In contemporary philosophy of action, the existence of intentional and unintentional action is relatively uncontroversial. What is controversial is whether there exists a third kind of action—action that is neither intentional nor unintentional. This third kind of action is known in the literature as non-intentional action. In this paper, I develop a pair of arguments in favor of non-intentional action. More specifically, I argue that non-intentional action exists in the form of lucky and side-effect acts.

It is usually taken for granted that the necessary and sufficient conditions for refraining are with respect to mental or behavioral states of agents. Let us call such accounts internalist conceptions of refraining. In this paper, I argue that internalist conditions are insufficient for refraining; and so internalist conceptions of refraining are inadequate. I conclude that a proper account of refraining must contain an externalist condition – i.e., a condition that makes reference to an agent's environment.