‘false hopes’ and/or how to maintain hope while breaking bad news to patients. Little or no time is generally devoted to the description of hope that supports these analyses. In this paper, I present a detailed description of hope, one designed primarily for the healthcare context. Noting that hope is an emotional attitude, four key aspects are explored. In particular, the function of imagination in (...) hope is discussed in depth. Through an examination of the relationship between hope and vulnerability, I demonstrate how adequately describing hope can broaden the normative inquiry into the role of hope in healthcare. Three ways in which persons with hope can be vulnerable are illustrated, and the challenge of how healthcare providers can attend in moral ways to the hopes of patients is identified. (shrink)

ABSTRACT When hope is discussed in bioethics’ literature, it is most often in the context of ‘false hopes’ and/or how to maintain hope while breaking bad news to patients. Little or no time is generally devoted to the description of hope that supports these analyses. In this paper, I present a detailed description of hope, one designed primarily for the healthcare context. Noting that hope is an emotional attitude, four key aspects are explored. In particular, the function of imagination in (...) hope is discussed in depth. Through an examination of the relationship between hope and vulnerability, I demonstrate how adequately describing hope can broaden the normative inquiry into the role of hope in healthcare. Three ways in which persons with hope can be vulnerable are illustrated, and the challenge of how healthcare providers can attend in moral ways to the hopes of patients is identified. (shrink)

John–Michael Kuczynski says the “paradox of analysis” can be resolved with the proper definition of “partial knowledge.” He says that this definition will not do: (K) S has partial knowledge of x = dfS knows some, but not all, of x’s parts. He offers an alternative account of incomplete or partial knowledge. I argue here that: (a) Kuczynski’s chief criticisms of (K) are defective; (b) his proposed solution to the paradox of analysis has no clear application to the paradox in (...) its familiar forms; and (c) his solution may not avoid the puzzle about partial knowledge it was designed to resolve. (shrink)

The new awareness of limits profoundly challenges dominant habits of mind and styles of life. Although Christians have largely adopted these now inappropriate habits and styles, the Christian tradition has resources for a more appropriate response. Among these resources are Christian realism, the eschatological attitude, the discernment of Christ, the way of the cross, and prophetie vision. Finally, faith offers freedom from the burden of guilt of failing to live in a way appropriate to our newly perceived reality.

This book is a defense of political liberalism as a feminist liberalism. A novel and restrictive account of public reason is defended. Then it is argued that political liberalism's core commitments restrict reasonable conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine, substantive equality for women and other marginalized groups.

Zeitgeist Literature is offered here as a term with great potential as a conceptual tool for analyzing literature that responds to the moment in which it was written. Such literature chronicles the social and political life of the current moment, its trends and moods, and the mysterious forces that dictate tastes, manners, feelings, and actions of the collective.

Roots are good to think with indeed most of us use them as a metaphor every day. A root can signify the hiddenness of our beginnings, or, in its bifurcating structure, the various possibilities in the life of an individual or a collective. This book looks at rootedness as a metaphor for the genealogical origins of people and their attachment to place and how this metaphor transformed so rapidly in twentieth-century Europe. Christy Wampole s case study is France, with (...) its contradictory legacies of Enlightenment universalism, anti-Semitism, and colonialism. At one time, French nationalist rhetoric portrayed the Jews as unrooted and thus unrighteous people. After the two world wars, the root metaphor figured in the new French philosophy (notably Deleuze and Guattari). And recently, Caribbean thinkers in Haiti, Guadeloupe, and Martinique have debated whether their roots were in Africa, France, the Caribbean, or in some pan-national network that could not be identified on a map. Walpole argues that while the metaphor was perhaps once useful in the establishment of communities and identities, that usefulness has expired. The longer we remain attached to the figure of rootedness, the more discord it sows. Giving up on the metaphor of rootedness, Wampole urges, allows us to see at last that we are in fact unbound by the land we inhabit.". (shrink)

Reply to article 'Political Perception and Ensemble of Macro Objectives and Measures: The Paradox of the Index for Sustainable Economic Welfare' by Rafael Ziegler in Environmental Values vol.16 no.1, pp.43-60.

"To what extent can legal decisions be objective and fair, and how far does government depend on the law for its legitimacy? This concise analytical book examines the theory of both individual and political justice, concluding that many modern legal philosophers have undermined the prestige of the law by exaggerated claims in its defence. This is a basic book in jurisprudence"--Jacket.

In Darwinism's Struggle for Survival Jean Gayon offers a philosophical interpretation of the history of theoretical Darwinism. He begins by examining the different forms taken by the hypothesis of natural selection in the nineteenth century and the major difficulties which it encountered, particularly with regard to its compatibility with the theory of heredity. He then shows how these difficulties were overcome during the seventy years which followed the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species, and he concludes by analysing the major (...) features of the genetic theory of natural selection, as it developed from 1920 to 1960. This rich and wide-ranging study will appeal to philosophers and historians of science and to evolutionary biologists. (shrink)

This groundbreaking book is the first to provide a critical overview of the relationship between contemporary ceramics and curatorial practice in museum culture. Ceramic objects form a major part of museum collections, with connections to anthropology, archaeology and other disciplines that engage with the cultural and social history of humankind. In recent years museums have provided the impetus for cutting-edge artistic practice, either as a response to particular collections, or as part of exhibitions. But the question of how museums have (...) staged contemporary ceramics and how ceramic artists respond to museum collections has not been the subject of published research to date. This book examines how ceramic artists have, over the last decade, begun to animate museum collections in new ways, and reflects on the impact that these new initiatives have had in the broad context of visual culture. Ceramics in the Expanded Field is the culmination of a three-year AHRC funded project, and reflects its major findings. It brings together leading international voices in the field of ceramics, research undertaken throughout the project and papers delivered at the concluding conference. By examining the benefits and constraints of interventions and the dialogue between ceramics and museological practice, this book will bring focus to an area of museology that has not yet been theorized, and will contribute to policy debates and art practice. (shrink)

Philosopher Kings? The Adjudication of Conflicting Human Rights and Social Values, by George C. Christie, examines the attempts by courts to sort out conflicts involving freedom of expression, including religious expression, on the one hand, and rights to privacy and other important social values on the other. It approaches the subject from a comparative perspective, using principally cases decided by European and United States courts. A significant part of this book analyzes conflicts between freedom of expression and the right to (...) privacy. In a world in which, freedom of expression and privacy are said to be of equal value, the book explores whether it is possible to develop, through case-by-case adjudication, a legal regime which can give clear direction as to what expression is or is not permitted. Otherwise, if such a regime proves impossible, in the guise of recognizing the equal value of expression and privacy, privacy may become de facto the preferred value. (shrink)

Is a feminist political liberalism possible? Political liberalism’s regard for a wide range of comprehensive doctrines as reasonable makes some feminists skeptical of its ability to address sex inequality. Indeed, some feminists claim that political liberalism maintains its position as a political liberalism at the expense of securing substantive equality for women. We claim that political liberalism’s core commitments actually restrict all reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine substantive equality for all, including women and other marginalized (...) groups. In particular, we argue that political liberalism’s criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that eliminate social conditions of domination and subordination relevant to reasonable democratic deliberation among equal citizens and that the criterion of reciprocity requires the social conditions necessary for recognition respect among persons as equal citizens. As a result, we maintain that the criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that provide genuine equality for women along various dimensions of social life central to equal citizenship. (shrink)

G. E. Moore opined that the paradox of analysis might be avoided if it could be shown that sentences expressing conceptual analyses convey information not only about concepts, but also about the expressions they use. If so, “to be a brother is to be a male sibling” and “to be a brother is to be a brother” might express the same proposition, and yet not be identical in information value as the paradox suggests. How sentences might do this, Moore could (...) not see. Many philosophers have pointed out an obvious way in which sentences might be said to convey information about the expressions they use. Some have suggested this information might be used to develop Moore's intuition and resolve the paradox of analysis. I argue that this approach fails. I present a version of the paradox of analysis that resists this sort of solution. (shrink)

That each of us is unique is probably why I find drawing and painting the human form a constant challenge. Searching for that spirit within is what it's all about for me—whether best expressed through the tilt of the head, The curve of a wrist or through an expression in the eyes. For many years I have kept a sketch pad and pen, or charcoal, In a separate purse, just in case something or someone of interest might appeal to me, (...) To draw as I pass the time, In doctors' offices, airports and bus stations, places where I seem to be spending more of my time, waiting for my number to be called. It occurred to me these were ideal opportunities to people watch—opportunities for a moment in time to be captured, To be revealed—before he, she or they became conscious of being watched. If I feel that anyone is puzzled by my staring, or made uncomfortable by my intrusion, I wave a hand, turn the sketch toward them, and share what I am doing. Once, at the airport, I saw a toddler who had fallen sound asleep in his chair. I asked the father if I could sketch his son. He acquiesced, with one caveat: "Don't wake him up." After 15 minutes, simultaneously, I finished, The child woke up, And The announcement came over the PA system. Time to get in line. Trying to convey what seems to be special about a person—it takes awhile to see what I want to record. But in these sketches I look for what speaks to me, when I am not making an effort to get a likeness, and am led by JOY. It's so satisfying for me, and takes me into another kind of world. - Mary Cobb. (shrink)