Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents:IntroductionAntónio ZILHÃO: Folk-Psychology, Rationality and Human ActionJoão BRANQUINHO: The Problem of Cognitive DynamicsJ.P. MONTEIRO: Hume, Induction and Single ExperimentsMarco RUFFINO: The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's LogicJoão Vergílio Gallerani CUTER: Die unanwendbare Arithmetik des TractatusSílvio PINTO: Wittgenstein's Anti-PlatonismFernando FERREIRA: A Substitutional Framework for Arithmetical ValidityJ.R. CROCA & R.N. MOREIRA: Indeterminism Versus CausalismLuíz MONIZ PEREIRA: The Logical Impingement of Artifical Intelligence.

INCONTINENCE, HONOURING SUNK COSTS AND RATIONALITY According to a basic principle of rationality, the decision to engage in a course of action should be determined solely by the analysis of its consequences. Thus, considerations associated with previous use of resources should have no bearing on an agent’s decision-making process. Frequently, however, agents persist carrying on an activity they themselves judge to be nonoptimal under the circumstances because they have already allocated resources to that activity. When this is the case, agents (...) are said to be honouring sunk costs. Honouring sunk costs is thus typically viewed as irrational economic behaviour. Two striking findings of the psychological literature on the sunk cost effect are that it is, in general, not lessened by having taken previously courses in economics, and that agents who did take such courses and that do honour sunk costs seem to be frequently aware of a cognitive dissonance in their behaviour. Davidson’s account of the possibility conditions of incontinent action renders continent action materially unfeasible. The very idea of incontinent action becomes thus a hollow one. I’ll present an alternative description of these possibility conditions that renders continent action materially feasible, and both, continent and incontinent action, cognitively plausible. In a nutshell, my proposal rests upon the drawing of an essential cognitive contrast between explicit processes of deliberative reasoning and lower level heuristic procedures. I conclude the paper arguing that my redescription of incontinent action accounts for the above mentioned cognitive dissonance effect better than the alternatives and that viewing at least an important subset of behaviours of honouring sunk costs as incontinent actions will enable us to consider them as peculiar manifestations of a more general and meaningful pattern in human behaviour. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics, with its revolutionary implications, has posed innumerable problems to philosophers of science. In particular, it has suggested reconsidering basic concepts such as the existence of a world that is, at least to some extent, independent of the observer, the possibility of getting reliable and objective knowledge about it, and the possibility of taking (under appropriate circumstances) certain properties to be objectively possessed by physical systems. It has also raised many others questions which are well known to those involved (...) in the debate on the interpretation of this pillar of modern science. One can argue that most of the problems are not only due to the intrinsic revolutionary nature of the phenomena which have led to the development of the theory. They are also related to the fact that, in its standard formulation and interpretation, quantum mechanics is a theory which is excellent (in fact it has met with a success unprecedented in the history of science) in telling us everything about what we observe, but it meets with serious difficulties in telling us what is. We are making here specific reference to the central problem of the theory, usually referred to as the measurement problem, or, with a more appropriate term, as the macro-objectification problem. It is just one of the many attempts to overcome the difficulties posed by this problem that has led to the development of Collapse Theories, i.e., to the Dynamical Reduction Program (DRP). As we shall see, this approach consists in accepting that the dynamical equation of the standard theory should be modified by the addition of stochastic and nonlinear terms. The nice fact is that the resulting theory is capable, on the basis of a unique dynamics which is assumed to govern all natural processes, to account at the same time for all well-established.. (shrink)

We consider the problem of whether there are deterministic theories describing the evolution of an individual physical system in terms of the definite trajectories of its constituent particles and which stay in the same relation to quantum mechanics as Bohmian mechanics but which differ from the latter for what concerns the trajectories followed by the particles. Obviously, one has to impose on the hypothetical alternative theory precise physical requirements. We analyze various such constraints and we show step by step how (...) to meet them. This way of attacking the problem turns out to be useful also from a pedagogical point of view since it allows one to recall and focus on some relevant features of Bohm's theory. One of the central requirements we impose on the models we are going to analyze has to do with their transformation properties under the transformation of the extended Galilei group. In a context like the one we are interested in, one can put forward various requests that we refer to as physical and genuine covariance and invariance. Other fundamental requests are that the theory allows the description of isolated physical systems as well as that it leads to a solution (in the same sense as Bohmian mechanics) of the measurement problem. We show that, even when all the above conditions are taken into account, there are infinitely many inequivalent (from the point of view of the trajectories) bohmian-like theories reproducing the predictions of quantum mechanics. This raises some interesting questions about the meaning of Bohmian mechanics. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics, which describes the behavior of subatomic particles, seems to challenge common sense. Waves behave like particles; particles behave like waves. You can tell where a particle is, but not how fast it is moving--or vice versa. An electron faced with two tiny holes will travel through both at the same time, rather than one or the other. And then there is the enigma of creation ex nihilo, in which small particles appear with their so-called antiparticles, only to disappear (...) the next instant in a tiny puff of energy. Since its inception, physicists and philosophers have struggled to work out the meaning of quantum mechanics. Some, like Niels Bohr, have responded to quantum mechanics' mysteries by replacing notions of position and velocity with probabilities. Others, like Einstein and Penrose, have disagreed and think that the entire puzzle reflects not a fundamental principle of nature but our own ignorance of basic scientific processes. Sneaking a Look at God's Cards offers the general reader a deep and real understanding of the problems inherent to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, from its inception to the present. The book presents a balanced overview of current debates and explores how the theory of quantum mechanics plays itself out in the real world. Written from the perspective of a leading European physicist, the book looks extensively at ideas from both sides of the Atlantic and also considers what philosophers have contributed to the scientific discussion of this field. Sneaking a Look at God's Cards sets out what we know about the endlessly fascinating quantum world, how we came to this understanding, where we disagree, and where we are heading in our quest to comprehend the seemingly incomprehensible. (shrink)

Caro leitor! Em busca de sempre mais apresentar reflexões consistentes e relevantes para o pensar teológico, em conexão com o mundo e às urgências da Igreja, a presente edição trás importantes temas que ajudam refletir a realidade humana à luz do mistério de Deus. Por isso, os artigos oferecidos nas mais variadas áreas, a saber: bíblico-teológica, dogmática, moral, pastoral, antropologia teológica, filosofia e eclesiologia, dão suporte científico e metodológico para a reflexão teológica. Antes de conferir as novidades desta edição, gostaria (...) de comunicar que esta Revista Eletrônica conquistou um espaço ainda maior de publicação, ao tornar-se indexada na base de dados do Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ). (shrink)

We reconsider the nonlocal aspects of quantum mechanics with special reference to the EPR argument. We first confine our considerations to the correlations between the outcomes of measurements on spatially distant constituents, without worrying about the measurement problem. We pay particular attention to the relativistic aspects of the problem. Our first conclusion is that, when developed along the lines we follow, the EPR inference that quantum correlations and locality together imply incompleteness, is appropriate. We then investigate whether the other common (...) conclusion from the EPR argument, i.e. that standard quantum theory implies a spooky action at a distance, is correct. We emphasize the crucial role played by the locality assumption and we discuss the use of counterfactuals in the ‘relativistic’ reformulation of the EPR argument. We show that the above conclusion is false if understood as saying that standard quantum theory exhibits, at least with reference to possessed elements of physical reality, some sort of parameter dependence. Thus, in a sense, the coexistence of quantum mechanics with relativity is even more peaceful than commonly thought. We then go through a similar analysis by taking explicitly into account the measurement process. We point out the difficulties which one meets when confronting reduction mechanisms with relativistic requirements. This leads us to recognize the necessity of reconsidering the criteria for attributing objective properties to individual physical systems. Our final conclusion is that, in principle, it is perfectly possible to build up theories leading to the objectification of macroscopic properties which do not imply any spooky action at a distance. (shrink)

We apply the distinction between parameter independence and outcome independence to the linear and nonlinear models of a recent nonrelativistic theory of continuous state vector reduction. We show that in the nonlinear model there is a set of realizations of the stochastic process that drives the state vector reduction for which parameter independence is violated for parallel spin components in the EPR-Bohm setup. Such a set has an appreciable probability of occurrence (≈ 1/2). On the other hand, the linear model (...) exhibits only extremely small parameter dependence effects. We investigate some specific features of the models and we recall that, as has been pointed out recently, if one wants to be able to speak of definite outcomes (or equivalently of possessed objective elements of reality) at finite times, one has to slightly change the criteria for their attribution to physical systems. The concluding section is devoted to a detailed discussion of the difficulties which one meets when one tries to take, as a starting point for the formulation of a relativistic theory, a nonrelativistic scheme which exhibits parameter dependence. Here we derive a theorem which identifies the precise sense in which the occurrence of parameter dependence forbids a genuinely relativistic generalization. Finally we show how the appreciable parameter dependence of the nonlinear model gives rise to problems with relativity, while the extremely weak parameter dependence of the linear model does not give rise to any difficulty, provided one takes into account the appropriate criteria for the attribution of definite outcomes. (shrink)

We analyse a recent paper in which an alleged devastating criticism of the so called GRW proposal to account for the objectification of the properties of macroscopic systems has been presented and we show that the author has not taken into account the precise implications of the GRW theory. This fact makes his conclusions basically wrong. We also perform a survey of measurement theory aimed to focus better on the physical and the conceptual aspects of the so-called macro-objectification problem.

We reconsider the problem of the compatibility of quantum nonlocality and the requests for a relativistically invariant theoretical scheme. We begin by discussing a recent important paper by T. Norsen on this problem and we enlarge our considerations to give a general picture of the conceptually relevant issue to which this paper is devoted.

In this paper we reconsider the constraints which are imposed by relativistic requirements to any model of dynamical reduction. We review the debate on the subject and we call attention on the fundamental contributions by Aharonov and Albert. Having done this we present a new formulation, which is much simpler and more apt for our analysis, of the proposal put forward by these authors to perform measurements of nonlocal observables by means of local interactions and detections. We take into account (...) recently proposed relativistic models of dynamical reduction and we show that, in spite of some mathematical difficulties related to the appearence of divergences, they represent a perfectly appropriate conceptual framework which meets all necessary requirements for a relativistic account of wave packet reduction. Subtle questions like the appropriate way to deal with counterfactual reasoning in a relativistic and nonlocal context are also analyzed in detail. (shrink)

A brief review of the conceptual difficulties met by the quantum formalism is presented. The main attempts to overcome these difficulties are considered and their limitations are pointed out. A recent proposal based on the assumption of the occurrence of a specific type of wave function collapse is discussed and its consequences for the above-mentioned problems are analyzed.

Recently it has been claimed that no extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power, the statement following, according to the authors, from the assumptions of free will and of the correctness of quantum predictions concerning the correlations of measurement outcomes. Here we prove that the argument is basically flawed by an inappropriate use of the assumption of free will. In particular, among other implications, the claim, if correct, would imply that Bohmian Mechanics is incompatible with free will. This (...) statement, appearing in the paper, derives from the unjustified identification of free will with the no-signaling constraint and of a purely formal and not physical use of such a constraint. (shrink)

In view of the arguments put forward by Clifton and Monton [this volume], we reconsider the alleged conflict of dynamical reduction models with the enumeration principle. We prove that our original analysis of such a problem is correct, that the GRW model does not meet any difficulty and that the reasoning of the above authors is inappropriate since it does not take into account the correct interpretation of the dynamical reduction theories.

The problem of getting a relativistic generalization of the CSL dynamical reduction model, which has been presented in part I, is discussed. In so doing we have the opportunity to introduce the idea of a stochastically invariant theory. The theoretical model we present, that satisfies this kind of invariance requirement, offers us the possibility to reconsider, from a new point of view, some conceptually relevant issues such as nonlocality, the legitimacy of attributing elements of physical reality to physical systems and (...) the problem of establishing causal relations between physical events. (shrink)

With reference to recently proposed theoretical models accounting for reduction in terms of a unified dynamics governing all physical processes, we analyze the problem of working out a worldview accommodating our knowledge about natural phenomena. We stress the relevant conceptual differences between the considered models and standard quantum mechanics. In spite of the fact that both theories describe systems within a genuine Hilbert space framework, the peculiar features of the spontaneous reduction models limit drastically the states which are dynamically stable. (...) This fact by itself allows one to work out an interpretation of the formalism which makes it possible to give a satisfactory description of the world in terms of the values taken by an appropriately defined mass density function in ordinary configuration space. A topology based on this function and which is radically different from the one characterizing the Hilbert space is introduced, and in terms of it the idea of similarity of macroscopic situations is precisely defined. Finally, the formalism and the interpretation are shown to yield a natural criterion for establishing the psychophysical parallelism. The conclusion is that, within the considered theories and at the nonrelativistic level, one can satisfy all sensible requirements for a completely satisfactory macro-objective description of reality. (shrink)

Columbia University Press's multivolume _Prison Notebooks_ is the only complete critical edition of Antonio Gramsci's seminal writings in English. Based on the authoritative Italian edition of Gramsci's work, _Quaderni del Carcere_, this comprehensive translation presents the intellectual as he ought to be read and understood, with critical notes that clarify Gramsci's history, culture, and sources; an index of names; and a contextualization of the thinker's ideas against his earlier writings and letters. This set includes notebooks 1 through 8 with (...) all attendant notes and materials and is an indispensible resource for scholars in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Conway and Kochen proposed what is now known as the “Free Will theorem” which, among other things, should prove the impossibility of combining GRW models with special relativity, i.e., of formulating relativistically invariant models of spontaneous wavefunction collapse. Since their argument basically amounts to a non-locality proof for any theory aiming at reproducing quantum correlations, and since it was clear since very a long time that any relativistic collapse model must be non-local in some way, we (...) discuss why the theorem of Conway and Kochen does not affect the program of formulating relativistic GRW models. (shrink)

Book Description (Blurb): Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds explains the crucial role that human cognition research plays in the design and realization of artificial intelligence systems, illustrating the steps necessary for the design of artificial models of cognition. It bridges the gap between the theoretical, experimental and technological issues addressed in the context of AI of cognitive inspiration and computational cognitive science. -/- Beginning with an overview of the historical, methodological and technical issues in the field of Cognitively-Inspired Artificial Intelligence, (...) Lieto illustrates how the cognitive design approach has an important role to play in the development of intelligent AI technologies and plausible computational models of cognition. Introducing a unique perspective that draws upon Cybernetics and early AI principles, Lieto emphasizes the need for an equivalence between cognitive processes and implemented AI procedures, in order to realise biologically and cognitively inspired artificial minds. He also introduces the Minimal Cognitive Grid, a pragmatic method to rank the different degrees of biologically and cognitive accuracy of artificial systems in order project and predict their explanatory power with respect to the natural systems taken as source of inspiration. -/- Providing a comprehensive overview of cognitive design principles in constructing artificial minds, this text will be essential reading for students and researchers of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. (shrink)

In this compendium of essays, some of the world's leading thinkers discuss their conceptions of space and time, as viewed through the lens of their own discipline. With an epilogue on the limits of human understanding, this volume hosts contributions from six or more diverse fields. It presumes only rudimentary background knowledge on the part of the reader. Time and again, through the prism of intellect, humans have tried to diffract reality into various distinct, yet seamless, atomic, yet holistic, independent, (...) yet interrelated disciplines and have attempted to study it contextually. Philosophers debate the paradoxes, or engage in meditations, dialogues and reflections on the content and nature of space and time. Physicists, too, have been trying to mold space and time to fit their notions concerning micro- and macro-worlds. Mathematicians focus on the abstract aspects of space, time and measurement. While cognitive scientists ponder over the perceptual and experiential facets of our consciousness of space and time, computer scientists theoretically and practically try to optimize the space-time complexities in storing and retrieving data/information. The list is never-ending. Linguists, logicians, artists, evolutionary biologists, geographers et cetera, all are trying to weave a web of understanding around the same duo. However, our endeavour into a world of such endless imagination is restrained by intellectual dilemmas such as: Can humans comprehend everything? Are there any limits? Can finite thought fathom infinity? We have sought far and wide among the best minds to furnish articles that provide an overview of the above topics. We hope that, through this journey, a symphony of patterns and tapestry of intuitions will emerge, providing the reader with insights into the questions: What is Space? What is Time? Chapter [15] of this book is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. (shrink)

From the very beginning it was realised that quantum physics involves radically new interpretative and epistemological consequences. While hitherto there has been no satisfactory philosophical analysis of these consequences, recent years have witnessed the accomplishment of many experiments to test the foundations of quantum physics, opening up vistas to a completely novel technology: quantum technology. The contributions in the present volume review the interpretative situation, analyze recent fundamental experiments, and discuss the implications of possible future technological applications. Readership: Analytic philosophers (...) (logical empiricists), scientists (especially physicists), historians of logic, mathematics and physics, philosophers of science, and advanced students and researchers in these fields. Can be used for seminars on theoretical and experimental physics and philosophy of science, and as supplementary reading at advanced undergraduate and graduate levels. (shrink)

In this compendium of essays, some of the world's leading thinkers discuss their conceptions of space and time, as viewed through the lens of their own discipline. With an epilogue on the limits of human understanding, this volume hosts contributions from six or more diverse fields. It presumes only rudimentary background knowledge on the part of the reader. Time and again, through the prism of intellect, humans have tried to diffract reality into various distinct, yet seamless, atomic, yet holistic, independent, (...) yet interrelated disciplines and have attempted to study it contextually. Philosophers debate the paradoxes, or engage in meditations, dialogues and reflections on the content and nature of space and time. Physicists, too, have been trying to mold space and time to fit their notions concerning micro- and macro-worlds. Mathematicians focus on the abstract aspects of space, time and measurement. While cognitive scientists ponder over the perceptual and experiential facets of our consciousness of space and time, computer scientists theoretically and practically try to optimize the space-time complexities in storing and retrieving data/information. The list is never-ending. Linguists, logicians, artists, evolutionary biologists, geographers et cetera, all are trying to weave a web of understanding around the same duo. However, our endeavour into a world of such endless imagination is restrained by intellectual dilemmas such as: Can humans comprehend everything? Are there any limits? Can finite thought fathom infinity? We have sought far and wide among the best minds to furnish articles that provide an overview of the above topics. We hope that, through this journey, a symphony of patterns and tapestry of intuitions will emerge, providing the reader with insights into the questions: What is Space? What is Time? Chapter [15] of this book is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. (shrink)

We critically analyze a recent paper by D. Mermin and we compare his statements with Bell’s position on the problems he is discussing.

In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely: the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build arti cial agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviours in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of the (...) comparison of the CAs' knowledge representation and processing mechanisms with those executed by humans in their everyday activities. In the fi nal part of the paper further directions of research will be explored, trying to address current limitations and future challenges. (shrink)

In view of the arguments put forward by Clifton and Monton [this volume], we reconsider the alleged conflict of dynamical reduction models with the enumeration principle. We prove that our original analysis of such a problem is correct, that the GRW model does not meet any difficulty and that the reasoning of the above authors is inappropriate since it does not take into account the correct interpretation of the dynamical reduction theories.

In this paper, following an elementary line of thought which somewhat differs from the usual one, we prove once more that any deterministic theory predictively equivalent to quantum mechanics unavoidably exhibits a contextual character. The purpose of adopting this perspective is that of paving the way for a critical analysis of the use of counterfactual arguments when dealing with nonlocal physical processes.

The propositions, that what we see around us is real and that reality should be represented by the statevector, conflict with quantum theory. In quantum theory, the statevector can readily become a sum of states of comparable norm, each state representing a different reality. In this paper we present the Continuous Spontaneous Localization (CSL) theory, in which a modified Schrodinger equation, while scarcely affecting the dynamics of a microscopic system, rapidly "reduces" the statevector of a macroscopic system to a state (...) appropriate for representing individual reality. (shrink)

We dedicate these papers to the memory of John Bell, whose contributions to, support for, and encouragement of the research program described here has meant more than words can say to those involved in it.In Schrödinger’s “cat paradox” example, a nucleus which has a 50% probability of decaying within an hour is coupled to a cat by a “hellish contraption” which, if it detects the decay, will kill the cat. If we take the point of view that what we see (...) around us is real, what occurs in reality is one of the two following evolutions :(—> means “evolves in an hour into“).According to Schrödinger’s equation, the evolution of the statevector describing this situation isThe right hand side of Eq. (1.2) does not correspond to either the reality on the right hand side of (1.1a) nor to the reality on the right hand side of (1.1b). (shrink)

In this part we will consider recent attempts to get a relativistic CSL theory. The problem of getting such a generalization, or at least of making plausible that it exists, is of great interest. J. Bell (1990), after having expressed his dissatisfaction with the fundamental lack of precision of the standard formulation of quantum mechanics and the opinion that the only available acceptable alternatives are the Pilot Wave and the Spontaneous Localization schemes has stated: The big question, in my opinion, (...) is which, if either, of these two precise pictures can be redeveloped in a Lorentz invariant way. The point of view of this paper is that what is most interesting is not a detailed exposition of the formal aspects of the generalization, but some crucial conceptual points which have come into focus in this attempt. (shrink)

After a brief account of theway quantum theory deals with naturalprocesses, the crucial problem that such atheory meets, the measurement or, better, themacro-objectification problem is discussed.The embarrassing aspects of the occurrence ofentangled states involving macroscopic systemsare analyzed in details. The famous example ofSchroedinger's cat is presented and it ispointed out how the combined interplay of thesuperposition principle and the ensuingentanglement raises some serious difficultiesin working out a satisfactory quantum worldview, agreeing with our definiteperceptions. The orthodox solution to themacro-objectification problem, i.e. (...) thepostulate of wave packet reduction, isanalyzed and is proved to be inconsistent withthe assumption that the theory governes alsothe measurement process. After these premises,the rest of the paper is devoted to discuss arecent proposal of overcoming the difficultiesof the standard formalism by acceptingnonlinear and stochastic modifications of thequantum dynamics. The proposed theory is shownto agree with all known predictions of thestandard theory concerning microscopic systemsand to account, on the basis of a universaldynamics which is assumed to govern allnatural processes, for wave packet reductionin measurement processes and, more important,to eliminate all the difficulties concerningmacroscopic situations. Actually, the proposedtheory allows one to take consistently amacrorealistic position about natural processes and about our definite perceptions. (shrink)

Recently a quite stimulating paper (Heaney et al. arXiv:0911.0770v2 [quant-ph], 2010) dealing with the possibility of exploiting the nonlocal aspects of a superposition of states of a single photon appeared. We regard as greatly relevant the results which have been obtained. However we think that the presentation of the matter and the way to derive the conclusion are not fully satisfactory and do not put the necessary emphasis on some subtle basic aspects like locality and realism. In view of its (...) interest we consider it useful to reconsider the line of reasoning of Heaney et al. (in arXiv:0911.0770v2 [quant-ph], 2010) and to derive once more its results by following a procedure which seems to us more lucid and which makes fully clear the role of the various conceptual aspects of the treatment. We hope that our analysis will contribute to clarify and to deepen the interesting results of Heaney et al. (in arXiv:0911.0770v2 [quant-ph], 2010). (shrink)

Quantum mechanics describes the behavior of subatomic particles. Since its inception, physicists and philosophers have struggled to work out the meaning of quantum mechanics. This book sets out what we know about the quantum world, how we came to this understanding, where we disagree, and where we are heading in our quest to comprehend it.

After more than 70 years of debate about the difficulties that one encounters in working out a coherent view of physical processes based on the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, there is now a widespread belief that such difficulties do not arise from philosophical prejudices but represent precise mathematical and physical challenges which call for a physical solution. As J.S. Bell appropriately stated1 “the way ahead is unromantic in that it requires mathematical work by theoretical physicists, rather than interpretations by (...) philosophers”. It is also encouraging, for those who share this position, to see that now there are explicit proposals indicating possible ways out in which the process of measurement is analysed not in terms of vague assertions or resorting to ill-defined and/or contradictory dualistic evolution processes but in terms of more fundamental physical concepts. In particular, approaches of this kind, which S. Goldstein3 has appropriately denoted as “observer-free formulations of quantum mechanics”, can be grouped in three categories: the pilot-wave theories: the decoherent histories and the spontaneous localization models. (shrink)

The very formal structure of quantum mechanics implies the loss of individuality of physical systems and it requires to look at the Universe as an unbroken whole. The main reason for which, within such a theory, one must renounce to a clear identification of the parts and the whole is the superposition principle which stays at the basis of the theory. It implies, as well known, the phenomenon of entanglement which, in the most extreme case, entails that the constituents of (...) a composite system do not possess any objective property; only the system as a whole, when it is isolated, has some properties. Another source of difficulties derives from the symmetry requests that the theory imposes in the case of systems containing identical constituents. We discuss these points in detail and we outline recent proposals yielding a consistent solution to the problems arising from the entanglement between a microsystem and a macrosystem which unavoidably occurs in a measurement process. In particular we take into account the so called “collapse” theories which embody a mechanism forbidding, at an appropriate level, the persistence of superpositions and, as a consequence, lead, in general, to the emergence of precise individual properties for macroscopic systems. We then pass to a critical analysis of the difficulties related to the identity of the constituents. We stress that various misunderstandings characterize the treatment of this problem and we make fully clear how one has to deal with the very concept of entangled systems when identical constituents are involved. The ensuing picture should make clear to which extent one can still consistently ground the distinction between the parts and the whole in a genuinely quantum context. (shrink)