본고는 우파니샤드 중 가장 초기 우파니샤드 중의 하나인 『브리하다란야카 우파니샤드』에 대한 샹카라의 주석서인 『브리하다란야카 우파니샤드 주석서』(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya, 약칭 BUBh)를 연구한 것이다. BUBh는 비록 그의 『브라흐마 수트라 주석서』(Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya)에 비해 연구가 덜 이루어졌으나, 그 사료적 중요성과 베단타 전통 내의 중요성으로 보아 독립 대상으로서 연구할 가치가 높다. BUBh를 철학적, 신학적으로 접근한 두 선행 연구들과 달리 이 연구는 교육법에 초점을 두고, 이 교육법은 텍스트를 통독할 때 드러나게 된다고 주장한다. 독자는 의식하든 의식하지 않든 발췌독, 정독, 통독을 교차적으로 하게 되지만, 특히 BUBh는 (...) 발췌독, 정독과 함께 텍스트 전체를 통독해야 이 텍스트가 초급에서 고급으로 발전하는 단계를 고려한 교과서의 기능을 하고 있음을 알 수 있다. 그래서 본고는 BUBh를 앞에서부터 뒤로 순서대로 읽어야 이 텍스트를 더 바르게 이해할 수 있고, 더불어 교사 샹카라의 구체적 모습을 알고 느낄 수 있다고 주장한다. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a close comparative reading of a creation myth from chapter 1 of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, which opens with the startling statement “ātmaivedam agra āsīt”, “in the beginning there was the self (ātman)”. I read this classical text with Śaṅkara, its foremost commentator, in dialogue with an ensemble of Indologists (Wilhelm Halbfass, Greg Bailey and Frederick Smith) and theorists (Walter Benjamin, Ramchandra Gandhi and Hélène Cixous), and vis-à-vis, the creation myth narrated in chapter 1 of the (...) Book of Genesis. My aim is to decipher the intrinsic relation between identity, difference and diversity underlying the Upaniṣadic myth, and the ambivalent relationship (fear and desire) between self and other depicted here. The Upaniṣad presents a narrative of “the self first”, and implied is the aspiration to retrieve and rediscover this first self, the ātman, which precedes and encompasses everything else. I challenge this narrative drawing on Mukund Lath’s paper (J World Philos 4:6–23, 2003/2018). According to Lath, being is becoming, and change is a precondition of identity-formation. Identity, he argues, does not only accommodate but also invites change and plurality. Identity for Lath is a matter of creation, not restoration. It is pregnant with the future, not obsessed with premordiality. Lath’s unique case study for his counter-Upaniṣadic discussion of identity and self is classical Indian music, rāga music. (shrink)

The presence of women in the philosophical scene of classical India is sporadic. The present paper focuses on an Upaniṣadic story highlighting the contribution of such a rare woman, namely the debate between Gārgī and Yājñavalkya at King Janaka’s court in chapter 3 of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad. I offer a close reading of the debate, drawing on Śaṅkara’s commentary, with the intention of spotlighting Gārgī’s voice, a single female voice in an all-male arena. My analysis is supplemented with a quick (...) visit to Mahasweta Devi’s gut-wrenching story Draupadi. My silence-silencing argument is this: Silence holds a central place in classical Indian philosophy, as the story under discussion illustrates. It is an expression of a dramatic transformation in which the human person “recovers” his/her innermost essence, the ātman, no longer identifying with worldly aspects of her/his being. But according to Mahasweta Devi and Daya Krishna, each in her and his distinct context, this beatific silence can turn into an act of brutal silencing. This is to say that in the name of spiritual quest, the here and now, the social dimension, is often “forgotten”. The twist is that what is seen from one perspective as a benevolent silence is from another perspective, a symptom of blindness to the world one lives in. For Mahasweta and Daya Krishna one’s visit, or recurrent visits to “realms beyond” are empty unless they have ethical impact upon one’s return to the now and here. (shrink)

The female characters in the Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad have generally been interpreted by scholars in two opposing fashions: as fictional characters whose historicity can be dismissed or as representative of actual women in ancient India. Both of these interpretations, however, overlook the literary elements of this text and the role that these female characters play within the larger philosophical debate. This paper is an analysis of the various women who appear in the Br̥hadāraṇyaka and their role in this (...) text. Close attention is paid to their characterizations, their relationship to the doctrine discussed, and their functions in the larger narrative structure. The paper concludes with a discussion about the relationship of narrative to history and fundamental problems with the “woman question” based on this text. (shrink)

Verbal forms of upa √ās are one of the characteristic features of Upaniṣadic diction. While several studies have investigated their semantics, very little attention has been given to their syntax. A quick comparison of different translations shows that there is no agreement among Upaniṣadic interpreters regarding the syntax of upa √ās. By considering all its occurrences in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads, this paper offers the first systematic study of its syntax. It is hoped that the analytic model proposed here (...) will allow us to better parse, understand, and translate the relevant Upaniṣadic passages. The paper comprises two parts: Part I presents the results of my analysis succinctly; Part II offers a detailed analysis. Two appendixes follow: Appendix 1 examines the formula ‘ya eta- evaṃ vidvān upa √ās’; Appendix 2 represents all the occurrences of upa √ās in a table. (shrink)

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, one of the principal Upaniṣads, we find a venerable and famous story where the god Prajāpati separately instructs three groups of people (gods, humans, and demons) simply by uttering the syllable “Da.” In this paper, our concern is not with ethics but theories of meaning and interpretation: How can all divergent interpretations of a single expression be correct, and, indeed, endorsed by the speaker? As an exercise in cross-cultural philosophical reflection, we consider some of the (...) leading modern theories of meaning—those of Grice, Quine, and Davidson—in order to see if the Upaniṣadic story receives a natural home in any of them. We conclude that the story is best understood through Grice’s theory of meaning rather than Quine’s or Davidson’s. (shrink)

Among 108 Upaniṣads, the central theme of the true knowledge of Self is consistent. The wholesome philosophy of Upaniṣad is focused towards the enlightenment or proliferation of mind through the knowledge of Self as the source which is both Constitutive as well as Regulative source. According to Upaniṣadic view, only when we understand and realize the true nature of self, we can understand the concept of reality. In this article, I would concentrate on the idea of Self and Reality (...) from the perspective of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, which portrays that the manifestation of the universe is done out of self, which is identical with the ultimate reality Brahman, through consciousness. Moreover, with the reference to Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, I would make an attempt to highlight the nature of Self, methodologies to understand the Self, the ground of this empirical reality with diversity, and the ungendered Self. (shrink)

In this article, I study the concept of brahman—the exhaustive formulation of truth about the world—in the early Upaniṣads. Based on close reading of two stories appearing in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, the Kauṣītaki and the Chāndogya Upaniṣads, I reconstruct two competing theories about brahman, namely the “theory of puruṣa ” and the “theory of ātman.” While the theory of puruṣa refers to the creation of human and divine beings as a result of duplication of the anthropomorphic form of the universe, the (...) theory of ātman traces the phenomenal reality in its various forms to the inner, formless self “made of consciousness” capable of creating and projecting forms out of itself. These two theories are discussed in the dialogue between Gārgya Bālāki and Ajātaśatru, the king of Kāśi appearing in two versions in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣads. Bālāki’s theory of puruṣa is further revised and modified in the light of Ajātaśatru’s criticism in the story from the Chāndogya Upaniṣads, in which the god Prajāpati teaches Indra and Virocana about the self. (shrink)

The paper examines the Vedic sources of fear in ancient Indian thought. First, a connection to traditional Indian grammar offers a plausible explanation for the origin of fear. Further hints for tracing the sources of fear are traced in some specific upaniṣad-s, namely Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, with a possible reference to aesthetic context . Particular attention is dedicated to the commentary by the philosopher Śaṅkara to a pivotal passage from Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad . Two types of fear are hypothesized: an (...) empirical one and a metaphysical one, possibly in parallel with the gradation of soteriological knowledge, distinguished as inferior and superior in the vedantic milieu. (shrink)

This paper discusses the reliability of the criteria for determining Śaṅkara’s authorship established by Paul Hacker. His analysis of terminological peculiarities is based on only one of Śaṅkara’s works—the commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras. Therefore, doubt arises as to whether these criteria also apply to other works that we can claim to be authentic. First, it will be argued that the commentaries on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka- and Taittirīya-Upaniṣad are works that can be—with reasonable certainty—considered authentic. When applied to these two works, (...) Hacker’s criteria work remarkably well, and the commentaries on the Taittirīya- and Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad share the same terminological and conceptual features with the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya. Moreover, in most cases, it is possible to distinguish the usage of some terms and concepts from Sureśvara and Padmapāda. On the other hand, Sureśvara and Padmapāda use some of these terms in a quite similar way as Śaṅkara, but differently than the later Advaitins, indicating that a sharp line between Śaṅkara on the one hand and Sureśvara and Padmapāda on the other cannot be drawn in many cases. Also, the writings of these authors—especially Padmapāda—represent a transitional phase in the development of certain Advaita Vedānta concepts although the outlines of some peculiarities by which the later Advaita Vedānta differs from Śaṅkara can already be found sketched by Śaṅkara himself. (shrink)

Etymologies are often encountered in Vedic prose, in Brāhmaṇas and early Upaniṣads. Though they have received a fair amount of scholarly attention, Vedic etymologies still present a challenge to interpreters. To respond to it, I critically review previous interpretations, and focus on three case studies, Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 1.1.2, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.3, and Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.8. In my interpretation, I emphasize the need for a contextual reading, foreground Vedic etymologies’ complexity and sophistication, and call attention to the variety of (...) purposes they serve to achieve as well as to Vedic etymologists’ agency. Supplementing conventional interpretations concentrating mostly on their religious-magical aspects, I describe Vedic etymologies as discursive devices used by Vedic authors to further their thoughts and agendas. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)

Maitreyī has been renown since antiquity for her contributions to philosophy. In this chapter, her views as a proponent of Advaita (Monism) are explained. She was an explicator of a monistic approach to value that argues that the true Self, Ātman, is the basis of the highest values we hold and that knowledge of one’s true identity as Ātman, can be followed by acquiring a first person appreciation of one’s identity as Ātman. That deep axiological understanding, not merely intellectual comprehension, (...) is liberation. Maitreyī (or someone by that name) is reported by the ancient epic Mahābhārata to have remained unmarried, but in one of the earliest of Upaniṣads, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Maitreyī is described as a philosopher (brahmavādhinī) married to the sage Yājñavalkya. Regardless of her marital status, a dialogue with Yājñavalkya is preserved in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad in which she explicates the function of Ātman, its unity with Brahman (Growth, Expansion, Development), and discusses the nature of love and its role in the self who is seeking liberation. That dialogue is explored and discussed in this chapter. (shrink)

Gārgī Vācaknavī is known for her challenging interrogation of the sage Yājñavalkya, in what was by then a male dominated activity: philosophical debate. Gārgī distinguishes herself for challenging Yājñavalkya, being rebuked and challenging him a second time. Gārgī demonstrates her mastery over the concept at dispute (Growth, Expansion, Development) by being able to revise her approach to the question. Gārgī philosophically demonstrates the very idea she is investigating. Her salvos at Yājñavalkya display the two contrasting modes of philosophical investigation of (...) the early Vedas, characterized by naturalism, and the latter philosophy of the Upaniṣads, characterized as a procedural nonnaturalism. Gārgī engages in this dispute, challenging gender norms of her day. Over a millennia later, Gārgī and Yājñavalkya’s personas are reprised in a post-Vedic dialogue, the Yogayājñavalkya, on the technological application of Yoga philosophy. Here Gārgī is cast as the unassuming interlocutor—in stark contrast to her earlier firebrand, gender-norm-breaking performance in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BU). As this latter depiction is not historically accurate, we will focus on Gārgī’s contribution to the BU. (shrink)

The Upaniṣads The Upaniṣads are ancient texts from India that were composed orally in Sanskrit between about 700 B.C.E. and 300 B.C.E. There are thirteen major Upaniṣads, many of which were likely composed by multiple authors and are comprised of a variety of styles. As part of a larger group of texts, known as the … Continue reading Upanisads →.

Ovaj članak predstavlja tragove ranoga vedāntskog tumačenja Maitreyī-brāhmane, jednog od najpoznatijih dijelova Brhadāranyaka-upanišadi u Brahma-sūtrama, temeljnom tekstu filozofske škole vedānte. Predmet diskusije je egzegeza Maitreyī-brāhmane prema trima starodrevnim komentatorima Āśmarathyi, Audulomiu i Kāśakrtsni. Cilj je ovog rada pokazati kakve se metode tumačenja upanišadskih tekstova koriste u različitim vedāntskim školama. Također možemo vidjeti tehnike tumačenja preuzete iz pūrva-mīmāmse, škole tumačenja vedskih tekstova, koje su preoblikovane za tumačenje upanišadi. Članak također pokazuje kako filozofsko stajalište o odnosu sopstva i apsoluta služi egzegetskoj svrsi (...) pomirenja različitih upanišadskih učenja. Učenje BS i starodrevnih komentatora je bhedābhedavāda, istodobna različitost i nerazličitost sopstva i apsoluta. Śankara tumači sūtre kao da poučavaju monistički iluzionizam. On na dvije razine istine razlikuje niži brahman i najviši brahman. Na ovaj je način mogao pomiriti sva upanišadska učenja, bilo da naginjuteizmu ili monizmu. Važna je i hermeneutička rasprava Śankarina s bhedābhedavādinom Bhartrprapañcom o prirodi znanja i djelovanja, odnosno prvenstvu upanišadi koje se bave znanjem brahmana nad brāhmanama koje se bave obrednim djelovanjem.This article presents some traces of early vedāntic interpretations of Maitreyī-brāhmana, one of the most famous parts of Brhadāranyaka-upanishad, in the Brahma-sūtras, the fundamental work of the philosophical school vedānta. Topic under discussion conveys the exegesis of Maitreyī-brāhmana according to three ancient commentators, Āśmarathya, Audulomi and Kāśakrtsna. The purpose of this article is to show the methods of interpretation of upanishadic passages in different vedāntic schools. Also, we can see some techniques of interpretation taken from pūrva-mīmāmsa, the school of vedic interpretation, and adapted for upanishadic interpretation. The article shows how the main philosophical standpoint on the relation of the self and the absolute serves the exegetical purposes. So the standpoint of the BS and the ancient commentators is bhedābhedavāda, teaching of both the difference and non-difference between the self and the absolute, like sparks and fire. Śankara interprets the sūtras as teaching monistic illusionism. He also differentiates between the two levels of truth and accordingly the lower brahman and the highest brahman. In this way he was able to reconcile all upanishadic passages, whether they inclined to theism or monism. There is also an important hermeneutical discussion of Śankara with bhedābhedavādin Bhartrprapañca on the nature of knowledge and action and priority of the upanishads, part of sacred canon dealing with knowledge of brahman over the brāhmanas, which are dealing with ritual action. (shrink)

The Upanisads, the basic philosophical texts of Hinduism, represent the height of Vedic philosophy. Many of the older Upanisads can be dated in the eighth and seventh centuries BCE. This newly reissued scholarly work by S. Radhakrishnan, first published in 1953 and long out of print, contains in full the classical Upanisads, those commented on or mentioned by the eighth-century Indian philosopher Shankara. The Sanskrit text, transliterated into Roman script, is followed, verse-by-verse, with an English translation. The volume also includes (...) a commentary on the argument, notes on the vocabulary, and a very detailed introduction by Dr. Radhakrishnan. (shrink)

Evil in the Vedas and the Upanishads undergoes a theoretical transformation as this literature itself moves away from its consequentialist and naturalistic roots to a radical procedural approach to moral questions. The goods of life on the early account were largely natural: evil was a moral primitive that motivated a teleological approach to morality geared towards avoiding natural evil. The gods of nature (such as fire, and rain, intimately involved in metabolism) were propitiated to gain beneficent results, and to avoid (...) hunger and illness. To please the gods of nature involves eating, which is merely the imposition of natural evil on sacrificial victims so that one avoids the evils of disease and hunger oneself. The entire system is one of resentment: the goods of life are defined by way of the bads that they displace. Authors of the latter part of the Vedas, such as the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, show themselves to be concerned about the irreducibility of evil on the naturalistic account, but also more broadly with the irreducible phenomenon of moral luck that comes in tow with a teleological approach to ethics. Whether one is able to ward off evil and enjoy the goods of life is not under one’s control and is within the purview of the forces of nature. This motivates the transition to a procedural account of ethics---yoga---where evil is not a primitive but a side effect of the non-yogic life, characterized by a lack of self-governance. As Death teaches us, evil is not a moral primitive and can be reduced out of the moral equation by taking responsibility for a lack of autonomy, which transforms this external threat of a lack of autonomy into a self lack of autonomy, or self-governance. With this transformation we are delivered into the realm of preservation (Vishnu). (shrink)

In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James suggests that the human experience of a fundamental and existential uneasiness can be found at the core of most religious traditions, and that these traditions constiute essentially a proposed solution to this uneasiness. The present investigation focuses upon the notion of uneasiness, particularly fear, and its solution in the early Hindu tradition. Through a close examination of textual expressions of both desire and fear from the R̥gveda, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, and the (...) class='Hi'>Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, it is proposed that “liberation” in the early Upaniṣadic period, or at least the precursor to the traditional notion of liberation, actually meant freedom from fear, rather than freedom from karma or saṁs̥ra. The Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad suggests that the origin of duality is desire, and duality necessarily results in fear. By relinquishing the sorts of desires so frequently expressed in the earlier vedic literature, together with an understanding of the essentially non-dual relationship between the ātman and brahman, a state of complete freedom from fear (abhaya) may be achieved. (shrink)

Professional ethics, in general, deals with justified moral values that govern the work of professionals. Profession is an expertise who is committed to promote a distinctive public good, such as learning or education. Professionals are committed to special duties to make services available, maintain confidentiality, secure informed consent for services, and be loyal to clients, employers, and others with whom one has fiduciary relationship. Professional ethics deals with theoretical issues which seek to understand how the justified moral values governing professionals (...) are linked to wider values. It also deals with practical issues as to how to apply duties in particular contexts. Professional values include principles of obligation and rights, virtues, personal moral ideals as manifested in the great lives. Given such a Western idea of professional ethics, it is indeed fascinating to trace professional ethics in the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣadic sages since time immemorial have shown the path to peace and progress for all humanity, not only by laying down theoretical ideals or speculation, but by actually applying truths in their practical life. They have demonstrated the practical application of the ethical ideals or moral values in the personal and professional life and proved that self-realization alone can not only save man from misery but promote to the state of highest bliss. The standards laid down by them have been followed practically by people even today. Gītoponiṣad states that whatever action is performed by the great is imitated by the common people; whatever standard is set by him is followed by them. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad prescribes professional values to the extent that not he who has not ceased from evil conduct can obtain Him by knowledge. Good conduct as a value is thus emphasized here. In Taittirīya Upaniṣad, for instance, the teacher prescribes certain values in the form of commandments: speak the truth and practice virtue. Thus, it is evident that the Upaniṣadic teacher is not only concerned about the intellectual progress of the student but also its personal and professional life as well. The paper is a humble attempt to explore the roots of professional ethics in the Upaniṣadic ethics. (shrink)

This paper critically reads and analyzes the first discourse of Āruṇi and Śvetaketu in the first half of the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. It argues that, except for a few interpolated lines in VI.2 and VI.3, the entire discourse constitutes one integrated whole with a specific indicatory knowledge at its core that indicates deeper truth underlying all realities, and its characterization and twofold elaboration with reference to macro- and microcosmos. In light of two cosmogonic accounts from the (...) JaiminīyaBrāhmaṇa and some other Vedic passages, this paper argues that Āruṇi’s cosmogony originally posited asat as the primordial entity, which has not yet acquired any phenomenal form. Incidentally it also demonstrates that in this discourse the term ādeśa cannot denote a ‘method of substitution’ as proposed by Thieme and taken over since then by several scholars. (shrink)

The authors of the Samnyāsa Upanisads, manuals of ascetic lifestyle and practice, recommend that wanderers renounce behavioral standards of their formerly Brahmin householder life, including ritual purity and familial duties. Patrick Olivelle argues that these ascetics are thereafter considered impure and corpse– or ghoul–like, clearly lacking in dharma. However, these Upanisads counsel pursuing mental purity and moral behavior, and modeling oneself after the perfection of the Absolute. This essay investigates ascetic notions of purity and identity, and virtues such as non–violence (...) and kindness cultivated in forest isolation. Is ascetic dharma universal in intent, and is it conceptually opposed to householder dharma? What type of ethics is admired by the authors, what type deprecated? Olivelle’s position is reevaluated, as is Jeffrey Kripal’s notion that monistic mysticism does not support ethics adequately. (shrink)

[The Soul Chariot Allegory in Plato and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad].