Committee protocols typically involve a deliberation stage in which members try to influence and convince other regarding the “right” decision. Beyond information exchange, such deliberations also aim to affect the preferences and the votes of other members. Using a model of social influence, we demonstrate how deliberation procedures affect the voting outcome and how different protocols of consultation by committees’ chairs may affect their decisions. We then analyze the ability of a “designer” to control the deliberation protocol and to manipulate (...) the deliberation procedure to increase the probability that the outcome he favors will be selected. (shrink)

The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model in which players decide on search procedures for a prize located in one of a set of labeled boxes. The prize is awarded to the player who finds it first. A player can decide on the number of (costly) search units he employs and on the order in which he conducts the search. It is shown that in equilibrium, the players employ an equal number of search units and conduct a completely random search. (...) The paper demonstrates that the search procedure is intrinsically inefficient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D83. (shrink)