Amongst philosophers and cognitive scientists, modularity remains a popular choice for an architecture of the human mind, primarily because of the supposed explanatory value of this approach. Modular architectures can vary both with respect to the strength of the notion of modularity and the scope of the modularity of mind. We propose a dilemma for modular architectures, no matter how these architectures vary along these two dimensions. First, if a modular architecture commits to the informational encapsulation of modules, as it (...) is the case for modularity theories of perception, then modules are on this account impenetrable. However, we argue that there are genuine cases of the cognitive penetrability of perception and that these cases challenge any strong, encapsulated modular architecture of perception. Second, many recent massive modularity theories weaken the strength of the notion of module, while broadening the scope of modularity. These theories do not require any robust informational encapsulation, and thus avoid the incompatibility with cognitive penetrability. However, the weakened commitment to informational encapsulation greatly weakens the explanatory force of the theory and, ultimately, is conceptually at odds with the core of modularity. (shrink)

Much of cognitive science is committed to the modular approach to the study of cognition. The core of this approach consists of a pair of assumptions - the anatomical and the functional modularity assumptions - which motivate two kinds of inference: the anatomical and the functional modularity inferences. The legitimacy of both of these inferences has been strongly challenged, a situation that has had surprisingly little impact on most theorizing in the field. Following the introduction of an important, yet rarely (...) made, distinction between two functional concepts - the distinction between cognitive working and cognitive role - this paper analyses these kinds of inference, and refocuses the attention on new aspects of their main limitations. It is argued that both the anatomical and functional modularity inferences can, and do, operate in three distinct modes in contemporary cognitive science, and that seeing this is essential to understanding both the power and the limitations of these methodological tools. (shrink)

In cognitive science, the concept of dissociation has been central to the functional individuation and decomposition of cognitive systems. Setting aside debates about the legitimacy of inferring the existence of dissociable systems from ‘behavioural’ dissociation data, the main idea behind the dissociation approach is that two cognitive systems are dissociable, and thus viewed as distinct, if each can be damaged, or impaired, without affecting the other system’s functions. In this article, I propose a notion of functional independence that does not (...) require dissociability, and describe an approach to the functional decomposition and modelling of cognitive systems that complements the dissociation approach. I show that highly integrated cognitive and neurocognitive systems can be decomposed into non-dissociable but functionally independent components, and argue that this approach can provide a general account of cognitive specialization in terms of a stable structure–function relationship. 1 Introduction2 Functional Independence without Dissociability3 FI Systems and Cognitive Architecture4 FI Systems and Cognitive Specialization. (shrink)

Everybody assumes (1) that musical performances are sonic events and (2) that their expressive properties are sonic properties. This paper discusses recent findings in the psychology of music perception that show that visual information combines with auditory information in the perception of musical expression. The findings show at the very least that arguments are needed for (1) and (2). If music expresses what we think it does, then its expressive properties may be visual as well as sonic; and if its (...) expressive properties are purely sonic, then music expresses less than we think it does. And if the expressive properties of music are visual as well as sonic, then music is not what we think it is—it is not purely sonic. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is twofold. First, I provide an analysis of the notion of cognitive homology. In contrast with the well-known concept of structural homology in biology—defined as the same structure in different animals regardless of form and function—the notion of cognitive homology captures the idea that the basic cognitive contribution of a given homologous brain structure tends to remain stable over long evolutionary time scales. Second, I argue that this notion provides a powerful conceptual tool for the (...) study of cognition. Since a cognitive homology will often consist of an evolutionarily conserved relationship between a homologous brain structure and its basic cognitive contribution, such structure–function mappings can be conceived as basic building blocks of human cognition. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In recent years, the medical establishment has been speaking in favor of women's autonomy in childbirth by advocating cesarean delivery on maternal request (CDMR). This paper offers to look at the ethical dimension of CDMR through a feminist critique of the medicalization of childbirth and its influence on present‐day medical ethics. I claim that the medicalization of childbirth reflects a sexist bias with regard to conceptions of the body and needs to be used with caution when applied to women's (...) reproductive health. I then use this perspective to critically analyze the position of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) on the ethics of decision‐making in patient‐choice surgery. I claim that informed consent cannot be meaningfully exercised unless women are made aware of the sexist underpinnings of the medical model of childbirth and its influence on the ethical reasoning of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. I also express concern about the effects of normalizing patient‐choice cesarean sections on the choices available to pregnant women using as examples the institutional rules on mandatory cesarean sections for women with a previous cesarean delivery or breech presentation. I conclude with a call for more research into the real cost of convenience in CDMR, particularly as our increasingly strained publicly funded healthcare system would greatly benefit from the de‐medicalization of normal body functions rather than an increased dependence on costly surgical technology. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss the modularity of the emotions. In a general methodological section, we discuss the empirical basis for the postulation of modularity. Then we discuss how certain modules -- the emotions in particular -- decompose into distinct anatomical and functional parts.

Neural reuse theories suggest that, in the course of evolution, a brain structure may acquire or lose a number of cognitive uses while maintaining its cognitive workings (or low-level operations) fixed. This, in turn, suggests that homologous structures may have very different cognitive uses, while sharing the same workings. And this, essentially, is homology thinking applied to brain function.

Endogenous depression is highly correlated with low levels of serotonin in the central nervous system. Does this imply or suggest that this sort of depression just is this neurochemical deficit? Scorning such an inference, Antonio Damasio writes:If feeling happy or sad … corresponds in part to the cognitive modes under which your thoughts are operating, then the explanation also requires that the chemical acts on the circuits which generate and manipulate [such thoughts]. Which means that reducing depression to a statement (...) about the availability of serotonin or norepinephrine in general- a popular statement in the days and age of Prozac- is unacceptably rude.Damasio's thought is that depression is essentially a modification of how we perceive the world, reason about it, and make decisions about how to act in it - in other words, that it is essentially cognitive. A reduced level of serotonin might cause the said modification, but no adequate account of depression would identify the malady with its cause. A proper account would minimally need to say how cognitive processing is affected by a reduced level of serotonin. (shrink)

Some hold that W.K. Clifford's arguments are inconsistent, appealing to the disvalue of likely consequences of nonevidential belief-formation, while also insisting that the consequences are irrelevant to the wrongness of so believing. My thesis is that Clifford's arguments are consistent; one simply needs to be clear on the role consequences play in the "Ethics of Belief" (and, for that matter, in William James's "The Will to Believe"). The consequences of particular episodes of nonevidential belief-formation are, as Clifford insists, irrelevant to (...) the epistemic, and so moral, status of believing. The moral matter is that adopting a policy of nonevidential belief-formation constitutes commitment to antithetical principles, viz. (i) our antecedent moral obligation to minimize the risk of harming ourselves and others and (ii) the flagrant disregard for (i) entailed by employing a policy of risk, i.e. nonevidentialism. Clifford's arguments should be read as demonstrating that a nonevidentialist approach to belief-management constitutes the kind of risk that, in fact, is at odds with this antecedent moral obligation - hence the discussion of likely consequences, despite his claims that they are irrelevant to the moral status of the beliefs yielding them. They are irrelevant to the moral status of nonevidentialism but not irrelevant to the fact of risk. The moral impermissibility of nonevidentialism inheres in the inconsistency of it and our antecedent moral obligations, not in the value or disvalue of the particular consequences of that belief-management style. (shrink)

Emanuele Avallone, Patrice Bergeron, Dominique Laperle, Michael Quisinsky, Philippe Roy-Lysencourt et Karim Schelkens.

Mary Briody Mahowald, Bioethics and women across the life span, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, reviewed by Véronique Bergeron.

While C. I. Lewis’s most celebrated logical innovation is by no means neglected, strict implication features in Rosenthal’s discussion in a fashion parallel, one comes to understand, to its role in his broader philosophical efforts, viz., as one component of a much more ambitious philosophical enterprise. Were one pressed to apply a label to Lewis’s broader project, “epistemological” is perhaps the most fitting term, with his accomplishments in logic paving the way to this broader effort. As with Lewis, Rosenthal sets (...) for herself an ambitious project. She offers a meticulous explication of Lewis’s philosophical development, ranging from his logical investigations to his treatment of a priori knowledge, and, eventually, to a pragmatic understanding of moral imperatives. But always in her sights is the promise of a bridge between traditions, one might say, in which Lewis’s work is relevant both to analysts and to continentalists . Similarly, but more narrowly, Rosenthal’s Lewis manages to plaster over many of the cracks in the work of other classical pragmatists. For example, in response to James’s apparent commitment to the notion of degrees of truth whereby new systems of thought are judged. (shrink)

Près d'une trentaine d'articles sur les idées politiques de Gérard Bergeron et sur la politique en général.

Louis-Marie Chauvet a élaboré sa théorie du symbolique durant les années structuralistes. Après avoir montré comment la manière dont le théologien des sacrements théorise prête flanc à des critiques pouvant venir de toutes parts, l’article se penche sur l’hypothèse d’un resserrement théorique autour de l’anthropologie culturelle et sociale et du concept d’échange symbolique, afin de prolonger la théologie de l’alliance et de la grâce qu’il développe à partir de la ritualité chrétienne. L’itinéraire de Chauvet témoigne aussi à sa façon des (...) défis que rencontre tout théologien tentant de dialoguer avec les sciences humaines et sociales ; il se retrouve rapidement à la croisée de chemins qui, bien qu’ils se croisent, ne conduisent pas tous au même endroit. (shrink)

Patrice Bergeron,Fabrice Blée,Marc Dumas,Raymond Lemieux,Jean Richard,Gérard Siegwalt.

Le thème le plus fréquemment modulé par la philosophie actuelle, celui de l'intentionnalité de la conscience, s'inscrit à vrai dire dans le courant le plus constant de la philosophia perennis. Il s'agit du souci de rechercher le statut de l'esprit aux prises avec les objets qui ne sont tels que par rapport à sa présence. Un représentant accrédité de la philosophie contemporaine écrit que « le problème de l'existence du monde extérieur ne présente à la rigueur aucun sens quelconque ». (...) En effet, le monde extérieur est affirmé par la conscience immédiate et la tâche dévolue a la conscience réfléchissante, c'est de revenir sur ces données pour les thématiser et établir les rapports essentiels qui les constituent dans l'existence. Une conscience pure qui existerait avant tout contact avec ce qui n'est pas elle semble bien un rêve à jamais évanoui. Avant la mise entre parenthèses prônée par Husserl, la philosophie cartésienne nous assurait que « tout état de conscience en général est en lui-même conscience de quelque chose, quoi qu'il en soit de l'existence réelle de cet objet et quelque abstention que je fasse de la position de cette existence ». Les termes d'intentionnalité et de visée intentionnelle caractérisent cette particularité de la conscience d'être toujours au moins conscience de quelque chose. (shrink)

Résumé : Ce travail cherche à proposer une redéfinition conceptuelle de la justice ou du penser et de l’agir justes pour surmonter ce que nous concevons être l’illusion et la contradiction qu’implique notre rapport au monde naturel. Sur la base d’un fondement naturaliste et biologique, la définition générale proposée cherche tant à encapsuler qu’à dépasser des conceptions plus classiques pour reconcevoir le juste comme un rapport symbiotique découlant de notre constitution et de notre dépendance en tant qu’espèce. -/- Abstract: This (...) paper tries to propose a conceptual redefinition of justice or of just thought and action to surmount what we conceive to be the illusion and the contradiction implied in our relationship with the natural world. On the basis of a naturalist and biological foundation, the general definition proposed has for objective to encapsulate and to transcend more classical conceptions in order to re-conceive the just as a symbiotic relation resulting from our constitution and dependency as a species. (shrink)

Reflecting upon the lies that are tied to rebukes is a fundamental step in the analysis of interactions between health-care professionals and their clients. Our research focuses on questions that incite people to lie, namely, those for which a lying response avoids a rebuke or a judgment based on some type of behaviour. Our objectives are: 1) to characterize the `question/response' exchange that is interpreted as a `potential rebuke/ lie' exchange, and the questions that may induce lying; 2) to identify (...) the strategies that health-care professionals implement in order to obtain the information they seek when questioning their clients; and 3) to identify themes that refer to behavioural norms that clients might be inclined to lie about. The results are based on the assumption that there are ties between behaviour and speech acts, in this case between the transgression of behavioural norms and lying. (shrink)

Avec l’entrée en vigueur de l’Énoncé de politique des trois conseils, la surveillance éthique continue fait maintenant partie intégrante du processus d’évaluation éthique sur la scène universitaire canadienne. Pourtant, malgré l’acceptation de ce concept, les chercheurs et les institutions se questionnent sur sa portée et sa mise en application. Dans cette perspective, cet article porte un regard sur les racines et les variantes du concept, les efforts de rationalisation dont il a fait l’objet en contexte américain d’où il a émergé (...) et sur le contexte de son entrée sur la scène canadienne. (shrink)

With their landmark architectures, exhibitions and museums of science and technology partake in the spatial inscription of science in twentieth century landscapes. Unlike other beacons of progress, exhibitions and museums of science and technology double up, inside, as material arrangements of objects, visuals and texts aiming to confer meaning onto the modern world. They both embody and seek to order the spectacle of modernity while often being deployed with the aim of promoting particular visions of social and material progress. An (...) approach sensitive to the material, spatial, and experiential dimensions of displaying science and technology suggests that exhibitions and museums were in the twentieth century crucial sites for reflecting upon and promoting particular futures. (shrink)

Some studies report that the sport context increases the risk of exposure to sexual violence for athletes. In contrast, others indicate a protective effect of sport participation against sexual violence, particularly among varsity athletes. Studies of sexual violence towards varsity athletes are limited by their failure to include control groups and various known risk factors such as age, graduate level, gender and sexual identity, disability status, international and Indigenous student status, and childhood sexual abuse. The purpose of the present study (...) is to fill in these gaps to determine whether varsity athletes are at greater risk than non-athletes of sexual violence towards them or whether, on the contrary, involvement in a varsity sport is coherent with the Sport Protection Hypothesis. Data for this article come from the ESSIMU study, a broad survey of students, professors, and other employees at six francophone universities regarding sexual violence on university campuses. A total of 6,485 students with complete data on sexual violence, athlete status, and gender were included in the study. From this total, 267 participants identified themselves as varsity athletes. Data were analyzed using a series of logistic regressions on each form of violence using athlete status as a predictor and characteristics associated with sexual violence victimization or distinguishing between varsity athletes and non-athletes as confounding variables. When considering all confounding variables in the regression analyses on four yearly incidence rates of sexual violence, the results revealed that being a varsity athlete did not significantly increase the risk of exposure to sexual violence at university. All considered other variables were more significant predictors of the past year’s risk of sexual violence victimization than athlete status was. (shrink)

Peut-on prédire si un projet sera jugé socialement acceptable par ses principales parties prenantes? Dans un contexte où l’acceptabilité sociale en est venue à être considérée comme une condition à la réalisation de tout grand projet, cette question s’avère centrale pour tout développeur de projet, de même que pour les investisseurs qui les soutiennent. C’est dans cette perspective qu’a été développé l’Indice du risque social dans les projets miniers, une initiative soutenue par l’Autorité des marchés financiers à laquelle a travaillé (...) une équipe interdisciplinaire de chercheurs. Au-delà de jeter un éclairage sur la pertinence d’aller de l’avant ou non avec un projet, cet outil prédictif peut surtout permettre de moduler ledit projet, de concert avec ses parties prenantes, pour le rendre davantage acceptable à leurs yeux. Nous souhaitons ici rendre compte des possibilités offertes par cet indice en l’appliquant à deux projets miniers récemment discutés au Québec, soit le projet de mine aurifère développé par Osisko dans la municipalité de Malartic, en Abitibi-Témiscamingue, et celui de Mine Arnaud, à Sept-Îles, qui vise cette fois l’exploitation de l’apatite. Cet exercice nous permet de réaffirmer la pertinence de l’outil que constitue l’Indice, mais également de relever les limites qui lui sont inhérentes. (shrink)