Studies investigating the COVID-19 pandemic from a psychological point of view have mostly focused on psychological distress. This study adopts the framework of existential positive psychology, a second wave of positive psychology that emphasizes the importance of effective coping with the negative aspects of living in order to achieve greater wellbeing. Trait emotional intelligence (trait EI) can be crucial in this context as it refers to emotion-related personality dispositions concerning the understanding and regulation of one’s emotions and those of others. (...) The present study investigated the relationship between trait EI and both wellbeing and psychological distress (i.e., depression, anxiety, and stress), while exploring the mediating role of meaning-centered coping (proactive transformative strategies based on meaning in life) and maladaptive coping (i.e., behavioral disengagement and self-blame) during the first few months of the COVID-19 pandemic. A sample of 326 Lebanese adults completed measures of trait EI, wellbeing, psychological distress, coping, and meaning-centered coping. Results showed a strong positive correlation between trait EI and meaning-centered coping. Trait EI also correlated positively with wellbeing and negatively with psychological distress. Structural equation modeling showed that meaning-centered coping partially mediated the relationship between trait EI and wellbeing. Maladaptive coping fully mediated the relationship between trait EI and psychological distress. Findings indicate that trait EI is positively related to dealing with a stressful situation such as the pandemic in positive ways at both the cognitive level, by reformulating the situation to see something valuable in it, and behavioral level, by being proactive about it. Trait EI was positively linked to seeing the situation as an opportunity for personal growth, finding personal meaning in this situation, maintaining an attitude of hope and courage, and acting more responsibly with one’s self and others during the current crisis. In turn, this coping formula was related to lower psychological distress and improved mental health. These results are consistent with the existential positive psychology framework and can inform implementation programs and policies aiming at raising awareness and promoting healthy and successful coping during the pandemic. (shrink)

This article presents two different phenomenological paths leading from ego to alter ego: a Husserlian and a Merleau-Pontian way of thinking. These two phenomenological paths serve to disentangle the conceptual–philosophical underpinning of the mirror neurons system hypothesis, in which both ways of thinking are entwined. A Merleau-Pontian re-reading of the mirror neurons system theory is proposed, in which the characteristics of mirror neurons are effectively used in the explanation of action understanding and imitation. This proposal uncovers the remaining necessary presupposition (...) of a minimalized version of the Husserlian concept of pairing and its recent and improved version in terms of the intermodal system. This leads to a layered approach to the constitution of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Ego sum moribundus, or Heidegger's call -- I am the dead person I see in the mirror, or Lacan's subject -- Return to Descartes -- the equivocations of phenomenology -- The field of immanence -- The carnal synthesis, the chiasm -- How touching touches itself touching : the (im)possibility of the chiasm -- In contact with the untouchable : the remainder -- This is (not) my body : the remainder of incorporation -- Beyond the other -- The crisis of the (...) chiasm -- From hatred to love -- From archi-agony to resurrection -- Toward deliverance (instasy). (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

Philosopher and scientist Thomas Metzinger argues that neuroscience's picture of the "self" as an emergent phenomenon of our biology and the attendant fact that the "self" can be manipulated--and even controlled--raises novel and serious ...

It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world is dynamical, the dynamical explanation. We empirically test two (...) versions of the dynamical explanation. The first is the moving ego explanation—according to which it is our belief that the ego moves, or our phenomenology as of the ego moving, that jointly (partially) explains future- and near-bias. The second is the moving time explanation—according to which it is our belief that time robustly passes, or our phenomenology as of robust passage, which jointly (partially) explain future- and near-bias. We found no evidence in favour of either explanation. (shrink)

The paper presents basic Gestalt psychological concepts of ego and self. They differ from other concepts in the way that they do not comprehend ego and self as fixed entities or as central controlling instances of the psyche, but as one specific organized unit in a psychological field in dynamic interrelation with the other organized units—the environment units—of this field. On this theme, well-known representatives of Gestalt theory have presented some general and special theories since the early days of this (...) approach that could partly be substantiated experimentally. They illuminate the relationship between ego and world in everyday life as well as in the case of mental disorders. Not only the spatial extension of the phenomenal ego is subject to situational changes, but also its place in the world, its functional fitting in this world, its internal differentiation, its permeability to the environment, and much more. The German Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Metzger emphasizes the significant functional role that this dynamic plasticity of the phenomenal world and its continuously changing segregation of ego and environment have for human life by designating the phenomenal world as a “Central Steering Mechanism.” In this article, ego and self as part of this field in their interrelation with the total psychological field will be illuminated from the perspective of the thinking of the Gestalt psychologists Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Lewin, Wolfgang Metzger, Mary Henle, Edwin Rausch, and Giuseppe Galli. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Ego-splitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

La phénoménologie, après avoir dénoncé avec Husserl et Heidegger le contresens fatal qui aurait conduit Descartes à ne voir dans l’ego qu’une simple et banale « chose » pensante, conçue sur le modèle et à l’imitation de la choséité spatio-temporelle – celle qui caractérise la res extensa – s’est vite ravisée : Levinas réhabilite la dignité phénoménologique de la « res cogitans » ; Henry fait du sentir originel et soustrait à l’ekstase de la représentation le mode le plus fondamental (...) de la subjectivité vivante ; Marion réintroduit le moment de la chair sentante au cœur de la démarche métaphysique. L’article présente et discute ces différentes interprétations. (shrink)

The starting point of the investigation is the correspondence between the term and concept of Ego ("I") and the various types of experience. Two main ways of introducing and applying of the term "I" (Ego) in Russian philosophy are investigated from the semantic-analytical point of view. The first takes the Ego as initially existed either as a spiritual substance or a given form uniting experiences. This way of treating is realized in L. Lopatin's and V. Soloviev's philosophical teachings. The second (...) containing some moments of reflexion on the concept treated the Ego as a result of experience. It was developed in M. Karinskij und G. Spet. In context of difference between the Ego and the subject or consciousness the question of the owner of consciousness is considered. (shrink)

We discuss the structure of Buddhist theory, showing that it is a kind of moral phenomenology directed to the elimination of egoism through the elimination of a sense of self. We then ask whether being raised in a Buddhist culture in which the values of selflessness and the sense of non-self are so deeply embedded transforms one’s sense of who one is, one’s ethical attitudes and one’s attitude towards death, and in particular whether those transformations are consistent with the predictions (...) that Buddhist texts themselves make. We discover that the effects are often significant, but not always expected. (shrink)

L’Ego cartésien entretient des rapports complexes avec l’homme singulier René Descartes – ce qui n’implique aucune confusion entre le « Sujet » et le moi empirique. Dans un premier temps, on montre que la situation propre à Descartes physicien le conduit à poser la question du fondement de la science en des termes très différents de ceux de la philosophie transcendantale. Une relecture des Méditations conduit ensuite à proposer l’idée qu’elles ne constituent pas seulement une recherche du fondement de la (...) science, mais aussi une découverte de soi par le sujet philosophant, qui peut certes être tout homme, mais qui est ici Descartes lui-même. Enfin, l’étude des relations entre la volonté et la passivité qui naît de l’union de l’âme et du corps est mise en regard de l’« autobiographie » du Discours de la Méthode. Ainsi peut-on voir la spécificité de la philosophie cartésienne et son originalité par rapport à la philosophie du Sujet dont elle est pourtant la source. (shrink)

The depletion effect, a decreased capacity for self-control following previous acts of self-control, is thought to result from a lack of necessary psychological/physical resources (i.e., “ego depletion”). Kurzban et al. present an alternative explanation for depletion; but based on statistical techniques that evaluate and adjust for publication bias, we question whether depletion is a real phenomenon in need of explanation.

Pourquoi donc sommes-nous si accrochés à notre maigre « je »? Pourquoi refusons-nous d'accepter les leçons les plus radicales de la neuroscience ou de la psychologie cognitive à propos de notre « identité » ou de ce que nous aimons à considérer comme notre « libre arbitre »? Quel mal y aurait-il à accepter que nous soyons le résultat de déterminations qui nous dépassent – et que nos choix ne soient que des colifichets ayant pour seule fonction de nous rassurer? (...) Dans Lost Ego, François De Smet répond à toutes ces questions de la meilleure manière qui soit : en mettant le doigt sur les peurs qui continuent à nous voir nous accrocher à des reliques de notre « moi » en miettes et que nous refusons de regarder en face. Non, nous n'existons pas – mais c'est précisément parce que nous n'existons pas que nous pouvons trouver le moyen de vivre. Seuls, et surtout ensemble. (shrink)

Failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms, one of the hallmarks of referential opacity, is standardly explained in terms of the presence of an expression (such as a verb of propositional attitude, a modal adverb or quotation marks) with opacity-inducing properties. It is thus assumed that any term in a complex expression for which substitutivity fails will be within the scope of an expression of one of these types, and that where there is an expression of one of these types there (...) will be failure of substitutivity for terms within its scope. I shall discuss a series of examples that have been thought to challenge this explanation by exhibiting failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms for positions not within the scope of any of the standard opacity-inducing expressions. If these examples are genuine, then the usual explanations of opacity are either incomplete – because there are sources of opacity other than those standardly identified, or completely mistaken – because the standardly identified expressions are not causes of opacity. I will argue, however, that the examples only exhibit failure of substitutivity of non-coreferential terms, and, hence, do not present a challenge to standard explanations of opacity. (shrink)

It is an ancient view, to be found even in Aristotle’s analysis of friendship, that the other is an alter ego, another myself. More recently, this conception has provoked spirited debate within and without the phenomenological tradition. It can be found in a wide variety of texts, from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations to Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?” The basic position can be summarized as follows. Intentional experiences are subjective, first-person experiences, not objective, third-person experiences.

The subjective effects and therapeutic potential of the shamanic practice of journeying is well known. However, previous research has neglected to provide a comprehensive assessment of the subjective effects of shamanic-like journeying techniques on non-shamans. Shamanic-like techniques are those that demonstrate some similarity to shamanic practices and yet deviate from what may genuinely be considered shamanism. Furthermore, the personality traits that influence individual susceptibility to shamanic-like techniques are unclear. The aim of the present study was, thus, to investigate experimentally the (...) effect of shamanic-like techniques and a personality trait referred to as "ego boundaries" on subjective experience including mood disturbance. Forty-three non-shamans were administered a composite questionnaire consisting of demographic items and a measure of ego boundaries (i.e., the Short Boundary Questionnaire; BQ-Sh). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: listening to monotonous drumming for 15 minutes coupled with one of two sets of journeying instructions; or sitting quietly with eyes closed for 15 minutes. Participants' subjective experience and mood disturbance were retrospectively assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) and the Profile of Mood States-Short Form, respectively. The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between conditions with regard to the PCI major dimensions of visual imagery, attention and rationality, and minor dimensions of imagery amount and absorption. However, the shamanic-like conditions were not associated with a major reorganization of the pattern of subjective experience compared to the sitting quietly condition, suggesting that what is typically referred to as an altered state of consciousness effect was not evident. One shamanic-like condition and the BQ-Sh subscales need for order, childlikeness, and sensitivity were statistically significant predictors of total mood disturbance. Implications of the findings for the anthropology of consciousness are also considered. (shrink)

This is the first chapter of a projected book to be entitled, The Ego and the Spirit. This book will endeavor to examine what lies at the heart of human spiritual aspiration from a psychological, philosophical, and religious perspective. In this first chapter, I discuss the predicament of the human ego, charged with a task that it cannot fulfill: To establish itself securely within being. The ego's efforts to fulfill this task through its dealings with the things and people of (...) the material world lead to distortions in its self-experience, its relations with others, and its involvement in life in general. The world's spiritual traditions have long recognized the predicament of the ego and present themselves as a means to its resolution. In this first chapter, though, the focus is on the ego and its predicament. (shrink)

My critical focus in this article is on Rick Repetti's compatibilist conception of free will, and his apparent commitment to a Kantian conception of autonomy, which I argue is in direct conflict with the Buddhist doctrine of no‐self. As an alternative, I defend a conception of ego‐less agency that I believe better coheres with core Buddhist teachings. In the course of the argument, I discuss the competing conceptions of free agency and autonomy defended by Harry Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer, Christine (...) Korsgaard, and David Velleman. (shrink)

À partir de l’indécision apparente du concept de substance dans le corpus cartésien, on formule l’hypothèse que le « traité de la substance » des Principia I peut jeter une lumière sur les Meditationes (§ 1) ; en effet les Principia I développent deux définitions de la substance, tantôt comme chose existante par soi, tantôt comme support des attributs (§ 2) ; or ces deux définitions correspondent exactement aux deux lieux des Meditationes mobilisant la substance : la Meditatio III recourt (...) à la substance des Principia I, 51, et la Meditatio VI recourt à la substance des Principia I, 52 (§ 3). On en déduit que le cogito de la Meditatio II ne saurait remonter de l’attribut principal à la substance suivant la logique de Principia I, 52 (§ 4) et que l’ ego, alors entendu selon Principia I, 51, ne pouvait que perdre sa substantialité dès l’instant que se trouvait exhibée sa dépendance envers Dieu, à la fin de la Meditatio III (§ 5). Dès lors, les Principia nous paraissent trancher des indécisions cartésiennes avec une certaine efficacité (§ 6). (shrink)

O ego e o outro: sobre a crítica de Husserl ao cogito cartesiano.

Sartre’s conception of “the look” creates an ontological conflict with no real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonal relations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, as well as (...) believing too much in some deep “I” or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets “magically” reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable “I”; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better, with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core. (shrink)

Husserl - at least in his third intellectual career - was convinced that subject is placed at the heart of philosophy and philosophy is nothing but egology. This Cartesian character makes Husserl one of the greatest figures of modern thought. But in contemporary period, this central ego and, accompanied with that, the modern thought have been challenged by poststructuralists. Because of their focus on psychoanalysis and their priority to other poststructuralist writings, Lacan's argumeats are significant. In this article, at first, (...) we proceed with the Lacan's central idea against the Cartesian subject, and then by explaining Husserl's thoughts we will see what his defence is. Husserl, by phenomenological reduction of natural attitude inherent in natural sciences, places phenomenology in a different dimension and prefers it to other sciences. The process of raising empirical ego to transcendental ego supports such defence. (shrink)

Ego Sum proposes a provocative and unprecedented reading of Descartes. By paying attention to mode of presentation of Descartes's philosophy, Nancy challenges our common understanding of the Cogito and shows how Descartes's ego is not the self-certain, self-transparent Subject of metaphysics but a mouth that opens to utter: ego sum.

Well-known predictors of prejudice toward Muslims include social dominance and authoritarianism. However, a gap exists for variables reflecting a rejection or mitigation of ideological motivations associated with prejudice toward Muslims. We examined if quiet ego was related to positive attitudes toward Muslims, and whether this could be explained by lower levels of authoritarianism, social dominance, and the motivation to express prejudice. We explored this possibility across two studies of adults in the United States. In Study 1, regression results showed quiet (...) ego was directly associated with positive attitudes toward Muslims. Study 2 utilized path analyses and found that the direct relationship between quiet ego and positive attitudes toward Muslims was explained by associations between quiet ego and lower endorsement of authoritarianism, social dominance, and the internal motivation to express prejudice toward Muslims. Moreover, these associations held when accounting for several correlates of intergroup attitudes. (shrink)

La propuesta gnoseológica de Ricardo Sánchez Ortiz de Urbina de retirar al Ego trascendental sus funciones gnoseológicas no es inocua para el materialismo. Tiene consecuencias ontológicas y socio-antropológicas. En esta primera parte se ilustran las primeras, discutiendo las diferencias entre el materialismo filosófico del Gustavo Bueno, tal como aparece formulado en sus textos canónicos, y el materialismo fenomenológico, que propone Urbina a propósito de lo «trascedental». Para ello uso como filtro crítico un tercer materialismo, el de Gilles Deleuze, sobre cuya (...) filosofía nómada sólo se efectúan unos apuntes esquemáticos, pero suficientes para «espantar» a los fantasmas de la razón. La referencia a Deleuze en el debate sobre las consecuencias ontológicas que trae el planteamiento de Urbina es obligada, no sólo por las prevenciones que manifiesta Urbina en su texto «a causa de su radicalidad», sino sobre todo, porque sus propuestas estaban ya presentes (como referencia implícita) en las propias formulaciones iniciales del materialismo filosófico. (shrink)

Is our ego but an illusion, a mere appearance produced by a reality that is foreign to us? Is it the main source of violence and injustice? Jacob Rogozinski calls into question these prejudices that dominate current philosophy, psychoanalysis, and the human sciences. Arguing that we must distinguish the true ego from the alienated and narcissistic construct, he calls for an end to egicide, or the destruction of the ego. _Ego and the Flesh_ offers a critique of the two masters (...) of egicide, Heidegger and Lacan, along with a rereading of Descartes, who was the first to discover the absolute truth of "I am." The book's main purpose, however, is to provide an entirely new theory of the self, _egoanalysis_, which reveals a divided ego-flesh. Constantly striving to attain unity, the ego-flesh is haunted by a _remainder_, whose role sheds light on various enigmas: the encounter with the other, the passage from hate to love, the death and the resurrection of the I. For ego-analysis is no mere theory: it opens the way to our deliverance. (shrink)

Descartes ne joue pas, dans la pensée de Heidegger, un rôle limité à l'interprétation de l'histoire de la philosophie. Lorsque Sein und Zeit entreprend de déterminer le mode d'être propre et irréductible du Dasein, Heidegger doit entrer en confrontation avec certes Husserl, mais surtout, par-delà la « conscience » husserlienne, avec Descartes lui-même. Car l'ennemi mortel du Dasein, cest l'ego du cogito. Dans quelle mesure cette rivalité n'induit-elle pas aussi une similitude? Die Rolle, die Descartes in dem Denken von Heidegger (...) spielt, darf nicht in dem Feld seiner Deutung der Geschichte der Philosophie eng begrenztwerden. Denn, als Sein und Zeit eine Bestimmung der eigentümlicheigentlichen Seinsweise des Daseins hervorzubringen unternimmt, setzt die « Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie » eine Auseinanderstzung nicht nur mit Husserl, sondern auch, über Husserl hinaus, gerade mit Descartes vor. Der Todfeind des Daseins ist das ego, das aus dem cogito stammt. Inwiefern aber diese ständige Gegenüberstellung eine tiefe Nachahmung hinweise ? (shrink)

Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. (...) Combining recent work on the ‘integrative self' and the phenomenon of self-binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist. (shrink)

Ego psychology, more existential than scientific in tone, has made psychoanalytic theory more congenial to historical studies, especially when they deal with creative and conflicted leaders. Erikson's concept of the identity crisis points to the intersection of family-centered conflicts with social and cultural history. It also orients the historian to the reanimation of problems in earlier stages of the life-cycle, the importance of work to identity formation, and the neurotic function of over-identification with a troublesome parent. Phenomenologically descriptive rather than (...) causally explanatory, psycho-biography mediates between Freud's naturalism and Collingwood's idealism by relating conscious and unconscious purposes. It establishes congruences and resonances, helping to explain in narrative form the meaning, timing, and urgency of a leader's characteristic ideas. (shrink)

Husserl began by refusing the possibility to consider the ego as an essential center of reference for intentional acts. But later included it in phenomenological description as the center of reference for intentional experiences. The article analyzes those two moments and their possible correlation with the Kantian theory of the self, in order to highlight the significant difference between the two philosophers.

El presente escrito ensaya la crítica al colonialismo en la filosofía de Enrique Dussel centrándose en tres tópicos relevantes que ayudarán a la explicación y argumentación expuestos: (i) el ego conquiro, sujeto colonial previo al ego cogito cartesiano; (ii) la propuesta del proyecto de pluriverso transmoderno como proyecto de superación de la unilateralidad del mundo colonial, y; (iii) la idea de Segunda Emancipación de América Latina que recuerda que en ella aún hay una deuda pendiente para socavar las relaciones neocoloniales. (...) Este recorrido está precedido por una introducción en la cual se pone un necesario énfasis en la importancia de la experiencia del propio Enrique Dussel en Europa y Medio Oriente durante los años sesenta del siglo pasado, en la cual la recepción de la obra de Leopoldo Zea juega un papel relevante. Finalmente, el escrito termina con un par de reflexiones que se derivan de la argumentación elaborada. (shrink)

The purpose of the study was to investigate the associations between comfort in the physical proximity of others and interpersonal trauma and body ego. Comfort in the physical proximity of others was measured using a self-report method, as well as by means of a procedure where the experimenter initiated interpersonal touch. The results show that comfort in the physical proximity of others was associated with four types of trauma as well as with all aspects of dysfunctional body ego. Defying expectations, (...) the types of trauma studied did not differentiate individuals experiencing comfort from those experiencing discomfort, in an experimental setting of being touched. As predicted, both groups differed in all aspects of body ego. Moreover body ego proved to be a mediator between trauma and comfort in the physical proximity of others. (shrink)

A political act is a typical self-serving behavior that works to promote or protect self-interest. However, limited research explores its relationship with daily downstream behavior. Based on the ego depletion theory, the present study attempts to clarify when and how daily political acts will be transformed into interpersonal deviance. We collected 760 cases nested in 152 full time workers in mainland China through the experience sampling method. Via a multilevel structural equation model and hierarchical linear model, we tested the mediated (...) moderation model. The results showed that political acts correlated with interpersonal deviance on a daily basis. Moral self-efficacy buffers the relationship between political acts and interpersonal deviance, whereas chronic job strain amplifies the relationship. Furthermore, moral self-efficacy can mediate the moderating role of chronic job strain. (shrink)

ABSTRACTInitial acts of self-control can reduce effort and performance on subsequent tasks – a phenomenon known as ego depletion. Ego depletion is thought to undermine the capacity or willingness to engage executive control, an important determinant of success for many tasks. We examined whether ego depletion improves performance on a task that favours less executive control: insight problem solving. In two experiments, participants completed an ego-depletion manipulation or a non-depleting control condition followed by an insight problem-solving task. Participants in the (...) depleting condition demonstrated greater insight problem-solving accuracy than those in the non-depleting control condition. Priming theories of willpower did not impact these results. Although ego depletion is widely regarded as a “state of impairment”, attendant decreases in executive control may foster insightful thinking. (shrink)

The publication of Freud's essay on narcissism in 1914 set off a discussion about the psychoanalytic concepts of the ego and of narcissism. The author reviews this discussion by reference to articles appearing in the Int. Z. ärztl. Psa. between 1914 and 1922. She highlights the theoretical and technical modifications corresponding to this discussion and demonstrates that apparently modern theories of the ego and of narcissism have their roots largely in that period.