This chapter contains section titled: I the possibility of the denial‐of‐the‐will II christian quietism, yogic ecstasy, and buddhist enlightenment III asceticism and spiritual purication Notes Further Reading.

This chapter contains section titled: I empathy as the foundation of moral awareness II intelligible, empirical, and acquired character III humanity's sublime anguish Notes Further Reading.

Tranquillity’s Secret Presents A New Understanding Of The World And Ourselves, And A Forgotten Meditation Technique That Protects You From Traumatic Harm. There Is A Way Of Seeing The World Different. -/- My goal in this book is two-fold: to introduce a revolutionary paradigm for understanding ourselves and the world; and to explain an ancient meditation technique that brought me to the insights upon which it is founded. This technique appears in different forms in the extant spiritual and religious (...) traditions over millennia which have used it — and in which it has been acknowledged as the most efficacious way to reach a direct experience of mind, or the most direct path to a union with God. Unfortunately, the proper way to use it has been largely lost over the last few centuries along with a clear understanding of why it was claimed to be so highly efficient. The primary reason for this loss is the mechanical materialism that frames all our scientific knowledge today. Lady Anne Conway, an English philosopher and a contemporary of René Déscartes, the French Metaphysician of the Seventeenth Century, was the first to characterize his philosophy as the “Mechanical philosophy.” It was Déscartes’ fascination with garden automata (moving statues) that he saw throughout Paris during his time, that led to his idea that the bodies of animals are nothing more than machines of varying complexity – which could be replaced by metal cogs, axles, and wheels. This very contemporary idea is in fact his legacy to humanity — along with the mind-body split that it entails — as mechanism became the standard to which Nature and all life was compared, and still is. This was the genesis of the modern reductive scientific understanding of life as discovered mechanisms made up of dead matter. -/- Although Déscartes’ philosophy was not materialism proper, as he held mind to not be material in nature, his was the most significant move to a cognitive framing of all phenomena as the result of mechanical interactions, and he went so far as placing all non-human animals into the machine-only category, because, he argued, they didn’t have minds. While a full account of Déscartes’ thought is not useful in this work, I want to use Lady Conway’s term to make a distinction between a mechanical materialism, which materialism has evolved into, and a less severe understanding that is not so destructive of the primacy of two aspects of being alive — mind and cognizance — which today are asserted to be by-products or epiphenomena of material processes in the brain by strict adherents to the mechanical philosophy. -/- This frame allows nothing but dead matter, and all that is comprised of dead matter, to be entertained as real. Anything beyond that is either ignored, or considered to be nothing more than figments of someone’s imagination — and this both limits and structures our thoughts about everything. Even those who believe they have moved on from this limiting understanding continue to be fenced in by language, which is structured by it — so that there is no escaping its limitations via a simple substitution or redefinition of concepts. Rather, it will take a truly revolutionary new paradigm and a concomitant reframing of our understanding of ourselves, this world, and reality, and how they come together in the new paradigm. I characterize the difficulty of this change as being like that of meeting an alien race and trying to work out how they see reality before communication can begin — which is very difficult to do when one’s own view is so limited. -/- I call this revolutionary paradigm Responsive Naturing. -/- Responsive Naturing replaces the current paradigm and its concomitant idea of deterministic causality which is foundational in scientific practice today. It can do this because, as you will see, it better accounts for all categories of phenomena, and thus includes all the most important human experiences, such as that of being alive, of beauty, of love, and the ultimate unity of all things. Responsive Naturing provides a sound foundation for the sciences, without the imposed limitation of mechanical materialist explanations, so that both science and spirituality can be founded upon this single common understanding of how things work. -/- This novel paradigmatic understanding of reality intrinsically applies to all dimensions of mental phenomena — be it of perceptions, sensations, or thoughts — and from the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics to the stochastic nature of most physical phenomena, to the often accidental, sometimes fortunate, but never sure, character of all human activities. This makes this new paradigm immediately productive in a practical way — it simply works, as I will show. It empowers us in ways that our disjointed and parochial schools of thought lock us out of completely, opening up new possible methods of looking at problems and finding solutions across disciplines. However, understanding the repercussions of the new paradigm upon one’s cognitive frame and the concomitant structure of language is difficult to comprehend simply because it is alien to the existing frame and paradigm. The impetus to make the effort is becoming quite clear: -/- Today, the sciences are ruled by the limiting cognitive framing of mechanical materialism, and over the last century, the limitations of that frame and its associated scientific paradigm of physical causality have become obvious: science has become schizophrenic. On one hand, some scientists say everything is strictly determined by the laws of nature, and neither free will nor conscious intent have any involvement in what happens; but others say that the state of the underlying quanta that make-up everything is indeterminate until consciously observed with the intent to measure it. Mechanical materialism is why scientists say you have no free will, while you obviously experience that you do — and you are held responsible for your actions by society because you do. It is also why scientists cannot find a non-speculative explanation of consciousness on an evolutionary or biological level, even though being conscious is the most obvious aspect of being alive. And these contradictions have infected every aspect of our lives, and our world, by limiting our ability to see the world any other way. Even the formulation of spiritual doctrines is constrained today by this cognitive frame’s presence in our language. This is not an academic matter, as we see clearly in our failure, so-far, to change the path that has brought us to a global environmental collapse and the ecocide of life on Earth. -/- What is unique about the book’s approach is that it does not speculate about what might be the case, like so much of philosophy does. Instead, it relies upon meditative and contemplative insights that were gleaned directly from a dedicated advanced meditation practice over 60+ years of the author’s life. These insights were then confirmed by subsequent research into similar forms of this advanced meditation technique found across the world and throughout human history. In conjunction with my meditation practice, I have doctoral-level education in Philosophy and a 30-year career in Software Engineering. The latter was in part focused on automated software development, during which I was confronted with the unsolvable enigma — within the mechanical materialist understanding that I was enculturated into, and inculcated with — of Human Creativity. An enigma that set me on my path of discovery. -/- I have discovered, and continue to discover, just how productive this novel paradigm is in understanding ourselves and our world, by its ability to explain — in detail — so many of our experiences that are today either inexplicable, paradoxical, or ignored “for the present” by scientists until some hoped for mechanical description can be found. For the most part, scientists constrain themselves to describing mechanisms, but describing how is not explaining why — and that is why so much of our modern knowledge has a best-used-by-date. On the other side, seemingly all spiritual traditions accept this modern characterization of the world, ourselves, and reality that is manifest in our language, so that even spiritual phenomena and ideas are necessarily structured by it. We accept the ideas of separate beings, intentional entities, levels of consciousness, and attainment of enlightenment or unification with God, all of which are necessary because dead matter, and unconsciousness, are considered to be the starting point. It isn’t. Rather than just present this novel paradigm as a fait accompli, the book’s five sections bring the reader through stages of reconfiguration of our understanding: -/- Volume 1. The Way of Unsaying — The need for the articles in the first volume is not to tell the reader how things are, but to unsay the things that they have heard throughout their lives and have taken to heart. This is accomplished by exposing the logical and explanatory limitations of those ideas that usually go unnoticed. This is necessary to do in order to open the reader’s mind to other ways of accounting for phenomena, and navigating life, so that the reader will understand: first, why the meditation technique I will present is so effective; and second, why the novel paradigm that I propose will truly advance human knowledge and enable us to change our way of being in the world. In order to liberate oneself from seeing the world in a particular way I use skillful means to unseat all the understandings that we have all been inculcated with. This can be destabilizing, and you might find yourself getting annoyed, or even frightened. To paraphrase a Buddhist proverb: Better not to start; but if started, better to finish: -/- Volume 2. The Way of Contemplation — In this volume, the paradigm of Responsive Naturing is developed, building upon the dialogs in volume 1. This volume challenges the reader, since breaking free of one’s existing cognitive frame and paradigmatic understanding is not a trivial exercise, and neither is restructuring one’s thoughts to fit into a new paradigm. This section explains what Responsive Naturing means, how it works in both spiritual and scientific senses, my specific arguments for why it is the answer to our need for a better way to account for phenomena and experience, and how our way of being in the world can change because of it. I attempt to show, via a myriad of independent fields of study, just how powerful this paradigm is in explaining the various phenomena that until now, either had no scientific explanation, or had an incoherent and never proven one. -/- Volume 3. The Way of Tradition — This volume provides the reader with traditional descriptions of similar types of meditation to that which I am presenting. These techniques are related by the unusual support for meditation that they use: that of Inner Spontaneous Sound. This information is provided for two reasons: 1) to validate the technique I present in volume 4, The Way of Meditation, by showing the high esteem that these techniques have been held in by all spiritual traditions, and 2) to present a rational explanation for the technique’s effectiveness, based upon responsive naturing. Volume 4. The Way of Meditation — This volume describes the practice that I call “Great Responsiveness Meditation” which will allow the reader to: 1) engage in a long-term meditative and contemplative practice in order to attain the insights that are the foundation for the novel paradigm that I am presenting; and 2) to benefit from two unique side-effects of using inner spontaneous sound: one which protects the meditator during traumatic and extreme emotional experiences, especially of the kind now expected because of the current global environmental and societal crises; and the other — which is widely attested to — is an alchemical-like change in the meditator, who quickly displays compassion without self-centered concern. In Buddhism, this is known by the Sanskrit word “Mahākaruṇā,” which is the type of responsive compassion displayed by all enlightened beings. It is a permanent change in how we live our life, and it enables each of us to overcome our worst inculcated selfish behaviors. (shrink)

The Epicureans are hedonists who believe that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Since pleasure is the only intrinsic good, other things are only worthwhile for the sake of pleasure. Tranquility is the final Epicurean telos, i.e., all of our actions should aim for freedom from bodily and mental pain. According to the Epicureans, tranquility is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures so that there is no pleasure beyond tranquility. Once we free ourselves from all pain, there are no (...) further pleasures to pursue. This poses the following problem. Since hedonism is true and something is only worthwhile for the sake of pleasure, but there are no further pleasures for those who have achieved tranquility to pursue, then it seems that nothing is worthwhile to the tranquil. This poses a problem for Epicureans because they should reject this consequence and they seem to want to do so, but they cannot without contradicting themselves about the nature and limit of pleasure. I call this the Nothing is Worthwhile to the Tranquil Problem. This paper develops a strategy that Epicureans can adopt to solve NWP. I develop this strategy in three stages. First, I explain NWP: Epicurean claims about the limit and nature of pleasure suggest that nothing can be worthwhile to the tranquil. Second, I show that this problem is analogous to the Problem of Creation, which claims that an impassible God has no reasons to create. Third, I argue that a prominent solution to PoC can also solve NWP. That solution goes as follows. Some activities are worthwhile to the tranquil because these activities express tranquility, just as creating is worthwhile to God because it expresses God’s perfections. In the final section, I raise three objections to this solution. None of them is strong enough to defeat the solution for which I argue, and so I conclude that it merits consideration as a solution to NWP. (shrink)

Although tranquility is a fundamental aspect of human life, the experiential nature of tranquility remains elusive. Traditionally, many philosophical, religious, spiritual, or mystical traditions in East and West have strived to reach tranquil experiences and produced texts serving as manuals to reach them. Yet, no attempt has been made to compare experiences of tranquility and explore what they may have in common. The purpose of this theoretical study is to explore the experiential nature of tranquility. First, we present examples of (...) what we consider some of the most central experiences of tranquility in Eastern and Western traditions. For the sake of simplicity, we sort these examples into four categories based on their experiential focus: the body, emotions, the mind, and mysticism. Second, we offer an exploratory account of tranquility, arguing that the different examples of tranquility seem to share certain experiential features. More specifically, we propose that the shared features pertain both to the content or quality of the tranquil experiences, which involves a sense of presence and inner peace, and to the structure of these experiences, which seems to involve some degree of detachment and absorption. (shrink)

Tranquillity and Insight. An Introduction to the Oldest Form of Buddhist Meditation. Amadeo Solé-Leris. Century Hutchinson, London, and Shambhala, Boston 1986. 176 pp. £6.95 / $7.95.

Antipsychotic medications are sometimes imposed on psychiatric patients deemed dangerous to themselves and others. This is based on the assumption that treatment is safe and effective, and that recovery depends on biological adjustment. Under new laws, patients can be required to remain on these medications after leaving hospitals. However, survivors attest that forced treatment used as a restraint can feel like torture, while the consequences of withdrawal can also be severe.

This chapter contains section titled: I platonic ideas and aesthetic experience II artistic genius and the communication theory of art III the hierarchy of the visual and verbal arts IV tragedy and sublimity V music and metaphysical experience Notes Further Reading.

Despite the near universal desire for happiness, relatively little philosophy has been done to determine what “happiness” means. In this paper I examine happiness (in the long‐term sense), and argue that it is best understood in terms of tranquillity. This is not merely “contentment.” Rather, happiness requires reflection—the kind of reflection characteristic of philosophy. Happiness is the product of correctly assessing its conditions, and like any assessment, one can be mistaken, and thus mistaken about whether one is happy. That (...) is, one needs a correct understanding of happiness in order to be happy. (shrink)

This inquiry regarding the ethical parts of the works of Sextus Empiricus is mainly concerned with answering four questions. Firstly, how is one to understand his Pyrrhonian arguments against the claim that there are natural goods and evils? Secondly, how is one to understand the argument with which Sextus purports to show that one is disturbed by having the opinion that there are natural goods and evils, even if there are such things? Thirdly, in what sense is tranquillity the (...) moral end of the sceptics? And fourthly, what is one to make of the claim that the sceptics attain tranquillity? ;In advancing his destructive arguments against the dogmatic thesis that there are natural goods and evils, Sextus employs the same argumentative strategy as in his arguments against all other dogmatic theses. He is concerned with, first, refuting the dogmatists, and then with pitting his negative conclusions against the positive dogmatic theses, in order to induce suspension of assent. He is not concerned with maintaining as his opinion that there are no natural goods and evils. Sextus' argument for the claim that one is disturbed by having the opinion that there are natural goods and evils, even if there are such things, exhibits all the traits of ad hominem arguments: he tries to use assumptions and concessions of the dogmatists in order to force them to admit to his conclusion. Again, he is not committed to the conclusion himself. When Sextus says that the moral end of the sceptic is tranquillity, the question arises whether this claim is dogmatic. It appears, however, that Sextus can avoid charges of dogmatism, by defining the moral end in terms of someone who is not a sceptic, and implying that the sceptic, as a sceptic, has no such end. The final claim that the sceptic attains tranquillity is found to present Sextus with problems of consistency. The claim is presented as a conclusion to a philosophical argument, but Sextus seems clear when he states that insofar as claims are supported by philosophical arguments they are not endorsed by the sceptic. (shrink)

In this essay I examine the relevance of Hume's skepticism for the debate around his death. I argue that as to the official record of Hume's manner of death, `My Own Life' indirectly points to his skepticism, while Adam Smith's `Letter to Strahan' evades the issue altogether. As for the responses, when they address the problem of Hume's skepticism, they are either hostile or, at best, dismissive of it. I claim that William Cullen's letter to John Hunter constitutes the one (...) relation of Hume's death that positively acknowledges his skeptical principles, and acknowledges, in a Humean fashion, their beneficial moral influence. Along with Cullen, I argue that such influence both delivers one from superstitious disquiet and heightens the enjoyment of common life. It thus plays a central role in Hume's tranquil acceptance of death. (shrink)

Translation at this stage would be premature, but three variants in line 3 deserve notice, Bury writes Natorp , followed by Brochard , suggested , Wachsmuth prints a colon instead of a comma after It is not surprising that line 3 has attracted emendation. As it stands, it lacks a verb and has to modify an understood existential.

Explores the role of eliminating fear in Epicurean ethics and physics, focusing on techniques to eliminate the fear of death and the fear of the gods.

This paper explores how philosophy might be worthwhile on hedonic grounds for the Epicurean Sage who has achieved tranquility, reached the limit of pleasure, and thus for whom there is no further pleasure to pursue. I argue that philosophy might be worthwhile to the Epicurean Sage because it helps her maintain tranquility by preventing a painful boredom that could result without it.

The article argues that Schopenhauer seeks to defend art against Plato's critique, but that he does so by adopting two distinct strategies that to some extent conflect: a 'cognitivist strategy' according to which art provides the most objective knowledge of reality, and an 'aesthetic experience' strategy, in which there is a peculiarly aesthetic state of mind which gives our pleasure in art a value of its own. The truly unifying notion in Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory is that of tranquil, will-less contemplation, (...) a state of non-identification with the striving, suffering, bodily individual that one is. The Ideas testify to the endurance of Schopenhauer's early Platonic ambitions, but they do not really produce a convincing theory. At one end of the spectrum, the Ideas are otiose: pleasure is in the tranquility of contemplation, which may well be of an empirical object. At the other end of the spectrum, apprehension of the Ideas serves an all-important cognitive function, but our pleasure cannot stem from our knowing the horrifying Idea of humanity per se. Rather, the key to the satisfaction we take in tragedy is, in Schopenhauer's account, the will-lessness of sublime resignation in face of the Idea. (shrink)

Epicurus posited that the best life involves the greatest pleasures. He also argued that it involves attaining tranquillity. Many commentators have expressed scepticism that these two claims are compatible. For, they argue, Epicurus’ tranquil life is so austere that it is hard to see how it could be maximally pleasurable. Here, I offer an Epicurean account of the pleasures of tranquillity. I also consider different ways of valuing lives from a hedonistic point of view. Benthamite hedonists value lives (...) by the sum of pleasures minus the sum of pains, weighted by intensity and duration. Meanwhile, Binmore proposes that Epicurus valued lives by their worst episode. In contrast, I offer an Epicurean argument for why the best life is one in which a person attains tranquillity and tastes its pleasures until death. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on Tranquillizing the Passions John Immerwahr Borrowingafragmentfrom thelyric poetArchilochus, Sir IsaiahBerlin once divided thinkers into two categories: foxes, who know many things; and hedgehogs, who know only one, "one big thing."1 Although Berlin does not include Hume in either list, it is tempting to put him with the foxes. Indeed, Hume's corpus is brilliantly eclectic, ranging with equal facility over an impressive array of seemingly diverse subjects such (...) as epistemology, ethics, political science, religion, psychology, history, criticism, economics, and demography. Many of Hume's admirers have not even attempted to find a unity here, and Hume's less generous critics have attributed this diversity to an incessant hunger for "literary fame" which supposedly led Hume from topic to topic, always searching for popular acclaim and recognition.2 The dazzling diversity of Hume's thinking has obscured some important underlying themes; Hume is more of a hedgehog than he initially appears. At the centre of many of Hume's discussions is a recurring conviction about the nature of human well-being and the means to obtain it. This insistence—which can be found in each stage ofHume's career and in writings on virtually every topic—provides one way of finding an overarching unity to his thought and invites us to rethink some ofthe conventional wisdom about Hume. In this essay I argue that many of Hume's investigations are informed by his early distinction between calm and violent passions. Wherever we turn we find Hume insisting that people arehappiest and governments are most stable when emotional calmness prevails. Hume alsohas astrategy, which Icall "moderation through opposition," which is designedto"tranquillize and soften"the passions.3 This strategy also becomes a stylistic principle which informs Hume's own writing, especially his popular works. This essay begins with a brief discussion of the calm/violent distinction itself. I then sketch out the role ofcalm passions in Hume's treatment of rationality, happiness, morality, politics and religion. Next I turn from Hume's diagnosis to his proposed cure, and discuss the strategy that Hume presents for enhancing the calm passions; indeed, Hume's writing style itselfis often designed to implement this strategy. I then discuss the context of Hume's insight, arguing that while it grows out of a cosmopolitan continental paradigm of using Volume XVIII Number 2 293 JOHN IMMERWAHR passions to oppose passions, Hume's own use ofit is tailored to rather specific features of the political and intellectual life of eighteenth centuryEdinburgh. The essay concludesby discussingthe implications of these findings for reading ofHume's works. Passions: Calm and Violent One characteristic feature of the thinkers of the "Scottish Enlightenment" was a desire tofound moral concepts in a scientific and empirical understanding ofhuman nature, rather than upon abstract conceptions of virtue and justice.4 These thinkers were particularly interestedin non-cognitivistelements ofhuman nature, such as"taste," "sentiment" and the "passions,"5 and they were also interested in discriminatingamongthe feelings and passions to discover those which were most beneficial to the individual or society. One Scottish philosopher who was particularly influential upon Hume in this connection was Francis Hutcheson. In discussing the passions, Hutcheson distinguished between what he called the "calm desire of good" and the "particular passions towards objects immediately presented to the senses." Hutcheson noted that these calm desires were frequently powerful enough to conquer particular passions such as "lust or revenge."6 The calm passions are thus very important to our understanding ofhuman motivation. As in so many other things, Hume also appears to be influenced by Hutcheson on the existence and importance of "calm passions." Early in Treatise 2, Hume expands on Hutcheson's idea that our experience ofan emotion or passion can be described as either "calm" or "violent"7 (also "soft" or "tender," "rough" or "fierce").8 The main difference between calmness and violence has to do with the intensity with which a passion is experienced. When we experience violent passions we feel an "uneasiness" (T 418) and sometimes "disorders and agitations" (E 17).9 Other passions are "calm" in that they cause "no disorder in the soul" and "little emotion in the mind" (T 417).10 Hume's main point is that... (shrink)

Sextus Empiricus tells us that the sceptics conduct investigations. Genuine investigations are commonly taken to have some connection with the aim of discovering truth. Sextus also tells us that the sceptics aim at tranquillity in their investigations. But they do this only by suspending judgement. In what sense, then, are their investigations connected with the aim of discovering truth? This article argues that there is a sense in which Sextus can reasonably take sceptical investigations to be connected with the (...) aim of discovering truth, even though the sceptics only aim at preserving their tranquillity by suspending judgement. (shrink)

This volume examines the influence that Epicureanism and Stoicism, two philosophies of nature and human nature articulated during classical times, exerted on the development of European thought to the Enlightenment. Although the influence of these philosophies has often been noted in certain areas, such as the influence of Stoicism on the development of Christian thought and the influence of Epicureanism on modern materialism, the chapters in this volume forward a new awareness of the degree to which these philosophies and their (...) continued interaction informed European intellectual life well into early modern times. The influence of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies in the areas of literature, philosophy, theology, and science are considered. Many thinkers continue to perceive these philosophies as significant alternatives for understanding the human and natural worlds. Having become incorporated into the canon of philosophical alternatives, Epicureanism and Stoicism continued to exert identifiable influences on scientific and philosphical thought at least until the middle of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to develop a theory of peace education through an examination of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. It examines why Japan did not avoid this terrible nuclear disaster. This is an educational issue, because one of the major impacts of Fukushima's catastrophe is that it indicates the failure of peace education. In order to reestablish a theory of peace education, the concept of domestic tranquility is discussed. This article questions whether the Japanese public order is consistent (...) with democratic principles. Jane Roland Martin's examination of the concept of domestic tranquility is shown relevant. Martin's language analysis helps to distinguish whether or not Japanese domestic tranquility under nuclear crisis is democratic. I propose that post-Fukushima disaster peace education should be reformed as consistent with two democratic principles: acceptance of the diversity of peace and continuous negotiation among these different narratives. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss the role of Cassius' philosophical beliefs in his decision to assassinate Caesar. I analyse the situation of Cassius and discuss whether or not Epicureanism can justify the assassination, then I use these conclusions to establish the importance of Epicureanism in Cassius’ decision. I take the relevant aspects of Epicurean philosophy separately and make a judgement as to what parts of Epicureanism encourage or discourage the assassination. I bring this together with a discussion of how each (...) of these aspects contributes to the Epicurean goal of tranquillity and thus assess whether the assassination is the correct course of action for an Epicurean. I conclude that, though some aspects of Epicureanism would encourage Cassius to murder Caesar, the assassination is still unjustifiable due to both the personal and political beliefs of Epicureanism. I further conclude that Cassius held Epicureanism as a theoretical ideology, whilst holding his Republican beliefs as more practical in application. Overall this shows that Cassius political beliefs were more important than his philosophical allegiances in these decisions; this gives weight to Griffin’s theory that Greek philosophy’s role in Roman politics was more theoretical than practical. (shrink)

In June 1928, Captain Barnett W. Harris, an amateur naturalist from Indiana, arrived in Zululand to experiment on wild animals with his invention – the mercy bullet. This “bullet”consisted of a hypodermic needle filled with anesthetic drugs that could render an animal unconscious – an early model of what is now known as the tranquilizer gun. The history of this gun typically begins with Colin Murdoch, a New Zealand pharmacist and veterinarian, who patented the invention in 1959. While largely absent (...) in the archives, through tracing popular science publications and press, this article exposes a longer history of animal tranquilizers from an unlikely source. Tracing Harris’s story allows this article to speak to different historical discourses that influenced his rise as a celebrated inventor, and later to his disappearance from the scientific arena. This article argues that debates about pain relief (for both humans and nonhuman animals) and developments in military technology at the turn of the twentieth century resulted in experiments with narcotic bullets, a precursor to this “mercy bullet moment.” While hailed across the press as the man who might transform animal capturing into a humane practice, the workings of Harris’s bullet remained ambiguous. Despite this, he promoted his invention through several lecture series and radio presentations to the American public in the 1930s, where elements of scientific showmanship can be observed. Overall, Harris’s omission from the history of animal tranquilizing demonstrates the multiple contingencies that define a moment of scientific “success” – or, in this case, push some into relative obscurity. (shrink)

『회남자』에는 마음의 평정을 의미하는 허정(虛靜)이 인성 본연의 특성임을 지지하는 글이 있다. 이런 구절은 『회남자』의 일관된 독해에 몇 가지 문제점을 야기한다. 먼저, 『회남자』에 영향을 미친 주요 문헌들에서 허정은 후천적으로 얻어지는 조건일 뿐, 인성의 고유한 특성이 아니다. 둘째, 인성은 어떠한 방향으로 발전할 수 있는 재질이라고 해석할 수 있는데, 허정은 재질이 잘 발현되기 위한 토양에 가깝다. 셋째, 허정에는 철학자의 이념이 들어 있어야 하는데, 도가의 이념은 도이지 허정이 아니다. 본고에서는 이 문제점을 해결하기 위해 다음과 같은 해석을 제안했다. 첫째, 『회남자』의 허정은 마음의 평정과 도를 묘사하는 (...) 허무라는 두 가지 의미를 지니고 있다. 둘째, 전자의 허정은 인성이라는 재질이 발현될 수 있다는 점에서 토양이라고 할 수 있지만, 후자의 허정은 도의 특성이라는 점에서 재질 즉, 도가 구체화된 인성의 특성이라고 할 수 있다. 본고의 해석은 『회남자』가 고유한 이론적 특성을 지니고 있는 도가류의 문헌이라는 평가를 지지한다. (shrink)

Epictetus maintained that all people are free to control their lives and live in harmony with nature. This book offers practical guidelines for those seeking contentment and those who have already made some progress in that direction.

ABSTRACT Friedrich Nietzsche offers different opinions of the ancient Skeptics. On certain occasions, he praises them as philosophers of intellectual integrity, because they constantly question dogma and continue to inquire (ζητϵῖν) into the truth. He insists, however, that it is indispensable for every individual to adopt her own perspective in specific conditions, rather than suspend judgment as the Skeptics do. On other occasions, Nietzsche criticizes the ancient Skeptics because they separate their academic investigations from their philosophy of life and only (...) comply with conventions or apparent phenomena observed through sensations. Furthermore, he ridicules their ultimate goal – tranquility of mind (ἀταραξία) – as a product of feeble exhaustion. He himself is ready to embrace torments of life as part of the will to power. Although some similarities can be traced between Nietzsche and the ancient Skeptics, Nietzsche is more consistent in connecting his theoretical investigation and his philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

Meditation. The Buddhist Way of Tranquillity and Insight. Kamalashila. Windhorse Publications, Glasgow 1992. 288 pp. £11.99.

The present article studies the meditative approaches to imperturbability depicted in the?neñjasapp?ya-sutta and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels. By way of introduction to the main theme broached in this discourse, I briefly survey P?li discourses relevant to the early Buddhist notion of imperturbability. Next I examine the presentation given in the?neñjasapp?ya-sutta based on translated extracts from its Madhyama-?gama parallel, noting variations between these two and a Tibetan version extant in?amathadeva’s commentary on the Abhidharmako?abh??ya. In the concluding part of the article, (...) I turn to the relationship between tranquillity and insight reflected in the?neñjasapp?ya-sutta. (shrink)

A Time for Wisdom is for a beleaguered audience that wants to cultivate this virtue and elevate themselves above the noise and toxicity of the modern world. Written by a pair of psychologists, it unpacks the research that has been conducted on the subject in recent years but that hasn't been communicated to readers in a relevant way. What's more, the book takes our current scientific understanding and integrates it with timeless concepts of wisdom that have, for millennia, guided men (...) and women through life's troubles. With this as their foundation, the authors lay out four practices to pursue wisdom in our daily lives. These include receiving knowledge; practicing detachment; experiencing tranquility, and cultivating transcendence. These are profound and spiritual ideas that can quiet the shallow cacophony of the crowd and bring us inner peace. The authors make these practices clear and accessible and show us the immense satisfaction we can enjoy by aspiring to live by them. A Time for Wisdom is an invitation to step outside the circus of contemporary life, to break free from its fanfare of foolishness. It commends a course of action towards the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, towards calm and clear moral reasoning. And it gives us a recipe for self-transcendence so that we-like the great sages and scientists before us-can rise above the immediacy of the moment and a taste of the numinous and the infinite. (shrink)

Medical analogies are commonly invoked in both Indian Buddhist dharma and Hellenistic philosophy. In the Pāli Canon, nirvana (or, in Pāli,nibbāna) is depicted as a form of health, and the Buddha is portrayed as a doctor who helps us attain it. Much later in the tradition, Śāntideva described the Buddha’s teaching as ‘the sole medicine for the ailments of the world, the mine of all success and happiness.’ Cicero expressed the view of many Hellenistic philosophers when he said that philosophy (...) is ‘a medical science for the mind.’ He thought we should ‘hand ourselves over to philosophy, and let ourselves be healed.’ ‘For as long as these ills [of the mind] remain,’ he wrote, ‘we cannot attain to happiness.’ There are many different forms of medical analogy in these two traditions, but the most general form may be stated as follows: just as medicine cures bodily diseases and brings about physical health, so Buddhist dharma or Hellenistic philosophy cures mental diseases and brings about psychological health—where psychological health is understood as the highest form of happiness or well-being. Insofar as Buddhist dharma involves philosophy, as it does, both renditions of the analogy may be said to declare that philosophy cures mental diseases and brings about psychological health. This feature of the analogy—philosophy as analogous to medical treatment—has attracted considerable attention. (shrink)