Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights

Theory and Decision 88 (3):323-367 (2020)
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Abstract

Scoring rules constitute a particularly popular technique for aggregating a set of rankings. However, setting the weights associated with rank positions is a crucial task, as different instantiations of the weights can often lead to different winners. In this work we adopt minimax regret as a robust criterion for determining the winner in the presence of uncertainty over the weights. Focusing on two general settings we provide a characterization of the minimax regret rule in terms of cumulative ranks, allowing a quick computation of the winner. We then analyze the properties of using minimax regret as a social choice function. Finally we provide some test cases of rank aggregation using the proposed method.

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