Objectivity and the Evidence for a Davidsonian Theory of Meaning
Dissertation, University of Kansas (
1988)
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Abstract
This thesis seeks to develop the account of natural language semantics found in the work of Donald Davidson. Special attention is given to the empirical character of theories of meaning, and Quine's theses of translational and referential indeterminacy are examined for their bearing on this. It is argued that a strict form of Davidson's principle of charity plays the essential role in making these theories empirical. The formal modifications Davidson makes to Tarski in the course of structuring theories of meaning after Tarskian theories of truth are identified and a modified version of Convention T is provided. On the basis of the account of interpretation thus developed, the case is made that Davidson's argument against global skepticism is inadequate unless supplemented with his argument against incommensurable conceptual schemes. This latter argument is defended as being an argument for a notion of objectivity which rules out any interesting sort of correspondence theory of truth