In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

En Una Teoría de la Justicia (A Theory of Justice, 1971), la justicia —sus dos principios— viene a regular los intereses, fundamento y motor de la sociedad y del individuo ralwsianos. No obstante, tal regulación —individualista— preserva y favorece la libertad máxima individual, de modo que ésta, sin embargo, no llegue a alterar el orden social. Sobre la moralidad que Rawls propone, ante todo, hay que saber que la justicia como imparcialidad (Justice as fairness como él llama a su teoría) (...) no pretende la completa especificación de la conducta, sino más bien aproximarse a unos límites, a un marco dentro de los cuales los individuos y asociaciones son libres de perseguir sus fines (Rawls, 1978: 566). Acaso sean la indefinición o la poca importancia de pensar acerca de dichos fines los que hagan considerar a Rawls la moralidad como una simple preferencia (1978: 244), rasgo común en las tradiciones con las que se relaciona (utilitarismo y contractualismo). El concepto de bien se halla implícito en toda la teoría de la justicia de Rawls y sus conceptos (sociedad, individuo, deber, etc.), y, por tanto, en muchos debates que Rawls ha generado, aunque, a nuestro juicio, no ha sido examinado con suficiente detenimiento. El análisis que se propone discurre por tres temas distintos: el contexto del concepto de bien, la teoría específica (del bien) y la teoría general (del bien), para terminar con la conclusión. (shrink)

There is currently much debate in the economic literature about whether ethical investment involves a financial sacrifice or premium. One of the most common methods of testing this compares the financial performance of ethical investment funds with that of other funds not considered “socially responsible” or ethical. The majority of these research studies evaluate the performance of the ethical funds according to classic measures, whereby different financial markets, in different countries and for different periods of time serve as reference for (...) evaluation. The ultimate conclusion of all of these studies is that there are no significant differences between the performance results of one type of funds and the other. In Spain, ethical investment funds are still an incipient sector of investment. To date, the Spanish market has not been included in any type of analysis of these characteristics. Therefore the main objective of this article is to compare the financial performance of ethical investment funds to that of other funds in the Spanish retail market. We propose the aggregate type of analysis as the Spanish ethical investment funds have experienced a weaker development in comparison to those of other developed countries. In the first step we suggest the financial performance to be compared by style analysis since the asset distribution of the Spanish Social Return Investment (SRI) funds differs from the European trend. In particular, we use the multifactor regression model with style benchmarks. We found that their financial performance is in all cases superior or similar to that achieved by the rest of the funds. In the second step, to achieve a more robust and homogeneous comparison, we used the bootstrap method, comparing ethical and non-ethical fund subsamples by homogeneous groups. No significant differences between these two types of funds have been found. Thus, if we assume the positive o neutral effect of ethical investment on investor utility in the retail Spanish market the financial and social performance (FSP) of ethical funds will be, in aggregate, superior to the FSP achieved by conventional funds. In conclusion, the financial performance of ethical mutual funds in Spain is no sacrifice. (shrink)

Playing traditional games has a direct impact on the mood states of the players, and this is the reason why physical education is an ideal setting for teaching how to recognize them and be aware about how they can swing. The objective of the study was to determine if participating in traditional opposition games causes changes to the participants' mood states. A total of 102 students participated. Each participant recorded the intensity of the mood state experienced at the beginning and (...) at the end of the sessions, using the validated Profile of Mood States instrument. The pedagogical experience was planned as 4 sessions with 6 and 5 opposition games each: with competition in mixed groups, equally and unequally mixed; without competition in mixed groups, equally and unequally mixed; with competition in same-gender groups; and without competition in same-gender groups. When comparing the different mood states according to session, the mood states of the depression, fatigue, and vigor dimensions were significantly different, with higher scores in the sessions with competition for the mood states of vigor and fatigue. Also, when comparing the mood states depending on session grouping and group type, the results showed differences in the scores obtained for the dimensions fatigue and anger, and general mood state. These differences were found at the start of the session and at the end, with the dimension fatigue being the only one with differences in both situations when comparing the same-gender, equally-mixed, and unequally-mixed groups for the two types of traditional opposition games compared. In addition, after an analysis of the mood states depending on gender was performed, the results and therefore the significant differences found, were very similar to those obtained according to group type. Lastly, it was concluded that the type of group, and gender were decisive, causing variations in the mood states of the students. This provides valuable information for teaching professionals about the structuring and organization of PE sessions, aiming to promoting positive motor experiences. (shrink)

M. Blondel, cuya "filosofia de la acción" se halla en la linea del "espiritualismo frances" para el que la filosofía no es una actividad puramente de la razón sino del conjunto de la vida, abordó, después de L'Action (1893), el tema del conocimiento en L'illusion idéaliste (1898). Su propósito era responder a las "ilusiones" del conocimiento - "realista" e idealista - , particularmente a esta última. Para ello justifica la utilización de un "método de inmanencia" - no del sistema de (...) inmanencia - y reconduce el conocimiento hacia una forma de acción. En el artículo se presenta este proceso, y se discute las implicaciones que tiene de cara a la verdad y a la naturaleza de la transcendencia epistemológica y religiosa. /// M. Blondel, dont la "philosophie de l'action" se dévellope dans le sillage du "spiritualisme français" pour lequel la philosophic n'est pas une activité de la pure raison, mais de l'emsemble de la vie, a abordé, après L'Action (1893), le théme de la connaissance dans L'illusion idéaliste (1898). Son intention était de répondre aux illusions de la connaissance - "realiste" et idéaliste - en particulier à cette dernière. Pour ce faire, il montre qu'il faut utiliser une "méthode d'immanence" - non pas du système de l'immanence - et reconduire la connaissance vers une forme d'action. Le present article décrit ce processus et discute les implications qu'il suscite quant à la vérité et à la nature de la transcendance épistemologique et religieuse. /// After L'Action (1893), M. Blondel, whose "philosophy of action" is in line with "french spiritualism", which takes philosophy as an activity envolving not simply reason but the whole life, has dealt with the issue of knowledge in L'Illusion idealiste (1898). He aimed to explain the ''illusions" of knowledge - both the ''realist" and the "idealist" ones - , but particularly the latter. It is for this reason that he justifies the use of a "method of immanence" - not of a system of immanence, and deals with knowledge as a type of action. The paper explains this process and discusses its implications as to both truth and the nature of epistemologic and religious transcendence. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

Over the last decades, migration across Europe has continued to increase. Consequently, offering educational support for migrant students in the schools of host countries has been an extensively debated issue across Europe and further afield, especially in countries with a history of immigration. However, less is known about how education systems in the ‘new’ immigration countries have responded to the needs of recently arrived migrants. This article focuses on language support measures set up for migrant students in state-funded schools in (...) the Republic of Ireland and Spain – both multilingual countries with more than one official language and with a heterogeneous migrant population. In reviewing educational policy and practice in these jurisdictions in the areas of language support for migrants, this article seeks to contribute to the debate on challenges involved in supporting language acquisition by migrant students in formal educational settings. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Globalisation leads to increasing multiculturalism in societies. Preparing university students to recognise the growing diversity and to engage positively with one another in contemporary societies is therefore of paramount importance. However, the variables affecting the development of intercultural sensitivity have hardly been assessed. This study analysed the degree to which the influence of sex, year of study, and mobility experiences of university students influence the advancement of intercultural sensitivity. To this end, a scale was applied to Spanish university students (N (...) = 645). The results showed a significant gap between the students’ perceived orientation of their intercultural sensitivity and their actual orientation. In addition, there were some differences across sex, year of study, and mobility experiences in favour of females, final-year students, and students who had undergone some sort of mobility experiences. Four profiles were also identified according to intercultural sensitivity: initial, mid-initial, medium, and advanced. The findings demonstrate the need to incorporate an intercultural approach into higher education institutions in pro of more inclusive societies. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

1. Introducción. Historia, desde los orígenes a la Baja Edad Media -- 2. Historia, desde el Renacimiento a la actualidad.

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

Little has been studied on the relationship between affect and school problems related with attendance. This study aims to identify different affective profiles and to determine whether these profiles differ from each other based on the four functional conditions of school refusal behavior. Participants comprised 1,816 Spanish adolescents aged 15–18 years. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children-Short Form and the School Refusal Assessment Scale-Revised for Children were administered. Latent profile analysis revealed five affective profiles: low affective profile, self-fulfilling (...) profile, low positive affect profile, self-destructive profile, and high affective profile. The self-destructive profile revealed the highest average scores in the first three factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the high affective profile reached the highest average score in the fourth factor. On the contrary, the self-fulfilling profile obtained the lowest average scores in the first two factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the low affective profile revealed the lowest average scores in the last two factors. Findings suggest the relevance of developing more adaptative affective profiles, such as the self-fulfilling profile, which would contribute to diminishing school attendance problems. (shrink)

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)

In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...) According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility. (shrink)

There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...) facts could be causes. Imagine, for instance, the following scenario. I have a gun filled with red paint and another gun filled with blue paint, and I fire both guns at my neighbor’s white wall. A moment later, there is a graffiti on the wall and my neighbor notifies the police. He would have done so regardless of the graffiti’s color, since all he cares about is the existence of a graffiti on his wall. Is it plausible to claim that a disjunctive fact is a cause of his notifying the police? In particular, is it plausible to claim that he notified the police because I fired the red-paint gun or the blue-paint gun (the thought being that my firing paint of either color would have sufficed)? It seems not. The police was notified because of the actual graffiti on the wall, and the actual graffiti on the wall is made of a certain pattern of colored patches. Imagine, that, as it turns out, there are patches of both colors on the wall. Then it seems that both my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun were causes of my neighbor’s notifying the police. In other words, my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun jointly caused the outcome: each of them was a contributory cause of the outcome’s occurrence. On the other hand, imagine that there are only patches of one color on the wall. Then it seems that my firing only one of the guns was a cause. Either way, the disjunction fails to be a cause: either my firing the red-paint gun was a cause, or my firing the blue-paint gun was a cause, or they were both causes, but their disjunction was not.. (shrink)

A modo de preámbulo, consideramos importante mencionar que el presente ensayo pretende entrelazar los conceptos mirada y seducción desde distintas ópticas. Se plantean someramente algunas ideas desde la filosofía hasta el psicoanálisis. Se inicia con una “mirada” a las construcciones literarias de creadores de gran importancia, tales como Jean Braudrillard y Georges Bataille, en quienes se estudia la idea del ojo perverso, de la mirada y el deseo, subjetividad que nos atrapa. Se ambiciona articular con teorizaciones psicoanalíticas de lo inconsciente, (...) abundando en investigaciones freudianas y de otros teóricos del psicoanálisis para analizar e interpretar sus “seductoras” aportaciones.By way of preamble, we consider important to mention that this essay intends to link the concepts of look and seduction from different angles. Some ideas are raised from philosophy to psychoanalysis. The article starts with a “look” to the creators of literary constructions of great importance such as Jean Braudrillard and Georges Bataille, in order to study the idea of the evil eye, the gaze and desire, the subjectivity that catch us. The article aspires to articulate psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious, abounding in Freudian investigations and other theorists of psychoanalysis to analyze and interpret “seductive” contributions. (shrink)

The standard notion of formal theory, in logic, is in general biased exclusively towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the received notion by (...) allowing one to take both assertions and denials on a par. This novel notion of theory is based on a bilateralist approach to consequence operators, which we hereby introduce, and whose main properties we investigate in the present paper. (shrink)

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in (...) order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away. (shrink)

Las Comunidades de Aprendizaje son reconocidas por sus estrategias de inclusión y participación democrática. El objetivo de este texto es conocer las estrategias de participación democrática que se llevan a cabo en una escuela constituida como Comunidad de Aprendizaje. Los resultados muestran las experiencias de éxito educativo, convivencia e implicación de la comunidad educativa que surgen como consecuencia de la transformación de la escuela hacia un proyecto más inclusivo y participativo. En definitiva, la participación democrática representa una estrategia educativa y (...) reivindicativa que pretende acabar con las desigualdades que convergen en los espacios educativos. (shrink)