Abstract

A correct understanding of Hume's sentimentalism cleared away the alleged difficulties of his sentimentalism; this chapter shows how a correct understanding of Nietzsche's attacks on “morality” and altruism removes the difficulties of his egoism. The chapter investigates what it is to affirm one's own life, and what is involved in self‐sacrificing altruism. It also shows how affirming one's own life can be compatible with “working for one's fellow men”. One has seen that virtuous egoism is consistent with “overflowing” “gift‐giving” but the overflowing nature of giving is not sufficient for virtuous egoism. Full virtue requires the social feeling of the “collective‐individual.” Finally, one should recall that consequentialism for Nietzsche is the most shallow and “immature” of all the major types of moral theory, simply because it assesses states and actions solely in terms of their consequences, rather than in terms of the depth psychological states of individuals.