Objective communication—the principal aim of languages of any kind—meets with its greatest measure of success in science and art, which can both be precise, and therefore immune to misunderstanding born of vagueness or ambiguity, by giving specific expression to ideas. But, paradoxically, in order to reach specificity science and art must be developed along two opposite directions: in the first technical terminology replaces imagery-bearing words, in the second images are cultivated to the utmost. The scientist's procedure is entirely justified. For (...) it is undeniable that words are often misleading. because they are clouded with different images in the minds of different people. (shrink)

I have admitted different kinds of power but the admission does not make it objectionable--in spite of Dr. Beardsley's point and Mr. Grünbaum's opening statement--to use the same word in order to indicate that all these kinds are under the same category--Mr. Williams' rejection of the category notwithstanding--of latent but directed tendencies or dispositions. Let my critics envisage power by analogy with, and including, the physical vector of force. i.e. as something which we represent by an arrow, to induce them (...) to reconsider Dr. Beardsley's point and to concede that the Gestalt forces of cohesion and personal dispositions belong to the category under consideration since both are directed agencies. The directedness of power--let me add with reference to Mr. Feigl's point and to one of Mr. Krikorian's questions --enables me to account for the so-called teleological situations without assuming a metaphysics of teleology. In particular, I can mention a "feed-back" mechanism in order to give an example of the transformation of directed into directing, or controlling, power. (shrink)

To bring clearly before the mind what is meant by class and to distinguish this notion from all the notions to which it is allied, is one of the most difficult and important problems of mathematical philosophy.”When Russell wrote this in 1903, he could illustrate the difficulty of the problem by his own confusing attempt at a solution. He was able to demonstrate the importance of classes for mathematical philosophy in his later work: the definition of cardinal number as a (...) class of classes similar to a given class served him as a cornerstone for the derivation of mathematics from logic. (shrink)

This comment piece examines the distinction between negation of a statement and denial of its truth, in the context of an early examination of Quine's related views. Where P is "Jones is ill," the author maintains, in contrast to Quine, that the negation of P is "Jones is ill" is false.

The premise of functional meaning is to the effect that the appropriate use of words--the employment of words in accordance with the standard usage--discloses their meaning. In its extreme or radical version the premise is a downright identification of a meaning with an act, or acts, of using words, i.e., with actual occurrences. Since actual occurrences are particulars, this extreme form would appeal to a nominalist who wants to eschew universals, especially in a concern with meaning. But the radical premise (...) is incompatible with the second premise of a dispositional semantics. For the second premise is intended to do justice to the fact that the same word may take care of endless variations of its meaning or, at any rate, of a number which is not limited to particular variations that occur with the act, or acts, of using the word. Accordingly, a dispositional semantics requires a moderate version of the premise of functional meaning. (shrink)