In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Approaches to DiscourseDavid HermanApproaches to Discourse, by Deborah Schiffrin; x & 470 pp. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, $24.95.Surveying and implementing six approaches to discourse analysis—speech-act theory, interactional sociolinguistics, ethnography of communication, pragmatics, conversation analysis, and variation analysis—this book affords new perspectives on both formalist and functionalist paradigms for studying units of language beyond the sentence. Although written primarily for specialists in linguistics, Schiffrin’s book will also be (...) of interest to a wider audience, from rhetoricans and philosophers of language to cognitive scientists and literary and narrative theorists. To this reviewer’s knowledge, no other book so comprehensively and so skillfully summarizes the major issues facing analysts of discourse. Grounding each of the six approaches in the philosophical and disciplinary contexts from which it emerged, Schiffrin shows that no single approach can typify, let alone exhaustively characterize, multisentential segments [End Page 396] of language. Rather, the approaches are good for highlighting different—and differently salient—properties of discourse. What approach we should choose in a given instance depends largely on the kind of question that we are asking about discourse itself.One of the assumptions underlying and unifying Schiffrin’s analyses of discourse is that, above and beyond competence in the grammar of a language, human beings display broadly communicative competence. Humans traffic not in sentences but rather in utterances, i.e., sentence-tokens paired with the contexts in which those tokens are produced and interpreted. Utterances, not sentences, support inferences, license implicatures, such that we and our interlocutors are able to communicate far more than what we actually say to one another. (As Schiffrin notes on pp. 39–41, however, there is a lack of consensus about how best to characterize the notion of “utterance” itself.) Accordingly, discourse analysts should study “the way the communicative content of an utterance contributes to our understanding of relationships across utterances, or, alternatively,... the way relationships across utterances help us understand the form, function, or meaning of a single utterance” (p. 89). Schiffrin herself studies the communicative functions of utterances by isolating two common discourse phenomena—question-answer sequences and sequences of referring expressions—and then organizes her presentation of the six approaches around these phenomena. Thus speech-act theory, interactional sociolinguistics, and ethnography of communication prove especially useful for the study of questions and answers; meanwhile, (Gricean) pragmatics, conversation analysis, and variation analysis yield insights into the distribution of referring expressions across utterances.Particularly illuminating are the sample analyses that highlight the possibilities and limits of each of the six approaches. For example, in the chapter on speech-act theory and discourse (pp. 49–91), Schiffrin discusses the “multiple response options” made available by a given utterance. An utterance functioning as a question can be interpreted, and responded to, either as a request for information or as an offer (p. 75). Because speech acts perform more than one discourse function at a time, the illocutionary force of a given speech act is “sequentially emergent,” arising “only in relation to another prior act” (p. 78). Yet as Schiffrin demonstrates, what allows us to make decisions about the “sequential appropriateness” (p. 89) of a given response to a prior utterance has less to do with the constitutive rules of speech acts than the social meanings attaching to those acts. Speech-act theory has little to say about such meanings; at best, then, it provides a skeletal account of the configurations of utterances we intuitively identify as question-answer sequences. By contrast, interactional sociolinguistics, which Schiffrin traces back to the work of Erving Goffman and John J. Gumperz, affords a more “richly textured view of the contexts in which inferences about speakers’ meaning are situated” (p. 106). In speech-act theoretical terms, a response included in Schiffrin’s sample analysis figures [End Page 397] (ambiguously) both as a mere expansion of a prior utterance and also as an account explaining the very occurrence of that previous utterance (pp. 78–84). An interactional sociolinguistic approach more productively describes this same response in terms of a participant alignment that Schiffrin labels “speaking for another.” For Schiffrin, in comparison with the Austin-Searle tradition of speech-act analysis, the... (shrink)

Making room for character -- Pluralism and the community of moral judgment -- A cosmopolitan kingdom of ends --Responsibility and moral competence --Can virtue be taught?: the problem of new moral facts -- Training to autonomy: Kant and the question of moral education -- Bootstrapping -- Rethinking Kant's hedonism -- The scope of moral requirement -- The will and its objects -- Obligatory ends -- Moral improvisation -- Contingency in obligation.

Herman Parret and Jacques Bouveresse Introduction. As Rosenberg remarks, " Understanding ... is evidently difficult to understand" (in this volume, p. 29). ...

Discussion of the concept of evil in Indian philosophy.

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

By re-examining the writings of Gadamer and Habermas and their views of earlier interpretive theorists, this book offers a radical challenge to their idea of the 'dialogue' between researchers and their subjects.

First published in 1962, contains the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. It sets out Austin's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts for at least the last ten years of his life. Starting from an exhaustive examination of his already well- known distinction of performative utterances from statements, Austin here finally abandons that distinction, replacing it by a more general theory of 'illocutionary forces' of utterances which has important bearings on (...) a wide variety of philosophical problems. (shrink)

This study – the first full-length monograph in English on the subject – discusses the genesis of Theodor Lessing’s philosophy of history as mainly expressed in his books _Geschichte als Sinngebung des Sinnlosen_ (1919 and 1927), as well as its philosophical implications.

The idea of legal rights today enjoys virtually universal appeal, yet all too often the meaning and significance of rights are poorly understood. The purpose of this volume is to clarify the subject of legal rights by drawing on both historical and philosophical legal scholarship to bridge the gap between these two genres--a gap that has divorced abstract and normative treatments of rights from an understanding of their particular social and cultural contexts. Legal Rights: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives shows that (...) the meaning and extent of rights has been dramatically expanded in this century, though along with the widespread and flourishing popularity of rights, voices of criticism have increasingly been raised. The authors take up the question of the foundation of rights and explore the postmodern challenges to efforts to ground rights outside of history and language. Drawing rich historical analysis and careful philosophical inquiry into productive dialogue, this book explores the many facets of rights at the end of the twentieth century. In these essays, potentially abstract debates come alive as they are related to the struggles of real people attempting to cope with, and improve, their living conditions. The significance of legal rights is measured not just in terms of philosophical categories or as a collection of histories, but as they are experienced in the lives of men and women seeking to come to terms with rights in contemporary life. Contributors are Hadley Arkes, William E. Cain, Thomas Haskell, Morton J. Horwitz, Annabel Patterson, Michael J. Perry, Pierre Schlag, and Jeremy Waldron. Austin Sarat is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst College. Thomas R. Kearns is William H. Hastie Professor of Philosophy, Amherst College. (shrink)

”Meaningful human control” is a term invented in the political and legal debate on autonomous weapons system, but it is nowadays also used in many other contexts. It is supposed to specify conditions under which an artificial system is under the right kind of control to avoid responsibility gaps: that is, situations in which no moral agent is responsible. Santoni de Sio and Van den Hoven have recently suggested a framework that can be used by system designers to operationalize this (...) kind of control. It is the purpose of this paper to facilitate further operationalization of ”meaningful human control”. -/- This paper consists of two parts. In the first part I resolve an ambiguity that plagues current operationalizations of MHC. One of the design conditions says that the system should track the reasons of the relevant agents. This condition is ambiguous between the kind of reasons involved. On one interpretation it says that a system should track motivating reasons, while it is concerned with normative reasons on the other. Current participants in the debate interpret the framework as being concerned with (something in the vicinity of) motivating reasons. I argue against this interpretation by showing that meaningful human control requires that a system tracks normative reasons. Moreover, I maintain that an operationalization of meaningful human control that fails to track the right kind of reasons is morally problematic.When this is properly understood, it can be shown that the framework of MHC is committed to the agent-relativity of reasons. More precisely, I argue in the second part of this paper that if the tracking condition of MHC plays an important role in responsibility attribution (as the proponents of the view maintain), then the framework is incompatible with first-order normative theories that hold that normative reasons are agent-neutral (such as many versions of consequentialism). In the final section I present three ways forward for the proponent of MHC as reason-responsiveness. (shrink)

Contemporary society needs the recognition of a moral middle ground, where human behavior can be evaluated as permissible, understandable, or even valuable. As a counterforce to polarization and divisive politics, an identity model is proposed in which individual and group identities are transcended by a human and ecological identity.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

The subject of this paper, Excuses, is one not to be treated, but only to be introduced, within such limits. It is, or might be, the name of a whole branch, even a ramiculated branch, of philosophy, or at least of one fashion of philosophy. I shall try, therefore, first to state what the subject is, why it is worth studying, and how it may be studied, all this at a regrettably lofty level: and then I shall illustrate, in more (...) congenial but desultory detail, some of the methods to be used, together with their limitations, and some of the unexpected results to be expected and lessons to be learned. Much, of course, of the amusement, and of the instruction, comes in drawing the coverts of the microglot, in hounding down the minutiae, and to this I can do no more here than incite you. But I owe it to the subject to say, that it has long afforded me what philosophy is so often thought, and made, barren of -- the fun of discovery, the pleasures of co-operation, and the satisfaction of reaching agreement. (shrink)

Discrete choice experiments—selecting the best and/or worst from a set of options—are increasingly used to provide more efficient and valid measurement of attitudes or preferences than conventional methods such as Likert scales. Discrete choice data have traditionally been analyzed with random utility models that have good measurement properties but provide limited insight into cognitive processes. We extend a well-established cognitive model, which has successfully explained both choices and response times for simple decision tasks, to complex, multi-attribute discrete choice data. The (...) fits, and parameters, of the extended model for two sets of choice data (involving patient preferences for dermatology appointments, and consumer attitudes toward mobile phones) agree with those of standard choice models. The extended model also accounts for choice and response time data in a perceptual judgment task designed in a manner analogous to best–worst discrete choice experiments. We conclude that several research fields might benefit from discrete choice experiments, and that the particular accumulator-based models of decision making used in response time research can also provide process-level instantiations for random utility models. (shrink)

A review of Eric Schwitzgebel's book "A Theory of Jerks and Other Philosophical Misadventures" (2020).

Scholars have critiqued mainstream economic approaches to environmental valuation for decades. These critiques have intensified with the increased prominence of environmental valuation in decision-making. This paper has three goals. First, we summarise prominent critiques of monetary valuation, drawing mostly on the work of Clive Spash, who worked extensively on cost–benefit analysis early in his career and then became one of monetary valuation's most thorough and ardent critics. Second, we, as a group of scholars who study relational values, describe how relational (...) values research engages with and addresses many of the critiques of monetary valuation. Third, we offer suggestions for relational values research that continues and deepens its ability to respond to critiques of monetary valuation and contributes to transformative change towards sustainability. (shrink)

'Is There Truth in Art?' includes chapters on atonal music, environmental art, modern German and French poetry, contemporary French fiction, experimental French ...

A detailed theoretical analysis is presented of what five utility representations – subjective expected utility (SEU), rank-dependent (cumulative or Choquet) utility (RDU), gains decomposition utility (GDU), rank weighted utility (RWU), and a configural-weight model (TAX) that we show to be equivalent to RWU – say about a series of independence properties, many of which were suggested by M. H. Birnbaum and his coauthors. The goal is to clarify what implications to draw about the descriptive aspects of the representations from data (...) concerning these properties. The upshot is a sharp rejection of SEU and RDU and no clear choice between GDU and TAX, but a list of 8 properties is given that should receive more attention to discriminate between the latter two models. (shrink)

[v. 1] From the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment.--v. 2. From the German Enlightenment to the age of Darwin.

The collapse of the Weimar Republic remains central to the history of the 20th century and to contemporary debates on 'classical modernity' and its Europe-wide crisis in the wake of the First World War. The present issue of Thesis Eleven focuses on three dimensions of the Weimar crisis: the experience of fundamental societal crisis and closure and its diagnostic power in relation to the rise of fascist movements; the cognitive and normative resources that sought to work against this crisis-ridden sense (...) of closure; and third, the degree to which these counter tendencies anticipate postmodern interrogations of the premises of classical modernity. (shrink)

Criticism of ‘the West’ and of ‘Western civilization’ in Germany in the early 20th century is generally most familiar today as a conservative force of the age. It is well-known that at the outbreak of war in August 1914 a longstanding German complex of resentment of the Western European powers exploded in a call to arms. Yet it needs to be stressed that not all prominent German bourgeois writers endorsed a wholly militant reading of the motif of German national-cultural ‘protest (...) at the West’. By 1918 an array of voices could come to discern another kind of salient work of contention that refused apology for any kind of violent Kulturkrieg. The thesis defended in this article is that in sophisticated humanistic writing of the era, a German mood of antagonism with the West represents not a regressive ideology but the productive and intelligent outcome of a longstanding preeminence of philosophical questioning in German academic life since the later 19th century about European world pictures and their claims to universal validity on the stage of world history. A range of statements are shown here to anticipate debates of the present day about ‘late’, ‘reflexive’ or ‘post-Eurocentric’ conditions of Western modernity. (shrink)

By re-examining the writings of Gadamer and Habermas and their views of earlier interpretive theorists, this book offers a radical challenge to their idea of the 'dialogue' between researchers and their subjects.

One aspect of the utility of gambling may evidence itself in failures of idempotence, i.e., when all chance outcomes give rise to the same consequence the `gamble' may not be indifferent to its common consequence. Under the assumption of segregation, such gambles can be expressed as the joint receipt of the common consequence and what we call `an element of chance', namely, the same gamble with the common consequence replaced by the status quo. Generalizing, any gamble is indifferent to the (...) joint receipt of its element of chance and a certain consequence, which is called the `kernel equivalent' of the gamble. Under idempotence, the kernel equivalent equals the certainty equivalent. Conditions are reported (Theorem 4) that are sufficient for the kernel equivalents to have the kind of utility representation first discussed by Luce and Fishburn (1991), including being idempotent. This utility representation of the kernel equivalents together with the derived form of utility over joint receipts yields a utility representation of the original structure. Possible forms for the utility of an element of chance are developed. (shrink)

Many liberal philosophers view elite education as a virtue of political leaders and, in addition, hold that an important role of a just education system is to create better elites. A compelling and influential articulation of this view has been offered by Elizabeth Anderson. However, this view is in conflict with a commitment to substantive democracy, given the background conditions of the United States today. This article will argue, contra Anderson, that having the highly educated disproportionately represented in political leadership (...) is incompatible with egalitarian principles of democracy. The key reason for this is that it systematically shuts out the working class from full political participation. Therefore, in order to satisfy the constraints of democracy, we must sever the connection between elite education and political office. (shrink)

Historian Arthur Herman traces the roots of declinism and shows how major thinkers, past and present, have contributed to its development as a coherent ideology of cultural pessimism. From Nazism to the Sixties counterculture, from Britain's Fabian socialists to America's multiculturalists, and from Dracula and Freud to Robert Bly and Madonna, this work examines the idea of decline in Western history and sets out to explain how the conviction of civilization's inevitable end has become a fixed part of the (...) modern Western imagination. Through a series of biographical portraits spanning the 19th and 20th centuries, the author traces the roots of declinism and aims to show how major thinkers of the past and present, including Nietzsche, DuBois, Sartre, and Foucault, have contributed to its development as a coherent ideology of cultural pessimism. (shrink)