The basic theory of preference relations contains a trivial part reflected by axioms A1 and A2, which say that preference relations are preorders. The next step is to find other axims which carry the theory beyond the level of the trivial. This paper is to a great part a critical survey of such suggested axioms. The results are much in the negative — many proposed axioms imply too strange theorems to be acceptable as axioms in a general theory of preference. (...) This does not exclude, of course, that they may well be reasonable axioms for special calculi of preference. I believe that many axioms which are rejected here may be plausible if their range of application is restricted by conditions which are possible to formulate only in a language richer than that of the propositional calculus, e.g. in one containing modal operators or probabilistic concepts. (shrink)

. My main claim is that explanations are fundamentally about relations between concepts and not, for example, essentially requiring laws, causes, or particular initial conditions. Nor is their linguistic form essential. I begin by showing that this approach solves some well-known old problems and then proceeds to argue my case using heuristic analogies with mathematical proofs. I find that an explanation is something that connects explanandum and explanans by apprehensible steps that penetrate into more fundamental levels than that of explanandum. (...) This leads to a deeper discussion of what it means to be more fundamental. Although I am not able to give a general definition, I argue that linguistic entities and empirical concepts are usually not fundamental, much relying on the distinction between complete and depleted ideas or experiences. (shrink)

As part of the conference commemorating Theoria's 75th anniversary, a round table discussion on philosophy publishing was held in Bergendal, Sollentuna, Sweden, on 1 October 2010. Bengt Hansson was the chair, and the other participants were eight editors-in-chief of philosophy journals: Hans van Ditmarsch (Journal of Philosophical Logic), Pascal Engel (Dialectica), Sven Ove Hansson (Theoria), Vincent Hendricks (Synthese), Søren Holm (Journal of Medical Ethics), Pauline Jacobson (Linguistics and Philosophy), Anthonie Meijers (Philosophical Explorations), Henry S. Richardson (Ethics) and Hans Rott (Erkenntnis).

As part of the conference commemorating Theoria's 75th anniversary, a round table discussion on philosophy publishing was held in Bergendal, Sollentuna, Sweden, on 1 October 2010. Bengt Hansson was the chair, and the other participants were eight editors‐in‐chief of philosophy journals: Hans van Ditmarsch (Journal of Philosophical Logic), Pascal Engel (Dialectica), Sven Ove Hansson (Theoria), Vincent Hendricks (Synthese), Søren Holm (Journal of Medical Ethics), Pauline Jacobson (Linguistics and Philosophy), Anthonie Meijers (Philosophical Explorations), Henry S. Richardson (Ethics) and Hans Rott (Erkenntnis).

In this paper, I wish to argue that an explanation is not a logical structure¸ that it cannot be characterised in syntactic terms, but that it is rather an epistemological structure, and, more specifically, a structure organising conceptual content. I will start from a trivial example and systematically look at the effects of making premises more general or more specific or of reshuffling the same content into another set of premises, thereby exposing the implicit suppositions and consequences of some commonly (...) held views and showing their untenability. (shrink)

During recent years, there has been a growing awareness that a better understanding of human activities and the behavioural components of environmental problems is needed. This volume brings together psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, historians of technology and economics, and management experts to identify and examine the rules and motives that govern the environmental behaviour of individuals, households, organizations and society as a whole. Illustrated with case studies from Scandinavia, it shows how behaviours with negative or positive environmental effects are often performed (...) without such consequences in mind. The book discusses how change towards positive environmental behaviour often conflicts with deep-rooted habits as well as exploring the importance for environmental practice of different everyday contexts. By presenting this multi-disciplinary analysis, the volume provides a comprehensive understanding of how behavioural change in relation to the environment can come about and how this can be integrated in the political framework. (shrink)