Lexical Semantics is about the meaning of words. Although obviously a central concern of linguistics, the semantic behaviour of words has been unduly neglected in the current literature, which has tended to emphasize sentential semantics and its relation to formal systems of logic. In this textbook D. A. Cruse establishes in a principled and disciplined way the descriptive and generalizable facts about lexical relations that any formal theory of semantics will have to encompass. Among the topics covered in depth (...) are idiomaticity, lexical ambiguity, synonymy, hierarchical relations such as hyponymy and meronymy, and various types of oppositeness. Syntagmatic relations are also treated in some detail. The discussions are richly illustrated by examples drawn almost entirely from English. Although a familiarity with traditional grammar is assumed, readers with no technical linguistic background will find the exposition always accessible. All readers with an interest in semantics will find in this original text not only essential background but a stimulating new perspective on the field. (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to the ways in which meaning is conveyed in language. Alan Cruse covers semantic matters, but also deals with topics that are usually considered to fall under pragmatics. A major aim is to highlight the richness and subtlety of meaning phenomena, rather than to expound any particular theory.

A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be thought of as a stance: an attitude of mind or methodological orientation rather than a factual belief. In this article I will examine his (...) arguments for this claim in detail. I will argue that they do not succeed and that empiricism is, contrary to van Fraassen's claim, better thought of as a truth‐evaluable doctrine than as a stance. (shrink)

Representative for contemporary attempts to establish a science of consciousness we examine Chalmers' statement and resolution of the 'hard problem of consciousness'. Agreeing with him that in order to account for subjectivity it is necessary to expand the ontology of the natural sciences, we argue that it is not sufficient to just add conscious experience to the list of fundamental features of the world. Instead, we turn to phenomenology as the philosophy of conscious experience and give an outline of Merleau-Ponty's (...) critique of the objectivist ontology underlying science which excludes subjectivity from the world. We reconstruct his proposal for a revised ontology in The Visible and the Invisible aiming at an extended understanding of Being including subjectivity, which takes on the form of a constellation of new ontological terms centered around the concept of the 'flesh of the world'. Trying to spell out the consequences of Merleau-Ponty's ontological considerations for scientific practice and especially the science of consciousness, we notice that his philosophy of subjectivity-in-the-world on its part is unable to connect to the insights of the natural sciences. The phenomenological critique of the 'hard problem' reveals a deeper disparity which, at present, limits its practical implications. (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to the ways in which meaning is conveyed in language. Alan Cruse covers semantic matters, but also deals with topics that are usually considered to fall under pragmatics. A major aim is to highlight the richness and subtlety of meaning phenomena, rather than to expound any particular theory. Rich in examples and exercises, Meaning in Language provides an invaluable descriptive approach to this area of linguistics for undergraduates and postgraduates alike.

Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaçoet al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by Colaçoet (...) al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers. (shrink)

Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaço et al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by (...) Colaço et al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers. (shrink)

Self-fulfillment of theories is argued to be a threat to social science in at least two ways. First, a realist might worry that self-fulfillment constitutes a threat to the idea that social science is a proper science consistent with a realist approach that develops true and successful statements about the world. Second, one might argue that the potential self-fulfilling nature of social science theories potentially undermines the ethical integrity of social scientists. We argue that if one accepts that social science (...) theories are not based on laws akin to those that govern natural reality or acknowledges that if one can predict self-fulfillment via a meta-theory that explains the underlying regularities of the self-fulfilling change, the threat to realism is dismantled. Furthermore, on the basis of these arguments, we show that if one is unable to predict the consequences of a theory, it is difficult to ascribe moral responsibility at the individual level. It is, therefore, not the potential self-fulfillment of theories per se that poses an ethical challenge, in contrast to claims in the literature. (shrink)

Rich with analyses of concepts from deconstruction, systems theory, and post-Marxism, with critiques of fundamentalist thought and the war on terror, this ...

Behavior may be controlled by reactive systems. In a reactive system the motor output is exclusively driven by actual sensory input. An alternative solution to control behavior is given by “cognitive” systems capable of planning ahead. To this end the system has to be equipped with some kind of internal world model. A sensible basis of an internal world model might be a model of the system's own body. I show that a reactive system with the ability to control a (...) body of complex geometry requires only a slight reorganization to form a cognitive system. This implies that the assumption that the evolution of cognitive properties requires the introduction of new, additional modules, namely internal world models, is not justified. Rather, these modules may already have existed before the system obtained cognitive properties. Furthermore, I discuss whether the occurrence of such world models may lead to systems having internal perspective. (shrink)

PurposeThe paper aims to explore future and emerging information and communication technologies. It gives a general overview of the social consequences and ethical issues arising from technologies that can currently be reasonably expected. This overview is used to present recommendations and integrate these in a framework of responsible innovation.Design/methodology/approachThe identification of emerging ICTs and their ethical consequences is based on the review and analysis if several different bodies of literature. The individual features of the ICTs and the ethical issues identified (...) this way are then aggregated and analysed.FindingsThe paper outlines the 11 ICTs identified. Some of the shared features that are likely to have social relevance include an increase in natural interaction, the invisibility of technology, direct links between humans and technology, detailed models and data of humans and an increasing autonomy of technology that may lead to power over the user. Ethical issues include several current topics such as privacy, data protection, intellectual property and digital divides. New problems may include changes to the way humans are perceived and the role of humans and technology in society. This includes changing power structures and different ways of treating humans.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper presents a piece of foresight research which cannot claim exact knowledge of the future. However, by developing a detailed understanding of possible futures it provides an important basis for current decisions relating to future technology development and governance.Practical implicationsThe paper spells out a range of recommendations for both policy makers and researchers/industry. These refer to the framework within which technology is developed and how such a framework could be designed to allow the development of ethical reflexivity.Social implicationsThe work described here is likely to influence EU policy on ICT research and technology research and innovation more broadly. This may have implications for the type of technologies funded and broad implications for the social use of emerging technologies.Originality/valueThe paper presents a novel and important broad view of the future of ICTs that is required in order to inform current policy decisions. (shrink)

It is often thought that questions of reference are crucial in assessing scientific realism, construed as the view that successful theories are at least approximately true descriptions of the unobservable; realism is justified only if terms in empirically successful theories generally refer to genuinely existing entities or properties. In this paper this view is questioned. First, it is argued that there are good reasons to think that questions of realism are largely decided by convention and carry no epistemic significance. An (...) alternative conception of realism is then proposed, which focuses on the Ramsey sentences of scientific theories, constructed in the manner of David Lewis's 'How to define theoretical terms'. It is argued that because the Ramsey sentence of a theory preserves the epistemically significant part of the theory's content without generating commitments to any particular conclusions about reference, the realism issue is better addressed by asking whether Ramsey sentences of theories, rather than the theories themselves, are approximately true. (shrink)

In keiner geisteswissenschaftlichen Disziplin hat Gadamers Hermeneutik tiefere Spuren hinterlassen als in der Literaturwissenschaft. Bezugnahmen auf 'Wahrheit und Methode' bilden langst eine Art 'Koine' der Selbstverstandigung des Fachs. Der aus einem Kolloquium im Deutschen Literaturarchiv Marbach hervorgegangene Band bilanziert diesen Bestand: Im ersten Teil diskutieren Jean Grondin, Dieter Teichert, Norbert Groeben, Tilmann Koppe u.a. Gadamers Theorievorschlage und deren Rezeption durch so wirkungsmachtige Literaturwissenschaftler wie Hans-Robert Jauss, E.D. Hirsch und Frank Kermode. Dabei geht es nicht nur um wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Befunde, sondern um (...) eine aktuelle Kritik der Leistungen Gadamers. Im zweiten Teil des Bandes befassen sich David Wellbery, Rudiger Gorner, Sandra Kluwe, Gerhard Buhr u.a. mit Gadamers Interpretationen zu Goethe, Holderlin, George, Rilke und Paul Celan. Neben vergleichenden Perspektiven, so auf die Interpretationsmanier Heideggers, werden auch hier die Pramissen der Gadamerschen Auslegungspraxis herausgearbeitet und auf ihre hermeneutische Produktivitat hin befragt. Eine Podiumsdiskussion, in der Dieter Henrich, Glenn Most, Karlheinz Stierle und Rainer Warning Gadamers interpretationstheoretische Zentralmetapher des Text-Leser-Gesprachs erortern, rundet den Band ab. (shrink)

The notion of testifying (or testimony) is the central notion of Bolzano's theory of communication. In his Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science) Bolzano gives an analysis of this notion. It shows surprising parallels to Paul Grice's attempt to define "A meantNN something by x". I will begin with an explanation of some parts of the analysis and continue with an investigation of the relationship between Bolzano's analysis and that of Grice. In conclusion I would like to present some evidence supporting the (...) hypothesis that several of the virtues of Grice's theory had already been developed by Bolzano, whose approach even has the advantage of a better definition than Grice's, as Bolzano's analysis provides a better basis for defining a notion of successful communication of information. (shrink)

ExcerptCarl Schmitt's Hamlet or Hecuba (1956) is a peculiar text. For one, it stands out as the only detailed interpretation of a literary work that Schmitt ever produced. This is not to deny Schmitt's overall erudition and familiarity with Western literature nor his particular interest in the intricate relationship between aesthetics and politics, all of which can be traced throughout his writings from the 1910s to the 1950s. But the fact remains that apart from Hamlet or Hecuba, Schmitt did not (...) employ close readings of literary texts as a means to elaborate on his politico-philosophical ideas. Hamlet or Hecuba is…. (shrink)

In Kelsen's formalist and reductionisttheory of law, the concepts of `authority' and`competence' may be explained exclusively in termsof those norms on which the validity of other legalnorms or of legal acts is dependent. Kelsen describesthe nature of these norms in different ways; at leastthree different conceptions can be distinguished. Arational reconstruction of the most plausible of theseconceptions will understand sentences expressing such`norms of competence' either to state truthconditions for normative sentences of a lower level orto state criteria for an act (...) to be a legal act. Inboth functions, norms of competence regulate thecreation of normative facts. (shrink)

The article deals with problems of incommensurability and meaning change in thecontext of scientific dynamics. Its main topic is a proposal made by Putnam basedon his version of the principle of charity. It is shown that this proposal does not workas a general principle for the understanding of theory change, for it leads in some cases to an unconvincing interpretation of now discarded theories and is even uncharitable. So it could be polemically described as a kind of defamation ('üle Nachrede') (...) of these theories. This will be demonstrated in two case studies. The first one sketches the development of economic value theory, while the second deals with the development of the concept of probability. (shrink)

Historically, Chinese educational philosophy has been dominated by Confucianism and, since 1949, by Marxism. However, rapid industrialization, ideological demands, and loyalty to traditions have now led to a situation where various Western philosophies have been adopted into vocational education in hopes of moving the country forward without challenging the status quo too vigorously. The result is that China presently has no clear philosophical foundation that can help the country make solid decisions on how vocational education shall contribute to economic growth (...) and social improvements. Awareness of one's philosophy, however, is important for vocational educators so that they can make well-founded decisions about their teaching. The authors hope that by presenting an overview of which philosophies have been adopted in the past and the influence they have had on practitioners and policymakers, scholars can engage in a debate on which vocational education philosophy can help train China's workforce most effectively and support continued economic growth. (shrink)