Hegemonic practices of memorialization rely on narratives of heroic, morally untainted resistance, which cast traitors as the aberrant “other.” This paper draws on Simone de Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity and historical and sociological accounts of betrayal to trouble this binary and construct a framework for memorializing betrayal in its ambiguity—in relation to the everyday reality of tragic dilemmas that resisters face. I show how attentiveness to the ambiguity of betrayal can help rethink heroic (...) resistance myths beyond the exclusionary logic pitting moral purity against the depravity of treason—and warn against the reproduction of systematic practices of othering in the new political order. The paper develops the political relevance of this theoretical exploration via the example of a South African novel, The Texture of Shadows, examining how its insights into the ambiguity of betrayal challenge the myths of heroic resistance in South Africa. (shrink)

The claim that democratic politics is the art of compromise is a platitude but we seem allergic to compromise in politics when it happens. This essay explores this paradox. Taking my cue from Machiavelli’s claim that there exists a rift between a morally admirable and a virtuous political life, I argue that: a ‘compromising disposition’ is an ambiguous virtue—something which is politically expedient but not necessarily morally admirable; whilst uncongenial to moral integrity, a ‘compromising disposition’ constitutes an essential aspect of (...) political integrity. In so doing, I question certain moralistic assumptions which fuel contemporary vilifications of compromise—that, in theory, democratic politics should be inhospitable to compromise and that political integrity should be akin to moral integrity—and which are shared by Walzer’s Dirty Hands thesis which professes to be sensitive to the realities of politics. These assumptions displace the complex realities of politics and misconstrue the standards of political excellence; they unsatisfactorily idealize political integrity and the messy context in which democratic politicians operate—a context characterized by a plurality of incompatible traditions, each with its own values and principles. Whilst commitment to a set of principles stemming from one’s tradition or pre-election promises implies commitment to realize these, leading a virtuous political life amidst such a grubby domain often requires abandoning some of these. An innocent, all-or-nothing pursuit of one’s principles in politics might prompt political disaster or defeat: an uncompromising disposition entails the entire abandonment of any hope of realizing all of those principles. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 91-97 [Access article in PDF] The Ambiguities of "Meaning":A Commentary Hans S. Reinders "Death, Disability, and Dogma" by Jennifer Clegg and Richard Lansdall Welfare (2003) is a rich paper that presents an unexpected but interesting mixture of observations and perspectives on mourning, grief and bereavement in the lives of people with intellectual disabilities.In a number of ways, the notion of meaning is prominent (...) in the paper. The authors observe that recent literature on grief and bereavement because of loss of loved ones does not confirm the "stage theory of loss." Instead there is a "multiplicity of possible responses to bereavement," which is partly explained by the role of cultural diversity. Cultural diversity is particularly involved in the development of "meanings" about loss (2003, 69). However, looking into the literature on grief and bereavement among persons with intellectual disabilities, the authors found that literature "dogmatic" in that it sticks to the traditional theoretical framework of "grief work" (2003, 74). The authors offer an explanation for this "stuck discourse": The approach to grief and bereavement among people with intellectual disabilities is framed within the philosophy of normalization. This leads professionals to downplay limitations to the potential of their clients in ways that encourage the denial of disability. The meaning assigned to intellectual disabilities, this is to say, is primarily positive. This positive outlook promotes the "belief in the apparently limitless potential of the client group to develop skills and autonomy if only they are given the right help" (2003, 71). The authors read this promoting of positive meaning as a counter strategy: our culture in general does not seem to be convinced of a valued meaning of life for persons with intellectual disabilities. Therefore, the professional world of service systems adopts a strategy of "separitism" (2003, 77), which explains why approaches to phenomena like grief and bereavement are "stuck" with ideas that are inadequate. The professional community attending those with intellectual disabilities is too much a world on its own. There should be more interaction between generalists and specialists on the subject of grief and bereavement.So far the general argument of the paper. Because my own area of research is not in the fields of clinical psychology or psychiatry, it cannot be my task to comment on Clegg and Lansdall-Welfare's presentation of the research on grief and bereavement in these fields. Nonetheless, there are a few points in their review of the literature that I will briefly address, but only to prepare the way for the major topic of this commentary, which is the issue of meaning as it relates to intellectual disability.Intuitively, my sympathy would lie with social critics arguing for caution with regard to the [End Page 91] medicalization of mourning and grief (Clegg and Lansdall-Welfare 2003, 67-79). The loss of loved ones will oftentimes be a traumatic experience, but when it is, I tend to see the symptoms of distress following that experience as a sign of mental health, more than anything else. Losing a parent, sibling, or someone else who has been part of one's life, is not only missing the other person, it is missing a part of oneself. That being the case, it is only to be expected that, in some sense, life will never be again what it was. Replacing notions of recovery from a traumatic experience by notions of "adaptation and accommodation" (2003, 68) appears to me the more sensible approach.Therefore, I tend to be suspicious about notions such as "pathological grief." From a philosophical point of view, such a notion seems to betray a modernist conception of the human subject in control of its own action. Following that conception, human beings need to transform that which happens to them by means of their own action so that they have made it part of themselves. Being overcome with grief one is in an emotional state that as such is "pathological"—as Immanuel Kant had it—the main characteristic of which is its heteronomy. A person overcome by grief is controlled by passion instead... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Betrayal of Substance: Death, Literature, and Sexual Difference in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” by Mary C. RawlinsonShannon Hoff (bio)Mary C. Rawlinson, The Betrayal of Substance: Death, Literature, and Sexual Difference in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” New York: University Press, 2021, 215 pp. ISBN 978-0-231-19905-6Mary rawlinson shows that to be genuinely receptive to a philosophical text one must be creative, and she brings the Phenomenology of (...) Spirit to life with her reading. It speaks of and to experience, and she makes it resound as such, matching its aptitude with her own rich descriptions of the character of experience. The reader is bound to learn a lot from her careful and vivid analyses of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, where she displays her power to digest a text that is almost impossibly unwieldy. Both students and scholars of Hegel’s philosophy will find satisfaction here: her book will spark understanding and excitement in inexperienced readers and hone approaches to complex issues of interpretation in experienced ones.Rawlinson opens The Betrayal of Substance with the provocative thesis that Hegel “writes with both hands” (xv). On the one hand, he affirms the abundance of difference in life by insisting on the material realization of the abstract concept, on the life of the singleton (her translation of das Einzelne) as the site of this realization, and on the difference intrinsic to identities (xiii). On the other hand, she says, he aims at a science of logic beyond phenomenology, where singularity has been erased and difference comprehended, such that “nothing is other to it”; this is “an unrelenting insistence on an absolute [End Page 225] detachment from life” (53). Rawlinson tracks this severance of concept and life throughout the Phenomenology: in the abandonment of sensuousness in sense-certainty; in the thing’s dissolution in perception; in “the ‘loss of reality’ of the play of forces”; in the struggle to the death, where self-consciousness “risks life absolutely” (66); in stoicism and skepticism, which “install an absolute difference between life and thought” (47). The life of the singleton is severed from the concept by the production (on the part of the unhappy consciousness) of “ethics, culture, morality, and religion as institutional infrastructures sustaining the self-transcendence of the singleton in the ‘we’ of a community” (66); by reason’s erasure of singularity in its accomplishment of a universal consciousness (68); by perpetual reference to the Bacchanalian revel, that “frenzy of the group that survives [the singleton’s] collapse” (xxx). (Indeed, one of the book’s contributions is its illumination of the prevalence of the image of the revel in Hegel’s text.)In response, Rawlinson asserts the need for a double reading of this double writing: (1) to affirm the capacious narrative that dislodges “ready-made abstractions” and engages the “thick richness of life,” because that is where the truth lies (xxix–xxx); and (2) to oppose Hegel’s “completion” of the phenomenological project and the departure from it to logic, and with it the erasure of the singleton. The book reflects the style of this double reading at each turn, in turns rebellious and appreciative, at ease with its own ambiguity toward Hegel. Rawlinson produces three central pieces of evidence for her critique, three “dangling threads [that] refuse to be woven into the completed fabric of absolute knowing[:] sexual difference, the mortality of the singleton,... and the differences of style in art and literature” (xv). Her critique of Hegel’s abandonment of life sets in relief the critical centrality of Hegel’s identification of maternal love as “the most dangerous force with which the state must contend” (68): this love is a clear instance of affirmation of the singleton over the “we” in which it is submerged. Finally, Rawlinson opposes the idea that truth is “the fully realized series of shapes of knowing and figures of truth” in which “science will have been the truth of phenomenology” with the hypothesis instead that “phenomenology will prove to have been the truth of science” (xliv).Itself beginning several times, The Betrayal of Substance thematizes Hegel’s multiple beginnings and the insight ref lected thereby... (shrink)

An examination of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French history indicates that the relationship between the Jesuits and Quietism was shaped by politics as well as by concerns of theological orthodoxy. During the late 1690s, the Jesuits championed François Fénelon accused of Quietism at the same time as they spearheaded an attack against Quietism in Burgundy, emphasizing crimes of spiritual incest or the abuse of clerical authority. Such ambiguity indicates that the Jesuits were motivated by a desire to consolidate political power (...) in Louis XIV... trades court. However, the fusion of Quietist heresy, charges of spiritual incest, and political gamesmanship would ultimately make the Jesuits themselves vulnerable to claims of heresy and abuse when the Girard/Cadière affair became a national scandal in 1731. This essay argues that this disquiet over clerical behavior and power was articulated in a changing political culture between the late seventeenth century and the 1730s. Growing dissatisfaction against the crown established a new political consciousness, one that regarded the politics of secrecy as problematic if not outright illegitimate. The secrecy of the confession, the emphasis on interiority seemingly at the expense of morality, and the enigmatic language of mysticism, all associated with Quietism played into fears of clerical (or “Jesuit”) cabal and conspiracy. When Jesuit opponents linked the order to Quietism, they presented the Jesuits as threats to an emerging set of political values in which legitimate authority was transparent and open while illegitimate power operated in the shadows. (shrink)

Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski is renowned worldwide for wrestling with serious philosophical conundrums with dazzling elegance. In this new book, he turns his characteristic wit to important themes of ordinary life, from the need for freedom to the wheel of fortune, from the nature of God to the ambiguities of betrayal. Extremely lucid and lacking in intellectual pretension, these essays speak in everyday language, spurring the reader’s own thoughts and providing a handle on which to debate and think about (...) the themes. The eighteen essays cover the following topics: power, fame, equality, lying, toleration, travel, virtue, collective responsibility, the wheel of fortune, betrayal, violence, boredom, freedom, luxury, God, respect for nature, superstition, and national stereotypes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Betrayal's FelicityJudith Butler (bio)In translation, there is always the question of fidelity and betrayal, and even Benjamin seemed to understand that fidelity, in its literalness, was one dimension of translation, a dimension, he said, that tended to make translations bad. He thought that in addition to literalness, there was the necessity of "license" understood as "the freedom of faithful reproduction." For him, license is not precisely (...) class='Hi'>betrayal, but another kind of faithfulness. But from the point of view of fidelity, understood as being bound to the literal text, it may well be that that other order of faithfulness, the one associated with freedom and license, can only be read as betrayal.Barbara Johnson's reflections on translation carry many affective tones derived from this ambiguous scene in which faithfulness quarrels with fidelity. In fact, it is unclear whether translations can ever be other than "bad" or, at least, have some badness in them, since the original has to be crossed, if not partially mutilated, with the emergence of the translation itself. In a way, her inquiry into translation becomes, in Mother Tongues, an occasion in which an array of human emotional predicaments are explored as linguistic predicaments. One can discern in her discussion several ways in which translation operates emotionally: it can constitute a slander, a calmuny, and so an accusation. It can become bound up with a nostalgia for a lost wholeness, and so with a problematic of grief. It can refuse the idealizations of the past, and so, in its de-idealizations, release the present as a field of play; it can work the felicities of the arbitrariness of language, and so sidestep a pathos that might bind one to an elusive original. It also brings up questions of pain and damage, whether reparation is possible, and whether it should even be sought. And finally, it establishes a relationship to damage itself, as necessary, even as the means by which the afterlife of any given text is secured.Johnson introduces her discussion of translation in Mother Tongues by asking whether translation comes after, and is dependent upon, the original. She cites Kafka's The Trial, a book she happened to pick up while thinking about this question. That book begins with the following line: "Someone must have traduced Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning." Johnson registers her amusement and surprise: "Traduced"? She writes, "This is an English word I see only in lame attempts to translate the Italian traduttore, traditore, or the French traduire, trahir. To translate is to traduce—the betrayal of the original in the process of transmitting it is inherent in translation. In other words, 'traduce' is a bad translation of a pun on the inevitable badness of translations. Joseph K. had been betrayed in exactly the same way" [15].Johnson goes on to remind us that in the German, traduced is translated as verleumdet, implying the idea that this is a false accusation, a calumny, a slander. But Johnson is clear that to have traduced someone conveys something different from "telling lies about" someone. If the text were to read, "someone had been telling lies about Josef K.," then it would follow that there is a truth that could and should be told about him, a truth that is not being told, a truth that would, in fact, exonerate him. Traduce, however, does not allow us to set up that opposition between truth and falsehood. If the translation had read (as some do), "someone had been telling lies about him," then, according to Johnson, the translator would be "making more sense of the arrest, [and] [End Page 82] destroying its senselessness" [16]. It seems clear that someone has said something damaging about Josef K., and this damaging sort of saying is conveyed not only by the word traduced, but by the resonance that traduce maintains with translation itself. Thus Johnson writes, "only translation can betray without necessarily instating the polarity from which it deviates" [16]. The point here is not that translation must betray to communicate well, but that "the act of arresting Joseph K. cannot be better figured than by translation" [16... (shrink)

Following other contributions about the MAX accidents to this journal, this paper explores the role of betrayal and moral injury in safety engineering related to the U.S. federal regulator’s role in approving the Boeing 737MAX—a plane involved in two crashes that together killed 346 people. It discusses the tension between humility and hubris when engineers are faced with complex systems that create ambiguity, uncertain judgements, and equivocal test results from unstructured situations. It considers the relationship between moral injury, (...) principled outrage and rebuke when the technology ends up involved in disasters. It examines the corporate backdrop against which calls for enhanced employee voice are typically made, and argues that when engineers need to rely on various protections and moral inducements to ‘speak up,’ then the ethical essence of engineering—skepticism, testing, checking, and questioning—has already failed. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between Kierkegaard's theory of “indirect communication,” his employment of that method in the pseudonymous literature, and his explicit comments on the Teacher in Philosophical Fragments. My interest is principally in a pedagogical method able to serve as a solution to the problem of will formation, and so my assessment of Kierkegaard's theory and performance is essentially ethical in nature. I argue that there is at least an ambiguity, if not a contradiction, to be found (...) in the above relationship and that as a result, in its current form, Kierkegaardean pedagogical devices do not appear to be able to offer an adequate solution. (shrink)

In this provocative and timely book, David Kennedy explores what can go awry when we put our humanitarian yearnings into action on a global scale--and what we can do in response. Rooted in Kennedy's own experience in numerous humanitarian efforts, the book examines campaigns for human rights, refugee protection, economic development, and for humanitarian limits to the conduct of war. It takes us from the jails of Uruguay to the corridors of the United Nations, from the founding of a non-governmental (...) organization dedicated to the liberation of East Timor to work aboard an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf. Kennedy shares the satisfactions of international humanitarian engagement--but also the disappointments of a faith betrayed. With humanitarianism's new power comes knowledge that even the most well-intentioned projects can create as many problems as they solve. Kennedy develops a checklist of the unforeseen consequences, blind spots, and biases of humanitarian work--from focusing too much on rules and too little on results to the ambiguities of waging war in the name of human rights. He explores the mix of altruism, self-doubt, self-congratulation, and simple disorientation that accompany efforts to bring humanitarian commitments to foreign settings. Writing for all those who wish that "globalization" could be more humane, Kennedy urges us to think and work more pragmatically. A work of unusual verve, honesty, and insight, this insider's account urges us to embrace the freedom and the responsibility that come with a deeper awareness of the dark sides of humanitarian governance. (shrink)

Religious and secular convictions have powerful effects, but their fundaments are often surprisingly fragile. Because of the conspicuous role that nationalisms, populisms, and fundamentalisms have in our globalizing world it is essential not to take their strength for granted, but to acknowledge that conviction and doubt are part of the same dynamic. The chapters in this volume demonstrate that doubt and hesitation are daily concerns even among the Maoist movement in India, right-wing populists in Europe and newly pious Somali Muslims (...) in London. In fact, new converts are often such stringent believers precisely because they need to dispel their own lingering doubts, while revolutionary movements survive only through the denial of ambiguity. By studying everyday doubt this volume unravels the mechanisms by which convictions gain and lose their force, and analyzes the dynamics that propel loosely held ideas into committed action. Whereas a focus on overcoming doubt highlights the exclusionary effects of committed action, attention to the breakdown of belief serves to better understand the cycles of hope, conviction, and disillusion that bespeak the human condition. This is the central theme in several chapters looking at ideological break-down. The collapse of communism, for instance, produced an epistemological crisis in which all knowledge became unstable, prompting gold-miners in Mongolia to go as far as to doubt the cosmos. The post-ideological environment of Western democracies also produces anxieties, as the break-down of the bonds of trust between governments and citizens results in feelings of betrayal. Questions of truth and action are always related: if nothing is worth fighting for then apathy and hopelessness may become symptomatic. By paying attention to the mechanisms and dynamics by which specific ideas gain and lose their credibility this volume sheds important new light on the role of ideas in social and political action. (shrink)

Burkart et al. present a paradox – general factors of intelligence exist among individual differences (g) in performance in several species, and also at the aggregate level (G); however, there is ambiguous evidence for the existence of g when analyzing data using a mixed approach, that is, when comparing individuals of different species using the same cognitive ability battery. Here, we present an empirical solution to this paradox.

"Alexander's commentary on Book 1 concerns the definition of Aristotelian syllogistic argument; its resistance to the rival Stoic theory of inference; and the character of inductive inference and of rhetorical argument. Alexander distinguishes inseparable accidents, such as the whiteness of snow, from defining differentiae, such as its being frozen, and considers how these differences fit into the schemes of categories. He speaks of dialectic as a stochastic discipline in which success is to be judged not by victory but by skill (...) in argument. Alexander also investigates the subject of ambiguity, which had been richly developed since Aristotle by the rival Stoic school."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

Surprisingly, the fact is that despite the well-studied sources of sources as well as the large number of studies devoted to the Union of Brest, this phenomenon of church-religious life of Ukraine at the end of the seventeenth century and is still perceived ambiguously. At the same time, the sharply negative attitude to this fateful event on the part of the Orthodox spheres was and remains predominant. Suffice it to recall that I. Franko's Brest union was "a fruit of (...) class='Hi'>betrayal of the people and father's faith, fatal for Russia, and for Poland as a result of Jesuit intrigues," but according to class-ideological approaches of Soviet times, was considered "the main form of Catholic expansion on Ukrainian lands » Contributions made by the recent scientists to the interpretation of this significant event, too, do not inspire particular optimism, causing misunderstandings, and with them a lot of questions of the most different property. (shrink)

Through a series of empirical studies involving native speakers of English, German, and Chinese, this paper reveals that the predicate “true” is inherently ambiguous in the empirical domain. Truth statements such as “It is true that Tom is at the party” seem to be ambivalent between two readings. On the first reading, the statement means “Reality is such that Tom is at the party.” On the second reading, the statement means “According to what X believes, Tom is at the party.” (...) While there appear to exist some cross-cultural differences in the interpretation of the statements, the overall findings robustly indicate that “true” has multiple meanings in the realm of empirical matters. (shrink)

In his reflections on action in Being and Nothingness, Sartre goes to the heart of what it is to be human. Our free actions are not the consequence of ouridentity, they are its foundation. As human beings we go beyond who we are towards a freely chosen future self. Human identity is ambiguous because consciousness simultaneously accepts and sees beyond the identity it discovers; there is an internal disintegration which distances us from ourselves. The intentionality of consciousness means that we (...) are constituted not by an objective presence but by a “presence to” our identity. Personhood is established only when we select certain values and allow them to shape our identity and guide our actions. As “being-for-itself” we go beyond the present and project ourselves towards an identity that does not yet exist, thus creating ourselves through our freedom, through our concrete choices. This article pays careful attention to Sartre’s understanding of consciousness, selfconsciousness, and “selfness,” before drawing some conclusions about the role of human freedom in the construction of identity. (shrink)

I claim that the question of whether chemistry is reduced to quantum mechanics is more ambiguous and multi-faceted than generally supposed. For example, chemistry appears to be both reduced and not reduced at the same time depending on the perspective that one adopts. Similarly, I argue that some conceptual issues in quantum mechanics are ambiguous and can only be laid to rest by embracing paradox and ambiguity rather than regarding them as obstacles to be overcome. Recent work in the (...) reduction of chemistry is also reviewed, including discussions of the ontological reduction of chemistry and the question of the emergence of chemistry from physics. (shrink)

_The Ambiguity of Justice_ consists of a collection of essays that address difficulties and potential contradictions in thinking justice by focussing on Ricoeur's theory of justice and on the major thinkers that were influential for it.

The paper sketches out an account of ambiguous and agonistic love by drawing on the work of Simone de Beauvoir, Axel Honneth and Hannah Arendt. To begin with, I reconstruct the ambiguity of love within the conceptual framework of a paradigm of recognition. I argue further that the social relation of love, understood as an intertwine between dependence and independence, entails a power dynamic. Insofar as the dynamic actualises as “power in concert” or “power with”, namely as mutual empowerment, (...) love unfolds as free love. Finally, I show how agonistic love is damaged by turning into violent domination. (shrink)

We argue in this essay that (1) the embryo is an irredeemably ambiguous entity and its ambiguity casts serious doubt on the arguments claiming its full protection or, at least, its protection against its use as a means fo research, (2) those who claim the embryo should be protected as "one of us" are committed to a position even they do not uphold in their practices, (3) views that defend the protection of the embryo in virtue of its potentiality (...) to become a person fail, and (4) the embryo does not have any rights or interests to be protected. Given that many are willing to treat the embryo as a means in other practices, and that human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research holds the potential to benefit many people, one cannot but conclude that hESC research is permissible and, because of its immense promise for alleviating human even obligatory. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to resolve the tension between Kant’s doctrine of the highest good and his entire philosophical system. The concept of the highest good is the first major ambiguity of the doctrine. There are three pairs of ambiguities: immanent-transcendent; justice-perfection; and individual-community. They are able to form eight combinations. Corresponding to the various combinations and conceptions of the highest good, interpreters also conceive different reasons for the necessity of the doctrine as well as various conditions (...) of its applicability. For example, some emphasize its religious dimension, whereas others understand it in the political sense. In this paper, I adopt a different approach in understanding the highest good’s systematic meaning as the moral confirmation, and suggest that only a transcendent, perfect and communal concept of the highest good can provide the most consistent doctrine. Additionally, it explains the importance of the different branches (such as philosophies of religion and of politics) of Kant’s system. (shrink)

This article explores subversion as a practice of resistance and draws on the example of subversive radio for illustration. Radio became an important site of power struggles in the twentieth century, often placed in the service of both resistance and oppression. An examination of subversive acts in radio broadcasting, I argue, helps shift the focus away from the myths of heroic resistance, directing attention to the uncertainties encountered by the subversive actor. To make this argument, I build on Frantz Fanon’s (...) influential work on the resistant potential of radio and engage with literature on subversion and everyday resistance. The article illustrates the ambiguity of subversion on the case study of Radio Bantu, a broadcaster of ethnic-specific radio programmes established by the South African apartheid regime. (shrink)

In the tradition of substructural logics, it has been claimed for a long time that conjunction and inclusive disjunction are ambiguous:we should, in fact, distinguish between ‘lattice’ connectives (also called additive or extensional) and ‘group’ connectives (also called multiplicative or intensional). We argue that an analogous ambiguity affects the quantifiers. Moreover, we show how such a perspective could yield solutions for two well-known logical puzzles: McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens and the lottery paradox.

The diversity of interpretations of Aristotle’s treatment of chance and luck springs from an apparent contradiction between the claims that “chance events are for the sake of something” and that “chance events are not for the sake of their outcome.” Chance seems to entail the denial of an end. Yet Aristotle systematically refers it to what is for the sake of an end. This paper suggests that, in order to give an account of chance, a reference to “per accidens causes” (...) is not sufficient. Chance occurs as a parody of teleology; it is a“for-no-purpose” that looks like a purpose. The notion of “irony” is suggested as a way of accounting for a situation that keeps an ambiguity open. The fact that chance is thought of in relation to teleology does not mean that it is “reappropriated” by teleology. Rather,chance reveals a hiatus that betrays the limitation of a language concerned with substances to account for events. (shrink)

Denunciations, disclosures and reporting: why do whistleblowing procedures create an ethical dilemma in French corporations? Since July 2006, the requirement that foreign multinationals listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) implement this practice has been met with stiff resistance in many French companies. French labor unions see this controversy as a clash between the French and Anglo-Saxon models of transparency. To understand the moral reticence of French companies towards whistleblowing, we investigate five distinct perspectives: legal, economic, historical, philosophical and (...) sociological. 1/ We first probe into the legal contradictions in French regulations and find in these paradoxes the symptoms of a national taboo. 2/We report on an economic survey, that gathers empirical data from 82 large French corporations, and analyzes different business sectors in France and the working population covered by a whistleblowing procedure. 3/ To elicit the etiology of this taboo, we return to the historical sources of the Dreyfus Affair and the Vichy regime, whose political traumas remain imprinted on the collective French memory. The linguistic confusion between the two French terms délation and dénonciation shows why whistleblowing is perceived in France more as an act of betrayal than of heroism. 4/ The philosophical roots of whistleblowing also shed light on the organizational behavior of French companies and the transparency they are struggling to promote. 5/Entangled in sociological ambiguities, we discuss why French companies see whistleblowing as a risk, not as a means to prevent risk. (shrink)

Each thinker, according to Heidegger, essentially thinks one thought. Plato thinks the idea. Descartes thinks the cogito . Spinoza thinks substance. Nietzsche thinks the will to power. If a thinker does not think a thought, then he or she is not a thinker. He or she may be a scholar or a professor, a producer or a consumer, a fan or a fake, but he or she would not be a thinker. Thus, if Heidegger is a thinker, he essentially thinks (...) one thought. What is Heidegger’s one thought? It is neither life nor death, neither me nor you. It is neither technology nor art. It is neither spirit nor language. Heidegger’s one thought is being—or more precisely, the question of the meaning of being. And what is being? Neither presence nor absence--but rather, an ambiguous uncertainty. (shrink)

The ambiguity of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, a fictionalised portrait of Cyrus the Great and his rise to rule an empire, has led present-day interpretations to diverge widely. Should Cyrus be seen as an ideal king, whose capabilities exceed those of other rulers, or a despot whose ascent to power depends on deception and manipulation? This paper uses the modern conceptualisation of transgression to look at Xenophon’s careful depiction of political and personal boundaries throughout the work. It suggests that the key (...) final episode of the work, Cyrus’ return to his home in Persia (Cyropaedia 8.5), shows that Cyrus retains a respect for both political and personal boundaries; this offers a further challenge to ‘republic to empire’ readings of the work. (shrink)

Merleau-ponty's thesis of the ambiguity of time is used to criticize husserl's and hume's views of the self. the thesis states that 1) the experience of present and past time depend on one another for intelligibility, and 2) the "objective" is past experience frozen in time; the "subjective" is present experience. adequate accounts of the self (and, generally, adequate philosophical explanation) will respect the ambiguity of time and discuss the interaction between subjective and objective facets of experience.

Rather than denoting a natural kind independent of changing human interests and cultural discourse, aesthetic value, as I understand it, is a vague, ambiguous.

'Value' is a central concept in all of the principles and methods applied in Lean Construction, but it is rather difficult to provide a precise definition of the term. The problem lies in the word value itself: its ambiguity and vagueness make theorization difficult. This paper investigates the philosophical concept of value from a Lean Construction perspective. Several elements that contribute to value are considered, including objective elements such as waste reduction, quality, price and functionality, and more subjective elements (...) such as design. The hypothesis of this paper is that the reduction or removal of elements that detract from value, such as waste and costs, is not the only means by which value may be increased. The Sorites paradox is used to form a cohesive perspective on some different meanings of the word ‗value‘. One of the known ‗solutions‘ of the paradox, utilization theory, is then explored through a case study in off-site construction that illustrates how different actors in the construction process view value, and how utility theory can be used to provide a consensus on value that is acceptable. In practice, ‗value‘ is ambiguous because actors generally value different things and these views seldom converge during projects. Our results indicate that the actors involved strive for value individually. Analysis using utility theory allows the actors to establish a shared conceptualization of value, expressed in monetary terms. The work described in this paper aims to improve our understanding of value and of how to design products in construction to improve value for clients of industrialized housing. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the major development of mathematical analysis during the mid-nineteenth century. On the basis of Jahnke’s (Hist Math 20(3):265–284, 1993 ) distinction between considering mathematics as an empirical science based on time and space and considering mathematics as a purely conceptual science we discuss the Swedish nineteenth century mathematician E.G. Björling’s general view of real- and complexvalued functions. We argue that Björling had a tendency to sometimes consider mathematical objects in a naturalistic way. One example is (...) how Björling interprets Cauchy’s definition of the logarithm function with respect to complex variables, which is investigated in the paper. Furthermore, in view of an article written by Björling (Kongl Vetens Akad Förh Stockholm 166–228, 1852 ) we consider Cauchy’s theorem on power series expansions of complex valued functions. We investigate Björling’s, Cauchy’s and the Belgian mathematician Lamarle’s different conditions for expanding a complex function of a complex variable in a power series. We argue that one reason why Cauchy’s theorem was controversial could be the ambiguities of fundamental concepts in analysis that existed during the mid-nineteenth century. This problem is demonstrated with examples from Björling, Cauchy and Lamarle. (shrink)

Knobe reports that subjects' judgments of whether an agent did something intentionally vary depending on whether the outcome in question was seen by them as good or as bad. He concludes that subjects' moral views affect their judgments about intentional action. This conclusion appears to follow only if different meanings of “intention” are overlooked.

In this article I will examine Ricœur’s idea of the universal in his understanding of justice. Scholars recently discussed the extent to which Ricœur understands universal moral norms and universal rules of justice in his anthropology of human action, and argue that Ricœur stresses too much the idea of universal moral norms with regard to cultural and moral diversity,. G. H. Taylor, “Reenvisioning Justice,” Lo Squarda 12 : 65-80). In this article I will take part in the debate about universalism (...) and approach Ricœur’s idea of the universal from a different angle, in placing it in light of his idea of evil. The point I will aim to make in this article is that Ricœur’s idea of the relation between justice and evil demonstrates what I understand as the ambiguity of justice, which highlights the difficulty of defining universal rules of justice. I will argue that this ambiguity is the following: justice aims at the establishment of social peace and in that sense it is the necessary remedy against human evil, but justice also implies power, and possibly violence, over others in that it relates to violent feelings of vengeance, to institutional mechanism of authority, and to a struggle of values. Yet if rules of justice relate to evil in the sense of power over others, so I argue, then it is problematic to define absolute criteria for rules of justice, i.e., for rules for social peace: because justice relates to particular values, which means that the risk of violence is inherent to institutional rules of justice, there is no ultimate universal set of such rules. This article therefore questions Ricœur’s understanding of universal rules of justice in Oneself as Another. Yet, I will also draw on a series of other texts of Ricœur on justice, and argue that Ricœur’s idea of justice allows understanding how we find common sensibilities about justice through dialogue, a sensibility for the other, and narratives as a way of critique of existing moral norms and rules of justice. (shrink)

In the "cratylus", Plato presents two theories about the correctness of names, I.E., Names are correct by nature and names are correct by convention. In this paper, I argue that plato holds both views because he recognizes that the word 'name' is ambiguous as between type and token. Name tokens (individual strings of marks and noises) are conventional for plato. But name types (the role played by the tokens or the concept expressed by the tokens) are not conventional for plato.

Betrayal is both a “people” problem and a philosopher’s problem. Philosophers should be able to clarify the concept of betrayal, compare and contrast it with other moral concepts, and critically assess betrayal situations. At the practical level people should be able to make honest sense of betrayal and also to temper its consequences: to handle it, not be assaulted by it. What we need is a conceptually clear account of betrayal that differentiates between genuine and (...) merely perceived betrayal, and which also provides systematic guidance for the assessment of alleged betrayal in real life. In what follows I offer an account of betrayal that attempts to meet the two requirements of conceptual clarity and contextual adequacy. There is a great temptation to use the events in Washington of the past few years as the case study for such an analysis, but I believe that, for a variety of reasons, including the difficulty of viewing events from “within,” this would only complicate matters rather than clarify them. Rather, I believe that betrayal in literature is fruitful ground for analysis. I have chosen Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility for examples of trust and betrayal, because Austen displays the needed complexity and subtlety of human relationships and because she recognizes that violations of trust come in a variety of shades and colors. This particular novel, moreover, not only supplies multiple instances of trusting relationships gone awry, but also a common, detailed, and intelligible landscape within which these relationships exist. Again, however, in order to illuminate betrayal and appropriately assess a purported betrayal, rich examples are not enough. We need a clear concept of betrayal. I will develop this concept by beginning with the related concept of trust. By starting with an explicit definition of trust and using this definition to analyze the various examples Austen provides, betrayal will emerge as but one of two types of violation of trust. This in turn will allow us to distinguish actual from merely “felt” betrayals. I will finally argue that understanding and being sensitive to the other form of violation of trust, which I call abandonment, may be even more significant to our moral life. (shrink)

The diversity of interpretations of Aristotle’s treatment of chance and luck springs from an apparent contradiction between the claims that “chance events are for the sake of something” and that “chance events are not for the sake of their outcome.” Chance seems to entail the denial of an end. Yet Aristotle systematically refers it to what is for the sake of an end. This paper suggests that, in order to give an account of chance, a reference to “per accidens causes” (...) is not sufficient. Chance occurs as a parody of teleology; it is a“for-no-purpose” that looks like a purpose. The notion of “irony” is suggested as a way of accounting for a situation that keeps an ambiguity open. The fact that chance is thought of in relation to teleology does not mean that it is “reappropriated” by teleology. Rather,chance reveals a hiatus that betrays the limitation of a language concerned with substances to account for events. (shrink)

The author argues that Schauer's understanding of appropriate empiricism and relatedly what he wishes to take from the positivist classics might have an even more reductive impact on legal philosophical inquiry than the legal positivist quest to confine such inquiry to a search for necessary and sufficient conditions. The argument is based on the example of the legal order of the Arab territories occupied by Israel. In the author's view, this legal order is very close to what Schauer regards as (...) the normal case of a properly functioning legal order and in its closeness one can discern the flaws in his argument. (shrink)

This response draws on Saba Mahmood's work on Muslim subjectivities in order to consider how Stalnaker's conceptualization of virtue might be applied to non-Confucian sources. I argue that when applied cross-culturally, Stalnaker's revised definition of “skillful virtue” raises normative and metaethical questions about what counts as a skill versus a mere bodily practice, the process by how skill is acquired, and how we can both allow for the ambiguity of skills and continue to make constructive arguments about them.

In his "an ambiguity in the "sophist"," gregory vlastos showed that statements about forms in the central section of the "sophist" may be either 'ordinary' or 'pauline' predications. This paper refutes vlastos's claim that plato was "utterly unaware" of this ambiguity. 255c-e is taken to be the crucial passage here. This paper adapts the interpretation given by michael frede of this passage and shows that the sense of plato's partaking- terms (which are used to analyze statements about forms) (...) switches from a 'pauline' to an 'ordinary' usage at a definite point in the text which falls at the end of the crucial passage. the context and content of the passage determine that the switch is deliberate on plato's part. An analysis of an earlier passage, 250a-e, confirms this point. (shrink)