Penser le « corps énergétique » et la danse revient à considérer cette réalité énergétique au sein du corps dansant, autant au niveau quantitatif que qualitatif. En danse, nous ne parlons pas exactement de « corps énergétique », mais principalement d’énergie déployée. Afin de comprendre le « corps énergétique » en danse, nous nous sommes intéressés à deux pratiques originales mettant en œuvre un jeu de question-réponse énergétique : le contact improvisation et le vol chorégraphique. Le corps énergétique apparaît au (...) fur et à mesure de la réflexion comme une métaphore désignant une triade nécessaire au déploiement d’un seul système, et c’est cette même triade que nous rencontrons à chaque fois que nous appréhendons la complexité du corps dansant. (shrink)

This is a reply to “What Makes a Home” by Kimberley Brownlee and David Jenkins. In it, I defend my own account of homelessness, which I call the ‘legal conception’ against their criticism and try to illustrate the differences between my view and theirs, which I call the ‘social conception.’.

Joseph Raz’s account of norms provides that a norm requiring an agent to φ is a reason to φ protected by an exclusionary reason not to act on some other reasons. I present a dilemma concerning the determination of the contents of this set of excluded reasons. The question is whether or not the set includes reasons that count in favour of φing. If the answer is yes, the account is committed to a picture of norms that seems inconsistent with (...) the phenomenology, in that it rules out acting on the very reasons on which the norm is based. If the answer is no, the account licenses a problematic form of double counting of reasons. I conclude that Raz’s protected reasons account of norms must be rejected, and tentatively suggest a solution to the problem posed by the dilemma. (shrink)

Cet article part du constat que la robotique humanoïde se mêle de notre sens kinesthésique. Il cherche donc à explorer une situation de mouvement partagé entre l’humain et le robot humanoïde. En postulant une certaine connaissance de l’autre par le mouvement, il s’agit d’envisager la possibilité d’une sensation de mouvement interne entre un humain et un robot. Cette interaction n’invite-t-elle pas à penser non pas l’entre-deux comme ce qui opposerait deux différences, mais plutôt comme l’espace d’une pratique? Réfléchir à l’entre-deux (...) humain/robot dans la situation de transmission du geste nous conduira à se demander ce qui vit entre ces deux corps, et ainsi à explorer les notions d’écart et de tension. This article assumes that humanoid robotics gets involved in our kinesthetic sense. It therefore seeks to explore a situation of motion shared between human and humanoid robot. Assuming some knowledge of the other by movement, it is considering the possibility of a feeling of internal movement between a human and a robot. Can we think the in-between space as a practice, and not as the opposition of two differences? Reflect about the inter-human/robot in the situation of transmission of the gesture lead us to wonder what lives between these two bodies and thus to explore the notions of gap and tension. (shrink)

De Interpretatione is among Aristotle's most influential and widely read writings; C. W. A. Whitaker presents the first systematic study of this work, and offers a radical new view of its aims, its structure, and its place in Aristotle's system. He shows that De Interpretatione is not a disjointed essay on ill-connected subjects, as traditionally thought, but a highly organized and systematic treatise on logic, argument, and dialectic.

This is a Critical Notice of From Normativity to Responsibility, Joseph Raz’s brilliant treatment of the nature of normativity and reasons. Building on the thought that the law claims to give reasons to its subjects, I consider the application of Raz’s views about reasons to some questions in legal philosophy. I concentrate on what I take to be the central idea of the book, Raz’s “normative/explanatory nexus”, according to which a consideration cannot be a reason for an agent to perform (...) an action unless the agent could follow the consideration in performing the action. I show how the nexus can explain some of the Fullerian principles of legality. And I examine the implications of the nexus for our understanding of the psychology of legal obligation; here I suggest that the nexus might cause trouble for Raz’s own well-known exclusionary reasons account of legal obligation. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to clarify the ideas of equality underlying section 15 claims for benefits such as welfare and health care; I use the name ‘economic rights claims’ for these types of claims. I adopt Joseph Raz’s division of equality claims into rhetorical egalitarian claims, which are based in a failure to equally respect a universal claim , and strict egalitarian claims, which are based on an actually existing unequal distribution of resources . I show how the dignity-based (...) approach to equality stemming from Law v. Canada is an example of a rhetorical egalitarian claim. With this groundwork set, I turn my attention to the economic rights claims. I survey three reasons for thinking that an unequal distribution of some benefit might, even absent any failure to respect or recognize the dignity of those at the losing end, be thought of as wrong or unjust. The first two reasons – an appeal to an idea of sufficiency, and the fear that some stigma might be associated with the inequality – I reject in favour of the third, which is that in a situation in which all the participants have some equal claim to a benefit, a fair procedure will result in their benefiting equally. Following John Rawls, I suggest that our society, as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, creates in its members at least a prima facie equal claim to share in the society’s benefits. The economic rights claims, then, are claims that this prima facie equal claim has not been respected. But the benefits being claimed for, as benefits created by the society, are not benefits automatically due to everyone just in virtue of their humanity, instead they are due to the worst-off once the best off have come to be able to benefit from them. Thus they take a strict egalitarian form – once some members of our society benefit in a certain way, then the equality of all members as contributors to the cooperative venture for mutual advantage implies that the other members of our society gain a claim to that benefit. The fact that these economic rights claims are strict egalitarian claims means they cannot be grounded in arguments about dignity, as dignity-based claims are rhetorical egalitarian claims for benefits due to all in virtue of their universal human dignity. I conclude by returning to Law to highlight a passage which I believe provides a grounding for a recognition of economic rights in line with my argument; I also make some brief comments on the need for a stricter division of labour between section 15 and section 1 in the context of economic rights claims and on the effect of this argument on Canadian federal law more generally. (shrink)

Legal rationalist: law claims to give its subjects reasons for action. Normative reasons intuition: Reasons for action being key, the obvious way to establish that law makes a practical difference in people's deliberations is by arguing that the law claims to give reasons for action to its subjects. Explanatory Reasons Intuition: "And while it is possible to be confused about our normative reasons, it seems unlikely that everyone is confused all the time; so the fact that people consistently take the (...) law as their motivating reason and guide their conduct by the law does seem to suggest that the law does provide normative reasons for its subjects." And if it’s a necessary feature of law that it claims authority, then the argu- ment seems to establish that law claims to provide reasons for its subjects. Schematically the argument as a whole goes like this: The law claims to be a legitimate authority. If a legitimate authority directs a subject to φ the subject is obligated to φ ). The fact that an agent is obligated to φ is a reason for her to φ. So the law claims that its directives are reasons......Obligations as Reason-Giving : the fact that A is obligated to φ is itself a reason for A to φ. Unfortunately for the Legal Rationalist, OAR is false. Legal obligation has certain features which mean that the fact that a certain action’s being legally obligatory cannot itself constitute a reason to perform that action." Will explain away the intuitions in terms of triggering, and show how law can make a normative difference that is consistent with the falsity of OAR. Law's claim, and normative impact, can be captured exclusively in terms of second-order reasons. PartofwhatHartisafterhereistheideathatdeliberationon the matter of whether or not to φ is closed or settled by the obligation. But deliberation is cut off because the law has reached some sort of conclusion or answer or verdict on the question of whether or not to φ. The legal obligation not to φ contains a practical verdict about φing: it is not to be done. This idea – that the legal obligation not to φ provides or contains a verdict that φing is not to be done – is the idea that legal obligation is verdictive. For something to be verdictive is for it to express or embody a verdict or conclusion as to what ought to be done. It is plausible to say that wrongness is verdictive. So to say that such-and-such an action would be wrong is to express a verdict on that action – it is one which should not be done. To get a handle on the idea of the verdictive it helps to contrast it with the contributory. A contributory consideration is one which contributes to the verdict, by increasing the weight on the verdict’s side. So that φing would harm someone, or would cause extreme suffering, or would have costs that vastly outweighed any benefits, say, would be contributory considerations on the side of the verdict that φing would be wrong." "Wrong" is verdictive, and so it cannot itself be a reason for the action - it cannot be a reason for itself. Obligation and wrong in law are very close, and obligation should be treated as verdictive. This shows us that OAR is false. (shrink)

This thesis is an examination of Alfred North Whitehead's epochal theory of time. Two necessary conditions for Whitehead's epochal theory are analyzed. First, Whitehead's requirement that events "become" is examined, with the result that becoming is found not to be an objective, physical feature of events in Whitehead's theory as is commonly thought. Second, the requirement that events be discrete is examined, with the result that this requirement is found to be incompatible with contemporary quantum theory, contrary to Whitehead's claim (...) that it is compatible. (shrink)

This article concerns the problem of factual uncertainty in negligence law. We argue that negligence law’s insistence that fair terms of interaction be maintained between individuals—a requirement that typically manifests itself in the need for the plaintiff to prove factual or “but-for” causation—sometimes allows for the imposition of liability in the absence of such proof. In particular, we argue that the but-for requirement can be abandoned in certain situations where multiple defendants have imposed the same unreasonable risk on a plaintiff, (...) where the plaintiff suffers the very sort of harm that rendered the risk unreasonable, and where the plaintiff cannot prove which of the defendants was the but-for cause of her loss. This approach provides one way to understand the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke. We find support for our approach in various concepts that underlie negligence liability quite generally. These underlying concepts are normative in nature, and manifest core notions of justice and fairness. We argue that approaches to the problem of factual uncertainty that appeal to such normative principles to make sense of atypical cases of causation are in no way inconsistent with the nature and structure of negligence law. Rather, the opposite is true: in taking negligence law seriously as law, such approaches are instead reflective and supportive of it. (shrink)

Both Carnap and Quine made significant contributions to the philosophy of mathematics despite their diversedviews. Carnap endorsed the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic knowledge and classified certainmathematical questions as internal questions appealing to logic and convention. On the contrary, Quine wasopposed to the analytic-synthetic distinction and promoted a holistic view of scientific inquiry. The purpose of thispaper is to argue that in light of the recent advancement of experimental mathematics such as Monte Carlosimulations, limiting mathematical inquiry to the domain of (...) logic is unjustified. Robustness studies implemented inMonte Carlo Studies demonstrate that mathematics is on par with other experimental-based sciences. (shrink)

Décrit par des lexicographes et représenté sur la céramique athénienne de l’époque classique, le jeu du porteur (ephedrismos) est une activité ludique qui demande un effort physique. L’étude de figurines en terre cuite qui évoquent des adolescentes en train de s’y affronter permet d’affirmer que les jeunes filles grecques n’étaient pas étrangères à ce type de jeu, tout en explorant la symbolique érotique que pouvait revêtir la représentation d’une telle action sur ces objets.

Sur plusieurs vases du ve siècle, les peintres attiques ont représenté des figures féminines partiellement ou totalement dénudées qui manipulent différents accessoires athlétiques. Dans certains cas, qui constituent l’objet de cette étude, la jeune femme peut être identifiée comme l’héroïne Atalante. L’article montre comment ces images ne témoignent pas de pratiques réelles, mais sont créées pour exciter les banqueteurs qui utilisent les vases sur lesquels elles sont dépeintes.

Σε μια ανασκόπηση των ιπποκρατικών μελετών, αξίζει να σημειωθούν οι νέες αναγνώσεις, διότι πρόκειται για μια πρώτης τάξεως πηγή με συνοχή στη χρονολογία (μέσα 5ου - μέσα 4ου αι. π.Χ.). Ωστόσο, ο κατάλογος των αγγείων που αναφέρονται στο Corpus αυτό δεν είναι ομοιογενής, εφόσον τα σχήματα τους ποικίλλουν ανάλογα με τη θεραπευτική ή τη διδακτική τους χρήση. Τα χρηστικά αγγεία, μεγαλύτερα στον αριθμό, ενδιαφέρουν κυρίως τους γιατρούς όταν πρόκειται για καθαρά θεραπευτική χρήση, πράγμα που εξηγεί τη σπανιότητα των αγγείων πόσεως (...) και τη μεγάλη αφθονία των αγγείων που χρησίμευαν για την ατμοθεραπεία, χύτρες αλλά και οικιακά σκεύη διαφόρων ειδών, με μεταλλαγμένη συχνά χρήση. Αλλά ο εμπειρισμός αυτός συνοδεύεται με αυστηρότητα (βλ. την εμμονή στα «νέα» αγγεία), όπως αποδεικνύει η προσφυγή στην αναλογική μέθοδο, προορισμένη να διαφωτίζει φαινόμενα αόρατα : τα αγγεία χρησιμεύουν κυρίως για να δηλώσουν προβλήματα σχετικά με το χώρο και την κίνηση. (shrink)

Η Ιπποκρατική Συλλογή παρέχει δύο τύπους πληροφοριών σχετικά με τα αγγεία : άλλοτε συμπληρώνει τις πληροφορίες που υπάρχουν για ήδη γνωστά σχήματα αγγείων (χύτρες με διάτρητα πώματα) και άλλοτε αναφέρει σπάνια ονόματα αγγείων (« φακός », « άρυστήρ », « βομβυλιός »), αλλά που τα συνδέει με συγκεκριμένες χρήσεις* επομένως, η λειτουργία που αποδίδεται στα αγγεία αυτά, μέσα από κείμενα χρονολογημένα με ακρίβεια, καθώς και η εξέταση του συνόλου όπου αναφέρονται, βοηθά ασφαλώς στον ακριβέστερο καθορισμό του σχήματος τους. Γίνεται προσπάθεια (...) να βρεθεί μια πλήρης απεικόνιση των όρων που χρησιμοποιούνται για την κεραμική της εποχής της Ιπποκρατικής Συλλογής. (shrink)

This paper investigates the emotional import of literary devices deployed in fiction. Reflecting on the often-favored approach in the analytic tradition that locates fictional characters, events, and narratives as sources of readers’ emotions, I attempt to broaden the scope of analysis by accounting for how literary devices trigger non-cognitive emotions. I argue that giving more expansive consideration to literary devices by which authors present content facilitates a better understanding of how fiction engages emotion. In doing so, I also explore the (...) somatic dimension of reading fiction. (shrink)

Postcolonial science studies entails ostensibly contradictory critical and empirical commitments. Science studies scholars influenced by Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers embrace forms of realist, radical empiricism, while postcolonial studies scholars influenced by Jacques Derrida trace the limits of the knowable. This essay takes their common use of the term cosmopolitics as an unexpected point of departure for reconciling Derrida’s program with Stengers’s and Latour’s. I read Derrida’s critique of hospitality and Stengers’s and Latour’s ontological politics as necessary complements for conceiving (...) a care-oriented subalternist cosmopolitics, a process of composing common worlds that remains attentive to the limits of representation. (shrink)

This reconsideration of Hume’s classic essay “Of Miracles” via the lens of American pragmatist ways of thinking about history and power shifts our attention from Hume’s epistemic concerns about the legitimacy of witnesses and testimony to his distaste for sacred history, his critical stance regarding the social force of revelation, and his disdain for religious authority. To view Hume’s essay both as an articulation of a critical philosophy of history and as an exercise in moral dynamism (social power or, authority, (...) is a result of epistemic transactions), is to intervene in both Hume studies and Contemporary Pragmatism. (shrink)

We all experience loneliness at some time in our lives and it often motivates people, consciously or otherwise, to enter treatment. Yet it is rarely explicitly addressed in psychoanalytic literature. Loneliness and Longing rectifies this oversight by thoroughly exploring this painful psychological state. In this book contributors address the inner sense of loneliness âe" that is feeling alone even in the company of others âe" by drawing on different aspects of loneliness and longing. Topics covered include: loneliness in the consulting (...) room the relationship between loneliness and love the effects of social networking and the internet how loneliness changes throughout the life-cycle healing the analystâe(tm)s loneliness. Loneliness and Longing draws on both theory and practice to discuss ways to help people to understand and cope with this important emotional state, encouraging them to make loneliness and longing less pervasive in their lives. This will be ideal reading for analysts, psychotherapists, and related practitioners facing the challenges of loneliness in their consulting rooms. (shrink)

Biologists studying complex causal systems typically identify some factors as causes and treat other factors as background conditions. For example, when geneticists explain biological phenomena, they often foreground genes and relegate the cellular milieu to the background. But factors in the milieu are as causally necessary as genes for the production of phenotypic traits, even traits at the molecular level such as amino acid sequences. Gene-centered biology has been criticized on the grounds that because there is parity among causes, the (...) “privileging” of genes reflects a reductionist bias, not an ontological difference. The idea that there is an ontological parity among causes is related to a philosophical puzzle identified by John Stuart Mill: what, other than our interests or biases, could possibly justify identifying some causes as the actual or operative ones, and other causes as mere background? The aim of this paper is to solve this conceptual puzzle and to explain why there is not an ontological parity among genes and the other factors. It turns out that solving this puzzle helps answer a seemingly unrelated philosophical question: what kind of causal generality matters in biology? (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.