In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.2 (2000) 116-136 [Access article in PDF] Being, Time, and Definition: Toward a Semiotics of Figural Rhetoric Carol Poster For if History in the transferred sense of particular books called "histories," is rather apt to be false: nothing but History in the wider and higher sense will ever lead us to the truth. The Future is unknown and unknowable. The Present is turning to Past even (...) as we are trying to know it. Only the Past itself abides our knowledge. --George Saintsbury, A Letter BookDefining and classifying figures of speech and thought have been among the more important tasks of rhetoricians and grammarians for more than two millennia. The inventional focus, however, of much modern rhetorical theory has tended to relegate figuration either, on the one hand, to the domains of literary criticism or linguistics (the heirs of ancient grammar) or, on the other hand, to an ancillary position. The concomitant marginalization of the study of figures has had a significant effect upon contemporary scholarship in historical rhetoric. Many of the seminal scholarly works on the history of rhetoric have denigrated or minimized the importance of figural rhetoric. As Brian Vickers (1990, 294-95) has mentioned, George Kennedy and numerous other historians of rhetoric (e.g., Clarke 1996, 34) tend to condemn the teaching of figural rhetoric as dreary, tedious, and otiose. Often, the very periods themselves in which the study of the figures was pursued most vigorously and extensively are omitted from or condemned by modern scholarly discussion. As Marjorie Curry Woods has pointed out (1995, 73-78), biases against the medieval period, especially as found in Charles Sears Baldwin (1928) and Kennedy (1963, 1980) have in many ways defined the contours of our discipline, especially our attitudes toward the study of figures and tropes. Late antiquity and the Middle Ages, the periods of "decline" so deplored by Baldwin, Vickers, Kennedy, and others, were those in which figural rhetoric flourished, and both the sheer [End Page 116] volume of extant figural treatises and the continuity of figural rhetoric from the Hellenistic period through such contemporary semipopular books as Arthur Quinn's Figures of Speech: 60 Ways to Turn a Phrase (1982) and William Espy's The Garden of Eloquence: A Rhetorical Bestiary (1983) demand attention from the historical scholar. Along with the trivialization of figures in contemporary rhetoric has come a drastic oversimplification of the semiotics of figural terminology, which, in turn, contributes to the trivialization of many recent accounts of figures. To recover a more complex understanding of the semiotics of figural terms, we must start with a historical understanding of figuration, because rhetorical terms are encased in numerous historical strata that determine our understandings of them. 1 As Richard Rorty (1984, 49-75) argues concerning the historiography of philosophy, rational and historical reconstruction are mutually interdependent. A brief history of figural rhetoric From antiquity through the present, lists of figures have either occupied substantial sections of general treatises on rhetoric or grammar or have been the subject of specifically figural handbooks. Use of what we might term highly figured speech appears to predate the development of theoretical models for analysis of figures by many centuries. The Homeric epics, which were to provide the standard examples of rhetorical figures for many subsequent centuries, use patterns of speech later to be named and classified as rhetorical figures, but neither figural terminology nor self-conscious reflection upon figures qua figures appears in the epics. Similarly, although Gorgias was renowned for his use of the "Gorgianic" figures that later took his name, there is no evidence that he attempted systematic catologuing or development of specialized terminology for the figures. The testimonia describing his use of poetic words and figures (DK82a1, DK82a2, DK82a4, DK82a32--translated in Sprague 1972) do not attribute to him any invention of technical terminology.The question of invention of specific terminology for rhetorical figures is part of a more general historical question of the development of rhetoric as a self-conscious field. As Thomas Cole (1991) and Edward Schiappa (1991) have pointed out, the first... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence, Authority, and Interpretation: A Response to Jason HelmsCarol PosterAs someone with a long-standing interest in Heraclitus, I am delighted that Philosophy and Rhetoric is providing a forum for an ongoing discussion of his work.1 Although Jason Helms and I do disagree on specific matters concerning Heraclitean interpretation, we are, I think, in full agreement concerning the importance of Heraclitus for both rhetorical and philosophical studies and intend these (...) essays as contributions to what, it is hoped, will be a fruitful ongoing discussion of Heraclitus within the interdisciplinary tradition of this journal. Rather than address many minor points of disagreement superficially, I will concentrate below on close analysis of a few specific issues that I consider paradigmatic of differences in method rather than merely in conclusions.Panta Rhei (All Things Flow)That Heraclitus was interested in establishing any sense of orthoepia plays down his insistence on the panta rhei (everything flows). To suggest any final rightness of words would suggest that everything flows but the Logos.(Helms, this issue)Actually, I do not use the phrase “final rightness of words” but, rather, describe Heraclitus as “focus[ing] on the problem of correctness of names” and as [End Page 288] “consider[ing] the possibility that one can learn something about the nature of things by examining the non-literal sense of their names” (2006, 15).2 Name is an English equivalent of the Greek onoma (Latin nomen, substantive as opposed to verb or particle), not rhêma (word, verb, phrase) or logos (word, account, speech, saying, story, ratio, reason, etc.). The phrase “correctness of names” alludes to an ongoing discussion among scholars in classics and philosophy about a specific problem in early Greek thought (normally discussed in relation to Heraclitus, Protagoras, Prodicus, Plato’s Cratylus, and Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation).More importantly, Helms seems to think it impossible a priori that Heraclitus might have considered some sort of doctrine of flux compatible with a belief in correctness of names. Ancient evidence, however, suggests that Heraclitus did, in fact, consider stability of logos, correctness of names, and sensible flux compatible in some manner.For logos as unchanging, dk22b1 begins, “Of the logos that exists always [eontos aiei] uncomprehending are men.”3 Although the syntax is ambiguous, eontos aiei suggests some stability of logos. Sextus Empiricus states that Heraclitus considered the “divine logos” stable and eternal and human reason grounded in its participation therein (Adv. Math. 7.126–33).4 The “commonality” of logos in dk22b2 also suggests some interpretive stability, in the sense of logos not varying with respect to the perception of the individual.The phrase panta rhei, although solidly entrenched in the reception history of Heraclitus, often as part of a “doctrine of flux,” is not actually a well-attested Heraclitean saying (included in the dk “b” fragments) but, rather, derived from early testimonia. Whether the phrase is a paraphrase, indirect quotation, or Platonic/Aristotelian recasting of Heraclitus is uncertain. The earliest sources are Platonic:Therefore you [Theaetetus] were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all their followers— that all things are in motion like streams [hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta]—the doctrine of the great sophist Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge.(Theaet. 160d) [End Page 289]Those... would agree well enough with Heraclitus that all things move and nothing remains still [panta menein ouden].(Crat. 401d)Heraclitus says that all things move and nothing remains still [hoti panta chorei kai ouden menei], and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice in the same stream.(Crat. 402a)Nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots [panta hôsper keramia rhei], or believe that all things are just like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time [rheumatos te kai katarrou panta ta chrêmata].(Crat. 440c–d... (shrink)

This study examines the possibility of rhetoric in light of Parmenidean being.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Whose Aristotle? Which Aristotelianism? A Historical Prolegomenon to Thomas Farrell’s Norms of Rhetorical CultureCarol PosterThe description of various works of logical and rhetorical theory as “Aristotelian,” although far from unusual, is not particularly informative, because it assumes, incorrectly, that there is some ultimate singular Aristotle being imitated by all authors who consider themselves, or who are labeled by others, Aristotelian. In fact, there never has been an interpretation of (...) Aristotle that satisfies the canon of St. Vincent of Lerins, “quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est”; instead, there have been almost as many Aristotles as there have been interpreters of Aristotle. Thomas Farrell’s Norms of Rhetorical Culture (1993), therefore, is not so much situated against the background of some single, unique, undisputed Aristotle but, rather, as he himself mentions, within an evolving tradition of Aristotelianism.The historical transformations of Aristotle include two distinct traditions, one oriented toward scientific-technical philosophy andthe other toward rhetorical-poetic and ethical humanism.1 The technical-philosophccical tradition, in which Aristotle was conceived primarily [End Page 375] as metaphysician and natural philosopher, emphasized the logical treatises of the organon, the speculative systems of the Physics and Metaphysics, and the scientific works of the biological treatises. This tradition originated in the Greco-Roman middle and Neoplatonic schools and has had a continuous history stretching through the Middle Ages, Counterreformation, neo-Thomism, and certain contemporary European postmodernisms. The rhetoricalhumanistic tradition, on the other hand, emphasizing the Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, and ethical treatises, views Aristotle as a practical philosopher, concerned with the productive arts and those matters about which knowledge is probable rather than certain. This rhetorical-humanistic tradition was a relatively negligible aspect of Aristotle’s ancient reception, had a slight presence in the Islamic and Latin traditions, developed in certain strands of Renaissance humanism, and came to fruition in the late eighteenth century, primarily, though not exclusively, within a Protestant tradition. In eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century Britain, the rhetorical-humanistic Aristotle found expression directly in neoclassical poetics and, in a more complicated fashion, in a group of authors (including the Scottish moderates and the slightly later Oxford Noetics) who enlisted Aristotle in a battle against skepticism and materialism. It is the latter of the two strands of the rhetorical-humanistic Aristotle that resurfaces (albeit in an indirect and mediated fashion) in the work of Alastair MacIntyre, Richard McKeon (and other members of the Chicago school), and Thomas Farrell, who used Aristotle’s model of probable deliberation and habituated virtue to construct an alternative to twentieth-century skepticism and materialism.Significant Strata of Aristotelian ReceptionThe history of Aristotelian reception is not monolithic. There has been tremendous variation across periods and national traditions of what works were considered authentically Aristotelian, which of those works were considered important, and how they were interpreted. The phases of Aristotelian reception immediately relevant to Farrell’s work include Greco-Roman Platonism, Islamic commentary, medieval Latin Christianity, Renaissance humanistic textual recovery, neoclassical “Aristotelianism,” early modern Aristotelianism and anti-Aristotelianism, and the nineteenthcentury rehabilitation of Aristotle. This article will summarize briefly pre eighteenth-century interpretations of Aristotle as prolegomena to a close analysis of the works of two eighteenth-century Scotsmen, James Moor [End Page 376] and John Gillies, whose reconfiguration of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Poetics, and Organon as tools for practical wisdom in modern society anticipated (and, albeit indirectly, influenced) Farrell.2AntiquityTwo distinct strands of Aristotelian reception, the rhetorical-humanistic and technical-philosophical, originated in antiquity. Of these, the rhetorical-humanistic strand was substantially less important. Neither the Poetics nor the Rhetoric was well known in antiquity. The Rhetoric was not the subject of a Greek commentary until the Byzantine period and, although occasionally cited by Greco-Roman rhetoricians including Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionysus of Halicarnassus, was not widely or carefully read.3 The Poetics was also virtually unknown and was never the subject of an ancient commentary.4The Greek commentaries on Aristotle, which are predominantly technical-philosophical in character, include some fifteen thousand pages of extant text. Despite the existence of a distinct ancient Peripatetic school, the majority of commentaries were produced in the Platonic schools, where the works of Aristotle... (shrink)

This dissertation argues that the disjunction between philosophical ontology and the commonsense universe in early Greek thinkers results in a concomitant incommensurability of language and the kosmos. When language and the world no longer stand in a relationship of one-to-one correspondence, the two related problems of unwritability and ineffability arise. ;I trace the linguistic consequences of the separation of the sensible and noetic worlds historically, from early Eleatic thinkers through Plato and neoplatonism . I argue that the tendency of modern (...) scholarship to construct philosophy, rhetoric, and poetry as distinct disciplines is not only historically inaccurate when applied to classical thinkers, but also obscures the unified and interdisciplinary character of the Greek inquiry into the nature of language and the world and the relationship between logos and kosmos. I conclude by examining the doxographical tradition to show that the model of Greek thought that I advocate is the one we find in ancient histories of philosophy and rhetoric. ;Although this dissertation concentrates on the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric in antiquity, it does have consequences for contemporary approaches to both disciplines. If philosophy and rhetoric have their origins in a unified science of logos rather than a war between sophists and philosophers, we no longer can justify our Balkanization of the two disciplines on historical grounds. Poetry, philosophy, and rhetoric all are concerned with language and its relationship with the world, and just as it is not particularly advantageous to divide the world into warring nations, so it is equally unproductive to divide the understanding of logos into warring disciplines. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical EssaysCarol PosterAristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, edited by David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas; xv & 322 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, $45.00.Scholars will find Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Philosophical Essays fascinating both for what is present and what is absent. As Alexander Nehamas states (pp. xi–xiv), this volume attempts to rectify the neglect by philosophers of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in particular and rhetoric in general. While the (...) volume’s introduction and eleven essays are erudite, readable, and well-argued within their own logical and philosophical disciplinary traditions, the absence of reference both to contemporary rhetorical scholarship and ancient rhetorical traditions is somewhat disappointing.M. F. Burnyeat’s essay typifies both the strengths and weaknesses of the collection. Burnyeat presents a reception history of the Aristotelean enthymeme [End Page 361] in the logical tradition, and argues convincingly for reading the enthymeme as a relaxed rather than truncated syllogism. Missing, however, is a sense of how the enthymeme changed in response to large scale movements in ancient rhetorical theory and reference to contemporary rhetorical scholarship on the enthymeme, which covers much territory Burnyeat treats as unexplored.Several contributors compare the Rhetoric with Aristotle’s other works. Jacques Brunschwig claims that the Rhetoric and the Topics contextualize rhetoric differently and address different audiences. Glenn Most argues quite persuasively that Aristotle constructs a hierarchy of argumentative precision, with logic using the most precise, ethics and politics somewhat less precise, and rhetoric the least precise arguments. He shows that Aristotle’s treatment of endoxa (opinions) in the Rhetoric, Nichomachean Ethics, and Politics reflects this hierarchy. John Cooper points out that rhetoric looks to ethics/politics for its subject matter, but his argument applies only to one of the three genres of oratory and overlooks the heuristic potential of the topoi. Both Most and Cooper, though providing solid philosophical analyses of endoxa, do not discuss the rhetorical use of endoxa as gnômai, and thus useful premises for enthymemes. Stephen Halliwell also reconciles the Rhetoric with Aristotle’s ethical works by showing how the advantageous tends to, rather than opposes, the good.Alexander Nehamas builds a coherent theory of the emotions as amenable to reason by investigating fear and pity in the Rhetoric and Poetics. André Laks, drawing on the work of Paul Ricoeur, discusses two traditions of metaphor, ornamental and transformative, in the Poetics and Rhetoric. Jean-Louis Labarrière contributes a solid and highly original comparison of painting and oratory in Plato and Aristotle.Jürgen Sprute sees rhetoric not only as a solution to a Platonic impasse, but as a necessary and effective tool for Aristotelian political philosophy. Mary McCabe argues that Aristotle refutes both Phaedrus and Gorgias by showing that rhetoric is a technê and consequently a legitimate political tool. Eckart Schütrumpf presents the compelling and original suggestion that Aristotle’s Rhetoric should be read as extending the framework of the late Platonic Laws rather than as refuting earlier Platonic dialogues.Many of these essays share two serious flaws. The first is an unstated tendency to read the Aristotelian corpus as unproblematically systematic and polished, and all apparent contradictions as susceptible to reconciliation. More explicit attention to interpretative assumptions, as is commonplace in Platonic scholarship but rare in Aristotelian, might be desirable. The second flaw is disciplinary insularity. As Nehamas points out (pp. xi-xiv), rhetoric and philosophy were not clearly demarcated in antiquity. To respond to Aristotle’s Rhetoric adequately, scholars need to transcend contemporary disciplinary divisions, and attempt to synthesize rhetorical, logical, philosophical, and literary scholarship, something this volume, despite its many strengths, fails to do.Carol PosterUniversity of Northern IowaCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)