Deliberation and the First-Person Perspective

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):35-57 (2016)
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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