We show that three fundamental information-theoretic constraints -- the impossibility of superluminal information transfer between two physical systems by performing measurements on one of them, the impossibility of broadcasting the information contained in an unknown physical state, and the impossibility of unconditionally secure bit commitment -- suffice to entail that the observables and state space of a physical theory are quantum-mechanical. We demonstrate the converse derivation in part, and consider the implications of alternative answers to a remaining open question about (...) nonlocality and bit commitment. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that there are valuable consonances between democratic theory and music theory, and between democratization and musical performance and enjoyment. We suggest that this connection is not as trite as it may first appear, but that, since democracy is learned and practiced in a myriad ofways, music is one such place to learn democratic citizenship. The paper begins with a normative account of democratic theory that is present in two movements. The first, “foundations,” explicates the essential (...) components, criteria, and conditions of democracy. The second, “flows,” addresses the dynamism of democratization. Here is an account of what democracy looks like in action. We then turn to an explication of music theory and improvisation. Here, we focus on jazz as a way to hear the kind of interplay, responsiveness, accountability, discipline, and extemporaneousness that occurs in good jazz, and in authentic (radical) democracy. (shrink)

We study thorn forking and rosiness in the context of continuous logic. We prove that the Urysohn sphere is rosy (with respect to finitary imaginaries), providing the first example of an essentially continuous unstable theory with a nice notion of independence. In the process, we show that a real rosy theory which has weak elimination of finitary imaginaries is rosy with respect to finitary imaginaries, a fact which is new even for discrete first-order real rosy theories.

We develop a basic theory of rosy groups and we study groups of small Uþ-rank satisfying NIP and having finitely satisfiable generics: Uþ-rank 1 implies that the group is abelian-by-finite, Uþ-rank 2 implies that the group is solvable-by-finite, Uþ-rank 2, and not being nilpotent-by-finite implies the existence of an interpretable algebraically closed field.

We use the comparative method of language acquisition research to investigate children’s expression of directional expressions in two Eastern Mayan languages – K’iche’ and Mam. Both languages add clitics derived from verbs such as ‘go’ and ‘stay’ to their verb complex to express the direction an agent takes in the course of accomplishing an event. Historic changes to the prosodic structure of the verb complex in both languages explain why the directional clitics are predominately postverbal in K’iche’, while they occur (...) in preverbal and postverbal positions in Mam. Prosody explains why K’iche’ children initially produce clitics postverbally, while Mam children produce clitics both preverbally and postverbally. Prosody also explains why the children acquiring both languages produce morphemes in the verb complex that are relatively infrequent but prosodically prominent, while omitting obligatory morphemes that are prosodically weak. (shrink)

We define a notion of residue field domination for valued fields which generalizes stable domination in algebraically closed valued fields. We prove that a real closed valued field is dominated by the sorts internal to the residue field, over the value group, both in the pure field and in the geometric sorts. These results characterize forking and þ-forking in real closed valued fields (and also algebraically closed valued fields). We lay some groundwork for extending these results to a power-bounded T-convex (...) theory. (shrink)

In this paper, we prove the following:Theorem. Let M be a rosy dependent theory and letp,pbe non-þ-forking extensions ofp∈Switha0a1; assume thatp∪pis consistent and thata0,a1start a þ-independent indiscernible sequence. Thenp∪pis a non-þ-forking extension ofp.We also provide an example to show that the result is not true without assuming NIP.

A survey of university students tested whether committing animal abuse during childhood was related to approval of interpersonal violence against children and women in families. Respondents who had abused an animal as children or adolescents were significantly more likely to support corporal punishment, even after controlling for frequency of childhood spanking, race, biblical literalism, and gender. Those who had perpetrated animal abuse were also more likely to approve of a husband slapping his wife. Engaging in childhood violence against less powerful (...) beings— animals—may generalize to the acceptance of violence against less powerful members of families and society—women and children. This paper discusses the implications of this process. (shrink)

The liberal-communitarian debates, which became prominent in social and political philosophy during the 1980s, continue to be waged in those disciplines and in politics today with even more fervor, and this time, both the ‘80s and the ‘90s are called forth as bleak and sorry evidence for one side or the other. The current scene is reminiscent of some of the ‘60s ideological disputes, especially the reformist critique of conservatism within liberalism. And that dispute itself is reminiscent of yet another, (...) the one from whence it derived, John Dewey's well-known opposition of new and old individualism. (shrink)

This paper presents its author's famous distinction between globalization, as the process or vehicle by which ideas, habits and worldviews travel from one culture to another and are transformed in the process, and mundialization, as the taking in of the outside world into our own lifeworlds, a process by which the ideas and customs of other cultures are transported into our homeworlds. In this process, what was once strange and unfamiliar is transformed into something comfortable and familiar. This is the (...) process that is generally known as cultural assimilation, and by virtue of which the boundaries of our individual homeworlds become constantly widened. Examining this phenomenon, which he calls the 'mundialization of home', leads the author to sketch the main features of a possible transcultural moral world. (shrink)

Like any construction of the human mind, ideologies and utopias are products of reason and social imagination. The human interactions they feed off are nowadays being intensified by processes of globalization. Utopian projects, which are by nature ambitious, consist of dreams of freedom and equality but the voluntarist character of their implementation very often takes them far from their declared objectives. Thus utopia frequently tips over into ideology. In order to survive, utopia has to go through a process of ‘universalization’ (...) that allows ideas from different cultures to develop and mature in contact with one another. By forging bonds between individuals and cultures, this process could define the outlines of a constantly evolving global civil society. Universalization of conceptualizations that transform and motivate us, such as the global inclusivity of human rights, freedom and justice, builds an ethic of peace for the emergence, beyond frontiers, of an extended society such as that envisioned by the American philosopher John Dewey. (shrink)

The main aim of this essay is to show that, for Stevens, the concept of reality is very fluctuating. The essay begins with addressing the relationship between poetry and philosophy. I argue, contra Critchley, that Stevens’ poetic work can elucidate, or at least help us to understand better, the ideas of philosophers that are usually considered obscure. The main “obscure” philosophical work introduced in and discussed throughout the essay is Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism. Both a (shellingian) philosopher and a (...) (stevensian) poet search for reality. In order to understand Stevens’ poetry better, I distingush several concepts of reality: initial reality (the external world of the common sense), imagined reality (a fiction, a product of one’s mind), final reality (the object of a philosopher’s and a poet’s search) and total reality (the sum of all realities, Being). These determinations are fixed by reason (in the present essay), whereas in Stevens’ poetic works, they are made fluid by the imagination. This fluidity leads the concept of reality from its initial stage through the imagined stage to its final stage. Throughout this process, imagined reality must be distinguished from both a mere fancy and its products. Final reality is, however, nothing transcendent. It is rather a general transpersonal order of reality created by poetry/the imagination. The main peculiarity of final reality is that it is a dynamic order. It is provisional at each moment. Stevens (and Schelling too) characterizes this order as that of a work of art which is a finite object, but has an infinite meaning. Stevens calls this order “the central poem” or the “endlessly elaborating poem”. If ultimate reality is a poem created by the imagination, one may ask who is the imagining subject. I argue that this agent is best to be thought as total reality, that is, as Being. Stevens, however, maintains that if there were such an agency, it would be an inhuman agency, “an inhuman meditation”. The essay concludes, in a Derridian manner, with the claim that this agency cannot have any name; it is the “unnamed creator of an unknown sphere, / Unknown as yet, unknowable, / Uncertain certainty” (OP: 127). It is best thought as an X, as an unknown variable. Being has no name. (shrink)