Normative naturalism and Popperian views on reduction

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):325 – 326 (2000)
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Abstract

Eric Scerri has argued that chemists using ab initio calculations pursue a partial reduction of chemistry to physics, while accepting that full reduction (through axiomatization) is impractical. He characterizes this view as Popperian and naturalistic. However, Popper's position on reduction is not naturalistic, as he rejected axiomatization for different reasons.

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