Myth & Math, Part II

Synthese 88 (2):179-199 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is argued that there can only be a small-finite number of mathematical objects; that these objects range from the very concrete to the very abstract; and that mathematics is essentially not concerned with objects but with concepts. This viewpoint is described as "mentalist" and is upheld over Platonism, intuitionism, and formalism.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,611

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mythic Objects & Some Objects of Myth.Keith Dickson - 2009 - American Journal of Semiotics 25 (1-2):53-76.
What is Mathematics, Really?Reuben Hersh - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Øystein Linnebo - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth.Chiara Bottici - 2011 - Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 (5):31-52.
Aristotle on mathematical objects.Janine Gühler - 2015 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Øystein Linnebo - 2014 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.
Awareness of Abstract Objects.Elijah Chudnoff - 2012 - Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
Structuralism reconsidered.Fraser MacBride - 2005 - In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 563--589.
Non-uniqueness as a non-problem.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):63-84.
Fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Composite Objects and the Abstract/Concrete Distinction.Daniel A. Kaufman - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:215-238.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-21

Downloads
15 (#953,911)

6 months
3 (#984,719)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references