In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 46, no. 2. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 489 Anna Romina Guevarra and Maya Arcilla The Source of Actual Terror: The Philippine Macho-Fascist Duterte  What is JUSTICE with the violence you’ve waged  What is FREEDOM? Our people are encaged  What is JUSTICE with the violence you’ve waged?  What is FREEDOM? Our people are encaged  We have nothing to lose—nothing but (...) our chains  We have nothing to lose—nothing but our chains  Ang tao, ang bayan—ngayon ay lumalaban  Ngayon ay lumalaban—ang tao ang bayan 1  We will, we will oust you!  We will, we will oust you! —Lyrics of a chant at a Chicago protest rally, July 8, 20202 On July 8, 2020, in front of the Philippine Consulate of Chicago, a group of activists representing multiple transnational organizations committed to the pursuit of democracy, participated in a Global Day of Action against an Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL) passed in the Philippines five days earlier. This particular rally was led by fierce student and community organizers and workers who loudly proclaimed their opposition to President Rodrigo Duterte’s misogynistic and fascist measures. The epigraph 1. The people, the nation—today they fight / Today they fight—the people, the nation. 2. Song written by Charmaine Balisalisa. 490 Anna Romina Guevarra and Maya Arcilla above captures the lyrics of one young activist’s chant directed at Duterte and choreographed to the tune of Queen’s “We will Rock You.” People followed her steps and gestures rhythmically and in unison, accompanying her chant with sounds from a gangsa (gong), bells, a skateboard tapping the ground, and an empty bucket. There have been multiple protests denouncing Duterte since he assumed power in 2016, but on this particular day, the sense of outrage and urgency was especially palpable in the face of this new law aimed at suppressing dissent. This legislation marked a high point in Duterte’s efforts to exert authoritarian control, and it is significant that opposition to his regime has taken on a specifically feminist character. The Philippines Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (Republic Act No. 11479), signed into law on July 3, 2020, amends the Philippines Human Security Act of 2007 by expanding the government’s power and scope for defining what constitutes “terrorism.” It consolidates power through the creation of an Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) appointed by the President and empowered to act without oversight from the judiciary or legislature. The ATC can order mass arrests without warrants and detain individuals without due process for the mere suspicion of being involved in “terrorist” activities. This Law violates the Philippine Constitution’s Bill of Rights by eliminating free speech, violating the people’s right to privacy, and criminalizing individuals on suspicion of wrongdoing. As the law stipulates, anyone involved in “creating an atmosphere and spreading a message of fear” and “provoking or influencing by intimidation the government or any of its international organizations” will be construed as inciting terrorism. Indeed, this law will continue to erode democratic governance in the country, with some labeling it a “stealth declaration of martial law.”3 As US Congressional Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) noted at the press conference she convened on July 15 to publicly call for the Anti-Terrorism Law’s repeal, “this law represents a new weapon in the administration’s campaign to suppress dissent and will worsen attacks on ordinary people.” 3. Jodesz Gavilan, “‘Stealth Declaration of Martial Law’: Rights Groups Slam Duterte, Anti-Terror Law,” Rappler, July 3, 2020, https://rappler.com/nation /human-rights-groups-statements-duterte-signing-anti-terror-law. Anna Romina Guevarra and Maya Arcilla 491 “A Timeline of Terror”: From “Pride is a Protest” and #JusticeForFabelPineda to #HandsOffGabriela4 A number of prominent feminists and queer rights activists have been targeted under President Duterte in the lead up to the passing of the ATL. On June 26, twenty LGBTQ activists representing Bahaghari, an LGBTQ+ rights organization in the Philippines, were arrested at a Pride rally. These protestors, referred to as the “Pride 20,” were speaking out against the ATL and were immediately arrested.5 A few days later, fifteen-year-old Fabel Pineda from San Juan Ilocos Sur was gunned... (shrink)

Conceptual primitives and semantic universals are the cornerstones of a semantic theory which Anna Wierzbicka has been developing for many years. Semantics: Primes and Universals is a major synthesis of her work, presenting a full and systematic exposition of that theory in a non-technical and readable way. It delineates a full set of universal concepts, as they have emerged from large-scale investigations across a wide range of languages undertaken by the author and her colleagues. On the basis of empirical (...) cross-linguistic studies it vindicates the old notion of the "psychic unity of mankind", while at the same time offering a framework for the rigorous description of different languages and cultures. (shrink)

Introduction 1. Language and meaning Nothing is as easily overlooked, or as easily forgotten, as the most obvious truths. The tenet that language is a tool ...

The article is divided into two parts. The first part offers a careful reconstruction and detailed discussion of the argument of causal exclusion, as well as of the implications it has for physicalism. In its second part the article examines two important objections to the causal exclusion argument: the generalization objection, which holds that the argument is unacceptable since it confers causal efficacy only to ultimate basic properties, which arguably might not exist; and Yablo’s objection, according to which underlying the (...) argument of causal exclusion there is a principle of causal parsimony which leads to strong counterintuitive results and should therefore be abandoned. The article offers grounds for rejecting both objections as well as a new diagnosis of the problem for mental causation generated by the causal exclusion argument. (shrink)

Making decisions can be tough, but how do you know it s the right one and how can you be sure that unconscious biases aren t distorting your thinking? In Risky Business, Anna Withers and Mark Withers draw on decades of research in the fields of psychology, behavioral economics and neuroscience to explain why are so-called rational brains are frequently fooled by over 100 powerful unconscious biases. At the same time they provide a straightforward framework everyone can use, where (...) these biases are embodied into eight memorable characters that help us to avoid these pitfalls and make better decisions.". (shrink)

El cordobés Damián de Castro, gran exponente de la platería rococó española en la centuria dieciochesca, realizó junto a otros artífices diferentes piezas para el cardenal Delgado y Venegas, arzobispo hispalense entre 1776 y 1781. Hoy muchas de estas piezas las podemos contemplar en las vitrinas de nuestro museo catedralicio, sin embargo la existencia en su tiempo de diferentes piezas similares produjo cierta confusión en su posterior identificación. En este nuevo trabajo intentaremos desentrañar las dudas sobre dos de las más (...) vistosas piezas del tesoro de nuestro templo mayor: las dos bandejas de plata sobredorada que, ejecutadas en un exuberante y depurado rococó, deslumbran al visitante con sus fúlgidos destellos y atrevido diseño. (shrink)

One of the aims of “Mental Causation and Mental Properties” is to argue that Kim's position with respect to the problem of causal exclusion does not entail the causal heterogeneity of higher‐level properties pace Kim himself. I find that Esfeld's argument misses the point of Kim's position. In what follows I shall briefly try to explain why.

This article investigates the challenges posed by the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology and its connection to reality. Neurophenomenological research seeks to understand the intricate relationship between human consciousness, cognition, and the underlying neural processes. However, the subjective nature of conscious experiences presents unique epistemic challenges in determining the reliability of the knowledge generated in this research. Personal factors such as beliefs, emotions, and cultural backgrounds influence subjective experiences, which vary from individual to individual. On the other hand, scientific knowledge (...) aims to uncover universal truths based on empirical observations and objective principles. Reconciling the subjective and objective realms presents a significant challenge in determining the reliability of knowledge generated through neurophenomenological research. This article aims to examine the inherent limitations and challenges of neurophenomenological research to shed light on the complexities involved in understanding the nature of knowledge itself. This article highlights that the ontological implications of the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology arise from the question of how subjective experiences relate to objective reality. Understanding the neural correlates and mechanisms behind subjective experiences can provide insight into the underlying ontological nature of consciousness. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo ingresa en la ontología del acontecer y recorre cuatro momentos. En primer lugar, distingue la visión del mundo en general, propia de la llamada “metafísica” de la visión del ser como acontecer, y busca un diálogo entre la perspectiva del ser en la metafísica y ontología de Hans-Georg Gadamer. En segundo lugar, analiza la estructura del acontecer o el modo como se despliega el movimiento del sentido, para determinar la lógica de la pregunta como estructura del acontecer. (...) En tercer lugar, entabla un diálogo entre la idea de acontecer y la categoría de finitud, para evidenciar que, cuando se piensa en una ontología del acontecer, esta remite a la determinación de la finitud. Y, finalmente, plantea algunas líneas de desarrollo para profundizar en esta investigación. ABSTRACT The articles discusses the ontology of the event and covers four moments. First, it identifies the general worldview typical of the “metaphysics” of being as event, and seeks to establish a dialogue between the perspective of being in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s metaphysics and his ontology. Secondly, it analyzes the structure of the event or the way in which the movement of meaning unfolds, in order to determine the logic of the question as structure of the event. Third, through a dialogue between the idea of event and the category of finitude, the article shows that thinking the ontology of the event leads to the determination of finitude. Finally, the article suggests a few lines of inquiry for further in-depth research of this topic. (shrink)

Habilitation thesis, book proposal in preparation.

El artículo ingresa en la ontología del acontecer y recorre cuatro momentos. En primer lugar, distingue la visión del mundo en general, propia de la llamada “metafísica” de la visión del ser como acontecer, y busca un diálogo entre la perspectiva del ser en la metafísica y ontología de Hans-Georg Gadamer. En segundo lugar, analiza la estructura del acontecer o el modo como se despliega el movimiento del sentido, para determinar la lógica de la pregunta como estructura del acontecer. En (...) tercer lugar, entabla un diálogo entre la idea de acontecer y la categoría de finitud, para evidenciar que, cuando se piensa en una ontología del acontecer, esta remite a la determinaciónde la finitud. Y, finalmente, plantea algunas líneas de desarrollo para profundizar en esta investigación. (shrink)

RESUMEN El presente artículo tiene como objetivo reflexionar a partir de las principales ideas filosóficas de Walter Benjamin y Frantz Fanon sobre el problema de la violencia política para luego mostrar las diferencias y posibles relaciones en los planteamientos de los autores. En un primer momento se mostrarán las denuncias hechas por los dos autores al sistema político moderno en cuanto a que la apariencia pacífica de las relaciones sociales se fundamenta en relaciones mediadas por la violencia. Luego, se analizarán (...) los principales planteamientos acerca de la violencia divina y de la violencia revolucionaria o contraviolencia en cada uno de los filósofos. Por último, se aportarán algunas conclusiones que contrasten las propuestas de este diálogo y permitan trazar límites y posibilidades en la lucha política que cada autor en su particularidad está presentando. ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to reflect about the main philosophical ideas of Walter Benjamin and Frantz Fanon on the problem of political violence and then to present the differences and possible relations in the author's approaches. At the first time, will show the denunciations made by the two authors to the modern political system as a pacific appearance of social relations that are based on relations mediated by violence. Later, the main approaches to divine violence and revolutionary violence or counter-violence in each of the philosopher will be analyzed. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn to contrast with this dialogue and thus allow us to observe the limits and possibilities in the political struggle that each author in his particularity is presenting. (shrink)

Nothing seems as certain as death. However, what if life continues digitally after death? Companies and initiatives such as Amazon, Storyfile, Here After AI, Forever Identity and LifeNaut are dedicated to precisely this objective: using avatars, records, and other digital content of the deceased, they strive to enable a digital continuation of life. The deceased live on digitally, and at times, these can even appear very much alive-perhaps too alive? This article explores the ethical implications of these technologies, commonly known (...) as Death Tech. With the advancement of artificial intelligence, Death Tech will inevitably transform mourning practices, our perception of death, and how we cope with its reality in the coming years. In this article, it is demonstrated that Death Tech can contribute to individual grief support, education, and a vibrant culture of remembrance. However, it is crucial to recognise that the Digital Afterlife is not a paradise but necessitates active designing and ethical deliberation. DOI 10.5771/0010-3497-2023-3-427. (shrink)

Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

El objetivo del estudio es presentar de manera detallada el marcoantropológico introducido por Kant en su obra La religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón. Se intenta mostrar la manera como Kant reinterpreta los elementos esenciales de su sistema ético y comienza a entender el obrar incorrecto (transgresión moral) desde una perspectiva teológica.

Lo que me propongo presentar en este texto no son más que algunas observaciones y reflexiones, algunas de ellas incluso un poco marginales, a un trabajo mucho más amplio que vengo realizando desde hace más de seis años: la traducción y adaptación cultural para el mundo de habla hispana de la novela filosófica Suki, de Matthew Lipman, y de su correspondiente manual de apoyo para el profesor, que tiene por título Escribir: ¿cómo y por qué? Me ocuparé, en primer lugar, (...) de clarificar el origen y las características de este trabajo de traducción y adaptación cultural, en orden a mostrar algunos de los criterios generales que para ello fui elaborando a medida que desarrollaba mi trabajo. A continuación presentaré algunas experiencias de escritura con niños y jóvenes que me han servido de punto de referencia en mi reflexión sobre la dimensión filosófica del acto de la escritura. Lo esencial en el esfuerzo por generar en otros el interés y las habilidades para desarrollar la composición poética está muchas veces en ayudarles a expresarse nuevamente en términos sencillos, pero evocadores. Concluiré con algunas reflexiones generales, inspiradas en Matthew Lipman, sobre la relación existente entre la reflexión filosófica y la escritura poética. En el trabajo de adaptación del manual Escribir: ¿cómo y por qué? he hecho, entonces, una recopilación bastante amplia de poemas de grandes autores de muchísimos países hispanoamericanos. Hay allí poemas de autores como Miguel Hernández, Antonio Machado o Federico García Lorca, y otros , del mexicano Octavio Paz, del nicaragüense Rubén Darío, del peruano César Vallejo, o del chileno Pablo Neruda, o incluso canciones del panameño Rubén Blades, del cubano Silvio Rodríguez, del argentino Piero o hasta del brasileño Vinicius de Moraes. Pero he incluido también poemas escritos por niños de mi país. (shrink)

The reasonableness is a basic ideal of a philosophical education. Such ideal is especially expressed in “Philosophy for Children” by the notion, still open to multiple interpretations, of “good reasons”. “Being reasonable” means, in its widest sense, the trend, the finely cultivated habit, of giving, asking and evaluating reasons for our thoughts, feelings, actions, words, actions, or wishes. What is demanded of those who participate in a community of inquiry is the permanent effort of searching for the best reasons for (...) what we are, feel, think, say or wish to do. Why are good reasons necessary? How are those reasons to be evaluated? What allows us to distinguish between a good and a bad reason? What are the main characteristics of a good reason? These are some of the main questions I aim to examine in this paper. I begin by trying to clarify what gives rise to the need to give, ask and evaluate reasons. Then I try to answer the question I consider to be central: what is a good reason, or what does one consist of? I conclude my thoughts with some notes on the possibility and meaning of a “logic of good reasons” and on the role it plays in the P4C project. I show the diversity of reasons that can be offered according to the circumstances and the circles of interest in which we move. Since we live simultaneously in different worlds , the kind of reasons we must offer in each case may be entirely different. Therefore, the criteria according to which we can evaluate the reasons offered in each context may also be very different. I emphasize that good reasons are, in a great number, intuitive. They are immediate, that is, not mediated by long analysis, but ‘emerge’ in our minds rather ‘spontaneously’. Though good reasons may show up in a rather intuitive way, in general they are supported by a long process of analysis. Good reasons would not be such if they were not timely; therefore, they cannot take too long to show up; pressing circumstances require them to show up swiftly. Nonetheless, they are not produced casually or by chance. As a matter of fact, they are prepared in our permanent exercise of making good judgments, that is, careful, relevant and well enlightened judgments. This implies a process of decomposing a problematic situation into its constitutive parts , which happens too fast in our minds and shows up finished in those who permanently strive to reason in a sensible and coherent way when confronted with different situations. (shrink)

It has been suggested in the literature about actions that one can honour the philosophical intuition lying behind Davidson’s argument for the Anscombe Thesis (the claim that by-sentences --sentcnccs used to report actions of the general form: ‘A X-ed by V-ing’-- involve two descriptions of the same action) without accepting the argument’s conclusion. The suggestion in question is to interpret by-sentences as referring to two synchronous but different actions of the same agent. I argue that this suggestion, together with two (...) plausible semantic principles about the naming of events and a reasonable metaphysical principle about the constitution of events, leads to certain ontological commitments which are hardly acccptable. My conclusion is then that in order to deny the Anscambe Thesis what must be done is to show that Davidson’s intuition is wrong. (shrink)

El elemento primario de lo social es vivir en un ethos, implicados con el mundo, con los otros y con nosotros mismos. En diálogo con Hegel, este artículo muestra el aspecto crítico social de dicho planteamiento. La vida ética no es obediencia ciega a un destino ni quedarse en un círculo vicioso en el que solo se repiten costumbres, sino que contiene un grado de reconocimiento y apropiación que permite ver y alterar estas determinaciones cuando ya no hacen inteligible el (...) mundo, cuando no son racionales. Estas posiciones son elaboradas confrontando las lecturas que Habermas y Honneth adelantaron de Hegel. (shrink)

Al esbozar su proyecto de una fenomenología dialéctica, el joven Herbert Marcuse dirigió a Heidegger una crítica, la cual consistía en que, a pesar de sus genuinos aportes a una tematización de la facticidad y la historicidad, terminaba por recaer en una falta de concreción. Este artículo busca evaluar si dicha crítica es pertinente. Se propondrá que tal señalamiento es acertado ontológicamente, pero no metodológicamente. De las conclusiones derivadas de ello, se sugieren algunas posibles líneas de reinterpretación del pensamiento heideggeriano, (...) la fenomenología y el pensamiento crítico. En última instancia, se aborda la posibilidad que la idea de habitar (Wohnen) sea una respuesta de Heidegger al planteamiento de la mera praxis, considerado por él como insuficiente. (shrink)

The concept of natural otherness can be found throughout the environmental ethics literature. Drawing on this concept, this article pursues two aims. For one, it argues for an account of individual natural otherness as stable difference as opposed to accounts of natural otherness that put more emphasis on independence for the purpose of differentiating individual natural otherness from the concept of wildness. Secondly, this account of natural otherness is engaged to argue for a particular way of theorising the moral standing (...) of individual nonhuman entities. While individual natural otherness in itself does not provide an account of whether an entity matters morally in itself (that is, whether it is morally considerable); it points to an account of incommensurable moral significance for all entities which are attributed moral considerability. That is an often-overlooked alternative to egalitarian or hierarchical accounts or moral significance. Individual natural otherness understood in this way in turn provides another explanatory story for why relational accounts of environmental ethics that strongly emphasise the importance of concepts such as wildness are particularly salient. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind–body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: how the physical grounds the mental; and why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of individuating properties in terms (...) of causal powers, and defining realization as a relation of inclusion between sets of causal powers. Thus, as the causal powers that define a mental property are a subset of the causal powers that characterize a physical property, it can be said that physical properties realize mental properties. In this paper we examine the physicalist credentials of Shoemaker's mind–body theory in relation to three important issues: the direction of the relation of dependence that the theory is committed to; the possibility of mental properties existing without being anchored by physical properties; and the compatibility of the theory with the causal closure of the physical world. We argue that Shoemaker's theory is problematic in all three respects. After that we consider whether the theory should count as a mind–body theory at all, given that it seems to be committed to a distorted view of mental properties. (shrink)

Humans and some animal species are able to learn stimulus-response associations by observing others' behavior. It saves energy and time and avoids the danger of trying the wrong actions. Observational learning depends on the capability of mapping the actions of others into our own behaviors, processing outcomes, and combining this knowledge to serve our goals. Observational learning plays a central role in the learning of social skills, cultural knowledge, and tool use. Thus, it is one of the fundamental processes in (...) which infants learn about and from adults. In this paper, we review current methodological approaches employed in observational learning research. We highlight the important role of the prefrontal cortex and cognitive flexibility to support this learning process, develop a new neural working model of observational learning, illustrate how imitation relates to observational learning, and provide directions for future research. (shrink)

Grounding theorists insist that grounding and explanation are intimately related. This claim could be understood as saying either that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation or it could be interpreted as saying that grounding plays an important—possibly an indispensable—role in metaphysical explanation. Or both. I argue that saying that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation can only be justified if grounding is explanatory by nature, but that this view is untenable. We ought therefore to be ‘separatists’ and view grounding and (...) explanation as distinct. As it turns out, though, once grounding has been in this sense distinguished from the explanation it backs, the view that the role grounding plays in explanation justifies its introduction ends up in serious trouble. I conclude that the role grounding plays in explanation does not justify attributing to grounding whatever nature we think it has, and it most likely does not give us any special reason to think grounding exists. (shrink)

Theorists of political obligation have long devoted special attention to civil disobedience, establishing its pride of place as an object of philosophical analysis, and as one of a short li...

Este artículo corto reflexiona sobre la interesante relación que Michel Foucault plantea entre las formaciones de saber y las prácticas o dispositivos de poder, a través del caso particular de la clínica y la práctica médica. En efecto, este caso aporta elementos de relación en el propósito de hacer del hombre tanto un objeto de estudio como una variable para controlar. Es particular que el caso de la medicina aporte un concepto central para dilucidar la relación entre saber y poder, (...) a saber, el concepto de mirada, si bien ha de reconocerse la transformación del mismo conforme al modo de aplicación. (shrink)

In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: 'evidence of evidence is evidence' (Feldman 2007, p. 208). We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence we introduce a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic states, Dyadic (...) Bayesianism. Based on this framework, we then discuss characterizations of evidence of evidence and argue for one of them. Finally, we show that whether the EEE Slogan holds, depends on the specific kind of evidence of evidence. (shrink)

The use of prisoners as research participants is controversial. Efforts to protect them in response to past exploitation and abuse have led to strict regulations and reluctance to involve them as participants. Hence, prisoners are routinely denied the opportunity to participate in research. In the absence of comprehensive information regarding prisoners’ current involvement in research, we examined UK prisoners’ involvement through review of research applications to the UK National Research Ethics Service. We found that prisoners have extremely limited access to (...) research participation. This analysis was augmented by a survey of those involved in research and research governance (UK researchers and Research Ethics Committee members). Our results suggest that pragmatic concerns regarding the perceived burden of including prisoners are far more prominent in motivating their exclusion than ethical concerns or knowledge of regulations. While prisoners may remain a vulnerable research population due to constraints upon their liberty and autonomy and the coercive nature of the prison environment, routine exclusion from participation may be disadvantageous. Rigorous ethical oversight and the shift in the prevailing attitude towards the risks and benefits of participation suggest that it may be time for research to be more accessible to prisoners in line with the principle of equivalence in prison healthcare. We suggest the necessary first step in this process is a re-examination of current guidance in the UK and other countries with exclusions. (shrink)

We routinely take diminished capacity as diminishing moral responsibility (as in the case of immaturity, senility, or particular mental impairments). The prospect of enhanced capacity therefore poses immediate questions with regard to moral responsibility. Of particular interest are those capacities that might allow us to better avoid serious harms or wrongdoing. We can consider questions of responsibility with regards to enhancement at various removes. In the first instance: where such (safe and effective) interventions exist, do we have an obligation to (...) undergo such enhancement? Secondly: once enhanced, would the ambit of our responsibility therefore increase? Some philosophers have argued that enhanced capacities potentially generate “hyperresponsibility.” Hyperresponsible people would be held to a different and higher moral standard than those of us with more ordinary human capacities, and are liable to be more blameworthy for wrongdoing than ordinary agents. This chapter discusses the implications of enhancement for three central views of responsibility, namely: capacity-based, control-based and revelation-based views. Debates around moral responsibility have primarily concerned diminished capacities; as such the prospect of enhancement introduces new terrain—and potentially new fault-lines and complexities—in which to interrogate our theoretical conceptions of the foundations (and limits) of moral responsibility. (shrink)

The author would like to make the following corrections to the published paper [...].

In ‘The autonomy of the affect’ Brian Massumi wrote of the gap between affective and cognitive registering of the traumatic experience. Affect theorists and neuroscientists have long shared the notion of a gap between the somatic response to a traumatic event and the appraisal of the affective situation. This article develops theories on dissociation or nothingness, where nothingness is a measurement of the space between the affective and the cognitive registering of a traumatic event. It explores the concept of two (...) different systems, one a ‘conscious automatic’ system and the other an ‘intensity system’ that exists outside of normal physiological sequencing, beyond narration, and therefore incapable of integrating into memory systems. (shrink)

In a series of influential articles (Kim 1989b, 1992b, 1993a and 1998), Jaegwon Kim has developed a strong argument against nonreductive physicalism as a plausible solution to mental causation. The argument is commonly called the ’causal exclusion argument’, and it has become, over the years, one of the most serious threats to the nonreductivist point of view. In the first part of this paper I offer a careful reconstruction and detailed discussion of the exclusion argument. In the second part I (...) show why some important objections to it actually fail. (shrink)

In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative (...) judgments? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgments? (3) Questions about Value Theory and Evaluative Perception: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of value experience? (shrink)