Differences in perceptions and knowledge of crop diseases constitute a major obstacle in farmer–researcher cooperation, which is necessary for sustainable disease management. Farmers’ perceptions and management of crop diseases in the northern Ethiopian Regional State of Tigrai were investigated in order to harness their knowledge in the participatory development of integrated disease management (IDM) strategies. Knowledge of disease etiology and epidemiology, cultivar resistance, and reasons for the cultivation of susceptible cultivars were investigated in a total of 12 tabias (towns) in (...) ten weredas (districts). Perception of diseases involved both scientific and spiritual conceptual frameworks. Of the more than 30 crop diseases recorded on the major crops in the region, only rusts and powdery mildews (locally called humodia) and a few root rots were considered by farmers to be important. Farmers’ awareness of other diseases was extremely low; some highly damaging but less conspicuous diseases, such as faba bean chocolate spot and chickpea ascochyta blight (also called humodia), were not regarded by farmers as disease but as problems caused primarily by excessive soil moisture. Considering that some of these “unrecognized” diseases can cause complete yield loss and genetic erosion in epiphytotic years, there is an urgent need for bringing together farmers’ and scientists’ knowledge to complement each other. Even when farmers had access to disease-resistant or disease-tolerant cultivars, they grew susceptible local varieties because of multiple criteria including earliness, good yield in years with low humodia severity, suitability for home consumption, market demand/quality, and low soil fertility and land management requirements. Farmer innovation and knowledge were evident in their use of diverse disease control measures, but these were a mixture of the “useful and the useless.” Our findings stress the necessity for extension workers and researchers to understand and improve farmers’ knowledge of crop diseases, and farmers’ ability to observe and experiment, through the Farmer Field School or a similar experiential learning approach. These insights about farmers’ knowledge of crop diseases provide a basis for further collaborative maintenance of crop genetic diversity, development of germplasm, and IPM-related research in Africa. (shrink)

What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.

Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered (...) to support these claims is sorely deficient. He also shows that there is strong empirical support for the thesis that some conscious decisions and intentions have a genuine place in causal explanations of corresponding actions. In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will. Mele examines the accuracy of subjects' reports about when they first became aware of decisions or intentions in laboratory settings and develops some implications of warranted skepticism about the accuracy of these reports. In addition, he explores such questions as whether we must be conscious of all of our intentions and why scientists disagree about this. Mele's final chapter closes with a discussion of imaginary scientific findings that would warrant bold claims about free will and consciousness of the sort he examines in this book. (shrink)

The author demonstrates that certain forms of irrationality - incontinent action and self-deception - which many philosophers have rejected as being logically or psychologically impossible, are indeed possible.

The role of ethics in business -- Business in society : beyond the market and laws? -- Cultural diversity and international standards for business -- Ethics, at the core of the human action -- Individual responsibility and moral judgments in business -- Frequent ethical issues in business -- The purpose of the firm and mision-driven management -- Use and misuse of power -- Human virtues in leadership of organizations -- Ethics in organizational cultures and structures.

A significant voice in encouraging the theoretical development and practical implementation of humanistic management is Pope Benedict XVI. In his Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate, published in 2009, he proposed a new humanistic synthesis to realign the economy with its social purpose. The aim of this book is to interpret, comment, and develop aspects of this Encyclical Letter which are significant for economic and business activity and contribute to humanistic management. The authors, specialists in their different fields, provide an interdisciplinary (...) dialogue between their repsective areas and the Encyclical. The first, theoretical, part of the book focuses on the relationship between ethics and economics to advance toward a holistic view of business and managerial activity. The second part is oriented more toward the practical and managerial aspects, and discusses how the Encyclical can contribute to more humanistic ways of management. (shrink)

We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...) understood. (shrink)

Autonomous Agents addresses the related topics of self-control and individual autonomy. "Self-control" is defined as the opposite of akrasia-weakness of will. The study of self-control seeks to understand the concept of its own terms, followed by an examination of its bearing on one's actions, beliefs, emotions, and personal values. It goes on to consider how a proper understanding of self-control and its manifestations can shed light on personal autonomy and autonomous behaviour. Perspicuous, objective, and incisive throughout, Alfred Mele makes a (...) convincing case for the value of individual autonomy. (shrink)

The latest offering in the highly successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, The Philosophy of Action features contributions from twelve leading figures in the field, including: Robert Audi, Michael Bratman, Donald Davidson, Wayne Davis, Harry Frankfurt, Carl Ginet, Gilbert Harman, Jennifer Hornsby, Jaegwon Kim, Hugh McCann, Paul Moser, and Brian O'Shaughnessy. Alfred Mele provides an introductory essay on the topics chosen and the questions they deal with. Topics addressed include intention, reasons for action, and the nature and explanation of internal (...) action. A selective bibliography is included as a guide to further reading. Comprehensive and up-to-date, this collection provides an accessible and stimulating introduction for readers interested in the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, and moral philosophy. (shrink)

Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issue in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will - one for readers who are convinced that free will (...) is incompatible with determinism, and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will. (shrink)

Studies designed to help us understand how nonspecialists conceive of intentional action have generated some widely discussed results. To what extent are the results accounted for by the existence of different folk conceptions of intentional action? That is my guiding question in this article. I am not in a position to offer a full answer, but I do hope to make some progress.

Humanism in business is not only an alternative to economism but a way to human excellence. Humanism presented here revolves around the rich notion of “human person”, keystone of modern personalist philosophy and Catholic Social Teaching. From this perspective this book is offered to everyone, believer and nonbeliever alike. The person-centered humanism considers the human-wholeness, individual and relational, with subjectivity, self-determination, openness to transcendence, and with capacity not only to possess but also to give. It also highlights the uniqueness of (...) each person, endowed with a high constitutive dignity and in continuous process of flourishing toward human plenitude. An attitude of respect and good will is due to non-personal beings, while persons deserve to be treated with justice and even with love of benevolence. The book is prepared in dialogue with mainstream of thought in business and business ethics and focused on exploring ways to improve some conventional views. It includes some proposals such as a person-based ethics, ethics understood as intrinsic to business activity, the consideration of the company as an organized community of persons, and the purpose of the company oriented toward the common good through a double mission, internal and external. It is also suggested substituting the notion of “stakeholder” for the richer one of “relationholder.”. (shrink)

This chapter is a commentary on the others, concentrating on themes that link many of them. It provides conceptual background on free will, distinguishes among distinct philosophical positions on the topic (including compatibilist and incompatibilist positions), discusses determinism and laws of nature, connects free will to consciousness, critically examines Benjamin Libet's work on free will and consciousness, and considers the light that Daniel Wegner's contribution to the volume sheds on the “the illusion of conscious will” and free will.

Benefiting from recent work in neuroscience, this paper rebuts a pair of neuroscience-based arguments for the non-existence of free will. Well-known neuroscientific experiments that have often been cited in support of skepticism about free will are critically examined. Various problems are identified with attempts to use their findings to support the claim that free will is an illusion. It is argued on scientific grounds that certain assumptions made in these skeptical arguments are unjustified—namely, assumptions about the times at which decisions (...) are made and the times at which the point of no re­turn for the making of a decision is reached. It is argued as well that alleged findings about decisions of the kind featured in these experiments—arbitrary decisions made in the absence of conscious reasoning about what to do—fail to support certain crucial claims about non-arbitrary decisions made after careful deliberation. The paper also examines a fallback position for skeptics about free will. Some scientific skeptics about free will contend that free will, by definition, depends on the existence of immaterial souls. Survey-style studies that bring free will down to earth are brought to bear on this contention. (shrink)

Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In (...) addition, he defends an account of self-control, argues that "strict" akratic action is an insurmountable obstacle for traditional belief-desire models of action-explanation, and explains how a considerably modified model accommodates action of this sort. (shrink)

Benjamin Libet contends both that “the brain ‘decides’ to initiate or, at least, prepare to initiate [certain actions] before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a decision has taken place” and that “if the ‘act now’ process is initiated unconsciously, then conscious free will is not doing it.” He also contends that once we become conscious of our proximal decisions, we can exercise free will in vetoing them. This chapter provides some conceptual and empirical background and then discusses (...) three major problems regarding Libet's findings. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on a pair of topics in moral psychology that are linked to motivation and evaluation: weakness of will and first-person moral ought beliefs.

In a period in which the concept of self‐determination has become a cliche, it seems astonishing that it occupies the center of the historical stage in the various searches for a community in the horn of Africa. Thus, the concept itself might indeed have been a cliche, but not for the millions of human beings that have sacrificed, and continue to sacrifice, their lives for the sake of a way of life that the concept promises.

Human Foundations of Management explores the human foundation of management and economic activity in a way that is accessible to readers. The structure and contents of this book examines those aspects of the human being which are relevant to management and economic activities.

Teleological explanations of human actions are explanations in terms of aims, goals, or purposes of human agents. According to a familiar causal approach to analyzing and explaining human action, our actions are, essentially, events (and sometimes states, perhaps) that are suitably caused by appropriate mental items, or neural realizations of those items. Causalists traditionally appeal, in part, to such goal-representing states as desires and intentions (or their neural realizers) in their explanations of human actions, and they take accept-able teleological explanations (...) of our actions to be causal explanations. Some proponents of the view that human actions are explained teleologically resist this. They regard the causal approach as a rival. I dub this position “anticausalist teleologism,” or AT, for short. I favor the causal approach, but I will not directly argue for it here. My aim is more modest. I will develop a serious problem for AT that strongly suggests that teleologists need causalism; and I will rebut a style of objection to the project of providing a causal analysis of acting in pursuit of a goal that recently resurfaced in the literature on teleological explanations of action, a style of objection featuring a certain kind of causal deviance. (shrink)

Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its (...) advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature. Contributors include Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick. (shrink)

Intention, intentional action, and the connections between them are central topics of the philosophy of action, a branch of the philosophy of mind. One who regards the subject matter of the philosophy of mind as having at its core some aspect of what lies between environmental input to beings with minds and behavioural output may be inclined to see the philosophy of action as concerned only with the output end of things. That would be a mistake. Many intentional actions depend (...) for their development on the processing of input — both from the environment and from the body. (shrink)

Whereas some philosophers view all reasons for action as psychological states of agents, others—objective favourers theorists—locate the overwhelming majority of reasons for action outside the agent, in items that objectively favour courses of action. (The latter may count such psychological states as a person's belief that demons dance in his kitchen as a reason for him to seek psychiatric help.) This article explores options that objective favourers theorists have regarding cases in which, owing significantly to a false belief, an agent (...) performs an action for which there is no objective favourer. Topics addressed include whether such theorists, including Jonathan Dancy himself, should accept Dancy's thesis that 'intentional, deliberate, purposeful action is always done for a reason' and whether there are two different concepts of reasons for action, one geared to action-evaluation and the other to action-explanation. (shrink)

In order to be doing something intentionally, must one know that one is doing it? Some philosophers have answered yes. Our aim is to test a version of this knowledge thesis, what we call the Knowledge/Awareness Thesis, or KAT. KAT states that an agent is doing something intentionally only if he knows that he is doing it or is aware that he is doing it. Here, using vignettes featuring skilled action and vignettes featuring habitual action, we provide evidence that, in (...) various scenarios, a majority of non-specialists regard agents as intentionally doing things that the agents do not know they are doing and are not aware of doing. This puts pressure on proponents of KAT and leaves it to them to find a way these results can coexist with KAT. (shrink)

This volume showcases cutting-edge scholarship from The Big Questions in Free Will project, funded by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation and directed by Alfred R. Mele. It explores the subject of free will from the perspectives of neuroscience; social, cognitive, and developmental psychology; and philosophy. The volume consists of fourteen new articles and an introduction from top-ranked contributors, all of whom bring fresh perspectives to the question of free will. They investigate questions such as: How do children conceive (...) of free will and how does their concept of free will develop? How does lowered or raised confidence in the existence of free will affect our behavior? What modifies our power to resist temptation? What do lay folk mean by free will? What brain processes underlie decisions? How does the conscious experience of voluntary action contribute to the neural control of behavior? What are the neural differences between deliberate choosing and arbitrary picking? How do neuroscientific studies of decision making in monkeys bear on human free will? Is determinism compatible with free will? What can a proper understanding of causation tell us about free will? What is moral responsibility? Readers interested in the current and future direction of scholarship on free will find this volume essential reading. (shrink)

Les concepts de paradigme et de thématisation, par lesquels Jean Cavaillès décrit dans l’ouvrage posthume Sur la Logique et la théorie de la science la dynamique de l’activité mathématique, trouvent dans la théorie des catégories à la fois une illustration et une formalisation, et dans la dialectique hégélienne un précédent. Dans un premier temps, nous examinerons cette hypothèse, non sans définir le concept de thématisation et les quelques notions élémentaires de théorie des catégories qui nous serviront par la suite. Ensuite, (...) en supposant hégélienne la notion de « dialectique » employée par Cavaillès, nous vérifierons si le concept de « thématisation » peut prétendre décrire le processus dialectique de la logique hégélienne, interprétation dont nous trouverons l’esquisse chez William Lawvere. Enfin, nous mettrons à l’épreuve cette interprétation en analysant la dialectique hégélienne de l’être et du néant dans la Science de la logique et les Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie. Nous verrons ainsi comment la dialectique hégélienne peut tout à la fois décrire la pratique mathématique et s’y voir représenter. (shrink)

Les concepts de paradigme et de thématisation, par lesquels Jean Cavaillès décrit dans l’ouvrage posthume Sur la Logique et la théorie de la science la dynamique de l’activité mathématique, trouvent dans la théorie des catégories à la fois une illustration et une formalisation, et dans la dialectique hégélienne un précédent. Dans un premier temps, nous examinerons cette hypothèse, non sans définir le concept de thématisation et les quelques notions élémentaires de théorie des catégories qui nous serviront par la suite. Ensuite, (...) en supposant hégélienne la notion de « dialectique » employée par Cavaillès, nous vérifierons si le concept de « thématisation » peut prétendre décrire le processus dialectique de la logique hégélienne, interprétation dont nous trouverons l’esquisse chez William Lawvere. Enfin, nous mettrons à l’épreuve cette interprétation en analysant la dialectique hégélienne de l’être et du néant dans la Science de la logique et les Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie. Nous verrons ainsi comment la dialectique hégélienne peut tout à la fois décrire la pratique mathématique et s’y voir représenter. (shrink)

Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its (...) advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature. Contributors include Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick. (shrink)

I will argue that some changes of mind about what it is best to do are akratic occurrences and that the associated overt actions are derivatively akratic, and I will explain how akratic episodes of this kind are possible. Even if Socrates is mistaken in denying the reality of strict akratic action, he has identified an important phenomenon that deserves more attention than it has received.

Il est parfois fécond, en philosophie des sciences, de chercher si les concepts techniques relèvent d’une nécessité de structure plutôt que des seuls hasards de l’invention. En essayant de fonder de la sorte les concepts fondamentaux des systèmes d’exploitation que sont les notions de processus et de fichier, on s’aperçoit qu’ils sont, depuis Unix, les pendants des notions ontologiques abstraites d’acte et d’objet, et qu’ils satisfont toutes les propriétés que la théorie des catégories peut en attendre. La programmation peut dès (...) lors être vue comme une thématisation, c’est-à-dire la transformation de l’acte qu’est le processus en l’objet qu’est le fichier ; mais on découvre également que l’exécution de programmes joue le rôle d’une « antithématisation », transformation d’objets en actes dont l’histoire récente des mathématiques fournit également des exemples. Par ses concepts comme par ses procédés, la pratique informatique est pour la philosophie un objet aussi pur que les mathématiques. (shrink)

Il est parfois fécond, en philosophie des sciences, de chercher si les concepts techniques relèvent d’une nécessité de structure plutôt que des seuls hasards de l’invention. En essayant de fonder de la sorte les concepts fondamentaux des systèmes d’exploitation que sont les notions de processus et de fichier, on s’aperçoit qu’ils sont, depuis Unix, les pendants des notions ontologiques abstraites d’acte et d’objet, et qu’ils satisfont toutes les propriétés que la théorie des catégories peut en attendre. La programmation peut dès (...) lors être vue comme une thématisation, c’est-à-dire la transformation de l’acte qu’est le processus en l’objet qu’est le fichier ; mais on découvre également que l’exécution de programmes joue le rôle d’une « antithématisation », transformation d’objets en actes dont l’histoire récente des mathématiques fournit également des exemples. Par ses concepts comme par ses procédés, la pratique informatique est pour la philosophie un objet aussi pur que les mathématiques. (shrink)

Philosophe structural tout autant qu’historien structural de la philosophie, Jules Vuillemin fonde la classification des systèmes philosophiques sur une structure jumelle : la classification des formes de prédication. Essayant d’appliquer à l’œuvre de Vuillemin la méthode qu’il appliquait à ses objets d’étude, nous montrons que la structure de ces deux classifications peut être déduite de la combinaison de trois critères : le caractère intelligible ou sensible de l’objet, le caractère a priori ou a posteriori de la connaissance et le caractère (...) objectif ou subjectif de l’état de choses décrit. La classification peut ainsi être décrite comme un tableau cubique contenant cinq systèmes cohérents et trois systèmes contradictoires. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of the current version of Derk Pereboom’s “disappearing agent argument” against event-causal libertarianism. Special attention is paid to a notion that does a lot of work in his argument—that of settling which decision occurs (of the various decisions it is open to the agent to make at the time). It is argued that Pereboom’s disappearing agent argument fails to show that event-causal libertarians lack the resources to accommodate agents’ having freedom-level control over what they decide. (...) The connection between the disappearing agent argument and the problem of present luck is explored, as is the connection between settling which decision one makes and luck. Pereboom’s disappearing agent argument also is distinguished from another argument with the same name that targets intentional action itself. (shrink)

People intend to do things, try to do things, and do things. Do they also will to do things? More precisely, if people will to do things and their willing bears upon what they do, is willing, or volition, something distinct from intending and trying? This question is central to the intention/volition debate, a debate about the ingredients of the best theory of the nature and explanation of human action. A variety of competing conceptions of volition, intention, and trying have (...) been advanced in the literature; it would be impossible to examine each thoroughly in a single paper. We can show, however, that the major functional roles ascribed to volition are nicely filled by a triad composed of intention, trying, and information feedback. Sections I and II below develop an account of the connection between intention and trying. Section III examines leading arguments for the existence of volitions and decomposes volitions into members of the triad just identified. (shrink)

Offers an analysis of a paradigmatic species of motivational attitude, one that essentially encompasses motivation to act, as action–desires and intentions do. It is argued that attitudes of this kind have, essentially, a functional connection to intentional action that beliefs lack. A subsidiary thesis is that so‐called “negative actions” do not undermine the analysis offered because, in fact, they divide into non‐actions and positive actions misdiagnosed as negative ones. The main support for the idea that there are truly negative actions (...) – namely, that sometimes it is intentional on a person's part, and for a reason, that he does not do something – is explained away. (shrink)