This is the first definitive graduate and advanced undergraduate level treatment of behavioral economics that describes the cutting edge of the subject. It carefully outlines the evidence, describes the relevant theory, and provides interesting and economically relevant applications of the theory. Behavioral economics is not only the fastest growing area in economics but it is rapidly going mainstream, and it is most likely to be the future of economics. The field has lacked a definitive (...) treatment- this is it. The book covers most areas in economics, which accounts for its length. Behavioral economics not only explains the evidence much better, it is fun to do relative to the dismal science of traditional economics; this book conveys both these aspects. (shrink)

Behavioral economics has potential to offer novel solutions to some of today's most pressing public health problems: How do we persuade people to eat healthy and lose weight? How can health professionals communicate health risks in a way that is heeded? How can food labeling be modified to inform healthy food choices? Behavioral Economics and Public Health is the first book to apply the groundbreaking insights of behavioral economics to the persisting problems of health (...) behaviors and behavior change. In addition to providing a primer on the behavioral economics principles that are most relevant to public health, this book offers details on how these principles can be employed to mitigating the world's greatest health threats, including obesity, smoking, risky sexual behavior, and excessive drinking. With contributions from an international team of scholars from psychology, economics, marketing, public health, and medicine, this book is a trailblazing new approach to the most difficult and important problems of our time. (shrink)

Corruption involves greed, money, and risky decision-making. We explore the love of money, pay satisfaction, probability of risk, and dishonesty across cultures. Avaricious monetary aspiration breeds unethicality. Prospect theory frames decisions in the gains-losses domain and high-low probability. Pay dissatisfaction (in the losses domain) incites dishonesty in the name of justice at the individual level. The Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI, signals a high-low probability of getting caught for dishonesty at the country level. We theorize that decision-makers adopt avaricious love-of-money aspiration (...) as a lens and frame dishonesty in the gains-losses domain (pay satisfaction-dissatisfaction, Level 1) and high-low probability (CPI, Level 2) to maximize expected utility and ultimate serenity. We challenge the myth: Pay satisfaction mitigates dishonesty across nations consistently. Based on 6500 managers in 32 countries, our cross-level three-dimensional visualization offers the following discoveries. Under high aspiration conditions, pay dissatisfaction excites the highest- (third-highest) avaricious justice-seeking dishonesty in high (medium) CPI nations, supporting the certainty effect. However, pay satisfaction provokes the second-highest avaricious opportunity-seizing dishonesty in low CPI entities, sustaining the possibility effect—maximizing expected utility. Under low aspiration conditions, high pay satisfaction consistently leads to low dishonesty, demonstrating risk aversion—achieving ultimate serenity. We expand prospect theory from a micro and individual-level theory to a cross-level theory of monetary wisdom across 32 nations. We enhance the S-shaped Curve to three 3-D corruption surfaces across three levels of the global economic pyramid, providing novel insights into behavioral economics, business ethics, the environment, and responsibility. (shrink)

Principles of Behavioral Economics, written by an acknowledged leader in the field, provides a comprehensive introduction to one of the most exciting areas of modern economics. It demonstrates how models of economic theory can be enriched by using interdisciplinary insights from psychology, sociology, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience to build the basis for a more empirically supported set of economic principles. Unique in its level of rigor and lucidity, the book highlights the important link between theoretical and empirical (...) economics by demonstrating the usefulness of a range of data sources such as observational data, lab data, survey data, and neuroeconomic data. This field-defining textbook argues that behavioral economics is not just a supplement to mainstream economics. Taking behavioral economics seriously requires a total rethink, and eventual transformation, of every area of economics. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBehavioral economics may be considered as neoclassical behavioral economics, which adopts a neoclassical normative model of rationality and explains bias a...

Hausman and McPherson provide an evidential defense of welfare economics, arguing that preferences are not constitutive of welfare but nevertheless provide the best evidence for what promotes welfare. Behavioral economics identifies several ways in which some people's preferences exhibit anomalies that are incoherent or inconsistent with rational choice theory. I argue that the existence of these behavioral anomalies calls into question the evidential defense of welfare economics. The evidential defense does not justify preference purification, or (...) eliminating behavioral anomalies before conducting welfare analysis. But without doing so, the evidential defense yields implausible welfare implications. I discuss how the evidential defense could be modified to accommodate behavioral anomalies. (shrink)

Slight absolute changes in the Shanghai Stock Exchange Index (SHSE) corresponded to the city’s immediate increases in coronary heart disease deaths and stroke deaths. Significant fluctuations in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Index (SZSE) corresponded to the country’s minor, delayed death rates. Investors deal with money, greed, stock volatility, and risky decision-making. Happy people live longer and better. We ask the following question: Who are the investors with the highest and most sustainable stock happiness, and why? Monetary wisdom asserts: Investors apply (...) their deep-rooted values (avaricious love-of-money aspiration and locus of control, Level 2) as a lens to frame critical concerns in the proximal-immediate (Shanghai Stock Exchange Index changes, Level 1) and the omnibus-distal contexts (domicile: city vs. country, Level 2) to maximize expected utility (portfolio changes, Level 1) and ultimate serenity (stock happiness, Level 1). We collected multilevel data—the longitudinal SHSE and 227 private investors’ daily stock happiness and portfolio changes for 36 consecutive trading days in four regions of China. Investors had an average liquid asset of $76,747.41 and $54,660.85 in stocks. This study is not a “one-shot” game with “nothing at stake.” We classified Shanghai and Beijing as the city and Shenzhen and Chongqing as the country. Our cross-level 3-D visualization reveals that regardless of SHSE volatility, investors with low aspiration, external control, and country domicile enjoy the highest and most sustainable stock happiness with minimum fluctuations. Independently, investors with low aspiration, external control, and country domicile tend to make fewer portfolio changes than their counterparts. Behaviorally, less is more, debunking the myth—risky decisions excite stock happiness. Our longitudinal study expands prospect theory, incorporates attitude toward money, and makes robust contributions to behavioral economics and business ethics. We help investors and ordinary citizens make happy, healthy, and wealthy decisions. Most importantly, the life you save may be your own. (shrink)

Different applications of synthetic biology are alike in that their possible negative consequences are highly uncertain, potentially catastrophic, and perhaps irreversible; therefore, they are also alike in that public attitudes about them are fertile ground for behavioral economic phenomena. Findings from behavioral economics suggest that people may not respond to such applications according to the normal rules of economic evaluation, by which the value of an outcome is multiplied by the mathematical probability that the outcome will occur. (...) Possibly, then, synthetic biology applications challenge the normative postulates of the standard approach, too.I want to first consider how some of the phenomena described by behavioral economists—and behavioral scientists more broadly—might affect people's perceptions of the uncertainties associated with synthetic biology. My analysis will be far from complete, however, because behavioral economics is essentially the study of human behavior, and thus its reach is potentially vast and its development longstanding and ongoing. Nonetheless, I hope to give an indicative perspective on how some aspects of behavioral economics might affect the assessment and perceived acceptability of synthetic biology. I will then consider the issue of agency. Should policy‐makers respect people's reactions to synthetic biology when those reactions are known to be driven by behavioral economic phenomena rather than following the normative postulates of rational choice theory? Or should policy‐makers dismiss these reactions as inherently biased? I will argue that the normative force of these human reactions (probably) depends on phenomenon and context. (shrink)

Stakeholder theorists distinguish between normative stakeholders, those who gain moral standing by making contributions to the firm, and derivative stakeholders, those who can constrain the corporate association even though they make no contribution. The board of directors has the legal authority to distinguish among these stakeholder groups and to distribute rights and obligations among these stakeholder groups. To be sure, this stakeholder formulation appropriately seizes on the firm’s voluntary, associative character. Yet, the firm’s constituents contribute assets and incur risks to (...) participate in market, economic activities. And, as such, the firm’s “stakeholders” must share an imperfect language to assist in making two key economic decisions: (1) who are the legitimate and who are the derivative stakeholders; and (2) who should sit on the board? Still, stakeholder theorists have good reason to be skeptical of neoclassical economics. Its assumptions that all act opportunistically and that all can calculate rationally and fully hardly correspond to studies on the managerial experience of corporate coordination. However, advances in behavioral law and economics now provide a cogent economic logic that readily fits into a stakeholder mode. In brief, we argue that (1) the firm’s economic purpose designates legitimacy to core stakeholders, to those who add value, assume unique risk, and can incur harm; (2) the board serves as the principal who coordinates these core stakeholders to sustain competitive advantage and new wealth creation; and (3) state incorporation law, Delaware in particular, reinforces the board’s function. These, in turn, supply selection criteria for board membership. We aim to synchronize concepts from behavioral law and economics with stakeholder theory. (shrink)

Values have a profound influence on the behaviour of all people, scientists included. Biodiversity is studied by ecologists, like myself, most of whom align with the “mission-driven” field of conservation biology. The mission involves the protection of biodiversity, and a set of contextual values including the beliefs that biological diversity and ecological complexity are good and have intrinsic value. This raises concerns that the scientific process might be influenced by biases toward outcomes that are aligned with these values. Retrospectively, I (...) have identified such biases in my own work, resulting from an implicit assumption that organisms that are not dependent on natural habitats effectively do not count in biodiversity surveys. Finding that anthropogenic forest disturbance reduces the diversity of plant species dependent on shady forests can thus be falsely equated with more general biodiversity loss. Disturbance might actually increase overall plant diversity. In this paper I ask whether ecologists share values that are unrepresentative of broader society, I discuss examples of potential value-driven biases in biodiversity science, and I present some hypotheses from behavioral economics on possible psychological underpinnings of shared values and preferences among ecologists. (shrink)

Until recently, economics conceived of poverty solely as a lack of material resources. This view likely captures the reality of poverty experienced by many people around the globe. However, two waves of behavioral economics demonstrate that the narrowing of people’s external environments may change people themselves: poverty lowers the quality of decision-making and poverty and oppression may depress the capacity to aspire. Poverty and a history of oppression also change how individuals are perceived. To overcome these effects (...) may require helping people acquire new mental models. This essay discusses key findings from behavioral economics, the implications for agency, and some interventions with promising outcomes. We hope to inspire scholars and policymakers to think more deeply about the nature of poverty and oppression and to consider policies that target the psychological and sociological factors that create cycles of poverty. (shrink)

A powerful critique of nudge theory and the paternalist policies of behavioral economics, and an argument for a more inclusive form of rationality.

Heyman's target article makes a strong case for a behavioral approach to addiction, yet some important assumptions require justification, and promising behavioral alternatives to the author's melioration approach should be considered. In particular, the behavioral economic approach to addiction appears well developed and comprehensive. How does the melioration approach complement or improve on a behavioral economic account?

At a time when both scholars and the public demand explanations and answers to key economic problems that conventional approaches have failed to resolve, this groundbreaking handbook of original works by leading behavioral economists offers the first comprehensive articulation of behavioral economics theory. Borrowing from the findings of psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, legal scholars, and biologists, among others, behavioral economists find that intelligent individuals often tend not to behave as effectively or efficiently in their economic decisions (...) as long held by conventional wisdom. The manner in which individuals actually do behave critically depends on psychological, institutional, cultural, and even biological considerations. "Handbook of Contemporary Behavioral Economics" includes coverage of such critical areas as the Economic Agent, Context and Modeling, Decision Making, Experiments and Implications, Labor Issues, Household and Family Issues, Life and Death, Taxation, Ethical Investment and Tipping, and Behavioral Law and Macroeconomics. Each contribution includes an extensive bibliography. (shrink)

Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the dark side of monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics—dishonesty. Dishonesty, a risky prospect, involves cost–benefit analysis of self-interest. We frame good or bad barrels in the environmental context as a proxy of high or low probability of getting caught for dishonesty, respectively. We theorize: The magnitude and (...) intensity of the relationship between love of money and dishonest prospect may reveal how individuals frame dishonesty in the context of two levels of subjective norm—perceived corporate ethical values at the micro-level and Corruption Perceptions Index at the macro-level, collected from multiple sources. Based on 6382 managers in 31 geopolitical entities across six continents, our cross-level three-way interaction effect illustrates: As expected, managers in good barrels, mixed barrels, and bad barrels display low, medium, and high magnitude of dishonesty, respectively. With high CEV, the intensity is the same across cultures. With low CEV, the intensity of dishonesty is the highest in high CPI entities —the Enron Effect, but the lowest in low CPI entities. CPI has a strong impact on the magnitude of dishonesty, whereas CEV has a strong impact on the intensity of dishonesty. We demonstrate dishonesty in light of monetary values and two frames of social norm, revealing critical implications to the field of behavioral economics and business ethics. (shrink)

Despite their popularity, dual process accounts of human reasoning and decision-making have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Cognitive scientists and philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of the ‘standard view’ of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance of evidence in support of it. Moreover, attempts to modify and refine dual process theory in light of these challenges have generated additional concerns about its applicability and refutability as a scientific theory. With these (...) concerns in mind, this paper provides a critical review of dual process theory in economics, focusing on its role as a psychological framework for decision modeling in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. I argue that the influx of criticisms against dual process theory challenge the descriptive accuracy of dualistic decision models in economics. In fact, the case can be made that the popularity of dual process theory in economics has less to do with the empirical success of dualistic decision models, and more to do with the convenience that the dual process narrative provides economists looking to explain-away decision anomalies. This leaves behavioral economists and neuroeconomists with something of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-making and give up the narrative, or they revise and restate their scientific ambitions. (shrink)

Monetary Intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the bright side of Monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics, frames money attitude in the context of pay and life satisfaction, and controls money at the macro-level and micro-level. We theorize: Managers with low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior will have high subjective well-being: pay (...) satisfaction and quality of life. Data collected from 6586 managers in 32 cultures across six continents support our theory. Interestingly, GDP per capita is related to life satisfaction, but not to pay satisfaction. Individual income is related to both life and pay satisfaction. Neither GDP nor income is related to Happiness. Our theoretical model across three GDP groups offers new discoveries: In high GDP entities, “high income” not only reduces aspirations—“Rich, Motivator, and Power,” but also promotes stewardship behavior—“Budget, Give/Donate, and Contribute” and appreciation of “Achievement.” After controlling income, we demonstrate the bright side of Monetary Intelligence: Low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior define Monetary Intelligence. “Good apples enjoy good quality of life in good barrels.” This notion adds another explanation to managers’ low magnitude of dishonesty in entities with high Corruption Perceptions Index. In low GDP entities, high income is related to poor Budgeting skills and escalated Happiness. These managers experience equal satisfaction with pay and life. We add a new vocabulary to the conversation of monetary intelligence, income, GDP, happiness, subjective well-being, good and bad apples and barrels, corruption, and behavioral ethics. (shrink)

An original examination of the relevance of behavioral economics for the practice of medical ethics.

This book presents the “pleasure phenomenon” as the most important factor in individual and socio-cultural development. This study emphasizes the necessity of transformation of marketing in the 21st Century which would shift the focus from seeking pleasure to controlling desires in a way that would benefit self and society.

This paper examines issues of ontology and methodology in behavioral economics: the attempt to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economic theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations. Of special interest is the epistemological status of neoclassical economic theory within behavioral economics, the runaway success story of contemporary economics. Behavioral economists aspire to replace the fundamental assumptions of orthodox, neoclassical economic theory. Yet, behavioral economists have gone out of their way (...) to praise those very assumptions. Matthew Rabin, for example, writes that behavioral economics “is not only built on the premise that [orthodox] economic methods are great, but also that most mainstream economic assumptions are great.” These apparently contradictory attitudes toward neoclassical theory raises the question of what, exactly, its epistemological status within behavioral economics is. This paper argues that the paradox can be resolved, and the question answered, by thinking of the epistemological status of neoclassical theory within behavioral economics in terms of Max Weber’s ideal types: analytical constructs that are not intended to be descriptively true of anything but which nevertheless can be used for a variety of theoretical purposes. The analysis is consistent with many of the insights from the philosophical literature on models in science and has important implications for the practice of economics—behavioral and neoclassical—as well as for the very nature of rationality. (shrink)

The goal of behavioral economics is to improve the explanatory and predictive power of economics. This can be achieved by using theoretical and methodological resources of psychology. Its fundamental idea is that the relationship between psychology and economics cannot be subsumed under standard philosophical accounts of intertheoretical relations. Philosophical Problems of Behavioral Economics argues that behavioral economics is best understood as an attempt to deidealize economic theory guided by psychological research. Behavioral (...) economics deconstructs the model of decision-making by adding different elements. Based on this understanding behavioral economics has a number of tasks: first, it has to identify which economic theory needs to be challenged; second it aims to identify factors which need to be modelled within economic theories of choice and modify the theory accordingly; and finally, it has to create models that explain economic phenomena based on the new theory. This book analyses the different stages of this deconstruction process and shows how the scientific disciplines of economics and psychology are connected by it. This volume develops a new account of intertheoretical relations based on the idea of deidealization and thus contributes to debates within the philosophy of social science. It is suitable for those who are interested in or study economic theory and philosophy, economic psychology and philosophy of social science. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the role of methodological individualism in behavioral economics. Since behavioral economics developed in reaction to traditional microeconomics, the chapter sketches first the latter’s understanding of methodological individualism. It argues that traditional microeconomics is based on three principles: the self-interest principle, the rationality principle, and the social change principle. The chapter then discusses experimental findings that led behavioral economists to relax all three principles. It argues that, in particular, the relaxation of the social (...) change principle pushes the boundaries of methodological individualism as understood in traditional microeconomics since it highlights ways in which social institutions, norms, and rules affect individual processes of preference formation. In doing so, behavioral economics invites intricate methodological discussions of the bidirectional relationship between social institutions and individual actions. (shrink)

George Loewenstein is one of the pioneers of the rapidly growing field of behavioral economics. For over twenty years he has been working at the intersection of economics and psychology and is one of the few people of whom it can be said that their work is equally respected and well known within both disciplines. This book brings together a selection of his papers focusing on what he calls "exotic preferences"-- the disparate motives that drive human behavior. (...) Anoriginal introduction outlines Loewenstein's general approach to research, and there are short introductions to each paper outlining briefly when, how and why they came to be written, providing a fascinating and vivid insight into the process of intellectual creativity. (shrink)

In their new book Escaping Paternalism, Glen Whitman and Mario Rizzo try to persuade readers to be skeptical of behavioral paternalism. Rizzo and Whitman describe behavioral...

We propose a triple test to evaluate the usefulness of behavioral economics models for public health policy. Test 1 is whether the model provides reasonably new insights. Test 2 is on whether these have been properly applied to policy settings. Test 3 is whether they are corroborated by evidence. We exemplify by considering the cases of social interactions models, self-control models and, in relation to health message framing, prospect theory. Out of these sets of models, only a correctly (...) applied prospect theory fully passes the tests at present. Specifically, in broad agreement with the evidence, a gain frame has positive implications for welfare encourages disease prevention activity, though this does not apply if the perceived probability of the bad health outcome is large enough. We see our tests as being useful to identify how much health policy weight policy makers should assign to specific behavioral economic models; they are also useful to verify what next steps would be most useful in further research. (shrink)

Behavioral economics is the latest trendy form of economics. Increasingly theorists are advocating using behavioral economics to do normative ethics or claiming that the behavioralists’ findings render normative claims otiose. I argue in this paper that we should be extremely wary when it comes to accepting any such normative pronouncements. I argue that behavioral economics: (a) minimizes and/or misunderstands the role that character and architectonic life goals play in accounting for the why of (...) ethical behavior, (b) fundamentally misconceives human practical rationality, (c) often unduly narrows the range of human action and choice, (d) misleadingly assumes that options are merely given to us rather than generated by us in accordance with our character, (e) is parasitic upon normative ethics, (f) results in an unhelpful ad hoc approach to ethical thinking, which is unlikely to prove all that useful and may even dangerously mislead ordinary agents or those who operate corporate compliance programs and who seek to improve corporate cultures, and (g) ignores the key role played in ethical behavior by meso‐ and macro‐factors. (shrink)

For me, economics is a collection of ideas and conventions which economists accept and use to reason with. Namely, it is a culture. Behavioral economics represents a transformation of that culture. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Camerer and Loewenstein (2003), its methods are pretty much the same as those introduced by the Game Theory revolution. At the core of most models in Behavioral Economics there are still agents who maximize a preference relation over some space (...) of consequences and the solution in most cases still involves standard equilibrium concepts. However, the behavioral economists are not committed to what is usually referred to as rational motivations. An economic fable (or a model as we would call it) that has at its core fairness, envy, present-bias and the like is by now not only permitted but even preferred. (shrink)

Economists working on behavioral economics have been awarded the Nobel Prize four times in recent years. This book explores this innovative area and in particular focuses on the work of Harvey Leibenstein, one of the pioneers of the discipline. The topics covered in the book include agency theory; dynamic efficiency; evolutionary economics; X-efficiency; the effect of emotions, specifically affect on decision-making; market pricing; experimental economics; human resource management; the Carnegie School, and intra-industry efficiency in less developed (...) countries. (shrink)

Interdisciplinarity in behavioral economics has often been described as limited or decreasing since the 1980s. In this article, we investigate the interdisciplinary influences of behavioral ec...

Metaphors “highlight and hide” different aspects of phenomena. A behavioral economic metaphor for excessive consumption highlights the contextual features of behavioral-environment relations. Can the behavioral momentum metaphor generate a representation of context that is at least as useful as that generated by behavioral economics? Maybe, maybe not; or maybe a mixed metaphor will do a better job than either alone.

I am a behavioral economist, who is interested in both behavioral sciences and economic behavior. By the term “economic behavior” I refer to the calculative reasoned domain of economic analysis, whereas by “behavioral economics” I address aspects of human feelings, emotions and everything that is not captured by the “rational” paradigm. Evidently, erroneous calculations, as well as unhinged sentiments lead to economic losses, and every change in the economics of the world has both calculative and (...) behavioral sides to it. In what follows, we examine these two sides of behavior in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic by drawing on contemporaneous data, forecasts, and images. Each side of behavior reveals distinctive insights, and intriguingly, not all outcomes count as loss. As we face this crisis, there is a clear environmental gain that we would be smart to preserve post pandemic. (shrink)

Recent work in behavioral economics and psychology provides valuable resources for religious ethicists. This book discussion examines contributions by Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton, Uri Gneezy and John A. List, and Douglas Hough. This literature raises important questions about ethical decision-making, moral agency and responsibility, and the ethics of life in global capitalism. It also opens up promising areas for interdisciplinary dialogue between economics and religious studies. This book discussion concludes that religious ethicists (...) have much to contribute to the conversations about moral anthropology that are now being held in behavioral economic research, and to the broader political economic debates in which this research participates. (shrink)

Read Rati Mekvabishvili's 'On the Importance of Altruism, Prosocial Behavior and Christian Love in Behavioral Economics research' here...

Governments and non-govermental organizations (NGOs) that plan projects to conserve the environment and alleviate poverty often attempt to modify rural livelihoods by halting activities they judge to be destructive or inefficient and encouraging alternatives. Project planners typically do so without understanding how rural people themselves judge the value of their activities. When the alternatives planners recommend do not replace the value of banned activities, alternatives are unlikely to be adopted, and local people will refuse to participate. Human behavioral ecology (...) and behavioral economics may provide useful tools for generating and evaluating hypotheses for how people value economic activities in their portfolios and potential alternatives. This is demonstrated with a case example from southwestern Madagascar, where plans to create a Mikea Forest National Park began with the elimination of slash-and-burn maize agriculture and the encouragement to plant labor-intensive manioc instead. Future park plans could restrict access to wild tuber patches, hunting small game, and fishing. The value of these activities is considered using observational data informed by optimal foraging theory, and experimental data describing people’s time preference and covariation perception. Analyses suggest that manioc is not a suitable replacement for maize for many Mikea because the two crops differ in terms of labor requirements, delay-to-reward, and covariation with rainfall. Park planners should promote wild tuber foraging and stewardship of tuber patches and the anthropogenic landscapes in which they are found. To conserve small game, planners must provide alternative sources of protein and cash. Little effort should be spent protecting lemurs, as they are rarely eaten and never sold. (shrink)

The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) is urging academic medical centers to ban pharmaceutical detailing. This policy followed from a consideration of behavioral and neuroeconomics research. I argue that this research did not warrant the conclusions drawn from it. Pharmaceutical detailing carries risks of cognitive error for physicians, as do other forms of information exchange. Physicians may overcome such risks; those determined to do so may ethically engage in pharmaceutical detailing. Whether or not they should do so is (...) a prudential judgment about which reasonable people may disagree. The AAMC's ethical condemnation of detailing is unwarranted and will subvert efforts to maintain a realm of physician discretion in clinical work that is increasingly threatened in our present practice environment. (shrink)

Abstract“Comprehensive Healthcare for America” is a largely single-payer reform proposal that, by applying the insights of behavioral economics, may be able to rally patients and clinicians sufficiently to overcome the opposition of politicians and vested interests to providing all Americans with less complicated and less costly access to needed healthcare.

In “A Virtue Ethics Critique of Ethical Dimensions of Behavioral Economics,” Professor Daryl Koehn criticizes the field of behavioral economics. She argues that behavioral economists ignore many important factors that affect how people make decisions, that their results are derived from experiments where subjects make choices in overly restrictive, artificial, and thin contexts that do not capture the richness of reality, and that the approach brings up psychological motivations that affect behavior in a piecemeal, ad (...) hoc way that does not capture the overall tapestry of the factors that influence the choices that we make. In this comment, I offer responses to many of these criticisms, and note where I think we have common ground. (shrink)

In this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore 's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the ‘scale-relativity’ considerations built into Binmore 's approach to modeling human evolution. Paul Seabright's criticism of Binmore, I note, repeats these oversights. In the course of answering Gintis's and Seabright's objections, I clarify and extend (...) Binmore 's theory in a number of respects, integrating it with Kim Sterelny's and Don Ross's recent work on the evolution of people as cultural entities. The account also yields a novel basis for choosing between socialism and what Binmore calls ‘whiggery’ as normative political programs. Key Words: theory of justice • bargaining theory • evolutionary game theory • human evolution • Ken Binmore • Herbert Gintis • Kim Sterelny. (shrink)

In their article “The Concept of Voluntary Consent,” Robert Nelson and colleagues (2011) argue for two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for voluntary action: intentionality, and substantial freedom from controlling influences. They propose an instrument to empirically measure voluntariness, the Decision Making Control Instrument. I argue that (1) their conceptual analysis of intentionality and controlling influences needs expansion in light of the growing use of behavioral economics principles to change individual and public health behaviors (growing in part by (...) the designation of “The Science of Behavior Change” as a new National Institutes of Health [NIH] Roadmap Activity); and (2) that their measure of voluntariness that relies on self-perceived intentionality and extent of control is unreliable, given findings from behavioral economics and cognitive science that show that our perceptions about the intentionality and control of our own and others’ decisions and actions are remarkably skewed and un-insightful. (shrink)

ArgumentThe main contribution of the Alfred P. Sloan and Russell Sage Foundations' behavioral economics program (1984–1992) was not the resources it provided, which were relatively modest. Instead, the program's contribution lay in catalyzing “a sense of mission” in the collaboration between psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, economist Richard Thaler, and their associates. Partly this reflected the common strategy of American foundations to pick an individual or small group of scientists and stick with them until scientific success had (...) been achieved. But moreover, it was a consequence of the careful management of the program's director Eric Wanner. The various actors involved in the behavioral economics program constructed a new behavioral economic sub-discipline in economics by tapping into existing missionary sentiments in the economic and psychological disciplines, while at the same time actively shaping this sense of mission. (shrink)