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Weak and strong theories of truth
Studia Logica 68 (1):89-101 (2001)
Abstract
A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Theories of Truth without Standard Models and Yablo’s Sequences.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2010 - Studia Logica 96 (3):375-391.
An ordinal analysis for theories of self-referential truth.Graham Emil Leigh & Michael Rathjen - 2010 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 49 (2):213-247.
Omega-inconsistency without cuts and nonstandard models.Andreas Fjellstad - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (5).
Axioms for Type-Free Subjective Probability.Cezary Cieśliński, Leon Horsten & Hannes Leitgeb - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-16.
References found in this work
An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 33 (1):1--21.
How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.
A theory of formal truth arithmetically equivalent to ID.Andrea Cantini - 1990 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (1):244 - 259.
A System Of Complete And Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (3):311-327.
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