Narratives of hope are omnipresent in democratic life, but what can they tell us about the structure and orientation of politics? While common, they are often reduced to an all-compassing understanding that overlooks hope's various forms and implications. Democratic theory, however, lacks the theoretical language to attend to these distinctions. The aim of this essay is thus to define a collective and political account of hope and recover the normative basis of a democratic theory of hope. Drawing on the literature (...) on hope and juxtaposing it with extracts from Harvey Milk's ‘The Hope Speech,’ I first distinguish its collective experience before turning to Hannah Arendt. While Arendt rejects a politics of hope that turns away from the world, exploring how she thinks with and against hope provides a theoretically fruitful approach that elevates the in-betweenness of its worldly expression. From that standpoint, I relate the work and experience of hoping with others to her notions of natality, action and promises. These three conceptual touchstones provide the normative basis of a democratic theory of hope and help situate a collective sense of possibility inherent in democratic politics. (shrink)

The ethical ideologies of psychologists and physicians were compared using the Ethics Position Questionnaire. The findings reveal that psychologists tend to be less relativistic than physicians. Further, we explored the degree to which physicians and psychologists report being influenced by a variety of factors in their ethical decision making. Psychologists were more influenced by their code of ethics and less influenced by family views, religious background, and peer attitudes than were physicians. We argue that these differences reflect the varied professional (...) cultures in which practitioners are trained and socialized. (shrink)

Setting the scene -- Sentience and the sentient mind -- Special senses and their interpretation Survival strategies -- Social strategies -- Animals of the waters -- Animals of the air -- Animals of the savannah and plains -- Animals of the forests -- Close neighbours -- Our duty of care.

Some people of colour feel shame in response to racist incidents. This phenomenon seems puzzling since, plausibly, they have nothing to feel shame about. This puzzle arises because we assume that targets of racism feel shame about their race. However, I propose that when an individual is racialised as non-White in a racist incident, shame is sometimes prompted, not by a negative self-assessment of her race, but by her inability to choose when her stigmatised race is made salient. I argue (...) that this can make sense of some shame responses to racism. My account also helps to highlight some of the emotional and cognitive costs of racism that have their root in shame as well as a new form of hermeneutical injustice and distinctive communicative harms, contributing to a fuller picture of what is objectionable about racism. (shrink)

Man controls and dominates the habitat of most animals, both domestic and wild and there is a need for a pragmatic, workable approach to the problem of reconciling animal welfare with economic forces and the needs of man. It is the author's contention that much of the current philosophical discussion of animal welfare is misdirected now that it is possible to measure to some extent what animals think and feel and how much they can appreciate their quality of life. The (...) book deals with farm animals, pets, wild animals and laboratory animals and dicusses their environmental requirements, fear and stress, their response to pain, injury, disease and death, behaviour and aggression, and the implications of biotechnology and genetic engineering. Finally, the book tries to reconcile reverence for life with the inescapability of killing and reviews the prospects of preserving and enhancing quality of life for animals through legislations, education, economic and moral incentives. (shrink)

L’hédonisme éthique est la théorie selon laquelle les seules choses qui ont de la valeur finale, respectivement positive et négative, sont le plaisir et le déplaisir. Une grande partie du débat philosophique autour de l’hédonisme éthique s’est concentrée sur la nature de ces états affectifs. Cet article se propose de revisiter cette question en examinant les relations entre l’hédonisme éthique et la philosophie du plaisir et de la douleur. L’hédonisme éthique est traditionnellement associé à une théorie qui conçoit le plaisir (...) comme une qualité phénoménale, mais cette théorie est loin de faire l’unanimité. Nous montrerons que la plupart des théories récentes les plus prometteuses en philosophie du plaisir et de la douleur sont en fait incompatibles avec l’hédonisme éthique, ce qui place l’hédoniste dans une position difficile. (shrink)

The social construction of space -- The anatomy of taste -- Towards a theory of cultural practice --Fields of cultural production -- Cultural practice, reflexivity and political action.

One of the main objections against effective altruism is the so-called institutional critique, according to which the EA movement neglects interventions that affect large-scale institutions. Alexander Dietz has recently put forward an interesting version of this critique, based on a theoretical problem affecting act-utilitarianism, which he deems as potentially conclusive against effective altruism. In this article I argue that his critique is not as promising as it seems. I then go on to propose another version of the institutional critique. In (...) contrast to Dietz's version, it targets not the core principles of effective altruism but rather some important methodological assumptions made in EA research, namely diminishing marginal returns and low-hanging fruits. One key conclusion is that it may be time for critics of effective altruism to shift their attention from the theoretical core principles of effective altruism towards the methodological tools actually employed in practice by the EA movement. (shrink)

The heterogeneity problem, which stems from the alleged difficulty of finding out what all pleasant experiences have in common, is largely considered as a substantial issue in the philosophy of pleasure, one that is usually taken as the starting point for theorizing about the essence of pleasure. The goal of this paper is to move the focus away from the heterogeneity problem and toward an alternative approach to pleasure. To do this, I first show that, although the approach stemming from (...) the heterogeneity problem has led to an interesting discussion about the essence of pleasure, it has usually endorsed an introspectionist methodology and other problematic assumptions that have led to doubtful results. I thus propose a natural-kind approach to pleasure, which seeks to determine what, if any, the natural kind of pleasure would consist in. This approach broadens the investigation of pleasure by enabling the use of a larger range of methodological tools, thus opening new promising directions for research. (shrink)

Revelation, or the view that the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, is as intuitively attractive as it is controversial. It is notably at the core of defences of anti-physicalism. I propose in this paper a new argument against Revelation. It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness or brightness, stand in relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to be fixed by (...) what their relata are. I argue that, under some plausible additional premises, no account of what grounds these relations in the essence of their relata is consistent with Revelation, at least if we take common phenomenological descriptions for granted. As a result, the plausibility of Revelation is undermined. One might however resist this conclusion by weakening the epistemic relation postulated between subjects and their phenomenal properties. (shrink)

L'hédonisme axiologique a une longue histoire en philosophie. Pourtant, il garde une mauvaise réputation qui lui vaut d’être parfois écarté sans ménagement de la discussion philosophique. Cet article se propose de défendre l'hédonisme axiologique en exposant les principaux arguments en sa faveur et en répondant aux principales critiques et confusions dont il fait l'objet. Une attention particulière sera portée aux arguments établissant la spécificité du plaisir et du déplaisir par rapport à toutes les autres choses — amitié, savoir, justice, etc. (...) — dont on pourrait argumenter la valeur finale.While axiological hedonism has a long history in philosophy, it also has a bad reputation, which has led to it being discarded without proper examination of its plausibility. In this article, I defend axiological hedonism by presenting the main arguments in its favour as well as the criticisms and confusions to which it has been subjected. I pay special attention to the arguments that hint at the specificity of pleasure and displeasure in comparison with other things — friendship, knowledge, justice, etc. — that might be argued to have final value. (shrink)

John Webster provides a major scholarly analysis, the first in any language, of the final sections of the Church Dogmatics. He focuses on the theme of human agency in Barth's late ethics and doctrine of baptism, placing the discussion in the context of an interpretation of the Dogmatics as an intrinsically ethical dogmatics. The first two chapters survey the themes of agency, covenant and human reality in the Dogmatics as a whole; later chapters give a thorough analysis of Church (...) Dogmatics IV/4 and the posthumously published text The Christian Life. A final chapter examines the significance of Barth's work for contemporary accounts of moral selfhood. The book is important not only for a detailed analysis of a neglected part of Barth's oeuvre, but also because it casts into question much of what has hitherto been written about Barth's ethical dogmatics. (shrink)

Pierre Bourdieu is arguably one of the twentieth century’s greatest socio-philosophical thinkers and his writings have much to offer anyone interested in the ways that people value, consume and produce architecture. Bourdieu spent much of his life attempting to understand cultural consumption and production through detailed empirical research that included studies of dwellings, art, museums, photography and aesthetics. This book introduces the architectural reader to Bourdieu’s key writings on culture and outlines the ways in which they offer powerful practical tools (...) and novel conceptual frameworks for understanding architectural value, taste, and practice. (shrink)

Quand nous lisons un livre passionnant, quand nous passons une bonne soirée avec des amis ou quand nous dégustons des mets raffinés, nous nous trouvons parfois dans un état de plaisir. La notion de plaisir traverse de nombreux champs de recherche en philosophie. Une question centrale reste sans doute celle de sa nature : qu’est-ce donc que le plaisir ? Pour y répondre, une comparaison avec d'autres entités mentales plus familières se révèle fructueuse, et permet de mettre à jour ses (...) spécificités propres. La définition du plaisir doit rendre compte de sa diversité, puisque le plaisir semble toujours se présenter sous des formes multiples : qu'y a-t-il de commun parmi toutes les instances de plaisir ? Par ailleurs, le plaisir semble souvent avoir un objet, ce qui soulève une série de questions : Quel type de chose peut être un objet du plaisir ? Dans quelle mesure l'objet du plaisir constitue-t-il le plaisir lui-même ? Plus généralement, quelle est la nature du lien entre le plaisir et son objet ? Ces questions seront abordées dans la Section 1. Au-delà de ces questions définitionnelles, des questions plus spécifiques se posent concernant la manière dont on peut rendre compte du plaisir dans une optique naturaliste : dans quelle mesure le plaisir est-il une entité qui s’intègre dans une image unifiée du monde dans lequel on vit ? Puisqu'il est généralement entendu que la science manifeste cette ambition unificatrice, comment peut-on rendre compte du plaisir de manière scientifique ? La Section 2 est dédiée à ces questions. Une des principales difficultés rencontrées est que le plaisir ne semble pas neutre. Il paraît plutôt avoir une valeur affective positive, dans un sens qui reste bien sûr à éclaircir. Cette valeur se manifeste d'abord dans le fait que le plaisir est susceptible d'orienter nos actions et réactions : nous sommes typiquement attirés par le plaisir, de la même manière que nous cherchons à éviter la souffrance. C'est l'aspect motivationnel du plaisir. La valeur affective du plaisir semble cependant aller au-delà de son rôle motivationnel, pour donner lieu à des caractéristiques normatives. Non seulement le plaisir motive certaines actions, mais il les justifierait aussi, en fournissant des raisons d'agir qui semblent valides. Plus encore, le plaisir semble bon pour nous, ou nous faire du bien. Il semble donc avoir une valeur prudentielle, en ce qu'il contribuerait à rendre notre vie meilleure. Cela pourrait alors justifier son intégration dans le domaine de la morale. Ces considérations seront l’objet de la Section 3. (shrink)

This Book is an important study of Barth's theology of human action, arguing that Barth's work cannot be properly understood unless his interest in human agency is fully appreciated. Throughout, Professor John Webster demonstrates the contemporary vitality of the style and content of Barth's theology. Many of the studies introduce posthumous texts by Barth which have so far received little attention (such as his lectures on Calvin and his ethics lectures), but which substantially revise the received views of Barth's (...) thinking about ethics and human action. Developing from the author's earlier study of Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation (CUP, 1995), this book argues forcefully for Barth's work as a whole to be understood as moral theology. (shrink)

Demuth tests generalize Martin-Löf tests in that one can exchange the m-th component a computably bounded number of times. A set fails a Demuth test if Z is in infinitely many final versions of the Gm. If we only allow Demuth tests such that GmGm+1 for each m, we have weak Demuth randomness.We show that a weakly Demuth random set can be high and , yet not superhigh. Next, any c.e. set Turing below a Demuth random set is strongly jump-traceable.We (...) also prove a basis theorem for non-empty classes P. It extends the Jockusch–Soare basis theorem that some member of P is computably dominated. We use the result to show that some weakly 2-random set does not compute a 2-fixed point free function. (shrink)

Kuera, A., On relative randomness, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 63 61–67. It is the aim of the paper to answer a question raised by M. van Lambalgen and D. Zambella whether there can be a nonrecursive set A having the property that there is a set B such that B is 1-random relative to A and simultaneously A is recursive in B. We give apositive answer to this question as well as further information about relative randomness.

The paper describes the context and the origin of a particular debate that concerns the evolution of phenotypic plasticity. In 1965, British biologist A. D. Bradshaw proposed a widely cited model intended to explain the evolution of norms of reaction, based on his studies of plant populations. Bradshaw’s model went beyond the notion of the “adaptive norm of reaction” discussed before him by Dobzhansky and Schmalhausen by suggesting that “plasticity” the ability of a phenotype to be modified by the environment (...) should be genetically determined. To prove Bradshaw’s hypothesis, it became necessary for some authors to identify the pressures exerted by natural selection on phenotypic plasticity in particular traits, and thus to model its evolution. In this paper, I contrast two different views, based on quantitative genetic models, proposed in the mid-1980s: Russell Lande and Sara Via’s conception of phenotypic plasticity, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is linked to the evolution of the plastic trait itself, and Samuel Scheiner and Richard Lyman’s view, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is independent from the evolution of the trait. I show how the origin of this specific debate, and different assumptions about the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, depended on Bradshaw’s definition of plasticity and the context of quantitative genetics. (shrink)

A positive answer to a question of M. van Lambalgen and D. Zambella whether there exist nonrecursive sets that are low for the class of random sets is obtained. Here a set A is low for the class RAND of random sets if RAND = RAND A.

The separating and isolating tendencies of measuring practices can lead educators to lose sight of the aims and purposes of education. These end purposes can be used to guide and ensure that the activities of educators are educational, and therefore, Biesta recommends there is a need for educators to reconnect with them. This article. explores this notion of a ‘reconnection’ and argues that if educators are to challenge any potentially miseducative measuring practices, then this reconnection must require educators to value (...) and desire particular end purposes. Desires are recognised to be existential in character and are identified as being necessary for initiating actions. It is argued here that this aspect of desires is important for understanding the significance of a ‘reconnection’ because without it the purposes of education may remain only as abstract philosophical ideals. To make a difference and to challenge the isolating and miseducative tendencies of some measuring practices, educators must come to value particular purposes of education, and in addition, they must exercise the courage to enact them. This can be made possible because educators strongly care for and desire the actualisation of the purposes to which they are connected. (shrink)

We show that there is a low T-upper bound for the class of K-trivial sets, namely those which are weak from the point of view of algorithmic randomness. This result is a special case of a more general characterization of ideals in $\Delta _2^0 $ T-degrees for which there is a low T-upper bound.

In 1956, in his Principles of Embryology, Conrad Hal Waddington explained that the word “epigenetics” should be used to translate and update Wilhelm Roux’ German notion of “Entwicklungsmechanik” to qualify the studies focusing on the mechanisms of development. When Waddington mentioned it in 1956, the notion of epigenetics was not yet popular, as it would become from the 1980s. However, Waddington referred first to the notion in the late 1930s. While his late allusion clearly reveals that Waddington readily associated the (...) notion of epigenetics with the developmental process, in the contemporary uses of the notion this developmental connotation seems to have disappeared. The advent and success of molecular biology have probably contributed to focusing biologists’ attention on the “genetic” or the “non-genetic” over the “developmental”. In the present paper, I first examine the links that exist, in Waddington’s work, between the classical notion of epigenesis in embryology and those of epigenetics that Waddington proposed to connect, and even synthesize, data both from embryology and genetics. Second, I show that Waddington’s own view of epigenetics has changed over time and I analyze how these changes appear through his many representations of the relationships between genetic signals and developmental processes. (shrink)

Proceeding in the theory with extensionality, comprehension for classes, existence of the empty set and the assumption the addition of one element to a set makes again a set we show a week assumption which guarantees existence of a saturated elementary extension of the system of hereditarily finite sets.

The concept of plasticity has always been present in the history of developmental biology, both within the theory of epigenesis and within morphogenesis studies. However this tradition relies also upon a genetic conception of plasticity. Founded upon the concepts of ‘‘phenotypic plasticity’’ and ‘‘reaction norm,’’ this genetic conception focuses on the array of possible phenotypic change in relation to diversified environments. Another concept of plasticity can be found in recent publications by some developmental biologists (Gilbert, West-Eberhard). I argue that these (...) authors adopt a ‘‘broad conception of plasticity’’ that is closely related to a notion of development as something that is ongoing throughout an organism’s lifecycle, and has no clear-cut boundaries. However, I suggest that given a narrow conception of plasticity, one can define temporal boundaries for development that are linked to specific features of the morphological process, which are different from behavioral and physiological processes. (shrink)

This article pursues a Whiteheadian association of meals and cooking with an orienting concern for ecological well-being and planetary health. Process thought helps those who eat to recognize the real influences that our meals have upon the emerging world.

This article looks at recent developments that have had an impact upon the way in which the ethical content of research is judged. It then goes on to look in some detail at the guidance offered to social science researchers in the Economic and Social Science Research Council's new Research Ethics Framework.

Le messianisme a souvent été, dans l’histoire du judaïsme, le nom de moments de crise et de renversement de la tradition. Au sein de la modernité juive, il revient particulièrement à Levinas et à Benjamin de retravailler la notion de messianisme pour tenter d’en actualiser la portée éthique et politique dans une optique offensive vis-à-vis du politique. On se propose ici d’approfondir le dialogue entre ces deux auteurs sur la question du messianisme éthique afin d’y trouver un possible renouvellement de (...) la pensée révolutionnaire, mais aussi pour questionner la violence propre de la révolution et pour signaler les premiers jalons d’une pensée de la communauté éthique et messianique. (shrink)

How do we understand the world around us? How do we solve problems? Often the answer to these questions follows a certain pattern, an algorithm if you wish. This is the case when our analytical left-brain side is at work. However, there are also elements in our behaviour where intelligence appears to follow a more elusive path, which cannot easily be characterised as a specific sequence of steps. Is Intelligence an Algorithm? offers an insight into intelligence as it functions in (...) nature, like human or animal intelligence, but also sheds light on modern developments in the field of artificial intelligence, proposing further architectural solutions for the creation of a so-called global Webmind"--Amazon.com. (shrink)

This is an introduction to a collection of articles on the conceptual history of epigenesis, from Aristotle to Harvey, Cavendish, Kant and Erasmus Darwin, moving into nineteenth-century biology with Wolff, Blumenbach and His, and onto the twentieth century and current issues, with Waddington and epigenetics. The purpose of the topical collection is to emphasize how epigenesis marks the point of intersection of a theory of biological development and a theory of active matter. We also wish to show that the concept (...) of epigenesis existed prior to biological theorization and that it continues to permeate thinking about development in recent biological debates. (shrink)

Osvald Demuth studied constructive analysis from the viewpoint of the Russian school of constructive mathematics. In the course of his work he introduced various notions of effective null set which, when phrased in classical language, yield a number of major algorithmic randomness notions. In addition, he proved several results connecting constructive analysis and randomness that were rediscovered only much later.In this paper, we trace the path that took Demuth from his constructivist roots to his deep and innovative work on the (...) interactions between constructive analysis, algorithmic randomness, and computability theory. We will focus specifically on Demuth’s work on the differentiability of Markov computable functions and his study of constructive versions of the Denjoy alternative, Demuth’s independent discovery of the main notions of algorithmic randomness, as well as the development of Demuth randomness, and the interactions of truth-table reducibility, algorithmic randomness, and semigenericity in Demuth’s work. (shrink)

Algorithmic decision making is used in an increasing number of fields. Letting automated processes take decisions raises the question of their accountability. In the field of computational journalism, the algorithmic accountability framework proposed by Diakopoulos formalizes this challenge by considering algorithms as objects of human creation, with the goal of revealing the intent embedded into their implementation. A consequence of this definition is that ensuring accountability essentially boils down to a transparency question: given the appropriate reverse-engineering tools, it should be (...) feasible to extract design criteria and to identify intentional biases. General limitations of this transparency ideal have been discussed by Ananny and Crawford :973–989, 2018). We further focus on its technical limitations. We show that even if reverse-engineering concludes that the criteria embedded into an algorithm correspond to its publicized intent, it may be that adversarial behaviors make the algorithm deviate from its expected operation. We illustrate this issue with an automated news recommendation system, and show how the classification algorithms used in such systems can be fooled with hard-to-notice modifications of the articles to classify. We therefore suggest that robustness against adversarial behaviors should be taken into account in the definition of algorithmic accountability, to better capture the risks inherent to algorithmic decision making. We finally discuss the various challenges that this new technical limitation raises for journalism practice. (shrink)