Within current debates about the future impact of Artificial Intelligence on human society, roughly three different perspectives can be recognised: the technology-centric perspective, claiming that AI will soon outperform humankind in all areas, and that the primary threat for humankind is superintelligence; the human-centric perspective, claiming that humans will always remain superior to AI when it comes to social and societal aspects, and that the main threat of AI is that humankind’s social nature is overlooked in technological designs; and the (...) collective intelligence-centric perspective, claiming that true intelligence lies in the collective of intelligent agents, both human and artificial, and that the main threat for humankind is that technological designs create problems at the collective, systemic level that are hard to oversee and control. The current paper offers the following contributions: a clear description for each of the three perspectives, along with their history and background; an analysis and interpretation of current applications of AI in human society according to each of the three perspectives, thereby disentangling miscommunication in the debate concerning threats of AI; and a new integrated and comprehensive research design framework that addresses all aspects of the above three perspectives, and includes principles that support developers to reflect and anticipate upon potential effects of AI in society. (shrink)

Aim of the lectures -- Early Brahmanical literature -- Panini's grammar -- A passage from the Chandogya Upanisad -- The structures of languages -- The Buddhist contribution -- Vaisesika and language -- Verbal knowledge -- The contradictions of Nagarjuna -- The reactions of other thinkers -- Sarvastivada Samkhya -- The Agamasastra of Gaudapada -- Sankara -- Kashmiri Saivism -- Jainism -- Early Vaisesika -- Critiques of the existence of a thing before its arising -- Nyaya -- Mimamsa -- The Abhidharmakosa (...) bhasya of Vasubandhu -- The Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga and its bhasya -- Bhartrhari -- The problem of negation -- Dignaga and verbal knowledge -- The Bodhisattvabhumi -- Prajnakaragupta -- Indian thinkers and the correspondence principle -- Appendix. The Mahaprajnaparamitasastra and the Samkhya tanmatras. (shrink)

One of the principal challenges to human survival will be for human beings, embedded in a plurality of cultural contexts, to engage with and learn from one another respectfully in the continuing task of creating a more liveable world. I argue here that theoretical psychology can contribute to setting some of the terms for this effort through the kind of conception it advances of the person as agent. I discuss broadly two philosophical perspectives toward human agency which have become prominent (...) in psychology in the last few decades, the humanistic and the hermeneutic. I argue that these two different frameworks make complementary contributions to the project of understanding ourselves and furthering the development of our humanity. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Some ten years ago an interesting discussion took place in the pages of this journal. It began with an article by Arindam Chakrabarti (2000) whose title betrays its intention: "Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyāya." There followed a response by Stephen H. Phillips (2001), "There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa," which in turn was commented upon in Chakrabarti's "Reply to Stephen Phillips" (2001).This discussion, as is clear (...) from the titles, concerns the need and even possibility of nirvikalpaka perception. What Chakrabarti tries to do is "to show why we can easily do without .. (shrink)

Proposes that to the extent that psychotherapy allows the individual to exercise greater freedom in his or her life it does so through enhancing psychological agency. The conceptions of free will and of agency used here are influenced strongly by J. F. Rychlak's discussion of the human capacity for "dialectical" thinking. The author discusses these conceptions of agency in terms of some of R. Schafer's recent ideas regarding psychoanalytic psychotherapy. A. H. Jenkins further notes that this conception of individuality is (...) contextually embedded and thus is fully compatible with the idea of a person devoted to others in mutually gratifying relationships and committed to self-definition through participation in community life. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Language (śabda) occupied a central yet often unacknowledged place in classical Indian philosophical thought. Foundational thinkers considered topics such as the nature of language, its relationship to reality, the nature and existence of linguistic units and their capacity to convey meaning, and the role of language in the interpretation of sacred writings. The first reader on language in--and the language of--classical Indian philosophy, A Śabda Reader offers a comprehensive and pedagogically valuable treatment of this topic and its importance to Indian (...) philosophical thought. A Śabda Reader brings together newly translated passages by authors from a variety of traditions--Brahmin, Buddhist, Jaina--representing a number of schools of thought. It illuminates issues such as how Brahmanical thinkers understood the Veda and conceived of Sanskrit; how Buddhist thinkers came to assign importance to language's link to phenomenal reality; how Jains saw language as strictly material; the possibility of self-contradictory sentences; and how words affect thought. Throughout, the volume shows that linguistic presuppositions and implicit notions about language often play as significant a role as explicit ideas and formal theories. Including an introduction that places the texts and ideas in their historical and cultural context, A Śabda Reader sheds light on a crucial aspect of classical Indian thought and in so doing deepens our understanding of the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Reviews the book Time and psychological explanation by Brent D. Slife . In this book Prof. Slife has taken on the task of showing how the Western conception of time is a construct whose use in psychology is in need of just such a review. The object of Slife's critique is the modern Western tradition which takes time to be an objective and linear entity. This perspective, of course, derives from the work and thinking of Sir Isaac Newton, and it (...) is an orientation which has been fundamental to the development of Western science and culture since the period of the Enlightenment. Prof. Slife argues that the Newtonian time paradigm rests on five somewhat overlapping conceptual elements which are basic to traditional scientific explanation. These are the notions of "objectivity," "continuity," "linearity," "universality," and "reductionism." Some of these characteristics can be seen to be features of the way Newton envisioned time itself and some are aspects of events to be accounted for, because they exist in absolute time. In sum Prof. Slife has made a philosophically literate case for the need to analyze the limiting effects of Newtonian notions of time on psychology's theory and practice. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Des historiens de l’astronomie, de la linguistique ou de la médecine indiennes anciennes, on attend généralement qu’ils soient familiers des contreparties occidentales modernes de ces disciplines. Mais qu’en est-il de la philosophie? Et tout d’abord, existe-t-il en Inde ancienne quelque chose comme une philosophie dont on pourrait faire l’histoire? Et si oui, qui en sera le meilleur exégète? Le philosophe attentif aux enjeux systématiques, ou l’historien sensible aux contextes de production? L’auteur apporte ici sa contribution à un débat qui agite (...) périodiquement, et aujourd’hui à nouveau, les études indiennes et bouddhiques, en soulignant l’importance de la deuxième approche. (shrink)

There are good reasons to think that Brahmanism initially belonged to a geographically limited area, with its heartland in the middle and western parts of the Gangetic plain. It was in this region that Brahmanism was at that time the culture of a largely hereditary class of priests, the brahmins, who derived their livelihood and special position in society from their close association with the local rulers. This situation changed. The most plausible hypothesis as to the reasons of this change (...) sees a link with the political unification of northern India, begun by the Nandas and continued by the Mauryas. Both the Nandas and the Mauryas had their home base in the region called Magadha and had no particular interest in brahmins and their sacrificial tradition. As a result Brahmanism as an institution was under threat; it either had to face disappearance, or reinvent itself. It did the latter. Brahmanism underwent a transformation that enabled it to survive and ultimately flourish in changed circumstances. This paper will argue that the Mahābhārata can be looked upon as an element in this Brahminical project. Far from being a mere collection of stories and general good advice, it was an instrument in the hands of a group of people who were determined to change the world in ways that suited them, and who to a considerable extent succeeded in doing so during the centuries that lay ahead. (shrink)

Bhartṛhari was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's superiority against the philosophies developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas, in which the Veda played a central role. Bhartṛhari and his thought are situated in their intellectual context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that others had dealt with before him in India and suggested solutions to (...) existing problems. Indeed, it becomes clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to try to gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition. (shrink)

This article argues that in early Mīmāṃsā the view was current that there are objects in the world corresponding to all words of the Sanskrit language. Evidence to that effect is primarily found in passages from Bhartṛhari’s works, and in some classical Nyāya texts. Interestingly, Śabara’s classical work on Mīmāṃsā has abandoned this position, apparently for an entirely non-philosophical reason: the distaste felt for the newly arising group of Brahmanical temple-priests.

Attempts have been made to correct the text of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha on the basis of the texts that its author used—and sometimes refers to by name—while composing his work. This procedure is promising in texts like the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, which makes abundant use of other works, and might in principle give results that are independent of, and prior to, the detailed study of its manuscripts. A closer investigation shows that this procedure is not without risks, and may occasionally give rise to (...) unjustified “corrections”. The article shows that quotations in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha deviate from their source-texts in numerous cases. It further illustrates that the archetype underlying the manuscripts used for the available editions on occasion demonstrably differs from what must have been the text’s autograph. Other cases demonstrate that already the autograph sometimes deviated from its source-texts. The article concludes that careless “correcting” of the text may have serious consequences and can stand in the way of its correct interpretation. (shrink)

Early Buddhism. A new approach. The I of the Beholder. Sue Hamilton. Curzon Press, Richmond, Surrey 2000. xi, 233 pp. pb. £16.99 ISBN 0-7007-1357-3.

This article concentrates on certain beliefs that many Indian thinkers implicitly accepted and that show up in an analysis of reasoned arguments they presented. These beliefs concerned the relationship between language and reality. For Brahmanical thinkers, who owed their privileged position in society in great part to their mastery of texts — the Veda — that were deemed to be directly connected to reality, this relationship between language and reality was a matter of course. For reasons of their own, Buddhist (...) thinkers had come to think that the world of our experience is largely determined by language. This shared belief, which most often though not always remained implicit, found its way into certain arguments. These arguments remain unintelligible without an awareness of the underlying belief. (shrink)

This article shows in detail that the widely held view according to which the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha has a hierarchical structure is mistaken. It further argues that at least some parts of the texts were independent essays before being incorporated into the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha.