Wissensaussage und die Unmöglichkeit ihrer Objektivierung

Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1):101-120 (1975)
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Abstract

Knowledge is expressed in sentences about states of affairs of the type 'p' not in knowledge-sentences of the type 'W(p)'. Knowledge-sentences are results of a reflexion about a subject of knowledge and a knowledge-system. Objectivization of a knowledgesentence 'W(p)' is defined as the entailment of 'p' from the premis 'W(p)' based on the generally accepted sentence 'W(p)->p'. The author distinguishes three kinds of knowledge-sentences: a) self-reflective knowledge-sentences which are a result of the subject's S reflexion about his own knowledge 'WS*(p)';b) comparative knowledge-sentences which are result of a reflexion of the subject S2 about the knowledge of another subject S1 using the knowledge of S2 as a criterion for judging S1's knowledge; c) the sentence of S2 about the believing of S1, that S1 knows p. In neither of these cases an objectivization is logically justified.

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