Abstract

This dissertation addresses several closely related issues in the philosophy of language. Using the work of Donald Davidson as a springboard, I examine the logical form of indirect discourse, the concept of literal linguistic meaning, and the nature of linguistic competence. I offer a defense of the Davidsonian program of truth-theoretic semantics, and in Chapter One attempt to develop a plausible account of oratio obliqua consistent with the general requirements of that program. Chapter Two involves a sustained critique of the intention-based, individualist theory of literal meaning advanced by Davidson in his recent work. I argue that this account cannot accommodate the need for structure and regularity in language. The role of convention in linguistic communication is explored, and its explanatory value is defended. Finally, I consider the relevance of communal norms of word use to ascriptions of meaning, and the extent to which a formal truth-theory like Davidson's can accommodate the effect of context on the content of sayings. Chapter Three concerns the nature of linguistic competence, and the role of a structured truth-theory in the description of such competence. A non-inferential account of everyday linguistic understanding developed and defended against potential objections