This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānaviniścaya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ʼgyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular (...) the distinction between “proving consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic. (shrink)

The Tibetan Buddhist logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge devoted a large part of his discussion on argumentation to arguments by consequence. Phya pa distinguishes in his analysis arguments by consequence that merely refute the opponent and arguments by consequence that qualify as probative. The latter induce a correct direct proof which corresponds to the reverse form of the argument by consequence. This paper deals with Phya pa’s classification of probative consequences based on the type of the logical reason (...) involved. I first establish the basis of Phya pa’s classification—the typology of logical reasons in inference-for-oneself—with a special attention to logical reasons consisting in the ‘apprehension of something incompatible [with the negandum]’ and among them the specific case of the ‘apprehension of the cause of something incompatible [with the negandum]’. The treatment of the latter is shown to be instrumental in Phya pa’s classification, as well as in explaining the divergences that occur in the models adopted by his successors, such as gTsang nag pa brTson ʾgrus seng ge and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge. Turning to Phya pa’s effective application of this typology when he resorts himself to arguments by consequence, I examine Phya pa’s rephrasing, in the form of four arguments by consequence, of the discussion on the relation between the two realities found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and relate it to a parallel discussion in an earlier Madhyamaka work by rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags. I compare the variant versions of these four arguments in three Madhyamaka works of Phya pa and show that the differences pertaining to the identification of the type of the logical reason result from apparently insignificant variations in the formulation of each of the arguments. In the conclusion, I discuss the potential philosophical or practical interest of such a classification. (shrink)

Exegesis on Buddhist dialectics and logics.

On the fundamentals of Buddhist doctrines; including explation of the karmic law of cause and effect with stories.

Letters commenting on Hardwig, J "Is There a Duty to Die?" with a reply to those letters by the author.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?William EdelglassThe Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Edited by Georges B. J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. viii + 398.As early as Bhāvaviveka (sixth century), Indian Buddhist doxographers situated important philosophers in schools and sub-schools characterized by adherence to distinct views, thereby providing a coherent, hierarchical presentation of the Buddha's teaching. In (...) Tibet this practice continued and gained considerable importance: the pedagogical and hermeneutical significance of ordering texts occasioned widespread doxographical literary production.1 The doxographical projects, in which the systematic understanding of unchanging 'tenets' was privileged over the singular views of individual authors, were highly contested. Much of the disagreement was due to the multiplicity of interpretations bound to arise during a millennium of intellectual exchange. Doxographical hierarchy set the parameters of intellectual discourse, and thus the classification of tenets was not simply a matter of historical interest. Traditions were constructed in such a way that one's own thought would conform to an acceptable view, to say nothing of the complex relationship between political power and religious doctrine in Tibet. Despite the contested status of Tibetan doxographical categories, the classifications and distinctions that order much contemporary Western scholarship on Mahāyāna Buddhism in India were inherited from Tibet. Until recently, even the best research often uncritically employed dominant Tibetan classifications as basic interpretive categories and was thus able to bring order to an enormous body of literature.The most philosophically significant and vigorously contested classification in Tibetan doxography is the distinction between the Rang rgyud pa and the Thal 'gyur ba (sanskritized by modern scholars as 'Svātantrika' and 'Prāsaṅgika', respectively). The original locus of the discussion is three Indian commentaries on Nāgārjuna's (second century) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Buddhapālita (fifth-sixth centuries), in what is the oldest extant commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by a known author, followed Nāgārjuna's reductio ad absurdam form of argumentation, leading from the opponent's premise to an untenable consequence (prasaṅga, thal 'gyur). Shortly thereafter Bhāvaviveka claimed that for every prasan.ga argument in Nāgārjuna's text there is an unstated positive argument, and he criticized Buddhapālita for not utilizing the new methods of Buddhist logic to demonstrate the validity of Madhyamaka thought. Bhāvaviveka argued that Mādhyamikas ought to present formal probative (prayoga; sbyor ba) and autonomous (svatantraprayoga; rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba) arguments and argued that inferential reasoning was necessary to establish the Madhyamaka view of emptiness. Candrakīrti (seventh century) then defended Buddhapālita, insisting that prasaṅga arguments were the only fitting method for a Mādhyamika because they do not require the affirmation of inherent nature. Roughly five centuries later, although Madhyamaka had already been divided according to a variety of classifications in India and Tibet, some Tibetan scholars retroactively characterized Bhāvaviveka as the founder of the Svātantrikas and Candrakīrti as the [End Page 415] founder of the Prāsaṅgikas. Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the most famous proponent of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, believed this debate was about more than methodological or epistemological questions: because autonomous argumentation requires inherently existing objects, even if only conventionally, he claimed that Svātantrikas were crypto-realists who deviated from Nāgārjuna's radical understanding of emptiness.Tsong kha pa's analysis of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, and therefore Madhyamaka philosophy in general, came to dominate Western scholarly research. However, in the last few decades there has been considerable exploration of the forces and influences that contributed to the emergence of conflicting Tibetan doxographical systems.2 This research program has been significantly furthered with the publication of The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Because the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction is a Tibetan conceptual construction based on Indian commentaries, an understanding of the issues involved requires a careful analysis of the Indian sources, an investigation of the growth of the various doxographies in Tibet... (shrink)

Selected works on Svātantrika Mādhyamaka Buddhist philosophy.

Collection of Buddha's teaching (Tib. Bkaʼ) translated into Tibetan (ʼgyur).

Collection of commentaries on Buddha's teaching written by Indian scholars and translated into Tibetan (Tib. Bstan ʼgyur).

Collection of Buddhist canonical texts translated from Sanskrit into Tibetan.

Bkaḥ-Ḥgyur: ka-ya [volume 1-25], Text number 1-729. Rgyud -- ra-a, kṣa, ki-tsi [volume 26-49], Text number 730-759. Śer-phyin -- tshi-ʼi [volume 50-55], Text number 760. Dkon-brtsegs -- yi-ri [volume 56-61], Text number 761. Phal-chn -- ai, ku-ke [volume 62-93], Text number 762-1029. Mdo-sna-tshogs -- khe-phe [volume 94-106], Text number 1030-1055. Ḥdul-ba.

Predominantly on Tibetan Buddhist doctrines and philosophy.

volume ka-pa [1-13]. ʼDul ba -- volume ka-a [14-25]. ʼBum [Sher phyin] -- volume ka-kha, a [26-28]. Nyi khri -- volume ka-nga [29-32]. Khri brgyad stong pa -- volume ka [33]. Brgyad bstong pa -- volume ka [34.] Sher phyin sna tshogs -- volume ka-ga, a [35-38]. Phal chen -- volume ka-cha [39-44]. Dkon brtsegs -- volume ka-am [45-76]. Mdo sde -- volume ka-wa [77-96]. Rgyud ʼbum -- volume ka-ga [97-99]. Rnyin rgyud -- volume shri [100]. Dus ʼgrel -- volume (...) e-wam101-102. Gzungs ʼdus -- volume 103. Dkar chag. (shrink)

Collection of Buddhist canonical texts translated from Sanskrit into Tibetan.

Corpus of Nyingmapa doctrines, commentaries on Buddhist canonical texts, and philosophy etc.

The phyi dar or ‛later dissemination’ of Buddhism in Tibet is known to be a crucial formative period of Tibetan Buddhism; yet, many questions still wait to be answered: How did Tibetan Buddhist teachers of this time approach the Buddhist scriptures? Did they quote from books or from memory? Did they study Buddhism through original Sūtras or exegetical literature? To what degree was the text of the scriptures fixed and standardised before the Bka’ ’gyur and the Bstan ’gyur were compiled? (...) In search for some answers to questions such as these, the present article focuses on the gzhung pa or ‛scriptural tradition” of the Bka’-gdams-pa school of Tibetan Buddhism. Their works contain quotations from the Indian Buddhist scriptures that sometimes differ markedly from the mainstream editions of the Bka’ ’gyur and Bstan ’gyur. There are several possible explanations for such discrepancies: The Tibetan authors might be quoting a different Tibetan translation that was later discarded by the redactors of the Tibetan canon; they might be quoting from a secondary source such as a commentary or Buddhist anthology; or they might be quoting from memory, changing the text either deliberately or by accident. Giving examples from works of the early Bka’-gdams-pa masters this article discusses how textual deviations from the canonical versions can be explained. It will thereby provide insights into the way the Indian Buddhist scriptures were studied and transmitted in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition around the 11th–13th centuries. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo se sitúa ante los nuevos contextos que los jóvenes viven en América Latina, especialmente, considerando las estructuras de corrupción ante lo cual los jóvenes son más vulnerables por su condición de búsqueda de espacios de desarrollo y crecimiento social. Esta situación, plantea nuevos retos para la Pastoral Juvenil latinoamericana teniendo en cuenta que la misma institución eclesial no ha estado ajena a situaciones de corrupción. A través de un análisis documental, desde las Escrituras, pasando por cuatro de (...) las Conferencias Episcopales Latinoamericanas, el artículo pretende desarrollar la tensión entre jóvenes, sociedad y pastoral juvenil, para finalmente presentar una propuesta que se fundamenta en un proceso juvenil de cinco décadas que transita desde una pastoral liberadora a una pastoral regeneradora, donde los sujetos jóvenes rotos buscan renacer en nuestra América Latina.s The article is set against the new contexts that young people live in Latin America, especially considering the structures of corruption lo which young people are more vulnerable because oj their search for spaces of development and social growth. This situation poses new challenges for Latin American Youth Ministry bearing in mind that the Church institution itself has not been unaware of situations of corruption. Through a documentary analysis, from the Scriptures, through four of the Latin American Episcopal Conferences, the article aims to develop the tension between young people, socieíy and youth pastoral, lo finally present a proposal thal is based on a youth process of five decades that It goes from a liberating pastoral to a regenerative pasloral, where the broken young subjects seek to be reborn in our Latin America. (shrink)

In the Middle Age it was tried to show that índex of five predicables that Porfirio proposes in Isagoge was suitable and complete. More recently it is affirmed that chis índex is incomplete, and thal can add a new predicable that also Aristotle would have considered: the accidents per se.

Satisficing and maximizing versions of consequentialism have both assumed that rightness is an alI-or-nothing property. We argue thal this is inimical to the spirit of consequentialism, and that, from the point of view of the consequentialist, actions should be evaluated purely in terms that admit of degree. We first consider the suggestion that rightness and wrongness are a matter of degree. If so, this raises the question of whether the claim that something is wrong says any more than that (...) it is bad. We consider the possibility that a consequenlialist should simply equate wrongness with badness. We reject this on the grounds that there is not a satsifactory way for a consequentialist to account for the badness of actions, as opposed to states of affairs. We explore two concepts of wrongness: to do something wrong is to be blameworthy; and the fact that something is wrong creates a reason not to do it. We argue that the first of these is not available to the consequentialist because of her views on blame, and that the second is just as much a feature of badness as of wrongness. We conclude that the consequentialist can make no sense of the concept of wrongness. (shrink)

Satisficing and maximizing versions of consequentialism have both assumed that rightness is an alI-or-nothing property. We argue thal this is inimical to the spirit of consequentialism, and that, from the point of view of the consequentialist, actions should be evaluated purely in terms that admit of degree. We first consider the suggestion that rightness and wrongness are a matter of degree. If so, this raises the question of whether the claim that something is wrong says any more than that (...) it is bad. We consider the possibility that a consequenlialist should simply equate wrongness with badness. We reject this on the grounds that there is not a satsifactory way for a consequentialist to account for the badness of actions, as opposed to states of affairs. We explore two concepts of wrongness: to do something wrong is to be blameworthy; and the fact that something is wrong creates a reason not to do it. We argue that the first of these is not available to the consequentialist because of her views on blame, and that the second is just as much a feature of badness as of wrongness. We conclude that the consequentialist can make no sense of the concept of wrongness. (shrink)

Selected explanation on the difficult points of the Buddhist philosophical view and realization in the translated words of the Buddha and their commentaries and treatises by Indian panditas. Includes detailed analysis on the meaning of the word "dharma", predominantly on the Vaibasika and Madhyamaka school of thought with special references to the Bkaʾ-ʾgyur and Bstan-ʾgyur and interpretation of difficult points.