Designed to bring the concepts and methods of philosophy to bear on practical concerns, the essays in this volume discuss the environment, personal relationships, war, terrorism and violence, social justice and medicine. Contributors emphasize the metaphysical and ethical dimensions.

abstract I consider the putative originality of applied philosophy and seek to defend a version of it often called 'bottom up'. I review ways in which imagined cases may cause us to reconsider our normative commitments, and endorse a general attentiveness to the matter of how the world is and how it might reasonably be imagined. This is important if practical philosophers want to form the correct normative judgements, to be able to recognize the sui generis character of (...) some moral theorising in particular domains, practically to enact their considered judgments, and properly to acknowledge how the real world, in the form of institutions, practices and a cultural framework, constrains, or facilitates, practical enactment. Throughout I illustrate my abstract claims by reference to the moral judgement and legal regulation of sexual behaviour. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical discussion of the concept of applied philosophy. Writers specializing in applied philosophy (e.g., in the various fields of applied ethics) often assume what is here called the traditional concept of applied philosophy, i.e., they think of themselves as applying a “pure” (in itself nonapplied) philosophical theory to some humanly important practical problem area. If understood along these lines, applied philosophy can be taken to be analogous toapplied (...) science. However, this analogy collapses as soon as we realize that the “results” of applied philosophy cannot usually be regarded as instantiations of the von Wrightian technical norm, which can be considered the basic form of the results of applied scientific research. On the other hand, the postmodernist, antiscientific rival of traditional applied philosophy, viz., “media philosophy,” is argued to be little more than a relativist, degraded version of the traditional conception. Finally, it is suggested that the dichotomy between pure and applied philosophy should be abandoned in favor of a pragmatist view, which urges that all significant philosophical problems are always already embedded in human practice. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical discussion of the concept of applied philosophy. Writers specializing in applied philosophy (e.g., in the various fields of applied ethics) often assume what is here called the traditional concept of applied philosophy, i.e., they think of themselves as applying a “pure” (in itself nonapplied) philosophical theory to some humanly important practical problem area. If understood along these lines, applied philosophy can be taken to be analogous toapplied (...) science. However, this analogy collapses as soon as we realize that the “results” of applied philosophy cannot usually be regarded as instantiations of the von Wrightian technical norm, which can be considered the basic form of the results of applied scientific research. On the other hand, the postmodernist, antiscientific rival of traditional applied philosophy, viz., “media philosophy,” is argued to be little more than a relativist, degraded version of the traditional conception. Finally, it is suggested that the dichotomy between pure and applied philosophy should be abandoned in favor of a pragmatist view, which urges that all significant philosophical problems are always already embedded in human practice. (shrink)

This chapter explores the extent to which philosophy of language can be considered an applied discipline. I consider, first, ways in which sub-sections of philosophy of language may be considered as applied in terms of their subject matter and/or the kinds of questions being addressed (e.g. philosophy of language which deals with derogatory or inflammatory uses of language, or the role of philosophy of language within feminist philosophy). Then, in the second part of (...) the chapter, I turn to consider a more general (and perhaps more controversial) conception of philosophy of language as applied, which arises from the methodology adopted and the relationship of the discipline to empirical data. (shrink)

This essay aims to explore the ways in which a philosophical account of humor can contribute to the explanation of the application of humor in the course of everyday day life. After providing a conceptual analysis of comic amusement ‐‐ the psychological state that takes humor as it's object ‐‐ and defending the thesis that it is an emotion, I will go on to show how this emotion functions productively in various situations in terms of the non‐exhaustive and non‐exclusive categories (...) of bonding, coping, and perspectival modification (or frame changing). I will not, however, discuss the frequent claims that humor contributes to health because the evidence for this claim is highly contested. (shrink)

Ancient philosophy is “applied” in a number of ways, and for distinctive reasons, some perhaps rather different from those to be found in contemporary philosophy. In the case of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, one important basis for this lies in their views about the scope and purpose of philosophy. A second ground derives from their reflections on method. The methodological approaches discussed and implemented in the works of both Plato and Aristotle have significant implications for ideas (...) about applied philosophy. They also cast doubt on the possibility of a sharp distinction, or clear dividing line, between “pure” and “applied” philosophy. But they do not imply a conservative approach to applied philosophy. (shrink)

Applied philosophy is experiencing its “golden days,” as Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen says in his insightful introduction to A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Applied philosophy seems to be distinguished from its opposite, pure philosophy, usually understood as traditional philosophy, which deals with subjects such as free will, consciousness, or knowledge in philosophical subdisciplines like ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. To embrace applied philosophy could thus mean to advocate for a philosophy that deals (...) with questions “relevant to ‘the important questions of everyday life,’” as Leslie Stevenson puts it, as opposed to questions that arise from within the subdisciplines of pure philosophy. (shrink)

This essay characterises applied philosophy of religion as a certain sort of engagement with what religion means in the private and public lives of its practitioners. After emphasising continuities with the past, such as Hume's critique of miracles and Hobbes and Spinoza's discussions of scriptural meanings, it then discusses John Cottingham's recent work on spirituality and religious sensibility, followed by a section on new explorations of religious epistemology citing Linda Zagzebski's work on individual and communal epistemic authority, and (...) Leonore Stump's elaboration of a form of non‐propositional knowledge gained from narrative. Debates about the role of religion in liberal democratic politics are then addressed, with special attention to the contentious idea of a religion‐free “secular” or “public” reason as advocated respectively by Robert Audi and John Rawls. The significance of interdisciplinary input for dispelling religious stereotypes leads to a discussion of common gaps between proclamations of religious leaders and the sincere religious beliefs of their flocks. A section follows on the complex idea of religious experience, before the essay concludes with an account of relevant issues in religious ethics. (shrink)

'The unconsidered life is not worth living' - Socrates. Thinking about life, what it means and what it holds in store does not have to be a despondent experience, but rather can be enlightening and uplifting. A life truly worth living is one that is informed and considered so a degree of philosophical insight into the inevitabilities of the human condition is inherently important and such an approach will help us to deal with real personal dilemmas. This book is an (...) accessible, lively and thought-provoking series of linked commentaries, based on A. C. Grayling's 'The Last Word' column in the Guardian. Its aim is not to persuade readers to accept one particular philosophical point of view or theory, but to help us consider the wonderful range of insights which can be drawn from an immeasurably rich history of philosophical thought. Concepts covered include courage, love, betrayal, ambition, cruelty, wisdom, passion, beauty and death. This will be a wonderfully stimulating read and act as an invaluable guide as to what is truly important in living life, whether facing success, failure, justice, wrong, love, loss or any of the other profound experience life throws out. (shrink)

This is a reprint of an article in a collection edited by Cristopher Cowton and Roger Crisp, Business Ethics: Perspectives on the Practice of Theory (1998). The article reflects on (a) the tension between aprioristic applied philosophy --geared to thought experiments constructible in the armchair-- and applied philosophy informed by contact with relevant practitioners; and (b) the tension between the content of business ethics and the receptiveness of a business audience to its moralising messages. The contrast (...) between business ethics and medical ethics in these respects is discussed at some length. (shrink)

This paper draws an earlier book (with Evans and Higgins) entitled _Bad Call: Technology’s Attack on Referees and Umpires and How to Fix It_ (hereafter _Bad Call_) and its various precursor papers. These show why it is that current match officiating aids are unable to provide the kind of accuracy that is often claimed for them and that sports aficianados have been led to expect from them. Accuracy is improving all the time but the notion of perfect accuracy is a (...) myth because, for example, lines drawn on sports fields and the edges of balls are not perfectly defined. The devices meant to report the exact position of a ball—for instance ‘in’ or ‘out’ at tennis—work with the mathematically perfect world of virtual reality, not the actuality of an imperfect physical world. Even if ball-trackers could overcome the sort of inaccuracies related to fast ball speeds and slow camera frame-rates the goal of complete accuracy will always be beyond reach. Here it is suggested that the purpose of technological aids to umpires and referees be looked at in a new way that takes the viewers into account. (shrink)

Given the socio‐economic incentives for academic relevance, the sceptic may well challenge the academic integrity of the evolving discipline of business ethics. For, the question is, how could such an emerging field of enquiry constitute applied philosophy? I critically examine certain arguments, principally advanced by Michael Oakeshott and Stephen Clark, which might be thought to underwrite such scepticism, via a wholesale suspicion of applied ethics. Yet, I argue, philosophy can be and is properly concerned with our (...) practical experience and actions. The significance of more general, abstract ethical questions derives, in great part, from their bearing upon our practical deliberations and actions. Moreover, reflection about the nature and role of ethical principles need not deny a role for moral judgement. Although for contingent reasons we may be right to be worried, I present an argument to show that, as a matter of principle, the sceptical challenge regarding business ethics can be refuted. (shrink)

The methodology of applied philosophy may consist in its mode of application; or it may serve applied philosophy's purpose of speaking to practical matters. There may be no single method that is shared by all sub‐fields of applied philosophy; applied ethics, the dominant form of applied philosophy, should be thought of as neither “top‐down” nor “bottom‐up” in its methods. The use of far‐fetched examples is arguably in tension with the concerns and (...) intended audience of applied philosophy. Finally, applied philosophers may not be able to claim the status of experts; and moral expertise, in particular, is subject to moral worries. (shrink)

This paper examines possible applications of ideas and methods of Philosophy for Children (P4C) to workshop-style environmental education conducted in Sado, Japan. The theme of the workshop is the preservation of toki (the crested ibis) and the local community development. As a result of the success in new breeding, it was determined that the toki, which once became extinct in Japan, would be released to the natural environment in 2008. In order to achieve its successful settlement, local residents are (...) expected to participate in natural and social restoration. Since children will take over this task in the future, they need to be familiar with this issue and to be equipped with necessary skills to think for themselves what can be done towards the betterment of personal, natural, andsocial well-being. As an approach to children’s education, a series of school workshop has been conducted in Sado. The focuses of this education are to introduce the value of thinking for themselves about the issues of toki, environment, and community, and to provide them with some of the necessary skills. A strict timeframe, however, is a crucial difficulty when applying P4C to the school workshop. The workshop must be conducted in two hours (or less), and can be given only one time at each school. In this paper, I consider how it is possible to incorporate the process of thinking into the school workshop and to examine the value of thinking-oriented environmental education. Based on the responses from the students and the teachers, I argue that the integration of P4C ideas into theschool workshop has been meaningful for providing different and creative learning opportunities for them. (shrink)

In 1793, Kant published an essay entitled On the Common Saying: “That May be Correct in Theory, but It is of No Use in Practice.” The saying purports to express the superior wisdom of the worldly and experienced person, conveying a justified disdain of impractical philosophers with their abstract theories. (Its intended target is conjectured to be Edmund Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution, and Burke's claim that philosophical theorists were to blame for what went disastrously wrong in France.) In (...) the context of Kant's essay, ‘theory’ means philosophy, and ‘practice’ means its application. The common saying could thus be taken as an attack on the very idea of ‘applied philosophy’, or else as advocating the view that philosophy may be applied only with ad hoc exceptions. Kant argues, however, that when accurately understood, the Common Saying is not wisdom at all. Instead, in relation to non‐moral cases, it represents only ludicrous ignorance, while in relation to morality it exhibits an attitude of self‐deceptive moral corruption. Kant argues this last point at length in relation first, to personal morality, second, to the duties of politicians, and third, to our outlook in relation to the question whether the human species is morally progressing. The present chapter sympathetically expounds Kant's arguments in relation to morality, emphasizing especially the application of his argument to politics. (shrink)

Contributed articles presented at the National Workshop on "Innovative Courses on Applied/Practical Philosophy" held on Dec. 10-12, 2001 organized by Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

Philosophy of science was once a much more socially engaged endeavor, and can be so again. After a look back at philosophy of science in the 1930s-1950s, I turn to discuss the current potential for returning to a more engaged philosophy of science. Although philosophers of science have much to offer scientists and the public, I am skeptical that much can be gained by philosophers importing off-the-shelf discussions from philosophy of science to science and society. Such (...) efforts will likely look like efforts to do applied ethics by merely applying ethical theories to particular contexts and problems. While some insight can be gained by these kinds of endeavors, the most interesting and pressing problems for the actual practitioners and users of science are rarely addressed. Instead, I recommend that philosophers of science engage seriously and regularly with scientists and/or the users of science in order to gain an understanding of the conceptual issues on the ground. From such engagement, flaws in the traditional philosophical frameworks, and how such flaws can be remedied, become apparent. Serious engagement with the contexts of science thus provides the most fruit for philosophy of science per se and for the practitioners whom the philosophers aim to assist. And if one focuses on contexts where science has its most social relevance, these efforts can help to provide the thing that philosophy of science now lacks: a full-bodied philosophy of science in society. (shrink)

A traditional social scientific divide concerns the centrality of the interpretation of local understandings as opposed to attending to relatively general factors in understanding human individual and group differences. We consider one of the most common social scientific variables, race, and ask how to conceive of its causal power. We suggest that any plausible attempt to model the causal effects of such constructed social roles will involve close interplay between interpretationist and more general elements. Thus, we offer a case study (...) that one cannot offer a comprehensive model of the causal power of racial categories as social constructions without careful attention both to local meanings and more general mechanisms. (shrink)

Advances in science and technology have created a plethora of medical therapies in various forms including drugs, devices, and equipment. Many of these therapies are not curative, however, and patients sometimes find themselves being more burdened than benefited by them. These situations result in ethical dilemmas for which the bioethicist is sometimes consulted to resolve. Using philosophical principles of maximizing good, minimizing harm, being just, and respecting the values of others, the bioethicist counsels patients, families, and hospital personnel, sometimes functioning (...) as advocate, arbitrator, negotiator, mediator, and teacher. (shrink)

Advances in science and technology have created a plethora of medical therapies in various forms including drugs, devices, and equipment. Many of these therapies are not curative, however, and patients sometimes find themselves being more burdened than benefited by them. These situations result in ethical dilemmas for which the bioethicist is sometimes consulted to resolve. Using philosophical principles of maximizing good, minimizing harm, being just, and respecting the values of others, the bioethicist counsels patients, families, and hospital personnel, sometimes functioning (...) as advocate, arbitrator, negotiator, mediator, and teacher. (shrink)

The value of applied philosophy is often taken to consist in its contribution to our understanding of practical issues with which applied philosophy engages and in its contribution to their satisfactory resolution. This chapter examines the relationship between the nature of applied philosophy and its value. It regards the value of applied philosophy as dependent both on its philosophical quality and on its contribution to the understanding and (potential) resolution of practical issues (...) with which it engages. These dual points of reference are difficult simultaneously to fulfill and arguably sometimes in tension with one another. The chapter takes issue with the idea that the value of applied philosophy consists, or ought to consist, in its direct impact on actual policy or practice. (shrink)

Applied philosophy has been a growing area of research for the last 40 years. Until now, however, almost all of this research has been centered around the field of ethics. A Companion to Applied Philosophy breaks new ground, demonstrating that all areasof philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind, can be applied, and are relevant to questions of everyday life. This perennial topic in philosophy provides an overview (...) of these various applied philosophy developments, highlighting similarities and differences between various areas of applied philosophy, and examining the very nature of this topic. It is an area to which many of the towering figures in the history of philosophy have contributed, and this timely Companion demonstrates how various historical contributions are actually contributions within applied philosophy, even if they are not traditionally seen as such. The Companion contains 42 essays covering major areas of philosophy; the articles themselves are all original contributions to the literature and represent the state of the art on this topic, as well as offering a map to the current debates. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that applied philosophers hoping to develop a stronger role in public policy formation can begin by aligning their methods with the tools employed in the policy sciences. I proceed first by characterizing the standard view of policymaking and policy education as instrumentally oriented toward the employment of specific policy tools. I then investigate pressures internal to philosophy that nudge work in applied philosophy toward the periphery of policy debates. I capture the (...) dynamics of these pressures by framing them as the “dilemma dilemma” and the “problem problem.” Seeking a remedy, I turn to the interdisciplinarity of a unique approach to policymaking generally known as the “policy sciences.” Finally, I investigate the case of bioethics, an instance where philosophy has made decent headway with policymakers. From this I draw parallels to public policy. I suggest that because the policy sciences are essentially analchemist’s brew of academic fields, and because philosophy covers many of the foundational questions associated with these fields, it is only natural that applied philosophers should begin collaborations with other applied academics by adopting the strategies that have so successfully applied in other theoretical fields. (shrink)