Abstract

In 1793, Kant published an essay entitled On the Common Saying: “That May be Correct in Theory, but It is of No Use in Practice.” The saying purports to express the superior wisdom of the worldly and experienced person, conveying a justified disdain of impractical philosophers with their abstract theories. (Its intended target is conjectured to be Edmund Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution, and Burke's claim that philosophical theorists were to blame for what went disastrously wrong in France.) In the context of Kant's essay, ‘theory’ means philosophy, and ‘practice’ means its application. The common saying could thus be taken as an attack on the very idea of ‘applied philosophy’, or else as advocating the view that philosophy may be applied only with ad hoc exceptions. Kant argues, however, that when accurately understood, the Common Saying is not wisdom at all. Instead, in relation to non‐moral cases, it represents only ludicrous ignorance, while in relation to morality it exhibits an attitude of self‐deceptive moral corruption. Kant argues this last point at length in relation first, to personal morality, second, to the duties of politicians, and third, to our outlook in relation to the question whether the human species is morally progressing. The present chapter sympathetically expounds Kant's arguments in relation to morality, emphasizing especially the application of his argument to politics.