The paper explores a connection between Schelling’s celebrated Freedom Essay and Plato’s Timaeus by considering the importance of Schelling’s translation of a phrase found in the Platonic dialogue in which Timaeus expresses the limits of human discourse, speaking of it as a kind of “bastard reasoning.” These limits are said to arise necessarily through the progression of the inquiry carried out by Timaeus. Schelling’s own resistance to viewing his inquiry determined by such limits and such necessity is highlighted (...) by the fact that he curiously translates the phrase as “false imagination” or sin. The paper questions the reasons for such resistance given the striking structural similarity between the Timaeus and Schelling’s own essay. The paper concludes that Schelling’s thinking of the “unground” is comparable to the chorological interruption enacted in the Timaeus, but that Schelling does not consider how such an interruption bears upon God’s word. The paper thus points to a self-estranging necessity at the heart of all discourse and thought. (shrink)

In a wide-ranging, provocative anatomy of modern society and its origins, novelist and historian John Ralston Saul explores the reason for our deepening sense of crisis and confusion. Throughout the Western world we talk endlessly of individual freedom, yet Saul shows that there has never before been such pressure for conformity. Our business leaders describe themselves as capitalists, yet most are corporate employees and financial speculators. We are obsessed with competition, yet the single largest item of international trade is a (...) subsidized market in armaments. We call our governments democracies, yet few of us participate in politics. We complain about "invasive government," yet our legal, educational, financial, social, cultural and legislative systems are breaking down. While most observers view these problems separately, Saul demonstrates that they are largely manifestations of our blind faith in the value of reason. Over the last 400 years, our "rational elites" have gradually instituted reforms in every phase of social life. But Saul shows that they have also been responsible for most of the difficulties and violence of the same period. This paradox arises from a simple truth which our elites deny: far from being a moral force, reason is no more than an administrative method. Their denial has helped to turn the modern West into a vast, incomprehensible, directionless machine, run by process-minded experts - "Voltaire's bastards"--Whose cult of scientific management is bereft of both sense and morality. Whether in politics, art, business, the military, entertainment, science, finance, academia or journalism, these experts share the same outlook and methods. The result, Saul maintains, is a civilization of immense technological power whose peoples increasingly dwell in a world of illusion. Already known to millions of readers as the author of novels which portray the overwhelming effects of this power on the modern individual by weaving together international finance, the oil and arms business, guerrilla warfare, drug traffic, and the world of art, here Saul lays aside the mask of fiction to speak in his own voice. Only by withdrawing from our addiction to "solutions," he argues, reclaiming the citizens' right to question and participate in public life, and recovering a common sense capacity for intelligent panic, can we find a way out of our permanent crisis. (shrink)

This essay criticises ‘modest’ one‐child policies, which would impose sanctions upon parents who create multiple children. Specifically, this article considers what the state owes individuals who would be born (illegally) beneath restrictive procreative policies and argues that such policies would fail to show due respect to second‐ or third‐born individuals created beneath them. First, I argue that modest procreative restrictions (like sanctions) are likely to generate only modest compliance. I then suggest it is reasonable to think a one‐child policy fails (...) to demonstrate due respect to existing second and third children. I argue that such a policy generates an undue burden on any second or third children who would be born beneath them, before concluding by considering whether the state might be able to avoid effectively reinscribing ‘bastardy’ into its law by locating responsibility for the effects of such a policy entirely on the parents, rather than on children. (shrink)

Cet article aborde la question du temps dans l’institution judiciaire en prenant pour objet le contentieux familial. En considérant la dimension temporelle du règlement des conflits qui émergent lors des ruptures d’union, il met en évidence le changement radical de la vision du temps qui a touché le monde de la justice civile dans les dernières décennies. Le mouvement d’accélération qui touche l’ensemble de l’institution judiciaire se trouve redoublé dans ce champ par l’urgence qu’impose la réaction face à un contentieux (...) de masse : il s’agit de répondre sans délais aux conflits familiaux, selon des modalités adaptées aux besoins des intéressés. L’étude s’appuie sur une enquête réalisée dans cinq juridictions, en France et en Belgique. Dans ces deux pays, les dernières réformes intervenues ont eu pour projet de hâter les procédures de divorce. Dans la pratique, différentes modalités de l’accélération du traitement judiciaire sont observées. En France, le juge aux affaires familiales est un acteur central qui traite l’ensemble des ruptures de couple soumises à la justice. Les JAF font tout pour accélérer les décisions, en s’appuyant autant que faire se peut sur l’accord des parties et en cherchant à contrôler les avocats. En Belgique, l’accélération est particulièrement apparente s’agissant du procès en divorce, mais les décisions sur les effets accessoires de la séparation sont renvoyées à différentes instances ayant leur propre temporalité. Par-delà ces différences, la comparaison suggère que l’accélération du traitement du contentieux de la famille résulte de la coprésence des deux tendances majeures observées, la managérialisation de la justice et le renvoi des décisions relatives à la famille vers les intéressés eux-mêmes. L’accélération du traitement judiciaire du divorce n’est cependant pas sans conséquence : en particulier, elle rend plus apparente la disjonction du temps du procès et de celui que vivent les conjoints en rupture. (shrink)

El presente texto pretende reivindicar agencias materiales en las prácticas de la pintura al óleo. El artículo comienza presentando algunos debates sobre la importancia de la materialidad desde una estética posthumana, relacional y ecológica inspirada por las teorías de los nuevos materialismos y sus distintos anclajes (la teoría del actor-red, las epistemologías feministas de la tecno-ciencia, la ontología orientada a los objetos o la cultura material post fenomenológica). A continuación, presentaré algunos ejemplos de mediaciones o hibridaciones socio-técnicas en la pintura (...) al óleo donde agencias humanas y no humanas se involucran para articular y sostener los cuadros; pero también para traicionar, interrumpir y asombrar las intenciones de sus autores, la estabilidad de sus pigmentos y la autenticidad de su apreciación estética. Finalmente, desplegaré un proceso de ontogénesis material de un instrumento pictórico, la paleta, como agenciamiento esperanzador para abandonar los dualismos de la modernidad estética. (shrink)

Quelle est aujourd’hui la place des Espaces-Rencontre parmi les interventions qui portent sur les relations enfants-parents, notamment dans les situations de rupture? Quelle est la spécificité de l’action des Espaces-Rencontre et d’où tiennent-ils leur identité? Quelle place occu-pent-ils dans le champ judiciaire, la santé mentale, le travail social? Et quel enseignement tirer de cette analyse pour l’avenir des Espaces-Rencontre? L’auteur, sociologue et chercheur, fait le point pour les dix ans du Point-Rencontre de Lille.

La médiation familiale existe en France depuis un peu moins de vingt ans et elle a obtenu, en 2002, une reconnaissance officielle sous la forme de la création d’un diplôme décerné par l’État. Cet article analyse le succès de la médiation et la place qu’elle occupe aujourd’hui dans la régulation des affaires privées. Pour ce faire, il considère différents niveaux de changement: l’évolution de la famille, celle de l’intervention sociale, ainsi que les stratégies développées par les médiateurs. En ce qui (...) concerne la famille et les ruptures d’union, la médiation familiale s’inscrit dans le droit fil des conceptions qui dominent actuellement. Elle se fait le promoteur de séparations négociées, permettant le maintien des relations entre l’enfant et le parent avec lequel il ne vit pas. S’agissant des transformations de l’action sociale, la médiation apparaît également comme l’expression d’un mouvement plus large : la diffusion d’une forme « douce » d’encadrement des comportements privés. En médiation, les parties sont conduites à écouter l’autre et à faire des concessions. Le dispositif lui-même est porteur d’une normativité forte. Le succès de la médiation ne s’explique cependant que si l’on prend en considération le troisième niveau, l’action des médiateurs : renforcement de la formation, obtention de soutiens sans faille dans la société civile et l’État, et détermination dans la volonté de créer une profession. L’auteur s’interroge sur les raisons qui sont à la base de cette détermination et évoque les questions qui se posent aujourd’hui aux médiateurs. (shrink)

En este texto ofrezco una interpretación de la metafórica idea de la epigénesis de la razón que Immanuel Kant introduce en el §27 de la Crítica de la razón pura en su segunda edición. Tal interpretación se hace a la luz de la teoría racial kantiana, valiéndome de ella para explicar el carácter de espontaneidad de las categorías del entendimiento (como condiciones de la experiencia) en analogía con la explicación kantiana sobre el origen de las razas humanas. Para ello explico (...) a lo largo del artículo tres cosas: 1) que hay que entender tal metáfora dentro del objetivo de la deducción trascendental de las categorías, 2) que dicha metáfora refiere a la coincidencia entre conceptos y experiencia, y 3) que Kant defiende una idea de epigénesis con connotaciones preformacionistas desde su interés por el origen de las razas humanas. (shrink)

In face of the fashionable dogma that we must choose between procedural ethics and communitarianism, the neglected alternative of an ethics without foundations warrants careful demarcation. George Lucas aims at undermining its distinctiveness, treating the system of right argued for in Reason and Justice as a bastard theory incongruously melding the formalism of procedural ethics with modes of community that should better be conceived as historical conventions.

As Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for ends are provided by desires. Instead, they (...) may say, there is just one principle, a principle of, if you will, instrumental transmutation: if one desires the end, then one has reason to take the means. See the discussion of General Production, in section 8, for a doubt about this. (shrink)

The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by (...) the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally. (shrink)

We offer a model of moral reform and regeneration that involves a wrong-doer making two movements: on the one hand, he identifies with himself as the one who did the act, while he also intentionally moves away from that self (or set of desires and intentions) and moves toward a transformed identity. We see this model at work in the formal practice of contrition and reform in Christian and Buddhist rites. This paper is part of a broader project we are (...) undertaking on the philosophy of forgiveness. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Reincarnation/Rebirth Karma Causality Problem of Evil Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility Karma and Release Transfer of Merit Recent Developments Works cited.

Conscious macrostates are usually assumed to be emergent from the underlying physical microstates comprising the brain and nervous system of biological organisms. However, a major problem with this assumption is that consciousness is essentially nonmeasurable unlike all other proven emergent properties of physical systems. In an earlier paper, using a no-go theorem, it was shown that conscious states cannot be comprised of processes that are physical in nature (Reason, 2019). Combining this result with another unrelated work on causal emergence in (...) physical systems (Hoel, Albantakis and Tononi, 2013), we show in this paper that conscious macrostates are not emergent from physical systems and they also do not supervene on physical microstates. An important implication of our work is that there must be some form of violation of energy conservation in biological systems that are conscious. (shrink)