Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge

Abstract

What explanation is there of the source of my justification for my beliefs about my beliefs that respects the fact that I am normally the best authority on them? Moore's paradox demands an explanation of the absurdity of believing or asserting possible truths of the forms p but I don't believe that p or p but I believe that not-p. I argue for Evans principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. This helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs and also shows that it is impossible for a Moorean belief to be justified. I then explain the absurdity of Moorean assertion while avoiding the messy notion of 'expressing belief' yet acknowledging Shoemaker’s constraint that if I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert that p.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Self‐Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
Comments on Moore's paradox and self-knowledge.Rogers Albritton - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239.
Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.
Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Shoemaker, self-blindness and Moore's paradox.Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
Racionalidade epistêmica e o Paradoxo de Moore.Cláudio de Almeida - 2009 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2):48-73.
Moore's Paradox - One or Two?John N. Williams - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):141-142.
Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox.Bernard W. Kobes - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-07-02

Downloads
20 (#773,222)

6 months
1 (#1,478,856)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Moore's problem with iterated belief.Roy Sorensen - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):28-43.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references