Über die Möglichkeit einer wertungsunabhängigen Unterscheidung zwischen Gefahr, Risiko und Restrisiko

Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 95 (2):216-240 (2009)
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Abstract

How can we distinguish between danger, risk and residual risk? The classic answer hereto is based on the epistemological model of induction: induction is the principle that leads courts to make the decisions they do. In the terms of this concept, risks are interpreted as probabilities. This approach has law application depend on the judge’s individual decisions in a specific case. It is, however, possible to find a different set of criteria in order to differentiate between danger, risk and residual risk: A deductive approach combined with the „assessment of theories“ in comparative terms enables us to apply law without having to resort to individual decisions or value judgements. In this context, Karl Popper’s „theory of corroboration“ offers a new perspective on legal reasoning under conditions of uncertainty.

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