In sections 18 and 73 of Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language , Carnap famously presents what he understands to be decisive objections to Wittgenstein’s Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. However, Carnap has been criticized in recent literature for severely misinterpreting that distinction. Against this criticism it is argued that Carnap reads that distinction as applying to two distinct classes of expressions ( Unsinn and sinnlos ) that he holds to emerge from his reading of Tractatus 4.1212 and related Tractarian (...) theses. It is then argued that Carnap’s counterexamples to Wittgenstein’s theses are successful given his reading, and that our analysis of his counterexamples puts us in a unique position to reevaluate his conventionalism. (shrink)

The dominant research consensus in the history and philosophy of mathematics appears to be that the history of mathematics has little to do with the philosophy of mathematics, and that the philosophy of mathematics has little to do with the history of mathematics. The philosopher of mathematics works on a specialized set of problems with perhaps only an antiquarian regard to the history of mathematics, while the historian works on the historical transmission of mathematical texts and artifacts with perhaps only (...) a passing interest in the philosophical underpinnings of those developments. (shrink)

The dominant research consensus in the history and philosophy of mathematics appears to be that the history of mathematics has little to do with the philosophy of mathematics, and that the philosophy of mathematics has little to do with the history of mathematics. The philosopher of mathematics works on a specialized set of problems with perhaps only an antiquarian regard to the history of mathematics, while the historian works on the historical transmission of mathematical texts and artifacts with perhaps only (...) a passing interest in the philosophical underpinnings of those developments. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam's The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays serves as his latest installment attempting to detail some of the historical background and recent controversies over the so-called fact/value distinction. In it, Putnam claims that the positivists' influence led to an inflated dichotomy, rather than distinction, between descriptive sentences and evaluative sentences. He argues that such a dichotomy is unwarranted through a number of arguments intended to show that attempts to “disentangle” facts from values always fail. However, in (...) the process Putnam overlooks a number of interesting motives underlying the positivist movement, and disregards a now-enormous body of literature in the philosophy of science on descriptive and evaluative statements. Hence, his attempt, towards the end of the collection, to construct a viable philosophy of language that can support the dichotomy's collapse and an ethical theory that can support his discussion of the dichotomy's collapse appears somewhat weak. Nevertheless, Putnam engages his philosophical discussion with contemporary economic theory in order to motivate his central claim: that taking a somewhat interesting distinction between facts and values and inflating it into a dichotomy can, and often does, lead to disastrous policy decisions. Thus, the collection shines by highlighting real-world, practical and ethical consequences of certain philosophical and theoretical commitments. (shrink)

Towards the end of their reign, the logical positivists found themselves in bitter disagreement as to what extent the methods and axioms of the natural sciences can be justified by our abilities to grunt and point. What began as a project to epistemically ground the natural sciences ended as an argument about cavemen. Although such a story might be a good one, the consensus, among the positivists’ rivals and the positivists themselves, seemed to be that ahead lay a difficult road (...) indeed if grunts clarify physics. Understandably, that road would be one not traveled, and so our weary fact-warriors walked off elsewhere, leaving the detritus in their path and the rest of the world to deal with the consequences. And consequences there were. Take the current, popular idea that the natural sciences need not be governed by moral concerns; or if they do, such moral governance only need be justified by appeals to governmental, technological or, happily in this most learned of eras, divine authority. Although we may not be able to connect such popular ideas directly to the positivist program, it is nevertheless no great leap to say that their program was motivated in strong ways by a blind acceptance of the abilities of technological advancement and the triumphant march of the natural sciences. (shrink)