First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This article frames the poetry of William Wordsworth and the philosophical writings of Spinoza as mutually illuminating works exploring the ethical and ontological questions raised by bodies in states of passivity and immobility. Both writers, it argues, revise our idea of what a “powerful” body might be by developing the concept of “dynamic passivity”—a passivity that does not stand in simple opposition to states of activity, and that ought to be cultivated rather than overcome in the process of empowering the (...) body. The article examines and contrasts the different ways in which Wordsworth and Spinoza conceive of this dynamic passivity, with particular attention paid to how the former embeds a cultivation of “wise passiveness” for the reader in the very form of his poems, through a variety of elements like syntax, metre, and acoustic effects. (shrink)

This article frames the poetry of William Wordsworth and the philosophical writings of Spinoza as mutually illuminating works exploring the ethical and ontological questions raised by bodies in states of passivity and immobility. Both writers, it argues, revise our idea of what a “powerful” body might be by developing the concept of “dynamic passivity”—a passivity that does not stand in simple opposition to states of activity, and that ought to be cultivated rather than overcome in the process of empowering the (...) body. The article examines and contrasts the different ways in which Wordsworth and Spinoza conceive of this dynamic passivity, with particular attention paid to how the former embeds a cultivation of “wise passiveness” for the reader in the very form of his poems, through a variety of elements like syntax, metre, and acoustic effects. (shrink)

Lingering skepticism about climate change might be due in part to the way climate projections are perceived by members of the public. Variability between scientists’ estimates might give the impression that scientists disagree about the fact of climate change rather than about details concerning the extent or timing. Providing uncertainty estimates might clarify that the variability is due in part to quantifiable uncertainty inherent in the prediction process, thereby increasing people's trust in climate projections. This hypothesis was tested in two (...) experiments. Results suggest that including uncertainty estimates along with climate projections leads to an increase in participants’ trust in the information. Analyses explored the roles of time, place, demographic differences, and initial belief in climate change. Implications are discussed in terms of the potential benefit of adding uncertainty estimates to public climate projections. (shrink)

Reporting and investigating research misconduct can lead to disciplinary proceedings being initiated, and ultimately to disciplinary sanctions being imposed on convicted scientists. The conversion of research misconduct findings into disciplinary sanctions is poorly understood. This article analyses all the disciplinary decisions handed down on appeal by the Conseil national de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche (CNESER) between 1991 and 2023, concerning breaches of research integrity by academics and doctoral students ( n = 333). Three findings are highlighted. Firstly, the (...) article describes how the CNESER sanctioned research misconduct even before the notion of research integrity became part of French law, by monitoring scientists’ compliance with “deontological rules”. Secondly, we show that assessing disciplinary fault involves evaluating a much broader set of circumstances than the mere existence of research misconduct, which can explain why the latter do not result in disciplinary sanctions or lighter sanctions. Thirdly, the research highlights situations where research misconduct is intertwined with other allegations, blurring the relative importance of these motives in the awarding of disciplinary sanctions. The article concludes with a call for greater accessibility to the disciplinary decisions handed down by universities in the first instance, as a key next step in gaining a better understanding of the disciplinary response to research misconduct. (shrink)

The account of the death of Patroklos occupies a strategic position in the narrative economy of the Iliad: before this event, Achilles has withdrawn from combat out of indignation against Agamemnon; afterwards, his anger turns against Hector, whom he holds responsible for his friend's death. Achilles returns to battle and kills Hector in an act of vengeance that, as we have known from the beginning of the poem, will lead to his own demise, which is not actually recounted in the (...) Iliad. This episode stands out because it is atypical both in the contents of the narration and in the means of expression used (what are generally termed “formulas”). I will give some examples of these oddities and then propose an interpretation. Here is the text, in the translation by Richmond Lattimore:So long as the sun was climbing still to the middle heaven, so long the thrown weapons of both took hold, and men dropped under them; but when the sun had gone to the time for unyoking of cattle, then beyond their very destiny the Achaians were stronger and dragged the hero Kebriones from under the weapons and the clamour of the Trojans, and stripped the armour from his shoulders. And Patroklos charged with evil intention in on the Trojans. Three times he charged in with the force of the running war god, screaming a terrible cry, and three times he cut down nine men; but as for the fourth time he swept in, like something greater than human, there, Patroklos, the end of your life was shown forth, since Phoibos came against you there in the strong encounter dangerously, nor did Patroklos see him as he moved through the battle, and shrouded in a deep mist came in against him and stood behind him, and struck his back and his broad shoulders with a flat stroke of the hand so that his eyes spun. Phoibos Apollo now struck away from his head the helmet four-horned and hollow-eyed, and under the feet of the horses it rolled clattering, and the plumes above it were defiled by blood and dust. Before this time it had not been permitted to defile in the dust this great helmet crested in horse-hair; rather it guarded the hear and the gracious brow a godlike man, Achilleus; but now Zeus gave it over to Hektor to wear on his head, Hektor whose own death was close to him. And in his hands was splintered all the huge, great, heavy, iron-shod, far-shadowing spear, and away from his shoulders dropped to the ground the shield with its shield sling and its tassels. The lord Apollo, son of Zeus, broke the corselet upon him. Disaster caught his wits, and his shining body went nerveless. He stood stupidly, and from close behind his back a Dardanian man hit him between the shoulders with a sharp javelin: Euphorbos, son of Pantho(s, who surpassed all men of his own age with the throwing spear, and in horsemanship and the speed of his feet. He had already brought down twenty men from their horses since first coming, with his chariot and his learning in warfare. He first hit you with a thrown spear, o rider Patroklos, nor broke you, but ran away again, snatching out the ash spear from your body, and lost himself in the crowd, not enduring to face Patroklos, naked as he was, in close combat. (shrink)

Russellian or singular propositions are very useful in semantics to specify "what has been said" by a literal and serious utterance of a sentence containing a proper name, an indexical or a demonstrative, or for modeling demonstrative thoughts. I3ased on an example given by S. Guttenplan, I construct a case showing that if our only option for modeling demonstrative thoughts is a singular proposition à la Russell, we run the risk of admitting infallible empirical (existential) beliefs. I defend the principle (...) of the fallibility of our (first order) representations by appealing to Perry's notion of a relational mode of presentation that allows us to generalize the proposition which is the content of the perceptual belief in cases of hallucination or misidentification, so that there is no "immunity to error through misidentification" in the province of demonstrative thought. (shrink)

Leclerc-Andre_Spontaneous-linguistic-understanding.

L’article analyse la perception de la révolte de 1378 dans la mémoire florentine entre la fin du xive siècle et la moitié du xve siècle. Deux types de sources sont étudiées et croisées, les livres de famille, d’une part, et la littérature humaniste, de l’autre. Leur lecture conjointe permet de parvenir à deux conclusions : d’abord, les clés de lecture de l’événement suivent une évolution qui tend à éluder progressivement toute analyse socio-économique du conflit ; ensuite, ces clés de lecture (...) correspondent à deux enjeux politiques distincts et successifs : la resémantisation du guelfisme en premier lieu, puis, à partir des années 1430, l’analyse sociale de la république à partir d’une structure hiérarchique rigide. (shrink)

L’article analyse la perception de la révolte de 1378 dans la mémoire florentine entre la fin du xive siècle et la moitié du xve siècle. Deux types de sources sont étudiées et croisées, les livres de famille, d’une part, et la littérature humaniste, de l’autre. Leur lecture conjointe permet de parvenir à deux conclusions : d’abord, les clés de lecture de l’événement suivent une évolution qui tend à éluder progressivement toute analyse socio-économique du conflit ; ensuite, ces clés de lecture (...) correspondent à deux enjeux politiques distincts et successifs : la resémantisation du guelfisme en premier lieu, puis, à partir des années 1430, l’analyse sociale de la république à partir d’une structure hiérarchique rigide. (shrink)

On peut se demander si les grands développements de l’autobiographie auxquels nous avons assisté depuis les années soixante-dix ne correspondaient pas finalement au genre littéraire d’une époque, c’est-à-dire à l’avènement d’un sujet capable d’auto-détermination en des contextes changeants, mais suffisamment stables pour anticiper un devenir, une trajectoire, une mobilité. L’autobiographie est le genre de texte par excellence dans le cadre duquel s’effectue une dévolution à l’individu d’une c..

The problem of ‘individuals’ is an age-old philosophical concern, but from time to time in the history of thought it is a problem which becomes acute. In our day the far-reaching advances in science—in physics and chemistry, in biology and bio-chemistry, in neurology and psychology—have made the philosophical attention to the problem of ‘individuals’ a matter of urgency. Yet, with some notableexceptions, philosophers have so far been displaying singularly little interest in the problem.

In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke’s works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept “fictional entities” in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that (...) there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore’s paradox: it is paradoxical to say: “I made it, but I do not believe it exists”. Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of “exist” that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history.artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people. (shrink)

Quinze ans après la parution de son livre centré sur Alessandra Macinghi Strozzi, Ann Crabb nous propose les résultats d’une nouvelle enquête consacrée à une épistolière florentine : Margherita Datini (1360-1423), épouse du célèbre marchand de Prato. Ce travail de recherche a déjà donné lieu à plusieurs publications, qui nourrissent le livre. Ici encore, une correspondance exceptionnelle est à la fois à l’origine et au cœur du livre. 285 lettres de Margherita Datini (dont 22 autographes) nous...

My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention (...) is used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representations are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions –those provided with a conceptual content– are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens makes itself what it is.Keywords: Intentionality, disposition, artefact, contextualism, repertoire. (shrink)

Les " écrits intermédiaires " de Maurice Blondel, peu étudiés jusqu'ici de façon systématique, renferment sans doute la clef qui doit nous permettre de comprendre le passage de L'Action à " l'œuvre de maturité " du philosophe aixois, publiée dans les années 1930-1940, soit la grande Trilogie, ainsi que La Philosophie et l'Esprit chrétien. Le Colloque inter national réuni à Rome du 16 au 18 novembre 2000, dont nous présentons les Actes, a démontré la fécondité et le renouveau des perspectives (...) blondéliennes suscités par cette confrontation d'une trentaine de chercheurs avec les textes, stimulants et trop peu connus, publiés ou rédigés par Blondel de 1898 à 1930. Le présent volume est structuré autour de trois directions principales. La première concerne les relations, notamment épistolaires, de Blondel avec ses contemporains, en particulier Le Roy, Laberthonnière, Archambault, Teilhard de Chardin, Montcheuil et Duhem. La deuxième étudie directement les écrits et les thèmes les plus importants de cette période, de L'Illusion idéaliste aux Exigences philosophiques du christianisme. La troisième enfin considère la philosophie sociale de Blondel, son influence sur Don Luigi Sturzo et sur Gustavo Gutiérrez, ainsi que l'analogie de la pensée blondelienne avec celle du P. Joseph Wresinski, le père du " Quart Monde ". (shrink)

Os demonstrativos foram considerados tradicionalmente como expressões referenciais. É o que encontramos na história da filosofia desde o início da tradição gramatical ocidental que sempre tratou os demonstrativos como pronomes. A maior provocação no livro de King consiste precisamente em romper com essa tradição ao apresentar os demonstrativos complexos (“esta mesa”, “aquele homem” etc.) como termos quantificados (e, portanto, termos não-referenciais). King apóia seu tratamento sobre exemplos escolhidos que parecem favorecer sua tese, como “aquele arquiteto que construiu essas pirâmides era (...) um gênio”, quando o locutor da frase não tem nenhum alvo referencial em mente e não pode apontar para ninguém no contexto da enunciação. Mostrarei: 1) que o tratamento de King representa uma tremenda ruptura com a tradição e desconsidera as intuições de gerações e gerações de lingüistas e filósofos da linguagem; 2) que King apóia sua tese em evidências de natureza puramente sintática sem discutir metodologicamente o peso que devemos atribuir a essas evidências sintáticas nas discussões de semântica; 3) que King não leva em conta todos os dados disponíveis, forçando os dados por ele recolhidos a entrar numa mesma teoria unificada, mas, para isso, paga um preço alto: uma redundância inaceitável na semântica das expressões demonstrativas simples. (shrink)

Je présente d’abord quelques notions de base de la sémantique philosophique, en particulier celles de signification linguistique, compré-hension linguistique, conditions de vérité, et “ce qui est dit”. La signi-fication linguistique ne doit pas être confondue avec “ce qui est dit” par l’énonciation littérale d’une phrase en contexte, cette dernière notion, centrale dans le contextualisme actuel, pouvant être reconstruite comme sémantique ou pragmatique selon le rôle que l’on fait jouer à la notion de signification du locuteur. J’examine ensuite de quelle façon (...) ces notions se combinent dans diverses approches ou “figures historiques”, en insistant sur la relation langage-pensée. La première est la théorie idéationnelle du langage, défendue par Arnauld et Locke. La seconde est la sémantique philosophique classique, qui se développe dans la première moitié du XXe siècle. La troisième est le contextualisme actuel, développé en parti-culier par Travis et Récanati. La comparaison révèle ceci: quant à la façon dont est reconstruite la notion de “ce qui est dit”: l’idéisme et le contex-tualisme s’accordent pour en faire une notion pragmatique, en opposition à la sémantique philosophique classique assortie de l’appareil gricéen.I first present a few basic notions of philosophical semantics, namely that of linguistic meaning, linguistic understanding, truth-con-ditions, and What Is Said. I try to show, like contextualists today urge us to, that the distinction between linguistic meaning and What Is Said by a literal utterance of a sentence in a context should not be blurred. The notion of What Is Said, of central importance for contextualism, can be construed as a semantic or a pragmatic notion according to the role played by the notion of speaker meaning in one’s favorite theory. Then I present an overview of three historical approaches in the history of the sciences of language, focusing on the language-thought relation and showing how these notions combine differently. The first is the ideational theory of language, defended by Arnauld and Locke. The sec-ond is the classical philosophical semantics developed in the first half of XXth century. The third is today’s contextualism, developed mainly by Travis and Recanati. Here is what the comparison reveals: the “way of ideas” and contextualism agree that the notion of What Is Said should be construed as a pragmatic notion, in opposition to classical philosophical semantics cum the Gricean apparatus. (shrink)

After the seminal works of Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1982), the next important contribution to externalism is certainly Davidson’s (mainly 1987, 1988, 1989, 2001). By criticizing the positions of these philosophers, Davidson elaborated his own brand of externalism. We shall first present some features of Davidson’s externalism (the importance of historical-causal connections for the foundation of language and thought, for the explanation of how language can be learned, and how attitudes can be identified by the interpreter, and finally (...) how mental content is determined by appealing to the idea of triangulation), to prepare the discussion of a few problems. We then discuss two questions in Davidson’s externalism. First, how to reconcile the fact that external factors determine mental content, as Putnam, Burge and Davidson himself argued convincingly, with token-physicalism, the thesis that mental events are identical with physical events occurring “in the head” (or the thesis that mental events supervenes locally on brain activities)? The second main problem is how to reconcile the first person authority with some prima facie consequences of externalism, mainly that we should know the relevant parts of our (natural and social) environment in order to know the content of our own thoughts? We argue that Davidson’s answer to the first question is not successful, while his answer to the second was a breakthrough. (shrink)

After the seminal works of Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1982), the next important contribution to externalism is certainly Davidson’s (mainly 1987, 1988, 1989, 2001). By criticizing the posi-tions of these philosophers, Davidson elaborated his own brand of exter-nalism. We shall first present some features of Davidson’s externalism (the importance of historical-causal connections for the foundation of language and thought, for the explanation of how language can be learned, and how attitudes can be identified by the interpreter, and fi-nally (...) how mental content is determined by appealing to the idea of trian-gulation), to prepare the discussion of a few problems. We then discuss two questions in Davidson’s externalism. First, how to reconcile the fact that external factors determine mental content, as Putnam, Burge and Davidson himself argued convincingly, with token-physicalism, the thesis that mental events are identical with physical events occurring “in the head” (or the thesis that mental events supervenes locally on brain ac-tivities)? The second main problem is how to reconcile the first person authority with some prima facie consequences of externalism, mainly that we should know the relevant parts of our (natural and social) envi-ronment in order to know the content of our own thoughts? We argue that Davidson’s answer to the first question is not successful, while his answer to the second was a breakthrough. (shrink)

There is a long tradition in Western philosophical theology of conceiving God as ‘a being’. It dates back to the Hellenistic period, more particularly to the conjunction of Greek philosophy and the Hebrew religion in Alexandria with Philo, and it became orthodox in the Christian tradition through Augustine. In our time most aspects of this religious tradition have been subjected to a salutary re-examination, but in this the concept of God as ‘a being’ has been relatively neglected. After such a (...) long acceptance of so fundamental a doctrine, it is liable largely to have sunk to the status of a presupposition, entailing a loss of intellectual awareness of what precisely it implies. Even where the Augustinian philosophical argument upon which this concept is based is recognized, as it has been in the long Neoplatonic tradition, it has come to appear as essentially self-evident and thus has not been subjected to fundamental critical examination. Significant of this is that even where the personalistic conception of God has been abandoned, e.g. by the idealist philosophy of the Absolute, the conception nevertheless persists of God as ‘a being’. (shrink)

L’article examine les conceptions de Foucault concernant l’histoire de la vérité, ainsi que les rapports entre la volonté de savoir, la volonté de vérité et les formes du pouvoir. Il rappelle comment les notions nietzschéennes de volonté de vérité et de volonté de puissance font place dans son œuvre à la volonté de savoir comme instrument des rapports de domination. On examine ensuite comment la notion d’autorité, entendue à la fois au sens institutionnel et au sens discursif, peut permettre une (...) sociologisation des approches traditionnelles de la vérité, élaborées par les philosophes. Comment la visée de vérité du discours s’est-elle combinée historiquement avec la volonté de savoir des institutions ? Y a-t-il différents régimes de vérité, liés à des modalités de discours différentes, mais aussi à des formes d’autorité institutionnelle ? Est-il possible de construire une généalogie des figures de l’autorité discursive ?The paper examines Foucaultian views about the history of truth, as well as the relationships between the will to truth and the different forms of power. It reminds how Nietzsche’s conceptions about the will to truth and the will to power are replaced in Foucault’s work by the will to truth as a means of power relationships. The paper looks furthermore at the possibility of using the notion of authority, understood both in the institutional and in the discursive sense, as a tool for a sociologization of traditional approaches to truth, constructed by philosophers. How did the pursuit of truth historically combine with the will to knowledge belonging to the institutions ? Are there different regimes of truth, tied to different discursive modalities, as well as to institutional forms of authority ? Is it possible to construct a genealogy of figures of discursiveauthority ? (shrink)

L’interprétation dite “computationelle” de la pensée logico-linguistique de Hobbes est aujourd’hui courante. Ele attribue à Hobbes l’idée que penser ou raisonner, c’est essentiellement manipuler des symboles apartenant à une langue publique, c’est calculer sur des noms comme on calcule normalement sur des chiffres ou des lignes . Ce que nous aurions immédiatement dans l’esprit, ce sont des mots, les noms des choses, et non des représentations mentales de ces choses qui leur seraient associées par convention. Cette interprétation soulève bien des (...) problèmes qui ont été discutés dès le XVIIe siècle. Je voudrais montrer qu’il y a, sous la manipulation ou calcul des noms, une ratiocinatio interna sine verbis, un calcul sur des phantasmata qui mérite déjà certainement le titre de pensée. (shrink)

Prologue Ce projet de numéro thématique intitulé « Approches temporelles du développement durable » a été lancé fin 2017. L’appel à articles questionnait notamment le rôle des actions politiques dans les transitions, la perception des temporalités et le changement de comportements. Depuis le lancement de ce numéro, de nombreux événements ont eu lieu, illustrant la complexité et l’imprévisibilité des dynamiques sociales en lien avec le développement durable. En France, la démission de Nicolas...

My aim is to provide an analysis of cognitive experience from the point of view of philosophy of mind, by identifying and describing different components or features present in it. But different things are called ‘experience’ and some are more complex than other. I will first examine different uses of the word ‘experience’ to clear the way and to avoid cases of circularity. Then I try to restrict the investigation and introduce the mode and content of experience, and take BonJour’s (...) suggestion of what cognitive experience is as a starting point. In my view, the two main features of experience are Horizontal Intentionality and Vertical Intentionality. The first is the most striking and fundamental; it constitutes the continuity of experience. Vertical Intentionality selects objects of experience, so that our experience is always experience of something. In Perception, something is identified and recognized by the application of concepts. Attention is required, especially when we get involved in complicated operations or manipulations. Finally, the last feature is constituted by a huge set of dispositions, particularly abilities to keep track our thoughts and former experiences. Cognitive Experience in the full sense is the result of the interaction and mutual support of these features. (shrink)