The Myth of the Framework: In Defense of Science and Rationality

In Mark Amadeus Notturno (ed.), The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality. London: Routledge. pp. 33-64 (1994)
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Q175.P8633 1994

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0415113202   9780415135559   0415135559   9780203535806
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