The relationship between will and cognition represents one of the most fundamental issues in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The possibility of aesthetic experience, which involves a deliverance of cognition from the service of the will, and even more so the doctrine of the redemption through cognition – the fact that cognition can become a “tranquillizer” of the will and bring will to abolish itself – seems incompatible with Schopenhauer’s voluntaristic metaphysics. This paper aims to analyse this controversial part of Schopenhauer’s discourse, especially (...) in its implications for the system’s logical consistency, and tries to provide a theoretical and genetic explanation of the question. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed reconstruction of the origins of Schopenhauer's philosophy and its inherent aporias. It is divided into four parts. The first section delves into the pietistic upbringing of young Schopenhauer and his introduction to philosophy through the teachings of G.E. Schulze, as well as his study of Plato, Schelling, and Kant. Faced with the "negative" outcomes of Kant's criticism, particularly the unknowability of the thing-in-itself, young Schopenhauer initially engaged with Fichte and Schelling (this is covered in the (...) second part of the volume). However, Schopenhauer formed the opinion that these two philosophers, instead of upholding and expanding upon Kant's ideas, ultimately diverge from them. That notwithstanding, he implicitly inherited certain pivotal concepts from Fichte and Schelling. The third part explores Schopenhauer's initial endeavor to formulate a new metaphysics after Kant, known as the theory of "better consciousness." In the fourth part, the book demonstrates how the internal contradictions within that theory and Schopenhauer's transformative encounter with Indian wisdom (Hinduism and Buddhism) lead him to abandon his first attempt at a system and develop his metaphysics of will. The last and most substantial chapter of the book focuses on the author's analysis of the inherent aporias within Schopenhauer's mature system, approaching them from a genetic perspective. (shrink)

In the Summer 1811 Schopenhauer decided to move from Gottingen to Berlin, in order to hear Fichte’s lectures there. So, in the winter semester 1811/1812 he attended four lectures «Upon the study of philosophy», and then the lectures «Upon the facts of consciousness» and «Upon the doctrine of science». Although Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation flaunts his contempt for Fichte in a very colourful way, many scholars alleged and proved a certain affinity of his philosophy with Fichte’s (...) philosophy, namely concerning the concepts of “body” and “will”. However, in this paper, a very likely influence that Fichte could exert on Schopenhauer is pointed out, not in relation to Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the world «as will», but to his doctrine of the world «as representation». For this purpose a comparison is made between some excerpts from Schopenhauer’s notes of Fichte’ s lectures and some passages from the third book of The World as Will and Representation, in particular with respect to the «Losrei.en des Wissens» : a theoretical point, that receives a great relevance both in Fichte and in Schopenhauer.Im Sommer 1811 entschied sich der junge Philosophiestudent Schopenhauer, von Gottingen nach Berlin umzuziehen, um die Vorlesungen Fichtes horen zu konnen. So besuchte er im Wintersemester 1811/1812 vier Vorlesungen Fichtes »Uber das Studium der Philosophie«, die Vorlesung »Uber die Tatsachen des Bewusstseins« und die »Uber die Wissenschaftslehre«. Obwohl nun Schopenhauer in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung seine Geringschatzung fur Fichte sehr explizit geau.ert hat – und eine so offene Zurschaustellung ist eigentlich schon verdachtig –, so haben nicht wenige Forscher doch eine gewisse Verwandtschaft seiner Lehre mit der von Fichte behauptet und bewiesen; und zwar in Hinsicht auf die Grundbegriffe »Leib« und »Wille«. In diesem Beitrag soll nun aber auf eine Wirkung Fichtes auf Schopenhauer hingewiesen werden, welche eigentlich nicht dessen Betrachtung der Welt »als Wille«, sondern die der Welt »als Vorstellung« betrifft. Zu diesem Zweck wird also ein Vergleich zwischen einigen Textauszugen aus der Schopenhauer’schen Nachschrift der Vorlesungen Fichtes und einigen Stellen des dritten Buchs von Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung gezogen; insbesondere in Hinsicht auf das »Losrei.en des Wissens«, oder des »Erkennens« – ein theoretischer Zug, der sowohl im Diskurs Fichtes als auch in dem Schopenhauers eine zentrale Relevanz erhalt. (shrink)