Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 6, June 2022.

Dorfman et al.’s (2024) study on psychiatrists’ perceptions of treatment-refractory mental illness found that while most psychiatrists recognize there are cases where further treatment may no longe...

本书介绍了职业道德的特征、社会主义职业道德的基本原则和规范,职业道德的教育、修养和评价等内容。.

Ben shu dui ke xue mei xue si xiang shi de yan jiu dui xiang, ren wu he fang fa jin xing le xi tong di lun shu.

Riben Jiuzhou da xue tu shu guan cang you gu xie Huizhou ben "Zhuzi yu lei" yi bai si shi juan. Huizhou ben shang cheng "Chi lu", xia qi li bian, zai yu lu dao yu lei de xing cheng guo cheng zhong chu yu guan jian de di wei, dui xue jie yan jiu zhu xi si xiang de xing cheng guo cheng, Zhu Xi men ren de qing kuang, jin ben "Zhuzi yu lei" de xing cheng guo cheng (...) yi ji zhong gu shi qi gu Han yu bai hua, ti gong le xin de cai liao he xin de shi ye. (shrink)

Ben shu shou lu wen zhang si shi yu pian, shi zuo zhe dui dao jia yu dao jiao wen hua duo nian lai yan jiu cheng guo de zong he zhan xian.

Ben shu yi si xiang jiao liu wei he xin yi ti, Li zu yu dong ya wen hua chuan bo de xue shu fan chou, Tan tao zhu shun shui yu zhong ri wen hua, Si xiang, Zheng zhi, Xue shu deng fang mian suo qi de ying xiang yu zuo yong.

本书内容包括:科耶夫的主奴法权与英国的普通法心智;施特劳斯的现代性叙事与苏格兰启蒙思想;洛克的现代政治叙事及其对话者等。.

Claims concerning processes, claims of the form “xisφing”, have been the subject of renewed interest in recent years in the philosophy of action. However, this interest has frequently limited itself to noting certain formal features such claims have, and has not extended to a discussion of when they are true. This article argues that a claim of the form “xisφing” is true when what is happening withxis such that, if it is not interrupted, a φing will occur. It then applies (...) itself more directly to the case of action, arguing that when “xisφing” describesx's intentional action, it is true iffxis acting from a method she knows to be sufficient to φ, in the sense that if she is not interrupted in carrying out this method, she will φ. I use this criterion to argue that the carbon‐copier example Donald Davidson gives in “Intending” fails to refute Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that an agent who is φing intentionally knows that she is, because the agent in Davidson's example is not intentionally making the copies. (shrink)

Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...) following views: pleasure, rather than achievement or the satisfaction of desire, is what makes life go well; death is generally bad for its victim, in virtue of depriving the victim of more of a good life; death is bad for its victim at times after death, in particular at all those times at which the victim would have been living well; death is worse the earlier it occurs, and hence it is worse to die as an infant than as an adult; death is usually bad for animals and fetuses, in just the same way it is bad for adult humans; things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more good life is possible. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a framework for accounting for the self, based on a reconstruction of Galen Strawson’s “theory of SESMETs,” or the Pearl view, with Barry Dainton’s continuous consciousness thesis. I argue that the framework I provide adequately accounts for the self and is preferable to solely adopting either Strawson’s or Dainton’s theory. I call my reconstruction the “Necklace” view of the self.

本书对科技与政治交互作用空间的性质、结构及其张力进行了基本阐述,探讨科技政治空间价值张力的离合及有机统一的作用规律以及科技政治空间自由与干涉的权力张力及其作用规律等。.

Philosophers of logic are particularly interested in understanding the aims, epistemology, and methodology of logic. This raises the question of how the philosophy of logic should go about these enquires. According to the practice-based approach, the most reliable method we have to investigate the methodology and epistemology of a research field is by considering in detail the activities of its practitioners. This holds just as true for logic as it does for the recognised empirical and abstract sciences. If we wish (...) to systematically understand the aims and epistemology of logic, we are best placed achieving this by looking at what logicians do, rather than reflecting upon the nature of logic itself. In this entry, we outline the motivations for a practice-based approach towards the philosophy of logic and highlight its advantages over more “top-down” approaches, which attempt to infer conclusions about the nature of logic and its methodology on the basis of traditional assumptions about knowledge, metaphysics, or logic itself. We end by addressing several prominent concerns raised against the practice-based approach. (shrink)

Ben shu fen wu ge zhuan ji,Xuan lu le wang wei guang,Zhang quan jing,Tian xin ming,Liang zhu,Li shen ming,Liu run wei,Zhou xin cheng deng fa biao zai deng qi kan shang de pi pan li shi xu wu zhu yi de wen zhang,Zhi zai yin dao guang da dang yuan gan bu shen ke ren shi li shi xu wu zhu yi de wei hai,Shi zhong jian chi wei wu shi guan,Jian jue fan dui li shi xu wu zhu yi.

本书分四个部分:第一部分以梁漱溟先生的思虑为个案样本,探讨法的一般理念问题;第二部分论及宪政、普通法和近代西方法律教育与法学研究;第三部分意在研索“罪孽理念与罪刑关系”;第四部分为通讯体论文。.

本书是关于新意识形态批评的论文集,本书要论述的意图是:以理论与社会生活的密切关系而言,中国文论家可以创造出自己的“本位话语”,其具体问题集中为两个,即文化转型中的当代中国的精神建构和建立文学理论的本位 话语。.

本书内容包括:孔子思想的主要特征、老子思想的文化地位、墨子思想的历史影响、孟子思想的历史影响、董仲舒在学术思想史上的地位、张衡在中国思想文化上的地位等内容。.

本书简要地介绍了《周易》的一些重要概念及其在二十一世纪的可能应用,指出以《周易》为代表的东方文明对人类社会在新世纪的可持续发展所可能做出的贡献。.

I argue that extant accounts of harm all fail to account for important desiderata, and that we should therefore jettison the concept when doing moral philosophy.

Some jurisdictions that allow assisted dying require participating patients to have a terminal illness. This includes all Australian and US states where assisted dying is allowed. 1 Philip Reed 2 argues that this requirement constitutes discrimination against the dying. As Reed 2 argues: ‘assisted death laws that limit their services to the dying discriminate against them because death is offered to them to solve their problems’. This discrimination could take two forms: (1) via harm to dying patients as a group (...) as a result of the existence of assisted dying programmes; (2) via a negative message that such programmes communicate about whether the lives of dying patients are worth living. Assisted dying programmes are not unjustly discriminatory in either sense so long as we assume that unjust discrimination requires harm to the group in question. If assisted dying singles out the terminally ill for a programme... (shrink)

Some healthcare systems are said to be grounded in solidarity because healthcare is funded as a form of mutual support. This article argues that health care systems that are grounded in solidarity have the right to penalise some users who are responsible for their poor health. This derives from the fact that solidary systems involve both rights and obligations and, in some cases, those who avoidably incur health burdens violate obligations of solidarity. Penalties warranted include direct patient contribution to costs, (...) and lower priority treatment, but not typically full exclusion from the healthcare system. We also note two important restrictions on this argument. First, failures of solidary obligations can only be assumed under conditions that are conducive to sufficiently autonomous choice, which occur when patients are given ‘Golden Opportunities’ to improve their health. Second, because poor health does not occur in a social vacuum, an insistence on solidarity as part of healthcare is legitimate only if all members of society are held to similar standards of solidarity. We cannot insist upon, and penalise failures of, solidarity only for those who are unwell, and who cannot afford to evade the terms of public health. (shrink)

I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective-taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective-taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual-process accounts of mindreading.

The philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being: - lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person's life was for him or her considered as a whole, and - temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, (...) a day, month, year, or chapter of a life. Many theories have been offered of each of these kinds of well-being. A common view is that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being. This book argues that much of this literature is premised on a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being, because there is no such thing as temporal well-being. The only genuine kind of well-being is lifetime well-being. The Passing of Temporal Well-Being will prove essential reading for professional philosophers, especially in moral and political philosophy. It will also be of interest to welfare economists and policy-makers who appeal to well-being. (shrink)

Lucid, learned, and incomparably rich in thought and detail, Art Without Borders is a monumental accomplishment, on par with the artistic achievements ...

According to hedonism about well-being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The Experience Machine, and The Resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that the right (...) motivation for it is the ‘experience requirement’ (i.e., that something can benefit or harm a being only if it affects the phenomenology of her experiences in some way). Next, I argue that hedonists should accept a felt-quality theory of pleasure, rather than an attitude-based theory. Finally, I offer new responses to the three objections. Central to my responses are (i) a distinction between experiencing a pleasure (i.e., having some pleasurable phenomenology) and being aware of that pleasure, and (ii) an emphasis on diversity in one’s pleasures. (shrink)