Existence Hedges and Neutral Free Logic

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):379-386 (2016)
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Abstract

I argue that neutral free logic and existence hedging are incompatible. Primarily, I respond to proposals by James Pryor intended to reconcile the two. Consideration of those proposals will reveal that on any neutral free logic either some existence hedges will entail some undesired existence claims, or they will not entail some desired existence claims.

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Daniel Yeakel
Wayne State University

Citations of this work

Free logic.John Nolt - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Confusion in the Bishop’s Church.Jan Heylen - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1993-2003.
Skepticism and Content Externalism.Michael McKinsey - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Existence hedges, neutral free logic and truth.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

More free logic.Scott Lehmann - 2002 - In Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. 5. New York: Springer. pp. 197-259.
Strict Fregean free logic.Scott Lehmann - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (3):307--336.
Hyper-reliability and apriority.James Pryor - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344.

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